7 A.2d 226 | Conn. | 1939
The plaintiff sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on July 6, 1936. Under the terms of a voluntary agreement he was paid compensation for total incapacity until November 16, 1938. On that day he attained his maximum recovery. His injury resulted in a 25 per cent. loss of use of his left leg. "The claimant is totally disabled from following any gainful occupation at the present time, although he might do some selective work, but such work is not available to him." On these findings, which are not disputed, the commissioner ruled, in accordance with the contentions of the defendant, that he was bound by the terms of General Statutes, 5237, to award only compensation for the specific loss of the injured limb, although, but for the provisions of this section, the plaintiff would be entitled to compensation for total disability. The plaintiff claimed that under the terms of General Statutes, 5236, he, being in fact totally disabled, was entitled to compensation for total incapacity until that condition changed. The case was reserved by the court of its own motion for the advice of this court.
The first question arises upon the quoted portion of *565 the finding. This leaves the fact of total incapacity somewhat uncertain. Since the defendant practically admits that the plaintiff is in fact totally incapacitated and since that is the only reasonable construction of the finding as a whole, we treat the case on that basis.
The general purposes of our Workman's Compensation Act are fully stated in Powers v. Hotel Bond Co.,
A situation similar to that in the case at bar existed in Panico v. Sperry Engineering Co.,
The opinion goes on to point out that this construction may, under exceptional circumstances, work an injustice but concludes (p. 715) that "the experiences of administration thereunder have produced no further amendments bearing upon this question for more than a decade [to which period eight more years may now be added]. If justice requires further adjustments, it is for the General Assembly to devise and make them."
It follows that the award made by the commissioner under 5237 was correct.
The Superior Court is advised to dismiss the appeal.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.