RUSSELL HESS, III v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY, Appellant
No. 18-2226
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
July 30, 2019
PRECEDENTIAL. Argued January 24, 2019. Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. Filed: July 30, 2019.
Jordana Cooper [ARGUED]
M. Jared Littman
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel SSA/OGC/Region III
300 Spring Garden Street – 6th Fl.
P.O. Box 41777
Philadelphia, PA 19123
Counsel for Appellant
Christopher J. Marzzacco
Thomas F. Meister [ARGUED]
Marzzacco Niven & Associates
1909 N. Front Street
2nd Fl., Ste. 1
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Counsel for Appellee
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
This is a case about form and substance in decisions about eligibility for social security benefits. The Appellee, Russell Hess, III, invites us to give supremacy to form. While form is not irrelevant in the scripted analytical steps called for when determining if someone is disabled, Hess‘s invitation would lead to the hidebound circumstance in which an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ“) would have to “chant every magic word correctly” or an otherwise thorough and well-reasoned opinion “would have to be remanded[.]” United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1993) (Roth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The law makes no such demand. Cf. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1157 (2019) (“Where Biestek goes wrong, at bottom, is in pressing for a categorical rule[.] ... The inquiry, as is usually true in determining the substantiality of evidence, is case-by-case.“).
The ALJ who ruled on Hess‘s application for social security disability benefits concluded that Hess had “moderate difficulties” in “concentration, persistence or pace,” but the ALJ offered a detailed explanation for why she believed those difficulties were not serious and why Hess was nevertheless capable of performing simple tasks. (App. at 32.) Based on that analysis, she found that Hess was “limited to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[.]” (App. at 33-34.) In a series of hypothetical questions meant to include Hess‘s limitations, she asked a vocational expert whether there were jobs in the national economy available to someone with those limitations. The expert said there were. The ALJ thus decided that Hess was not disabled and rejected his claim for benefits.
Hess then filed this lawsuit challenging the ALJ‘s decision. The District Court determined that the ALJ had erred because, in the limitations she described in her hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, she failed to include or account for
The government now appeals. It argues that an ALJ‘s statement of a limitation confining a person to “simple tasks” – like the limitation statement at issue here – is permissible after a finding of “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace,” if the ALJ offers a “valid explanation” for it. According to the government, the explanation given by the ALJ in this case was “valid,” and the District Court failed to give it due consideration. We agree and, for the reasons that follow, will remand the case to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment for the government.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Social Security Disability Determination Methodology
Social security cases can be complex, in part because of the labyrinthine regulatory structure that governs them. The matter before us involves the part of that structure controlling disability determinations.
The Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now familiar five-step analysis.
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is performing “substantial gainful activity[.]”
At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has any “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that meets certain regulatory requirements. Id.
At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant‘s impairments meet or equal the requirements of an impairment listed in the regulations[.]” Smith, 631 F.3d at 634. If the claimant‘s impairments do, he is disabled.
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant‘s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC“) and whether he can perform his “past relevant work.”2
At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work[,]” considering his “[RFC,] ... age, education, and work experience[.]” Id.
When, as in this instance, mental impairments are at issue, additional inquiries are layered on top of the basic five-step disability analysis. Id.
As part of step two of the disability analysis, the ALJ decides whether the claimant has any “medically determinable mental impairment(s).” Id.
The ALJ uses that degree rating in “determin[ing] the severity of [the] mental impairment(s)[,]” which is considered at steps two and three. Id.
At step three, if the ALJ has found that a mental impairment is severe, he “then determine[s] if it meets or is equivalent in severity to a listed mental disorder.” Id.
Finally, to complete steps four and five of the disability analysis, if the ALJ has found that the claimant does not have a listed impairment or its equivalent, the ALJ “will then assess [the claimant‘s mental RFC].” Id.
With that regulatory framework in mind, we turn to the details of the case before us.
B. Factual and Procedural Background
1. Hess‘s Social Security Application and the ALJ‘s Opinion
In August 2013, Hess applied for social security disability benefits. After a hearing, the ALJ denied his claims. Her decision was based on her conclusion that Hess was not disabled within the meaning of the applicable regulations. In reaching that conclusion, she followed the five-step disability analysis just outlined.
The ALJ‘s reasoning and the findings she made are central to this case. Consequently, we describe the relevant portions of her opinion in detail. As to step one, however, it is sufficient to simply note that the ALJ determined Hess was not engaged in substantial gainful activity.
At step two, the ALJ found that Hess had multiple “severe impairments[.]” (App. at 30.) Specifically, she said that Hess suffered from:
major depressive disorder single episode-mild, depressive disorder not otherwise specified, bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, history of conduct disorder and impulse control disorder, personality disorder not otherwise specified with antisocial tendencies, osteoarthritis and degenerative joint disease of the right ankle, cervical degenerative disc
disease, chronic pain disorder and history of opioid abuse and dependence.
(App. at 30-31 (citations omitted).)3
At step three, the ALJ found that Hess‘s mental impairments did not meet the standards for a “listed impairment[.]” (App. at 31.) In making that finding, she rated Hess in the four areas of mental functional limitation.4 As to “concentration, persistence or pace” – the area of functional limitation at issue here – she concluded that Hess had “moderate difficulties.” (App. at 32.) She reasoned that, although a state psychological consultant had rated Hess as having “not ... more
The ALJ clarified, however, that she did not consider Hess‘s “moderate“-level difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace” to be so serious that he could not perform simple tasks. In her words:
[Hess‘s] self-reported activities of daily living, such as doing laundry, taking care of his personal needs, shopping, working, and paying bills (when he has money), ... are consistent with an individual who is able to perform simple, routine tasks. Furthermore, progress notes from treating and examining sources generally indicate no serious problems in this area of functioning, reporting that [Hess] could perform simple calculations, was fully oriented, and had intact remote/recent memory.
(App. at 32 (citations omitted).) The “self-reported activities of daily living,” as referenced by the ALJ, were described more fully as follows:
[Hess] reported he could care for his own personal needs and grooming, do laundry (although he needs help carrying the basket), clean, use public transportation, attend appointments, work part time, and go shopping in stores. [Hess] also pays bills (when he has money), counts change, and uses money orders. [Hess] testified that he works three days a week for five to six hours as a dishwasher, and he keeps track of the pantry items, checking for empty boxes and out of date food items.
(App. at 32 (citations omitted).)
At step four, the ALJ performed an RFC assessment.5 She decided that Hess was “limited to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[.]” (App. at 33-34.) In selecting that limitation, the ALJ engaged in a detailed examination of the record, from which she concluded that Hess‘s mental difficulties were such that he was capable of performing simple tasks.
The ALJ first noted that Hess‘s self-reported symptoms could “reasonably be expected” to flow from his “medically determinable impairments[.]” (App. at 34.) Those symptoms included “trouble with concentration and completing tasks[,] .... trouble with written and verbal instructions[,] ... [inability to] handle stress very well[,] .... racing thoughts, a lot of scrambled thoughts, and trouble sleeping.” (App. at 34 (citations omitted).) The ALJ found, however, that his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” (App. at 34-35.)
To support that finding, and to evaluate Hess‘s capabilities more generally, the ALJ analyzed each source of relevant evidence. Specifically, she looked to mental status examinations and reports, opinion evidence, Hess‘s Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF“) scores, his mental health
treatment history, his activities of daily living, and a report by one of Hess‘s longtime friends.
The ALJ acknowledged that a March 2015 mental status examination “allude[d] to an inability to work,” as well as “a depressed mood and poor insight/judgment[.]” (App. at 36, 38.) But she assigned “[a]ny report of an inability to work ... little weight” because it was inconsistent with the record, the examination itself contained “no function by function opinion on th[at] issue,” and Hess‘s inability to work was self-reported. (App. at 38.) Moreover, the examination was not all negative. It revealed “fair hygiene, fair eye contact, a cooperative attitude, normal speech, a calm affect, full orientation, and goal directed thought processing.” (App. at 36.)
Moving on to the opinion evidence, the ALJ similarly found that it showed Hess‘s mental difficulties left him capable of engaging in simple work. For example, she explained that Dr. Schwartz, a psychologist, opined that Hess “had ‘mild’ limitations in his ability to understand and remember simple instructions[,]” had “‘moderate’ limitations in his ability to carry out simple instructions[,]” “could perform simple, unskilled work with additional restrictions in social and adaptive functioning[,]” and had “‘marked’ limitations in his ability to respond appropriately to usual work pressures or changes in a routine work setting.” (App. at 36-37 (citation omitted).) The ALJ assigned most of that opinion “great weight[,]” but she gave “little weight” to the conclusion that Hess had “marked” limitations because it was inconsistent with the record generally and with a mental status examination Dr. Schwartz himself had performed, and because it was “based predominantly upon [Hess‘s] subjective complaints[.]” (App. at 37.)
The ALJ also examined the opinion of a “treating mental health provider[,]” who said that Hess “could perform simple unskilled work but had ‘marked’ limitations in ... his ability consistently to concentrate, persist, and keep pace in a routine work setting.” (App. at 37 (citation omitted).) The ALJ again rejected the “marked” rating as inconsistent with the record. In doing so, she noted that Hess “was able to work part-time as a dishwasher
As to Hess‘s GAF scores, the ALJ also deemed them not to be indicative of significant mental health difficulties. She acknowledged that Hess received “scores ranging from serious symptoms to moderate symptoms.” (App. at 36 (citations omitted).) But, she gave the GAF scores reflecting more serious symptoms “little weight” because they were “not consistent with the underlying mental status examinations[,]” Hess‘s “own reported daily activities[,]” and “the record as [a] whole that did not reveal frequent or regular serious symptoms.” (App. at 37-38 (citations omitted).) Additionally, the ALJ explained that Hess‘s “most recent
scores ... indicat[ed] that [Hess] was experiencing moderate work-related mental health symptoms.” (App. at 36 (citations omitted).) She assigned the GAF scores reflecting less serious symptoms “great weight” because they were “more consistent with the record” and more accurately captured Hess‘s “overall functioning.” (App. at 38 (citations omitted).) In doing so, the ALJ again cited the mental status examinations, which “revealed few serious symptoms,” the fact that Hess was “able to work part time as a dishwasher,” and records from close observation that “did not reveal any serious behavioral issues[.]” (App. at 38.)
Regarding Hess‘s mental health treatment history, the ALJ reasoned that it neither supported the claimed severity level of Hess‘s symptoms nor suggested that he was unable to perform simple tasks. She said that Hess was “not always compliant with treatment ... and ha[d] been discharged from treatment due to non-compliance“; “experienced short hospitalizations” in 2013 and 2015 “due in part to narcotics misuse and heroin addiction“; and “was not fully engaged in substance abuse treatment until” 2015. (App. at 36.) She noted, though, that Hess was then in a treatment program that began in August 2015, had been compliant with that treatment, and his symptoms had improved.
Turning to Hess‘s daily activities, the ALJ likewise found that those activities were not suggestive of symptoms as serious as Hess claimed, and that they instead demonstrated an ability to engage in simple work. As part of the RFC analysis, the ALJ reiterated what she had earlier said at step three concerning Hess‘s daily activities; namely, that Hess “takes care of his own personal needs and grooming, does laundry[,] ... cleans, uses public transportation, attends
appointments, works part time, ... goes shopping in stores[,] .... pays bills (when he has money), counts change, ... uses money orders[,] .... [w]orks three days a week for five to six hours as a dishwasher, and ... keeps track of the pantry items checking for empty boxes and out of date food items.” (App. at 36-37 (citations omitted).)
Finally, the ALJ reviewed a report by a longtime friend of Hess‘s stating that Hess “could cook daily, play computer games, pay bills, follow instructions good, pay attention for a long time, go shopping in stores, use public transportation, and take care of his own personal needs and grooming.”
The ALJ ultimately concluded that she had discerned “appropriate limitations” to account for Hess‘s “mental impairments” and that those “impairments and the restrictions caused by them would not prevent him from performing sedentary, unskilled work as defined ... in the [RFC].” (App. at 38-39.) She said that her RFC determination was based on her findings as to Hess‘s functional limitations (e.g., as to “concentration, persistence, or pace“) and “all the evidence with consideration of the limitations and restrictions imposed by the combined effects of all [of Hess‘s] medically determinable impairments[.]” (App. at 34.) She particularly cited the mental status examinations, “the objective medical evidence ... [Hess‘s] non-compliance [with treatment], the opinion evidence, and [Hess‘s] activities of daily living.” (App. at 38.)
At step five,7 the ALJ found that there were “jobs ... in significant numbers in the national economy that [Hess could] perform” and, thus, she concluded that Hess was not disabled. (App. at 39.) She based that conclusion on answers to hypothetical questions she posed to a vocational expert about whether there were jobs “in the national economy for an individual with [Hess‘s] age, education, work experience, and [RFC].” (App. at 40.) [App. at 40, 43-45.]
2. Hess‘s Lawsuit and the District Court‘s Decision
After the ALJ denied his claim for disability benefits, Hess appealed to the Social Security Administration Appeals Council, which denied his request for review. Accordingly, the ALJ‘s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Chandler v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Hess then filed suit to challenge that decision, pursuant to
The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who wrote a Report and Recommendation (“R&R“) in Hess‘s favor. According to the Magistrate Judge, the ALJ‘s decision was inadequate because she failed to “include in her RFC assessment, or in any hypothetical relied upon, her finding that [Hess] has [a] moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace” and “did not otherwise account for this finding in her RFC assessment or in any hypothetical question.” (App. at 19.) That, the Magistrate Judge said, ran afoul of our decision in Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2004), which the Judge understood to hold “that, when an ALJ finds that a claimant has [a moderate] degree of limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, she must include this limitation in any hypothetical question posed to a [vocational expert] that the ALJ wishes to rely upon” and “that this degree of limitation must be reflected in the RFC assessment.” (App. at 19.) The Magistrate
The District Court approved and adopted the R&R. In doing so, it made some additional comments about the case. The Court explained that Ramirez “reiterated that a hypothetical must account for all of an applicant‘s impairments” and “disapproved of a hypothetical restricting an applicant‘s potential work to ‘simple tasks’ when an ALJ also finds that the applicant ‘often’ has deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace.” (App. at 7 n.1 (citation omitted).) It observed that, here, “the ALJ did not incorporate her finding of a ‘moderate’ limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace in a hypothetical she posed to the vocational expert” but rather “asked the vocational expert if a
person ‘limited to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions making only simple, work related decisions ...’ could perform a job in the national economy.” (App. at 7 n.1.) The District Court concluded, in line with the Magistrate Judge‘s R&R, that the ALJ had violated Ramirez and the case must be remanded for further administrative proceedings.9
The government timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION10
The somewhat complicated question on appeal is whether the ALJ‘s limitation of Hess “to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[,]” as noted in the RFC determination at step four of the disability
analysis and in the resulting hypothetical questions to the vocational expert at step five, was permissible in light of her finding, at step three, of “moderate difficulties” in “concentration, persistence or pace[.]”11 (App. at 32-34.) The government argues that that limitation was acceptable because the ALJ offered a “valid explanation” for it. Hess responds that such a limitation is forbidden by Ramirez, after a finding of “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” The government‘s position is correct, and the District Court should not have disturbed the ALJ‘s decision.
A. The Functional Limitation Findings Do Not Require Particular Language to Appear in the Statement of the Limitation
The parties argue over whether an ALJ must use specific words in stating a limitation that will be employed at steps four and five of the disability analysis, based on the functional limitation findings at steps two and three, such as a finding of “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence,
It is true, as the government contends, that no incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a particular finding has been made at steps two and three. Those portions of the disability analysis serve distinct purposes and may be expressed in different ways. When mental health is at issue, the functional limitation categories are “used to rate the severity of mental impairment(s)[.]” SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *4 (July 2, 1996). While obviously related to the limitation findings, the RFC is a determination of “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations” “based on all the relevant evidence in [the] case record.”
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, social security regulations permit, and indeed require, an ALJ to offer “a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each” limitation at step four of the disability analysis. Id. at *7. That suggests a wide range of limitation language is permissible, regardless of what the ALJ found at earlier steps of the analysis, so long as the chosen limitation language is explained.
Nevertheless, as Hess maintains, the statement of a limitation does need to reflect the claimant‘s particular impairments, including those embodied in the functional limitation findings. “In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual‘s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.‘” Id. at *5; see also
Our case law supports the conclusion that the findings at steps two and three are important to the ALJ‘s statement of a claimant‘s limitation but do not require the use of any particular language. In Ramirez, we said:
We cannot concur in the Commissioner‘s [position that the functional limitation findings are relevant only at steps two and three of the disability analysis].
While [the pertinent regulation] does state that the [functional limitation] findings are “not an RFC assessment” and that step four requires a “more detailed assessment,” it does not follow that the [functional limitation findings] play no role in steps four and five[.]
372 F.3d at 555. We clarified, however, that those findings need only be “adequately conveyed” in the ALJ‘s statement of the limitation, not recited verbatim. Compare id. at 552 n.2 (observing that the claimant was arguing “that all of a claimant‘s limitations must be adequately conveyed in the hypothetical[,]” not, as the government suggested, that functional limitation findings must be stated “verbatim in the hypothetical“), with id. at 554 (“[The ALJ‘s chosen] limitations do not adequately convey all of [the claimant‘s] limitations.” (emphasis added)).12
In short, the functional limitation findings do not dictate the terms of the ALJ‘s statement of the claimant‘s limitation in the final analytical steps. But those findings are relevant to that statement of the limitation, which must be sufficient to reflect all of a claimant‘s impairments.
B. A “Simple Tasks” Limitation Is Appropriate After a Finding of “Moderate” Difficulties in “Concentration, Persistence, or Pace,” if a “Valid Explanation” Is Given
The next issue is whether a “simple tasks” limitation, like the one stated by the ALJ here, can be said to fairly reflect a claimant‘s impairments when that claimant has been found to face “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” The government argues that such a statement of the limitation is acceptable, if an ALJ provides a “valid explanation.” Hess responds that, under Ramirez, “a limitation to simple instructions and simple work-related decisions does not reflect a claimant‘s moderate restrictions in concentration, persistence, or pace.” (Answering Br. at 7-8.) We agree with the government.
1. The ALJ Chose a “Simple Tasks” Limitation
Before reaching the merits of this issue, we must address one preliminary matter. Both parties treat the limitation here - “to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[,]” (App. at 33-34) - as equivalent to a limitation to “simple tasks.” That is important because the case law they rely upon generally involves so-called “simple tasks” limitations.
We agree with their interpretation of the ALJ‘s framing of the limitation. A limitation to “simple tasks” is fundamentally the same as one “to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[.]” (App. at 33-34;) see Davis v. Berryhill, 743 F. App‘x 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2018) (treating “understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions” as equivalent to “simple tasks“); Richards v. Colvin, 640 F. App‘x 786, 790 (10th Cir. 2016) (referring to a limitation “to understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions” as a “simple-work limitation[]“). Indeed, both formulations - the ALJ‘s and the more concise
2. Only a “Valid Explanation” Is Required
Turning to the merits, the government is correct that, as long as the ALJ offers a “valid explanation,” a “simple tasks” limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” That conclusion flows directly from our decision in Ramirez.
In Ramirez, as Hess notes, we disapproved of a “simple tasks” limitation after an ALJ had found that a claimant suffered from deficiencies in “concentration, persistence, or pace” that arose “often[.]” 372 F.3d at 554-55. We said that “a requirement that a job be limited to one to two step tasks ... does not adequately encompass a finding that [the claimant] ‘often’ has ‘deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace[.]‘” Id. at 554 (citation omitted). We were specifically concerned that such a limitation would “not take into account deficiencies in pace” because “[m]any employers require a certain output level from their employees over a given amount of time, and an individual with deficiencies in pace might be able to perform simple tasks, but not over an extended period of time.” Id. On the record then before us, it seemed likely that, if the claimant often had “deficiencies in pace and this had been included in the hypothetical,” the vocational expert would have “changed her answer as to whether there were jobs in the local or national economy that [the claimant] could perform[,]” given that “the vocational expert testified that each of the jobs suitable for [the claimant] ... would have daily production quotas and that [the claimant] would have to maintain a certain degree of pace to maintain those jobs.” Id. In light of all that, we concluded that “[t]his omission from the hypothetical runs afoul of our directive in [Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987),] that a hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert must reflect all of a claimant‘s impairments,” and conflicts with “our statement in [Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2002),] that ‘great specificity’ is required when an ALJ incorporates a claimant‘s mental or physical limitations into a hypothetical.” Id. at 554-55 (citations omitted).
We immediately noted, however, that ALJs are not forbidden from using “simple tasks” limitations. An ALJ may frame a limitation in terms of “simple tasks” if - based on the facts of the case - the ALJ provides a “valid explanation” for doing so:
Of course, [we said,] there may be a valid explanation for this omission from the ALJ‘s hypothetical. For example, the ALJ may have concluded that the deficiency in pace was so minimal or negligible that, even though [the claimant] “often” suffered from this deficiency, it would not limit her ability to perform simple tasks under a production quota.
Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
That we did not adopt a categorical rule regarding “simple tasks” limitations is confirmed
In sum, Ramirez did not hold that there is any categorical prohibition against using a “simple tasks” limitation after an ALJ has found that a claimant “often” faces difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” Rather, a “simple tasks” limitation is acceptable after such a finding, as long as the ALJ offers a valid explanation for it.
Ramirez‘s “valid explanation” rule remains the law in our circuit.13 That is true even though Ramirez dealt with a finding of difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace” that arose “often[,]” id. at 554-55, and here, due to a change in the regulatory rating scale, the ALJ expressed the limitation in different terms, saying that Hess had “moderate difficulties” in “concentration, persistence or pace,”14 (App. at 32.)
Regardless of the rating scale, “simple tasks” limitations have a relationship to abilities in “concentration, persistence, or pace” that makes a valid explanation necessary after a finding in that functional area.
The relationship between “simple tasks” limitations and “concentration, persistence, or pace” is a close one. Indeed, such limitations directly encompass and anticipate a minimal level of ability in that functional area. Under the Social Security Administration‘s Program Operations Manual System (“POMS“),15 “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions” includes “[t]he ability to maintain concentration and attention for extended periods (the approximately 2-hour
workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods.” POMS DI 25020.010(B)(2)(a). In short, “concentration, persistence, or pace” is tightly linked to the capacity to complete “simple tasks.”
Nevertheless, a “simple tasks” limitation alone does not account for the extent of a claimant‘s difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” Without explanation, such a limitation does not warrant a conclusion about whether a claimant‘s difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace” are so serious that he cannot satisfy the functional requirements of “simple tasks.” An explanation is thus important, regardless of the particular scale used for rating “concentration, persistence, or pace.” It must be given whether difficulties in that area are said to arise “often” or are called “moderate” in severity.16
Based on their understanding of the import of Ramirez, the Magistrate Judge and the District Court concluded that the ALJ erred because she did not “explicitly include” her functional limitation finding as to “concentration, persistence or pace” in the RFC assessment or hypothetical questions, and that a “simple tasks” limitation was inadequate to address Hess‘s circumstances. (App. at 19.) In light of that conclusion, neither the R&R nor the District Court‘s opinion discussed the sufficiency of the analysis that led to the ALJ‘s “simple tasks” limitation. That is problematic, for, as we have noted here, it is essential to assess whether a valid explanation has been given for an ALJ‘s statement of a claimant‘s limitation to “simple tasks.”
C. The ALJ Offered a “Valid Explanation”
The final question, then, is whether the ALJ in this case offered a valid explanation.17 The government argues that the ALJ did so by analyzing Hess‘s difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace” and concluding that they were not so serious that Hess could not perform simple tasks. Hess‘s only response is that “the ALJ failed to set forth a supported rationale for [her] RFC findings.” (Answering Br. at 5.) He does not assert that the ALJ mischaracterized the record, only that her analysis is flawed.
Having evaluated that analysis, we are persuaded that the ALJ did offer a valid explanation for her “simple tasks” limitation. As indicated by our detailed description of her
opinion, the ALJ explained at length and with sound reasoning why Hess‘s “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace” were not so significant that Hess was incapable of performing “simple tasks.” For example,
Likewise, in her meticulous analysis of the record at step four of the disability analysis, the ALJ highlighted, among other things, the following: mental status examinations and reports that revealed that Hess could function effectively; opinion evidence showing that Hess could do simple work; and Hess‘s activities of daily living, which demonstrated that he is capable of engaging in a diverse array of “simple tasks,” such as “work[ing] three days a week for five to six hours as a dishwasher[.]” (App. at 37.) She additionally noted that there were no “reports of behavioral issues or problems completing tasks” during a significant period of close observation, and that the record “did not reveal frequent or regular serious symptoms.” (App. at 37-38 (citations omitted).) The ALJ‘s review of the record, moreover, led her to give little weight to assertions that Hess had serious mental difficulties and to credit evidence that Hess could perform simple work. After all of that, the ALJ explained that “appropriate limitations” were imposed to reflect Hess‘s mental impairments and that Hess‘s “impairments and the restrictions caused by them would not prevent him from performing sedentary, unskilled work as defined ... in the [RFC].” (App. at 38-39.)
We think the ALJ‘s detailed explanation was sufficient.18 Indeed, the record evidence the ALJ cited in reasoning that a “simple tasks” limitation was appropriate is comparable to, or even stronger than, evidence that certain of our sister circuits have found to support similar limitations.19
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the government.