State ex rel. Dobson v. HandworkState ex rel. Dobson v. Handwork
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- O’Connor, Kennedy, French, Fischer, Dewine, Donnelly, Stewart (per curiam)
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Relator, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney Paul A. Dobson, seeks a writ of prohibition against respondent, Judge Peter M. Handwork, who presided in State v. Schuman, Wood C.P. case Nos. 2017-CR-0501, 2018-CR-0063, and 2018-
{¶ 2} After entry of the judgment of sentence and the filing of Schuman’s appeal from it, Judge Handwork considered two motions filed by Schuman and issued two orders modifying the judgment of sentence. Dobson seeks a writ of prohibition to vacate the two postjudgment ordеrs and to prohibit any further exercise of jurisdiction by Judge Handwork except in aid of the appeal and asks us to order that the costs of this action be paid by Judge Handwork. Because Judge Handwork did not file аn answer, Dobson has also filed a motion for default judgment. No response to the motion has been filed.
{¶ 3} Based on our review of the amended complaint and the exhibits attached to it, we grant the motion fоr default judgment, and pursuant to
I. Facts
{¶ 4} The criminal cases against Schuman, who is an attorney, involved three consolidated indictments. On May 29, 2019, after a bench trial, Judge Handwork issued a judgment entry finding Schuman guilty of seven felony offenses. In case No. 2018-CR-0063, the judge found Schuman guilty of five counts of tampering with records, all third-degree felonies; one count of perjury, a third-degree felony; and one count of theft, a fifth-degree felony.1 The judge aсquitted Schuman of the counts alleged in the other two indictments.
{¶ 5} At the sentencing hearing, the judge discussed Schuman’s community-control conditions, including the requirement that Schuman avoid contact with “other individuals on probation, parole, community control, or any
{¶ 6} On August 5, 2019, Judge Handwork issued a judgment of sentence imposing the three-year community-control sentenсe, which included a 45-day jail term and the above-quoted no-contact condition. The no-contact condition set forth in the judgment of sentence did not include the practice-of-law exception that Schuman’s counsel had requested at the sentencing hearing.
{¶ 7} Schuman appealed the judgment of sentence to the court of appeals on August 7, 2019. That same day, Schuman filed a “motion to modify judgment of conviction,” which asked the trial court to add a practice-of-law exception to the no-contact condition of community control.
{¶ 8} Dobson filed a response opposing the motion, arguing mainly that a trial court lacks authority to reconsider a final judgment in a criminal case and that by taking an appeal, Schuman had divested the trial court of “subject matter jurisdiction to do anything that might interfere with the appellate court’s ability to affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment/order that is currently on appeal.”
{¶ 9} Despite Dobson’s objections, the trial court granted the motion on August 19, 2019. On August 23, Schuman moved for a reduсtion of his jail sentence from 45 to 21 days. On August 28, Judge Handwork issued an order reducing Schuman’s jail sentence from 45 to 30 days.
II. The Default-Judgment Standard
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} In accordance with
{¶ 13} We hold that the complaint sufficiently states and proves a claim for relief.
III. The Judge Patently and Unambiguously Lacked Jurisdiction to Issue His Postjudgment Orders
{¶ 14} To demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, Dobson must show (1) that Judge Handwork has exercised judicial рower, (2) that his exercise of judicial power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law.
{¶ 15} Here, Judge Handwork clearly exercised judicial power. As discussed, the complaint refers to and has attachеd to it two orders that Judge Handwork issued after the judgment of sentence had been filed.
{¶ 16} Two principles show that Judge Handwork was not authorized by law to issue the two postjudgment orders. First, this court has stated that “ ‘trial courts lack authority to reconsider their own valid final judgments in criminal cases.’ ” State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. White v. Junkin, 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 338, 686 N.E.2d 267 (1997). It follows that because a trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion for reconsideration of a final criminal judgment, any ruling on such а motion is a nullity. See State v. Dix, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101007, 2014-Ohio-3330, ¶ 3; State v. Ford, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26466, 2012-Ohio-5050, ¶ 8-10; State v. Wilson, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 05AP-939, 05AP-940, and 05AP-941, 2006-Ohio-2750, ¶ 9.
{¶ 17} Second, “[o]nce a case has been appealed, the trial court loses jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal.” In re S.J., 106 Ohio St.3d 11, 2005-Ohio-3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 9. Here, both postjudgment orders were issued after Schuman had filed his notice of appeal. Schuman’s filing of his notice of appeal on August 7, 2019, divested Judge Handwork of jurisdiction to rule on Schuman’s postjudgment motions—with the result being that Judgе Handwork’s entries granting those motions are null and void. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103406, 2016-Ohio-8326, ¶ 8 (trial-court action taken after state prosecuted appeal in a criminal case was invalid); State v. Dunning, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2013-05-048 and CA2013-06-058, 2014-Ohio-253, ¶ 8 (trial court
{¶ 18} Although Judge Handwork did say at the sentencing hearing that he would take Schuman’s request for a modification of the no-contact order under advisement, this circumstance does not change the jurisdictional analysis. “A motion not expressly decided by the trial court when the case is concluded is ordinarily presumed to have been overruled.” Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Smith v. Wolaver, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2017 CA 0014, 2017-Ohio-8190, ¶ 17 (applying the principle in the context of an apрeal from a sentencing order). Thus, although the judge left the motion unresolved at the sentencing hearing, he did not do so in the judgment of sentence. Instead, by not including in the judgment of sentence any language regarding a practice-of-law exception to the no-contact condition of community control, he implicitly overruled the motion. The judgment of sentence therefore terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction tо consider that issue; as a result, at the time that Schuman moved for a modification of the judgment of sentence, “the motion
{¶ 19} The jurisdictional bar is as strong against the modified no-contact condition as it is against any issue expressly addressed in the judgment of sentence, and Judge Handwork had no jurisdiction to reconsider the no-contact condition during the pendency of the appeal. Moreover, the absencе of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous; as a result, no inquiry is needed into the existence of an adequate remedy at law. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 156 Ohio St.3d 458, 2019-Ohio-1676, 129 N.E.3d 393, at ¶ 26.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, we grant Dobson’s motion for default judgment and issue a peremptory writ of prohibition vacating Judge Handwork’s August 19, 2019 and August 28, 2019 orders modifying Schuman’s sentence. We also order Judge Handwork to refrain from any further exercise of jurisdiction in case No. 2018-CR-0063 apart from taking action in aid of the appeal or to execute a mandate from the court of appeals. Costs are taxed to Judge Handwork pursuant to
Writ granted.
O’Connor, C.J., and Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, Donnelly, and Stewart, JJ., concur.