THE STATE EX REL. BONNLANDER, APPELLANT, v. HAMON ET AL.; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE.
No. 2015-1697
Supreme Court of Ohio
May 30, 2017
2017-Ohio-4003
{1 10} Therefore, I dissent.
D. Michael Haddox, Muskingum County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerald V. Anderson II, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Barnhart Law Office, L.L.C., and Robert B. Barnhart, for appellant.
[2017-Ohio-4003.]
(Submitted April 4, 2017—Decided May 30, 2017.)
Per Curiam.
{1 1} Appellant, Timothy Bonnlander, has appealed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying his requеst for a writ of mandamus that would compel appellee, Industrial Commission, to award him compensation for permanent total disability resulting from his workplace injury. For thе reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
{1 3} Bonnlander returned to work after the accident in various positions in the construction industry. He also worked for nine years for the postal service, in maintenance and as a mail carrier. Hе last worked in December 2008.
{1 4} On February 28, 2014, Bonnlander applied for permanent-total-disability benefits, submitting a report from his treating psychologist in support of his application. John J. Brannan, M.D., and Debjani Sinha, Ph.D., examined Bonnlander on behalf of the commission. Dr. Brannan concluded that Bonnlander‘s medical conditions would not prevent him from performing sedentary work. Dr. Sinha evaluated Bonnlander‘s psychological condition and concluded that he was capable of working “part-time, up to 4 hours a day,” with thе following limitations: “accommodate for variable concentration; routine jobs are more appropriate; minimal new learning on an ongoing basis; multiplе breaks.”
{1 5} Following a hearing, a staff hearing officer relied on the reports of Drs. Brannan and Sinha and concluded that Bonnlander “could engage [in] sedentary emplоyment activity which involves part-time work, up to four hours a day and also involves routine employment and minimal new learning on an ongoing basis. The sedentary work should also аvoid overhead use of the right arm and avoid excessive lifting, bending and twisting.”
{1 6} The hearing officer also analyzed Bonnlander‘s nonmedical disability factors and concluded, “[b]аsed upon [Bonnlander‘s] age, education and work experience as well as the restrictions noted by Dr. Brannan and Dr. Sinha,” that Bonnlander was not permanently and totаlly disabled.
{1 7} Bonnlander filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order that was not supported by any evidence in the recоrd.
{1 8} A magistrate concluded that Dr. Sinha‘s report supported the commission‘s decision. The magistrate determined that the commission “adopted all of the ‘restrictions’ nоted” in the reports of Drs. Brannan and Sinha and that Dr. Sinha‘s opinion that Bonnlander can work “up to 4 hours a day” met the standard for part-time work set forth in State ex rel. Sheller-Chiles v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-245, 2014-Ohio-313, 2014 WL 352083, ¶ 5.
{1 9} In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals adopted the magistrate‘s decision and denied the writ. According to the dissenting judge, Dr. Sinha‘s opinion did not meet the Sheller-Chiles standard.
{1 10} Bonnlander filed an appeal as of right.
{1 12} Bonnlander argues that Dr. Sinha‘s report does not support the commission‘s order because given his need to take multiple breaks, the report does not establish that Bonnlander is capable of working four hours a day. See State ex rel. DeSalvo v. May Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-986 (June 29, 1999), aff‘d without opinion, 88 Ohio St.3d 231, 724 N.E.2d 1147 (2000). Bonnlander maintains that his need fоr multiple breaks so limits his ability to function that he cannot work four hours a day and must be considered permanently and totally disabled.
{1 13} The commission contends that four hours of work a day is not a threshold requirement for part-time sustained remunerative employment and that such a bright-line rule would interfere with the commission‘s role as finder of fact and exclusive evaluator of disability. The commission also argues that although some injured workers are so physically restricted that they are incapable of working, Bonnlаnder is not. The commission maintains that eligibility for permanent-total-disability compensation is decided on a case-by-case basis and that the record contains еvidence that Bonnlander is capable of some sustained remunerative employment.
{1 14} We agree with the commission.
{1 15} Permanent total disability is defined as “the inability to perform sustained remunerativе employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim.”
{1 16} In DeSalvo, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-986, thе court of appeals determined that the commission had not abused its discretion when it found that a claimant was capable of sustained remunerative employment based on her limited abilities to sit, stand, and walk for up to 4.5 hours a day. Since DeSalvo, the court of appeals has reiterated that four or more hours a day is the standard for determining whether part-time work constitutes sustained remunerative employment, but the court also continues to acknowledge the commission‘s discretion in each case. Sheller-Chiles, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-245, 2014-Ohio-313, 2014 WL 352083, at ¶ 5; State ex rel. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-387, 2007-Ohio-1498, 2007 WL 944155, ¶ 32; State ex rel. Cale v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1143, 2002-Ohio-2924, 2002 WL 1291359, ¶ 27; State ex rel. Elastomers v. Torok, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-116, 2002-Ohio-4770, 2002 WL 31031047, ¶ 21; State ex rel. Moyer v. Sharonville Fire Dept., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-92, 2005-Ohio-587, 2005 WL 351763, ¶ 29.
{1 17} There is no statutory or administrative authority for the court of appeals’ interpretation that four or more hours of work a day is the standard for sustained remunerative employment.
{1 18} In addition, this court has specifically rejected applying a numerical analysis in pеrmanent-total-disability cases. State ex rel. McDaniel v. Indus. Comm., 118 Ohio St.3d 319, 2008-Ohio-2227, 889 N.E.2d 93, ¶ 14-17, citing Lawson, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880. The mere number of activities performed by a claimant receiving permanent-total-disability compensation, without contеxt providing a time frame and the character of the activities, is meaningless for purposes of determining whether the claimant has the capability of performing sustаined remunerative employment. Id. at ¶ 15.
{1 19} Furthermore, we generally discourage bright-line rules in workers’ compensation matters.
[W]orkers’ compensation cases are, tо a large extent, very fact specific. As such, no one test or analysis can be said to apply to each and every factual possibility. Nor can only onе factor be considered controlling. Rather, a flexible and analytically sound approach to these cases is
preferable. Otherwise, the appliсation of hard and fast rules can lead to unsound and unfair results.
Fisher v. Mayfield, 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 280, 551 N.E.2d 1271 (1990).
{1 20} Therefore, we hold that there is no hourly standard for determining one‘s capability to perform sustained remunerative employment on a part-time basis. The commission decides whether a claimant is capable of sustained remunerative employment on a case-by-case basis. Here, Dr. Sinha opined that Bonnlander‘s psychological condition limited him to four hours of work a day with multiple breaks. It was within the commission‘s discretion to rely оn Dr. Sinha‘s report as evidence to support the conclusion that Bonnlander was capable of up to four hours of sedentary work a day.
{1 21} The court of aрpeals properly denied Bonnlander‘s request for a writ of mandamus. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O‘NEILL, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
Lisa M. Clark, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.