SOMASCAN, INC.; Somascan Plaza, Inc.; Centro Tomográfico de Puerto Rico, Inc.; and Instituto Central de Diagnóstico, Inc., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. PHILIPS MEDICAL SYSTEMS NEDERLAND, B.V., Defendant, Appellee.
No. 12-1634.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
April 22, 2013.
714 F.3d 62
The petition for review is denied.
Eric Pérez-Ochoa, with whom Adsuar Muñiz Goyco Seda & Pérez-Ochoa, P.S.C., was on brief for appellee.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This case comes before us after the District Court of Puerto Rico denied a motion for leave to amend a complaint. The motion was filed more than a year and a half after the deadline set in the scheduling order for such amendments and without a showing of good cause for delay. Because we find that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the request, we affirm.
The pertinent facts are as follows. On February 13, 2009, Somascan, Inc., Somascan Plaza, Inc., Instituto Central de Diagnóstico, Inc. and Centro Tomográfico de Puerto Rico, Inc. (collectively, “Somascan“) filed suit against Philips Medical Systems Nederland, B.V. (“Philips“). In the complaint, Somascan alleged, in essence, that Philips had misrepresented the capabilities of the medical equipment it sold to Somascan and that the medical equipment did not meet the appropriate standards of quality. It alleged diversity of citizenship as the basis for the court‘s jurisdiction.
On December 7, 2009, the district court entered a Case Management Order setting December 30, 2009, as the deadline to amend the pleadings. On July 11, 2011, a magistrate judge held a status conference and warned Somascan that “leave to amend would be granted for good cause shown as to why amendment could not have been requested at an earlier time.” Several days later, Philips filed a motion for summary judgment. The day after Philips filed said motion, on July 30, 2011, Somascan filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint along with a proposed amended complaint. The amended complaint purported to significantly change Somascan‘s case against Philips by introducing new claims under international and local law, introducing a new defendant to the suit, and changing the jurisdictional
When a district court has put in place a scheduling order pursuant to
As if the accumulation of these standards did not present a high enough hurdle for Somascan to overcome on appeal, an additional burden is imposed when leave to amend is sought after discovery has been completed and a motion for summary judgment has been filed by a defendant. In such cases, it is clearly established that “the proposed amendment must be not only theoretically viable but also solidly grounded in the record.” Hatch, 274 F.3d at 19 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gold, 30 F.3d 251, 253 (1st Cir. 1994)). Therefore, “an amendment is properly classified as futile unless the allegations of the proposed amended complaint are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Resolution Trust Corp., 30 F.3d at 253). It is settled that, “[r]egardless of the context, the longer a plaintiff delays, the more likely the motion to amend will be denied, as protracted delay, with its attendant burdens on the opponent and the court, is itself a sufficient reason for the court to withhold permission to amend.” Steir, 383 F.3d at 12 (citing Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton Int‘l of P.R., Inc., 156 F.3d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir. 1998)).
In the case at bar, Somascan moved to amend seventeen months after the deadline set in the scheduling order had passed and presented no persuasive argument to justify a finding that the delay was for “good cause.” No new evidence was alleged to have been uncovered and no excuse was offered. These factors are, by themselves, enough to conclude that the district court acted correctly in denying leave to amend.
Any further discussion is pointless. The denial of the motion for leave to amend is affirmed.
Affirmed.
