Stamm v. SaulStamm v. Saul
Plaintiff Jeromy R. Stamm (“Stamm”) brings this action under
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 12, 2017, Stamm protectively filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, claiming disability beginning December 23, 2015,
On December 4, 2020, Stamm commenced the instant action. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner responded on May 14, 2021, providing the requisite transcripts from Stamm’s disability proceedings. (Doc. 13; Doc. 14). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with Stamm raising three principal bases for reversal or remand. (Doc. 23; Doc. 26). This matter is ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
A. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the “Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now-familiar five-step analysis.” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2019). The “burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 201; see
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Court’s review of a determination denying an application for Title II benefits is limited “to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Katz v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 19-1268, 2019 WL 6998150, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2019). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Stamm is disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s determination that Stamm is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based on a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). If “the ALJ’s findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
In his written decision, the ALJ determined that Stamm “was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from December 23, 2015, the alleged onset date, through September 30, 2018, the date last insured.” (Doc. 14-2, at 28). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis provided in
A. STEP ONE
At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity.
B. STEP TWO
At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment—or a combination of impairments—that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement.
Regarding Stamm’ mental impairments, the ALJ determined Stamm’ history of depression was not severe, as it caused no more than a minimal limitation in Stamm’s ability to perform basic mental work activities. (Doc. 14-2, at 20). The ALJ reached this finding by considering the four broad areas of mental functioning set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders - understanding, remembering, or applying information, interacting with others, concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself. (Doc. 14-2, at 20-21). The ALJ also determined Stamm’s history of anxiety did not constitute a medically determinable impairment because it was established solely based on Stamm’s allegations regarding symptoms and was not derived from an “acceptable medical source.” (Doc. 14-2, at 21).
C. STEP THREE
At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version of 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ’s decision.
D. RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY
Between steps three and four, the ALJ evaluates the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), crafted upon consideration of all the evidence presented. At this intermediate step, the ALJ examines all of the claimant’s symptoms and “the extent to which [they] can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”
Considering all evidence in the record, the ALJ determined that Stamm had the RFC “to perform sedentary work as defined in
[Stamm] could occasionally balance and stoop; never kneel, crouch, or crawl; and never use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He should have avoided humidity; wetness; dusts, odors, fumes, and other pulmonary irritants; extreme cold; extreme heat; and vibration. As a result of side effects of medications, [Stamm] was limited to performing simple and routine work, generally described as unskilled.
(Doc. 14-2, at 22).
E. STEP FOUR
Step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant had, during the relevant period, the RFC to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work regardless of the claimant’s age, education, and work experience.
F. STEP FIVE
At step five of the sequential analysis, the ALJ considers the claimant’s age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant can make the adjustment to other work.
IV. DISCUSSION
Stamm advances three arguments on appeal: (1) the Commissioner under whom the ALJ issued the final decision serves a longer term than the President and is removable only for cause, in violation of the separation of powers; (2) the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the ALJ erred in rejecting Stamm’s credible statements concerning his inability to work. (Doc. 23, at 3). In response, the Commissioner maintains that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and that Stamm’s separation of powers argument does not entitle him to a rehearing of his disability claim. (Doc. 26, 1-2).
Stamm first asserts that the SSA’s decision is constitutionally defective. (Doc. 23, at 5). Stamm alleges such because the Commissioner under whom the ALJ issued his final decision serves a longer term than the President and is removable only for cause, violating the separation of powers. (Doc. 23, at 5). The Commissioner agrees that the Social Security Act provision limiting the President’s authority to remove the Commissioner without good cause,
Stamm contends the government deprived him of a valid administrative adjudicatory process. In support of his argument, Stamm relies on the Supreme Court decisions in Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021), and Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). (Doc. 5, at 5). In Seila Law, the Supreme Court held the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau‘s (“CFPB”) removal structure, which allowed for the CFPB director to be removed by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance of office,”
Applying the holdings in Seila Law and Collins here makes it clear that the provision for removal of the Commissioner of Social Security,
Here, Stamm argues that he was deprived of a valid administrative adjudicatory proves because, under
The ALJ’s delegation of authority to hear and decide [Stamm’s] claim came from Commissioner Saul and is therefore constitutionally defective. Similarly, the ALJ decided this case under regulations promulgated by Mr. Saul when he had no constitutional authority to issue those rules. Accordingly, a presumptively improper legal standard was utilized to adjudicate this disability claim at the administrative level.
(Doc. 5, at 6).
In response, the Commissioner agrees that
First, the removal provision does not render the Commissioner’s appointment invalid and thus, does not automatically void the ALJ’s actions under the Commissioner. In Collins, the Court found the defective removal procedure did not render the FHFA‘s actions void from the outset. 141 S. Ct. at 1787 (“Although the statute unconstitutionally limited the President‘s authority to remove the confirmed Directors, there was no constitutional defect in the statutorily prescribed method of appointment to that office. As a result, there is no reason to regard any of the actions taken by the FHFA [challenged on appeal] as void.”). The ALJ who denied Stamm’s disability claim was not appointed by a Commissioner subject to Section 902(a)(3)’s removal restriction. (Doc. 26, at 10). Rather, the ALJ was appointed by an Acting Commissioner of Social Security whom the President could remove at any time. (Doc. 26, at 10). Because an Acting Commissioner does not have the same removal restriction as the Commissioner and because the ALJ was properly appointed, Stamm‘s argument is not persuasive in this case. See Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1781 (because removal restrictions of the FHFA applied only to the Director, “any constitutional defect in the provision restricting the removal of a confirmed Director would not have harmed [the plaintiffs], and they would not be entitled to any relief” by actions of an Acting Director who enjoyed no such protections); see also Boger v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-CV-00331, 2021 WL 5023141, at *3 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 2021) (finding that “Plaintiff‘s constitutional ‘removal restriction’ argument is likely not
Second, Stamm has not demonstrated that the unconstitutionality of
In Collins, the Court found it was “possible for an unconstitutional provision to inflict compensable harm,” and remanded to the lower court to determine whether the removal
By contrast, in this case, the action challenged by Stamm is the ALJ‘s decision denying benefits. Stamm has alleged no direct action by former Commissioner Andrew Saul (“Commissioner Saul”), and no involvement—or even awareness—by the former President in the ALJ‘s decision. Cf. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1802 (Kagan, J. concurring) (“[G]iven the majority‘s remedial analysis, I doubt the mass of SSA decisions—which would not concern the President at all—would need to be undone. When an agency decision would not capture a President‘s attention, his removal authority could not make a difference.”). Stamm cannot show how the President’s supposed inability to remove the Commissioner without cause might have affected any ALJ’s disability benefits decision, much less the decision on his specific claim. As the Commissioner points out in his reply brief, holding Stamm to a lower
Lastly, as the Commissioner notes, several constitutional remedial doctrines support the denial of Stamm’s request for a rehearing. The harmless error doctrine dictates that retrospective relief is only appropriate where a statutory provision that violates the Constitution caused the plaintiff some harm. (Doc. 26, at 20). Here, because Stamm cannot show that the Commissioner’s tenure protection affected the ALJ’s decision on his claim, his request for rehearing is denied. Next, “[t]he de facto doctrine springs from the fear of the chaos that would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office could be open to question, and seeks to protect the public by insuring the orderly functioning of the government despite technical defects in title to office.” Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995). Here, however, the Commissioner’s appointment and the appointment of the presiding ALJ were entirely proper. To hold otherwise would risk unwinding untold thousands of SSA disability determinations,
Lastly, the rule of necessity states that a judge must exercise adjudicatory responsibility over a matter, notwithstanding some defect in his or her title or authority, where all other judges share the same defect. See Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 185 (Pa. 1870). Here, it could not have been an error for the deciding ALJ to hear Stamm’s disability claim. If the Commissioner’s tenure protection somehow filters down to affect one ALJ within the entire SSA, it affects all such ALJs. To hold that the assigned ALJ should have declined to adjudicate Stamm’s claim for that reason would have meant that all other ALJs must decline to adjudicate as well for the same reason. Such widespread action would have left Stamm without a forum to adjudicate his claim and it would have denied him even the opportunity to qualify for benefits.
Accordingly, Stamm has not alleged any connection between the unconstitutional limit on the Commissioner of Social Security’s removal and the ALJ’s decision denying Patterson benefits. See Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, 8 F.4th 1123, 1138 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]here is no link between the ALJ‘s decision awarding benefits and the allegedly unconstitutional removal provisions. And nothing commands us to vacate the decisions below on that ground.”). Thus, while the removal clause in § 902(a)(3) violates the separation of powers, it does not independently require the Court to reverse the ALJ‘s decision absent a showing of compensable harm.
Stamm argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Doc. 23, at 6). Specifically, Stamm asserts that the ALJ erroneously found that the medical opinions of record were not fully persuasive and improperly relied on his own lay interpretation of the medical records to make the RFC determination. (Doc. 23, at 7). The Commissioner contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC because the ALJ was not required to rely on any physician’s opinion or choose between the opinions of a plaintiff’s physicians when formulating his RFC assessment. (Doc. 26, at 30).
The Third Circuit has ruled that the ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC determination. Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). “[RFC]” is defined as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d at 121 (quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 359 (3d Cir. 1999)). Specifically, one’s RFC reflects the most that an individual can still do, despite his or her limitations, and is used at steps four and five to evaluate the claimant’s case.
As this matter involves a claim filed after March 27, 2017, the new regulatory framework governing the evaluation of medical opinions applies to the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions in the record. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (technical errors corrected by 82 Fed. Reg. 15,132-01 (Mar. 27, 2017)); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 15263 (March 27, 2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 16869 (corrective notice) (explaining that SSR 96-2p and 96- 5p do not apply to newly filed or pending claims after March 27, 2017). Under the new regulations, rather than assigning weight to medical opinions, the Commissioner will articulate “how persuasive” he or she finds the medical opinions.
The ALJ must explain how he or she considered the “supportability” and “consistency” of a medical source‘s opinion.
On March 30, 2018, state agency physician Kevin Hollick, D.O. (“Dr. Hollick”) reviewed Stamm’s medical records. (Doc. 14-4, at 25-33). Dr. Hollick opined that Stamm was able to perform light work, except he could frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, kneel, crouch, and crawl; occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and stoop; and only needed to avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations, pulmonary irritants, and hazards. (Doc. 14-4, at 31-32). Considering this opinion, the ALJ found that the opinion of Dr. Hollick was “unpersuasive and unsupported” because the opinion was inconsistent with the medical evidence of record. (14-2, at 25). Specifically, the ALJ noted that “the medical evidence of record showed some pain, tenderness on palpation, positive straight leg raising, and range of
On March 2, 2018, consultative examiner Ahmed Kneifati, M.D. (“Dr. Kneifati”) conducted an internal medicine examination of Stamm. (Doc. 14-20, at 54). Dr. Kneifati opined that Stamm was able to perform light work; he could walk for up to 3 hours and stand for up to 4 hours; he could have occasional exposure to hazards, humidity, wetness, and extreme temperatures; he had no limitations on exposure to vibrations; he could occasionally perform all postural maneuvers; he could only occasionally operate foot controls; and he could only walk for 5 minutes at a time without interruptions. (Doc. 14-20, at 58-66). The ALJ found that the opinion of Dr. Kneifati was “unpersuasive” because the opinion was inconsistent with the medical evidence of record. (Doc. 14-2, at 25). The ALJ noted that the evidence of record did not specify Stamm required limitations to hazards. (Doc. 14-2, at 26). Further, the ALJ stated that the medical evidence of record showed that Stamm had normal strength and motor function, which supported the ALJ’s RFC determination that Stamm did not require limitations on the use of foot controls. (Doc. 14-4, at 26). Thus, the ALJ found that the RFC was sufficient to address Stamm’s medical condition limitations. (Doc. 14-2, at 26).
On March 10, 2019, medical expert Charles Brenner, M.D. (“Dr. Brenner”) submitted a report containing his evaluation of Stamm’s medical condition and limitations. (Doc. 14-25, at 38). Dr. Brenner opined that Stamm was able to perform light work, except he could
In this case, the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence of record and the relevant factors of supportability and consistency. In formulating the RFC determination, the ALJ did not necessarily reject the medical opinions of Dr. Hollick, Dr. Kneifati, and Dr. Brenner, but explained that Dr. Hollick’s and Dr. Brenner’s opinions were “unpersuasive and unsupported” and that Dr. Kneifati’s opinion was “unpersuasive” because they were inconsistent with the medical evidence of record. (Doc. 14-2, at 25-26). The ALJ explained that “the medical evidence of record showed some pain, tenderness on palpation, positive straight leg raising, and range of motion limitations, as well as a history of sleep apnea and asthma, that limited [Stamm] to performing sedentary work with additional postural, environmental, and mental limitations discussed in the above [RFC].” (Doc. 14-2, at 26).
Despite the findings in the objective imaging, treatment records support that the claimant’s spinal impairments did not completely prevent him from performing basic work activities, although they resulted in reasonable limitations … Despite some observations of positive straight leg raising that is greater on the left side, antalgic gait, tenderness on palpation, range of motion limitations that are greater with extension and rotation, pain with range of motion, and tenderness on palpation, physical examinations reveal that the claimant was still capable of performing less than sedentary work. The record generally revealed normal sciatic tension signs in the seated position; normal symmetric strength in the bilateral lower extremities; an ability to ambulate without an assistive device; an ability to dress himself, sit, and get on and off the examination table without help; intact sensation to light touch; and normal motor function.
(Doc. 14-2, at 24).
Thus, the ALJ’s stated rationale for his “unpersuasive and unsupported” findings is the presence of contradictory medical evidence of record. (Doc. 14-2, at 25-26). This rationale speaks directly to the factor of “consistency” described in the Social Security Regulations and disputed by Stamm. See
The ALJ discussed Stamm’s physical examinations both generally and with specific reference to his degenerative disc disease, post-laminectomy syndrome, arthritis, and obesity. (Doc. 14-2, at 23-24). He explained that Stamm underwent an L5-S1 laminectomy without stabilization in January 2013 and was diagnosed with post-laminectomy syndrome of the
The ALJ also discussed the objective medical evidence of Stamm’s asthma and sleep apnea. (Doc. 14-2, at 25). The ALJ explained that Stamm underwent a sleep study in May 2012 that revealed he has severe obstructive sleep apnea; however, no follow-up sleep studies were performed during the relevant period. (Doc. 14-2, at 25; Doc. 14-24, at 14). The ALJ noted that Stamm reported improved symptoms when using a c-pap machine and that “[h]is symptoms were well controlled using conservative treatment with inhalers and medication, there were no emergency pulmonary events, and physical examinations generally revealed lungs clear to auscultation with no wheezing, rhonchi, or rales.” (Doc. 14-2, at 25).
In his discussion of the record evidence, the ALJ explained why he found that the medical opinions of Dr. Hollick, Dr. Kneifati, and Dr. Brenner were “unpersuasive and unsupported” by the medical evidence of record and accounted for each of Stamm’s impairments in making his RFC determination. Indeed, the ALJ explicitly noted that he considered the effects of Stamm’s degenerative disc disease, post-laminectomy syndrome, arthritis, obesity, asthma, and sleep apnea in making his RFC determination and explained his imposition of additional limitations. (Doc. 14-2, at 23-25); see Dowd v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-01589, 2018 WL 3448537, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2018) (ALJ successfully discussed record evidence of plaintiff’s impairments and explained his decision to assign medical opinion little weight because of its lack of consistency in relation to the record as a whole). The burden is on Stamm to demonstrate, by medical findings, that he has a condition which reasonably could be expected to produce the alleged symptoms that are the cause of his inability to work. See Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d Cir. 1992). Stamm has not
Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination and evaluation of the medical evidence of record.
C. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE ALJ’S ASSESSMENT OF STAMM’S SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOM ALLEGATIONS.
Stamm argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating his subjective complaints concerning his ability to work. (Doc. 23, at 15). Stamm contends that the ALJ erred in finding inconsistency with his activities of daily living and incorrectly concluded that his ability to dress himself independently, perform light chores, prepare one meal per day, read, and watch television establishes a capacity to work at any level on a sustained basis. (Doc. 23, at 16). In response, The Commissioner argues that the Social Security Act makes clear that “[a]n individual’s statements as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability[.].” (Doc. 26, at 34); see
The ALJ properly applied the new set of Social Security Regulations for evaluating medical evidence that eliminates the hierarchy of medical opinions and states that an ALJ will not defer to any medical opinions, even those from treating sources. (Doc. 14-2, at 25-26); see
Additionally, in evaluating the intensity and persistence of pain and other symptoms, the ALJ should consider the claimant‘s daily activities; location, duration, frequency and intensity of pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; type, dosage, effectiveness, and side
Here, the ALJ found that Stamm’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Stamm’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Doc. 14-2, at 23). Specifically, the ALJ noted that Stamm’s “allegations of the persistence and limiting effects of the symptoms of his degenerative disc disease, post laminectomy syndrome, arthritis, and obesity are not fully consistent with the
Considering Stamm’s activities of daily living, including dressing himself independently, performing light chores, preparing one meal per day, reading, and watching TV, the ALJ found that Stamm’s “allegations of the severity and persistence of his symptoms are not fully consistent with the medical evidence of record.” (Doc. 14-2, at 24). The ALJ specifically addressed findings made by each physician and examiner, incorporating their explanations into Stamm’s RFC, as well as Stamm’s subjective symptom allegations in formulating his RFC determination, which accounted for Stamm’s mental and physical limitations. (Doc. 14-2, at 25-26). Therefore, in reconciling the contrasting medical evidence and medical opinions of record with the inconsistencies in Stamm’s abilities and limitations, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Hollick’s and Dr. Brenner’s opinions were “unpersuasive and unsupported” and that Dr. Kneifati’s opinion was “unpersuasive.” (Doc. 14-2, at 25-26).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ fulfilled his duty in considering Stamm’s symptom allegations and weighed them against the entire medical record. The ALJ provided
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and final judgment is entered in favor of the Commissioner and against Stamm.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: December 31, 2021
s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Chief United States Magistrate