Spencer v. Vera Whole Health IncSpencer v. Vera Whole Health Inc
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shannon Spencer filed this class action in King County Superior Court against Vera Whole Health and related entities to pursue claims Defendants violated the pay transparency requirements of Washington‘s Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (EPOA),
A. Statutory Background
Washington State passed its first equal pay legislation, the Equal Pay Act, in 1943, and amended it for the first time in 2018, at which time it became known as the EPOA. See
In 2019, the EPOA was further updated to address discriminatory hiring practices by prohibiting employers “from seeking the wage or salary history of an applicant for employment in certain circumstances,” and by requiring “an employer to provide wage and salary information to applicants and employees” upon request, although only “after offering the applicant the position.”
In 2022, the Legislature again amended the EPOA by modifying
The EPOA now states, in relevant part, that an employer must “disclose in each posting for each job opening the wage scale or salary range, and a general description of all of the benefits and other compensation to be offered to the hired applicant.”
B. Factual Background
Shannon Spencer lives in Washington and applied for an IT Service Desk Analyst position at Defendants’ Seattle office. (Complaint ¶¶ 8, 17; Declaration of Timothy W. Emery Ex. 1 (Dkt. No. 17-1 at 4).) Spencer alleges “[t]he posting for the job opening did not disclose the wage scale or salary range to be offered.” (
ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows litigants to seek the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A jurisdictional attack under Rule 12(b)(1) may be
Because the Court does not reach Defendants’ other arguments under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court does not address the standards under Rule 12(b)(6).
B. Plaintiff Lacks Standing
The Court finds that Spencer lacks standing because he has failed to identify a concrete injury from Defendants’ failure to provide statutorily-required salary information.
“Under Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the ‘Power’ to resolve not questions and issues but ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.‘” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011). “Among other things, that limitation requires a plaintiff to have standing.” Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289, 295–96 (2022). If a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was
This case falls into a category of lawsuits where standing is premised on the violation of a statutory right. “[T]he Supreme Court made clear that a plaintiff does not ‘automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.‘” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016) as revised (May 24, 2016)). To establish a concrete injury, “the plaintiff must allege a statutory violation that caused him to suffer some harm that ‘actually exist[s]’ in the world; there must be an injury that is ‘real’ and not ‘abstract’ or merely ‘procedural.‘” Id. (quoting Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 340).
“Although we often think of ‘tangible’ injuries as the basis of this jurisdictional requirement, the Supreme Court has confirmed that ‘intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.‘” Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 999 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 340). While “[t]he omission of statutorily required information can constitute a distinct, concrete injury,” “not ‘every minor inaccuracy reported in violation of [a statute] will cause real harm or present any material risk of real harm.‘” Id. (quoting Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1116). “[A]n intangible injury may be concrete if it presents a material risk of
“To determine whether the violation of a statute constitutes a concrete harm, we engage in a two-part inquiry.” Magadia, 999 F.3d at 679. “We first consider ‘whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect concrete interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights).‘” Id. (quoting Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1113). “If so, we then assess ‘whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such interests.‘” Id. (quoting Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1113).
Although the EPOA protects concrete interests of job applicants, the Court finds that the alleged violation Spencer identifies did not cause an actual harm or present a material risk of harm to that interest. The Court reviews its two-part analysis, below.
First, the Court finds that the salary disclosure requirement in the EPOA was established to protect concrete, non-procedural rights for job applicants and employees. The EPOA was recently amended to address the wage gap and income disparities that exist affecting workers in Washington.
Second, Spencer has failed to show how the lack of disclosure caused him an actual harm or material risk of harm consistent with the EPOA. In full, Spencer alleges that as a result of the missing pay scale and wage range information, he “lost valuable time” and was unable to “evaluate the pay for the position, negotiate that pay, and compare that pay to other available positions in the marketplace[.]” (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.) But these allegations fail to show any actual harm against which the EPOA intends to protect. Nowhere has Spencer alleged that he was offered an interview or that he engaged in any pay negotiations. All Spencer alleges is that he applied to job. And Spencer does not even allege he was qualified for the position. As a result, the only injury Spencer identifies is the time he “lost” in submitting the application. This is not an injury that the EPOA seeks to prevent or redress. The conclusion reached in a similar case pending this District applies here: “[a] job posting that does not contain compensation information is a technical violation, but it does not harm or create a material risk of harm to any individual‘s concrete interest” because “[a] nominal applicant with no interest in the position will neither receive a benefit from early pay disclosure nor be harmed by the lack thereof.” Floyd v. Insight Global, LLC, C23-1680 BJR, Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 14 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2024). As was the case in Floyd, Spencer has failed to identify a concrete and particularized
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Spencer has failed to allege an injury to a concrete interest sufficient to satisfy Article III standing. The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and it may not preside over this matter. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and REMANDS this matter to the King County Superior Court. The Court DENIES the Motion to Remand as MOOT.
The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.
Dated July 2, 2024.
Marsha J. Pechman
United States Senior District Judge