STATE ex rel. Kenneth BAUMRUK, Relator, v. Honorable Ronald M. BELT, Judge, Circuit Court, Macon County, Respondent.
No. 79861.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Feb. 24, 1998.
964 S.W.2d 443
COVINGTON, Judge.
John R. Lasater, Dean P. Waldemer, James J. Redmond, Asst. Pros. Attys., Clayton, for respondent.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Karen King Mitchell, Hugh L. Marshall, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for Mo. Atty. Gen. as amicus curiae.
COVINGTON, Judge.
The issue before this Court is whether
On May 5, 1992, relator attended a proceeding for the dissolution of his marriage in the St. Louis County courthouse. It is alleged that during this hearing relator shot and killed his wife. It is also alleged that relator shot and wounded his lawyer, his wife‘s lawyer, a court bailiff, and a court security officer. Police shot relator nine times, twice in the head. Doctors surgically removed part of the right frontal lobe of his brain in order to save his life.
The state charged relator with first degree murder and multiple counts of first degree
Pursuant to chapter 475, Fulton State Hospital subsequently filed a “Petition for Appointment of Guardian and Conservator and Motion for Authorization to Admit Ward to a Mental Health Facility” in the probate division of the Circuit Court of Callaway County. Relator contested the chapter 475 guardianship proceeding and requested a jury trial. The jury unanimously found that relator did not need a court-appointed guardian or conservator because the state did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that relator was disabled, partially disabled, incapacitated, or partially incapacitated.
Following the guardianship proceeding, relator moved for the trial court to dismiss the criminal charges against him. He claimed that
Relator filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. The court of appeals denied the petition. Relator then petitioned this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to dismiss the criminal charges against him and to discharge him from custody.
According to the United States Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that a criminal defendant have the right not to be tried while legally incompetent. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-73, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903-905, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that “a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to trial.” The United States Supreme Court also has addressed the difficult constitutional issues facing the courts when a defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial for the foreseeable future. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), the United States Supreme Court concluded that a person charged by a state with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. Id. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858. The Court also found that a criminal defendant could not be subject to civil commitment standards that were different than those applicable to non-defendants. Id. at 730, 92 S.Ct. at 1854. The Court held that if a defendant is not mentally fit to proceed to trial and there is no substantial probability that the defendant will attain such capacity in the foreseeable future, the trial court must either institute the “customary civil commitment proceeding ... or release the defendant.” Id.; see also Ex parte Kent, 490 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. banc 1973) (this Court suggesting procedures, in light of the Jackson decision, for the trial court to follow in dealing with incompetent defendants who do not have a substantial probability of attaining such capacity in the foreseeable future). In Jackson, the Court refused to rule on whether the Constitution required the dismissal of the criminal charges pending against the defendant. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 740, 92 S.Ct. at 1859.
The statute first states that “[w]henever any judge has reasonable cause to believe that the accused lacks mental fitness to proceed,” he or she must appoint at least one psychiatrist or psychologist to examine the defendant.
The determination of mental fitness to proceed is made at a competency hearing at which the trial court reviews the reports and testimony of the various examiners.
Six months after the accused is committed at the initial competency hearing, the court shall order a detailed examination of the accused to ascertain whether he is mentally fit to proceed and, if not, whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain the mental fitness to proceed to trial in the foreseeable future.
If it is found that the accused lacks mental fitness to proceed and there is no substantial probability that the accused will be mentally fit to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future, the court shall dismiss the charges and the accused shall be discharged, unless proper proceedings have been filed under chapter 632 or chapter 475, RSMo, in which case those sections and no others will be applicable. The probate division of the circuit court shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the accused upon the filing of a proper pleading to determine if the accused shall be involuntarily detained under chapter 632, RSMo, or to determine if the accused shall be declared incapacitated under chapter 475, RSMo, and approved for admission by the guardian under section 632.120 or 633.120, RSMo, to a mental health or retardation facility. When such proceedings are filed, the criminal charges shall be dismissed when the court makes its finding on whether the accused is mentally ill and
should be committed or whether he is incapacitated and should have a guardian appointed.1
(Emphasis added.)
Relator contends that because the trial court found him incompetent to stand trial and substantially unlikely to regain competency in the foreseeable future, and because the court has returned a finding that he is not incapacitated and that a guardian should not be appointed under chapter 475, he now has a right under
As has been noted repeatedly, this Court has a duty to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in their plain and ordinary meaning. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). This Court cannot look to rules of construction if the statute contains no ambiguity. Bosworth v. Sewell, 918 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. banc 1996). “When statutory language is clear, courts must give effect to the language as written.” M.A.B. v. Nicely, 909 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. banc 1995). The plain language of
As noted above,
In this case, the circuit court found that relator lacked the mental fitness to proceed with trial and that there was no reasonable probability that he would be fit to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Fulton State Hospital instituted a proceeding under chapter 475 to have a guardian appointed. In the guardianship proceeding, the jury found that relator was not incapacitated and, consequently, that a guardian should not be appointed. Because that verdict constitutes a finding on “whether he is incapacitated and should have a guardian appointed,” the plain language of
In an attempt to avoid the consequences mandated by the plain language of
As much as counsel might wish for the result that his construction allows, the plain language does not permit that construction. The legislature plainly stated that “the criminal charges shall be dismissed when the court makes its finding on whether the accused is mentally ill and should be committed or whether he is incapacitated and should have a guardian appointed.”
Counsel also contends that the statutory language does not support this Court‘s reading because the language does not include a statement that the charges shall be dismissed when the court makes its finding on whether or not the accused should be committed or whether or not a guardian should be appointed. Counsel argues that the omission of or not after the word whether contradicts this Court‘s interpretation of the statute. Counsel overlooks the well-established rule that when the word whether is used to introduce an issue, whether encompasses both the positive and negative resolution of the issue. In other words, use of or not is superfluous. Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 575 (Oxford University Press 1987). The legislature‘s omission of or not does not alter the meaning of
Finally, counsel argues that if this Court interprets
In summary,
Respondent is ordered to dismiss the criminal charges pending against relator, and the alternative order in mandamus is made peremptory as amended.
LIMBAUGH, ROBERTSON and WHITE, JJ., concur.
PRICE, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
BENTON, C.J., and HOLSTEIN, J., concur in opinion of PRICE, J.
PRICE, Judge, dissenting.
In finding that the plain and ordinary meaning of
The principal failing of the majority opinion is that it does not give effect to the actual words used in
[T]he court makes its findings on whether the accused is mentally ill and should be committed or whether he is incapacitated and should have a guardian appointed. (Emphasis added.)
The only express terms in the statute that require dismissal of charges are that the accused is “committed” or has “a guardian appointed“. No express language in the statute even addresses what should happen if the accused is not committed or a guardian is not appointed, let alone mandates dismissal of criminal charges.
The majority infers that charges must be dropped from words that are not included in the statute. They argue that the word “whether” encompasses both the positive and the negative resolution of the two conditions and that the words “or not” must be inserted, by interpretation, into the statute. The majority cites without quotation Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 575 (Oxford University Press 1987) for support.
Garner, however, addresses the question at hand in only the most superficial way.2 In subpart (C) of his definition of the word “whether” he merely notes that:
Whether or not. The or not is usually superfluous. E.g., “Whether or not [read whether] the special litigation committee determines that the derivative suit should have been brought remains to be seen.”
Garner does not state that the words “or not” must always be assumed; he does not provide a comprehensive explanation for all uses of “whether“; and he gives, for example, a relatively simple sentence structure that is unlike the language at issue. Specifically, Garner does not address the use of the word “whether” with two disjunctive clauses, as here:
When such proceedings are filed, the criminal charges shall be dismissed when the court makes its finding on whether the accused is mentally ill and should be committed or whether he is incapacitated and should have a guardian appointed.
The Oxford English Dictionary, however, discusses the use of the word “whether” extensively. In discussing the use of the word “whether” precisely as used in
[When i]ntroducing a disjunctive clause (usually with correlative or) having a qualifying or conditional force, and standing in adverbial relation to the main sentence ... whether.. or = [means] whichever of the alternative possibilities or suppositions be the case; in either of the cases mentioned; if on the one hand.. and likewise on the other hand.
The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. XII, V-Z (Clarendon Press 1961).
Likewise, it is instructive to refer to Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary, 2603. In its first of four definitions of the word “whether“, it states “which one of the two“. Webster‘s offers an entirely separate definition for the term “whether or no also whether or not” that is stated as “in any case“. When applied to the words actually used in the statute, this distinction is crucial. The legislature used only the word “whether” indicating a choice between the two stated conditions, not the words “whether or not” which would have indicated in any case.
An example of this distinction in the use of the word “whether” is found in the following sentence: “We will arrive in St. Louis in two hours whether going by car or whether going by train.” In this context, the use of the word “whether” with the correlative “or” means that if either of the alternatives occurs, we will arrive in St. Louis in two hours. However, the sentence does not mean that if we sit still, walk, or ride a horse, we will arrive in St. Louis in two hours, although
A further indication of the error in the majority‘s interpretation of this sentence is that it renders every word after “finding” surplusage.
When such proceedings are filed, the criminal charges shall be dismissed when the court makes its finding on whether the accused is mentally ill and should be committed or whether he is incapacitated and should have a guardian appointed. (Emphasis supplied.)
If the use of the words “finding on” in conjunction with the word “whether [or not]” means that the charges are to be dropped regardless of the findings reached, stating those findings would be unnecessary. The sentence immediately preceding the sentence at issue makes clear what proceedings and what findings are involved.
The probate division of the circuit court shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the accused upon the filing of a proper pleading to determine if the accused shall be involuntarily detained under chapter 632, RSMo, or to determine if the accused shall be declared incapacitated under chapter 475, RSMo, and approved for admission by the guardian under section 632.120 or 633.120, RSMo, to a mental health or retardation facility.
There could be no purpose in restating the subject of the findings unless it is to restrict the triggering of dismissal of the charges to the two conditions expressly stated. To render these words meaningless is contrary to our duty to harmonize all provisions of a statute so that “every word, clause, sentence and section thereof must be given some meaning.” Staley v. Missouri Director of Revenue, 623 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Mo. banc 1981).
While I believe the majority is simply wrong concerning the plain and ordinary meaning of
AMBIGUITY. Doubtfulness; doubleness of meaning. (Citations omitted.)
This is not a high standard. For the majority to refuse even to acknowledge doubt concerning the proper reading of this statute belies a simplistic approach that fails to take into account the difficulty of statutory interpretation. See James E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 Mo. L. Rev. 283 (1995), and the inherent inability of humans, let alone legislatures, to express themselves with certain clarity in language. As stated by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 37:
When the Almighty Himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, His meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the medium through which it is communicated.
One wonders what better knowledge the majority has regarding the use of a word to which the Oxford Dictionary devotes one and one-half pages and to which Webster‘s Dictionary devotes four definitions and a separate fifth definition for the term the majority wishes to insert in its place that allows them to state, “There is no ambiguity.”
A recognition of ambiguity allows consideration of traditional rules of construction. Brownstein v. Rhomberg-Haglin & Assoc., 824 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Mo. banc 1992). One “compelling rule of construction requires the court to presume that the legislature did not intend to enact an absurd law and favors a construction that avoids unjust or unreasonable results.” Abrams v. Ohio Pacific Exp., 819 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. banc 1991). The purpose of
Another crucial consideration is subsequent legislative action. The legislature has clarified, without question, its intention that individuals should not be allowed to commit horribly violent acts and then be allowed to walk free without trial or treatment to endanger the public again when it amended the sentence in question in 1997 to read:
When such proceedings are filed, the criminal charges shall be dismissed without prejudice if the court finds that the accused is mentally ill and should be committed or that he is incapacitated and should have a guardian appointed.
Had the legislature intended this statute to have produced the absurd result reached by the majority, it would have amended the statute differently.
Notes
Well, he‘s not a disabled person. Is anything more clear than that? Here is the definition of “disabled person.” It‘s in Instruction No. 6. The term “disabled person” as used in these instructions means “one who is unable by reason of any physical or mental condition to receive and evaluate information or to communicate decisions to such an extent that the person lacks ability to manage his financial resources.”
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He deserves that chance. He‘s already spent enough time in that hospital wasting away. He‘s not an incapacitated person. This is a guy who knows what he wants to do. He‘s got a set mind. He doesn‘t want people in his way.
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He‘s functioning at a level of 70, global assessment scale, minor everyday problems. That‘s what the doctor said. Oh, but he‘s in a structured environment. Well, so why don‘t we give him a chance and see what he can do outside. Is that so bad? What‘s wrong with that? That‘s what we‘re asking you to do.