SNIDER INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, trading as Eastover Auto Supply; Mark Cranford; Stan Derwin Brown; Al Goyburu, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS, MARYLAND; Town of Riverdale Park, Maryland, Defendants-Appellees, and Mayor and Council of the Town of Riverdale Park, Maryland, Defendant.
No. 12-2490.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued: Oct. 29, 2013. Decided: Jan. 7, 2014.
739 F.3d 140
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Benefits Review Board is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge GREGORY wrote the opinion, in which Judge KING and Judge AGEE joined.
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Maryland permits localities to employ “speed monitoring systems,” better known as speed cameras, for enforcing traffic laws. Maryland‘s speed camera program imposes civil penalties for exceeding the speed limit by twelve miles per hour. During several years, two Maryland towns issued a number of electronically-signed
I.
Snider International Corporation, Mark Cranford, Stan Brown, and Al Goyburu (“Appellants“) filed a putative class action challenging the constitutionality of the issuance and form of automated speeding citations.1 Appellants received citations from the Town of Forest Heights, Maryland and the Town of Riverdale Park, Maryland (“Appellees“). The citations were issued under Maryland‘s speed camera program.
A.
Since 2006, the Maryland General Assembly has permitted the use of “speed monitoring systems” throughout designated areas within the state. See
The General Assembly further prescribed the form and contents of these automated citations. The appropriate agency mails the citation to the registered owner of the recorded vehicle.
A citation recipient may elect a trial in the District Court of Maryland in lieu of paying the penalty.
The speed camera statute references mail in two contexts. First, the statute requires all citations be mailed no later than two weeks after the alleged violation where the recipient is a Maryland resident.3
B.
Between May 2010 and January 2012, Appellees issued fifty-five citations via first-class mail to Appellants.4 Appellants paid some of these citations immediately. Other times, Appellants defaulted by neither paying the citations nor electing trial. In yet other instances, Appellants elected trial in the District Court of Maryland, received an adverse verdict, and still refused to pay. As to all fifty-five citations, the record lacks any indication that Appellants never received any of the mailed citations.
Appellants filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Appellants identified four classes of individuals: (1) anyone who received and immediately paid citations issued by the Town of Forest Heights, (2) anyone who received and immediately paid citations issued by the Town of Riverdale Park, (3) anyone issued citations by the Town of Forest Heights and suffered a default due to nonpayment, and (4) anyone suffering default due to nonpayment of the Riverdale Park citations. Appellants sought relief under
Without ruling on the class certification motion, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the towns.5 After rejecting Appellees’ jurisdictional and waiver arguments,6 the district court held that it could not enforce state constitutional laws through
II.
We review a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013).
III.
Appellants maintain that the automated citations violated both procedural and substantive due process in three ways. First, Appellants argue that first-class mail fails to satisfy due process, and that Appellees must use, at a minimum, certified mail. Second, Appellants contend that citations signed electronically cannot serve as sworn testimony admissible at trial. Third, Appellants claim that the citations’ noncompliance with
A basic requirement of a
We find Appellants’ third challenge, which concerns whether the citations comply with the Maryland statute, misplaced in a
IV.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
At bottom, procedural due process requires fair notice of impending state action and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950). Notice and the hearing are two distinct features of due process, and are thus governed by different standards. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002). Proper notice is “an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process,” and must be reasonably calculated to convey information concerning a deprivation. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 490 (4th Cir. 2006). Mathews set forth the familiar three-step inquiry for determining the adequacy of the opportunity to be heard: a balancing of the private interest and the public interest, along with “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
1.
Appellants challenge first-class mail as a constitutionally insufficient means of providing notice. As noted in Dusenbery, Mullane is the appropriate guidepost for this question. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 168. Notice must not be a mere gesture, but rather an effort reasonably calculated to effect actual notice. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. Actual notice is not necessary. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170-71. Instead, notice satisfies due process where it either 1) “is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected” or 2) “where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, ... the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted). The use of first-class mail at issue satisfies this inquiry.
The Supreme Court has routinely recognized that the use of mail satisfies the notice element of due process. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006); Tulsa Prof‘l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (recognizing that “the mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of communication” that would ordinarily “satisfy a prudent man of business“); cf. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982) (finding that “[n]otice by mail ... would surely go a long way toward providing the constitutionally required assurance” of proper notice under due process). Where the identities of interested parties are known, “a serious effort [must be made] to inform them personally of the [action], at least by ordinary mail to the record addresses.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added); see also Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (“Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party ... if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable.“).
First-class mail was reasonably calculated to confer actual notice upon Appellants. Through their designated agencies, Appellees mailed summonses to the addresses registered in connection with the recorded vehicles. It is difficult to imagine a more reasonable attempt at ef-
Repeated success of first-class mail delivery suggests the reasonableness of this method for two reasons. First, an individual that receives timely actual notice, and thus suffers no harm from the method of notice, cannot challenge the constitutionality of said method. See, e.g., Lind v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., 688 F.3d 402, 406 (8th Cir. 2012). Second, due to successful delivery, Appellees lacked any indication, e.g. envelopes returned as undeliverable, that first-class mail could not reasonably provide actual notice. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 229-30 (notice insufficient where the government proceeded with a taking after learning the notice was not delivered); cf. Linn Farms & Timber Ltd. P‘ship v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 661 F.3d 354, 358 (8th Cir. 2011) (additional steps beyond the initial notice attempt were necessary where notice letters were returned as undeliverable). Appellants offer no facts that would have suggested to Appellees that sending mail to the addresses of record would not accomplish actual notice. Appellants’ payment of the mailed citations plainly suggests both actual notice and the reasonableness in continuing to use the same notice procedure.
Appellants spend significant time attacking first-class mail, arguing it is sufficient only for in rem proceedings where publication already occurred. They contend that these in rem procedures do not displace the requirements for in personam actions, which Appellants read as requiring the use of certified mail or other efforts above and beyond first-class mail. This position is incorrect. Sufficiency of notice does not turn upon the sometimes malleable and elusive distinctions of in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem, thus we employ the “reasonably calculated to effect actual notice” inquiry regardless of the nature of the action. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312-13. As to their certified mail proposal, Appellants cite Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc., 345 Md. 43, 691 A.2d 208 (1997), for the position that first-class mail is insufficient for providing notice in an action for a money judgment in Maryland.8 However, Miserandino did not broadly declare first-class mail insufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment.9
Furthermore, and contrary to Appellants’ position, certified mail does not necessarily enhance the likelihood of actual notice; even if it did, such enhancement would not necessarily compel us to make certified mail the constitutional threshold. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172 (“[O]ur cases have never held that improvements in the reliability of new procedures necessarily demonstrate the infirmity of those that were replaced.“); cf. Akey v. Clinton Cnty., N.Y., 375 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (“As notice by mail is deemed to be reasonably calculated to reach property owners, the state is not required to go further, despite the slight risk that notice sent by ordinary mail might not be received.“). The record before us fails to demonstrate a correlation between requiring a recipient‘s signature upon delivery and an improvement or enhancement of delivery procedures. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172. Put another way, nothing presented to us indicates that the United States Postal Service delivers certified mail at a rate so superior to that of first-class mail that we should declare first-class mail not reasonably calculated to provide actual notice. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234-35 (recognizing that “certified mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail,” thus certified mail only increases chance of actual notice so long as someone is present to sign for the letter (citations omitted)). First-class mail may actually increase the likelihood of actual notice, as the signature requirement limits when certified mail may be delivered. Id. at 234.
2.
Appellants’ second argument challenges the validity of electronic signatures on cita-
A procedural due process violation arises not upon the occurrence of a deprivation but rather the failure of due process in connection with the deprivation. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125. “Therefore, to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.” Id. Rather than a meticulous examination of the minutiae of the state‘s procedural rubric, “procedural due process is simply a guarantee” that there is notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, Md., 519 F.3d 216, 230 (4th Cir. 2008). Having found notice sufficient, only an evaluation of the opportunity to be heard remains. We now consider 1) the private interest involved, 2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and 3) the state interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by additional process. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
More than twenty years ago, we applied Mathews in evaluating the MVA‘s deprivation procedures with respect to driver‘s license suspensions, which are analogous to the hearing procedure under the speed camera program. Plumer v. State of Md., 915 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1990). The procedure in Plumer required notice to the licensee of a pre-deprivation hearing, setting forth the basis for the suspension, and an opportunity at the hearing to inspect evidence, call witnesses, and present rebuttal evidence. Id. at 932. We found the MVA‘s procedures not only constitutionally adequate but possibly even more than due process requires. Id.
We find no reason to reach a different conclusion here. Appellants received constitutionally sufficient notice of the citation and potential penalty, and they could elect a trial prior to being assessed the penalty. The notice set forth the basis for the adverse action. The trial, like the hearing in Plumer, permitted Appellants to call witnesses and rebut the state‘s evidence with their own. Appellants’ interest is arguably less than that at stake in Plumer — driving privileges cannot be affected under the speed camera program and the $40 civil penalty is not subject to additional monetary penalties for nonpayment.10 It is difficult to see how additional process could significantly reduce the chance of erroneous deprivation, especially given the trial mechanism already in place. The state‘s interest in efficiently enforcing traffic laws would be greatly burdened were we to require additional procedural safeguards, exhausting significant fiscal and administrative resources, that would provide little, if any, additional protection above and beyond that afforded by a trial in the state courts.
In fact, the mere availability of a trial in which to present their grievances undermines Appellants’ argument. Notwith-
B.
We also find that the automated citation procedures do not violate substantive due process. “The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998). Only “the most egregious official conduct” qualifies as constitutionally arbitrary. Huggins v. Prince George‘s Cnty., Md., 683 F.3d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). To give rise to a substantive due process violation, the arbitrary action must be “unjustified by any circumstance or governmental interest, as to be literally incapable of avoidance by any pre-deprivation procedural protections or of adequate rectification by any post-deprivation state remedies.” Rucker v. Harford Cnty., 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991).
Appellants fail to identify any element of the disputed procedures that equate to egregious official conduct unjustified by the state interest in traffic enforcement. Furthermore, assessment of the $40 civil penalty was subject to correction through trial, presentation of witnesses, and rebuttal evidence. Thus, “Maryland‘s treatment of [Appellants] is hardly arbitrary when the state has given [them] the means to correct the [alleged] errors.” Mora, 519 F.3d at 231.
V.
We find that the notice and hearing afforded by Maryland‘s speed camera statute satisfy due process. Notice sent by first-class mail was reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the speeding violation and civil penalties. The availability of a trial in state court, upon Appellants’ election, provided adequate opportunity to be heard on any objections prior to imposition of the statutory penalties. Any flaws in the citation or enforcement process could have been challenged in the state courts, and Appellants failed to do so. Accordingly, the district court‘s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
SWATCH AG (Swatch SA) (Swatch Ltd.), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEEHIVE WHOLESALE, LLC, a limited liability company, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 12-2126.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued: Oct. 30, 2013.
Decided: Jan. 7, 2014.