THE STATE EX REL. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ATHENS COUNTY ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE GALLIA, JACKSON, MEIGS, VINTON JOINT SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 95-1274
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
June 19, 1996
75 Ohio St.3d 611 | 1996-Ohio-68
Submitted May 7, 1996. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Jackson County, No. 93CA730.
Mandamus to compel Board of Directors of the Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District to comply with
{¶ 1} In February 1989, the boards of county commissioners of Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Counties entered into an agreement establishing a joint solid waste management district. The members of the boards of county commissioners of the foregoing counties comprised the members of the board of directors of the six-county district.
{¶ 2} The February 1989 agreement provided that if fees collected by the six-county district were insufficient, the counties would share all operating costs and expenses incurred by the district in the same proportion that the census populations of the respective counties bear to the total census population of the six counties. Based on the foregoing, Athens and Hocking Counties were responsible for approximately forty-six percent of the six-county district‘s operating costs and expenses.
{¶ 3} The General Assembly subsequently enacted Sub.H.B. No. 723, effective April 1993, which provided, inter alia, a one-time opportunity for solid
{¶ 4} Under
{¶ 5} In June 1993, the six counties entered into an agreement that provided:
“1. The Counties of Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton agree to the withdrawal of Athens and Hocking Counties from the Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District and hereby agree to take all action necessary to permit the withdrawal of Athens and Hocking Counties from Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District;
“2. Athens and Hocking Counties shall receive a sum not to exceed $50,000.00 from the Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Joint
Solid Waste Management District, for invoices that relate directly to the planning and ratification process of the Athens and Hocking Counties’ Plan which sum is payable on the date that the withdrawal becomes final and the Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District is dissolved, provided that the Counties of Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton have formed a Joint Solid Waste Management District and obtained ratification of a Solid Waste Management Plan; “3. Athens County and Hocking County, jointly and severally, release and forever discharge the Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District, their successors and/or assigns, from all debts, claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action whatsoever, past, present or future which can or may ever be asserted;
“4. The parties hereto, pursuant to Section 343.012(B) of the Ohio Revised Code, agree that the proposed division of assets of the Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District including, but not limited to, funds of [sic, on] hand, credits, and real and personal property is equitable, is consistent with the agreement to establish and maintain the district and the prior contributions of Athens and Hocking Counties.”
{¶ 6} Pursuant to the agreement, the boards of county commissioners of each of the six counties adopted resolutions approving the withdrawal of Athens and Hocking Counties from the six-county district. The resolutions stated that “an agreement has been produced to provide for the orderly division of assets and liabilities should the withdrawal become effective ***.”
{¶ 7} In December 1993, the Director of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency approved the joint solid waste management plans submitted by the Athens-Hocking and Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton joint districts. In the same month, the chairman of the board of directors of the six-county district, Hocking County Commissioner Robert E. Daubenmier, twice requested a meeting in order to
{¶ 8} Appellants, the Boards of County Commissioners of Athens and Hocking Counties, filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Jackson County to compel appellee, the Board of Directors of the Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District, to comply with
{¶ 9} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Janet J. Henry and Virginia E. Richards, for appellants.
Ochsenbein, Cole & Lewis and William S. Cole, for appellee Board of Directors of the Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District.
{¶ 10} Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in denying the requested writ of mandamus. The court of appeals determined that appellee district board did not possess a clear legal duty pursuant to
{¶ 11} As a preliminary matter, the appellee board asserts that appellants are not entitled to a writ of mandamus because appellants possess an adequate remedy at law, i.e., an action to vacate the counties’ June 1993 contract. See
{¶ 12} In addition, although a writ of mandamus cannot issue to control a public body‘s exercise of discretion, it can be issued to compel the public body to exercise such discretion when it has a clear legal duty to do so. See State ex rel. Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 530, 534, 653 N.E.2d 349, 354. Mandamus is also appropriate to correct any abuse of discretion in the proceedings of the district board. See, e.g., State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 630 N.E.2d 701, 704-705; State ex rel. Kelly v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 413, 414, 639 N.E.2d 78, 79. Based on the foregoing, appellants properly sought a writ of
{¶ 13} As to the remaining prerequisites for a writ of mandamus, i.e., clear legal right and clear legal duty, appellants contend that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the district board had complied with
“*** Upon the withdrawal of a county from a joint district, the board of directors shall ascertain, apportion, and order a division of the funds on hand, credits, and real and personal property of the district, either in money or in kind, on any equitable basis between the district and the withdrawing county consistent with the agreement to establish and maintain the district entered into and ratified under division (A) of section 343.01 of the Revised Code and the prior contributions of the withdrawing county.”
“In construing a statute, a court‘s paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute. *** In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.” State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323. Under
{¶ 14} Upon withdrawal, the district board must initially “ascertain” the funds on hand, credits, and real and personal property of the district. In that “ascertain” is not defined in
{¶ 16} The court of appeals relied on evidence that the counties had access to district balance sheets and financial information to conclude that the six-county board substantially complied with the requirement of
{¶ 17} The court of appeals further concluded that the six-county board substantially complied with the
{¶ 19} Second, the equitable division of district assets must be consistent with the counties’ initial agreement to establish and maintain the district and the prior contributions of the withdrawing counties.
{¶ 20} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in holding that the district board substantially complied with
{¶ 21} Appellees pled several affirmative defenses in their answer to appellants’ amended complaint, including waiver. Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. State ex rel. Ryan v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 362, 368, 643 N.E.2d 1122, 1128. “‘As a general rule, the doctrine of waiver is applicable to all personal rights and privileges, whether
{¶ 22} In Shank, supra, we held that a party aggrieved by an order from the Director of Environmental Protection could waive his statutory right to appeal by entering into a settlement agreement supported by sufficient consideration. Similarly, in the case at bar, appellants Athens and Hocking Counties entered into the June 1993 agreement with the remaining four counties. The agreement specifically referred to the
{¶ 23} Six-county district Board Chairman Daubenmier conceded that the plain language of the counties’ June 1993 agreement waived any claim that the withdrawing counties possessed. The agreement was signed by all of the commissioners of Athens and Hocking Counties as well as by their respective counsel. It was supported by sufficient consideration, i.e., the consent of the remaining four counties to the withdrawal. Without the withdrawing counties’ agreement to accept a maximum potential amount of $50,000 as the proposed
{¶ 24} Further, as the court of appeals determined, the June 1993 agreement was not against public policy. See Gugle v. Loeser (1944), 143 Ohio St. 362, 28 O.O. 318, 55 N.E.2d 580, paragraph one of the syllabus (“Agreements voluntarily
{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals properly denied the writ of mandamus. It would be incongruous to permit appellants, who voluntarily signed the agreement while represented by counsel, to obtain the benefits of the June 1993 agreement (the consent of the remaining counties to their withdrawal from the six-county district plus up to $50,000 in planning expenses for their new district) without accepting the accompanying burdens (release of any claims, including those under
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur.