JOANN D. SMITH v. ESTHER GOLD-KAPLAN, ET AL.
No. 100015
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
April 3, 2014
[Cite as Smith v. Gold-Kaplan, 2014-Ohio-1424.]
Boyle, A.J., S. Gallagher, J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Probate Division Case No. 2011 ADV 174264; JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Kenneth J. Fisher
Kenneth J. Fisher Co., L.P.A.
2100 Terminal Tower
50 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Steven B. Potter
Dinn, Hochman & Potter, L.L.C.
5910 Landerbrook Drive
Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44124
{1} In this will-contest case, plaintiff-appellant, Joann Smith, appeals the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Esther Gold-Kaplan. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
Procedural History and Facts
{2} Simon Eidelman (“decedent”) died on October 25, 2011. Three days later, decedent‘s adoptive daughter, Esther, who is also decedent‘s named executor, filed decedent‘s last will and testament, dated June 22, 2011. Esther is the sole named beneficiary of the June 22, 2011 will. On December 7, 2011, Joann filed the underlying action, contesting decedent‘s will.
{3} According to Joann‘s complaint, decedent was a friend who resided at her home for approximately ten years. Joann further alleged that the will dated June 22, 2011, “operated to revoke” decedent‘s previous will dated March 29, 2011, which named Joann as executrix and sole beneficiary. Joann alleged that the March 29, 2011 will is the only valid will because decedent lacked the necessary testamentary capacity to execute the subsequent will in June 2011. Joann further alleged that the June 22, 2011 will was not valid because it “was the result of undue influence upon decedent.”
{4} Esther subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) decedent‘s will is presumptively valid, (2) Joann has failed to produce any documents in discovery, including an expert‘s report, to substantiate her claim of lack of testamentary
{5} Joann opposed the motion, relying primarily on her own affidavit and a letter from Dr. Philipp Dines to Joann‘s attorney, opining that “by June 22, 2011, it is more likely than not that [decedent] did not manifest testamentary capacity.” Joann further argued that Esther had a confidential relationship with decedent and that she used this confidential relationship to hire an attorney on decedent‘s behalf and to have a new will prepared.
{6} Esther filed a reply brief in support of her motion for summary judgment, arguing that Joann failed to comply with
{7} Joann raises three assignments of error:
- The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment relative to
the claim that decedent lacked testamentary capacity as genuine issues of material fact are present. - The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment relative to the claim that decedent was unduly influenced as genuine issues of material fact are present.
- The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, erred in determining the exhibits attached to appellant‘s opposition to summary judgment were not admissible.
{8} For ease of discussion, we will address these assignments of error out of order.
Standard of Review
{9} We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard. Baiko v. Mays, 140 Ohio App.3d 1, 10, 746 N.E.2d 618 (8th Dist.2000). Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court‘s decision and independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. N.E. Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 121 Ohio App.3d 188, 192, 699 N.E.2d 534 (8th Dist.1997).
{10}
- no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated,
- the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
- it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.
{11} The moving party carries an initial burden of setting forth specific facts that demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the movant fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not appropriate, but if the movant does meet this burden, summary judgment will be appropriate only if the nonmovant fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 293.
Admissible Evidence
{12} In her third assignment of error, Joann argues that the trial court erred in determining that the exhibits attached to Joann‘s brief in opposition to Esther‘s motion for summary judgment were not admissible.
{13}
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule.
{15}
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with the affidavit.
{16} “Documents submitted in defense against a motion for summary judgment must be properly ‘sworn, certified or authenticated by affidavit’ or they may not be considered in determining whether there is a triable issue of fact.” Burkhart v. H.J. Heintz Co., 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-12-008, 2013-Ohio-723, ¶ 12, quoting Green v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 85 Ohio App.3d 223, 228, 619 N.E.2d 497 (9th Dist.1993); see also Douglass v. Salem Comm. Hosp., 153 Ohio App.3d 350, 2003-Ohio-4006, 794 N.E.2d 107, ¶ 25 (7th Dist.). Although the rule appears harsh, Ohio courts consistently apply this rule and recognize that “documents that have not been sworn, certified, or authenticated by way of affidavit ‘have no evidentiary value.‘” Mitchell v. Internatl. Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 179 Ohio App.3d 365, 2008-Ohio-3697, 902 N.E.2d 37, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), quoting Lance Acceptance Corp. v. Claudio, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 02CA008201, 2003-Ohio-3503, ¶ 15. In other words, if the documents are not authorized under
{17} Decisions concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence are within the discretion of the court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, 834 N.E.2d 323, ¶ 20. An abuse of discretion is shown when a decision is unreasonable, that is, when there is no sound reasoning process that would support the decision. AAA Ents. v. River Place Community, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
A. Last Will and Testament of Simon Eidelman dated March 29, 2011
{18} Joann argues that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the March 29, 2011 will, which was attached to her complaint in compliance with
B. Fee Agreement, Durable Power of Attorney, and Health Care Power of Attorney
{19} Joann argues that the trial court should have properly considered these documents, despite them not being authenticated, because they were produced in discovery from Esther.
{20} Federal courts have consistently held that where a document is produced in discovery, there may be sufficient circumstantial evidence to support its authenticity. See Ridenour v. Collins, 692 F.Supp.2d 827, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11726 (S.D. Ohio 2010), citing Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir.1991); see also Anand v. BP W. Coast Prods. L.L.C., 484 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1092 n.11 (C.D.Cal. 2007) (documents produced in response to discovery requests admissible on summary judgment motion as self-authenticating); Architectural Iron Workers Local No. 63 Welfare Fund v. United Contrs., Inc., 46 F.Supp.2d 769, 772 (N.D.Ill. 999) (holding same as above). And although Joann fails to cite any authority in support of her argument, at least one Ohio court has recognized that it is disingenuous for a defendant to attack the authenticity of documents that the defendant provided to plaintiff in discovery. See Hubbard v. Defiance, 3d Dist. Defiance Nos. 4-12-22 and 4-12-23, 2013-Ohio-2144.
{21} But
{22} Joann relies on
C. Expert Report
{23} Joann next argues that the trial court should have allowed the submission of Dr. Dines‘s letter, which she characterizes as the “expert report,” because the report had been provided to opposing counsel prior to the filing of brief in opposition to Esther‘s motion for summary judgment. She further relies on
{24} Additionally, expert opinions may be not be based upon hearsay evidence that has not been admitted. See Schwarze v. Divers Supply, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2001CA301, 2002-Ohio-3945, ¶ 39, citing Azzano v. O‘Malley-Clements, 126 Ohio App.3d 368, 374, 710 N.E.2d 373 (8th Dist.1998). Indeed, it is well settled that an expert‘s opinion must be based upon facts within the witness‘s own personal knowledge or upon facts shown by other evidence. Burens v. Indus. Comm., 162 Ohio St. 549, 124 N.E.2d 724 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus. Here, Dr. Dines‘s letter is based in part on Joann‘s “chronology of events” that is replete with inadmissible hearsay statements. His report further relies on medical records that were not attached to the report or otherwise offered in support of the brief of opposition. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly disregarded the expert‘s report because the expert‘s opinion is not supported by admissible evidence in the record. See Rilley at ¶ 64-65 (expert‘s affidavit insufficient for opposing a motion for summary judgment because none of the documents relied on by the expert were attached to the brief in opposition or properly incorporated by affidavit).
{25} The third assignment of error is overruled.
Testamentary Capacity
{27}
A testator has capacity to make a will when he has sufficient mind and memory (1) to understand the nature of the business in which he is engaged, (2) to comprehend generally the nature and extent of his property, (3) to hold in his mind the names and identities of those who had natural claims upon his bounty, and (4) to be able to appreciate his relation to members of his family.
In re Estate of Worstell v. Harold Todd, Inc., ex rel. Estate of Worstell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19133, 2002-Ohio-5385, ¶ 17, citing Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503 (1917); see also In re Estate of Marsh, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2010CA78, 2011-Ohio-5554.
{28} Testamentary capacity is determined as of the time of the execution of the will. Meek v. Cowman, 4th Dist. Washington No. 07CA31, 2008-Ohio-1123, ¶ 9. However, “evidence of the testator‘s mental and physical condition, both at the time of making the will, and within a reasonable time before and after its execution, is admissible as throwing light on testamentary capacity at the time of the execution.” Id., quoting Riley v. Tizzano, 4th Dist. Washington No. 06CA3, 2006-Ohio-6625, ¶ 12.
{29} “The burden of proof in determining testamentary capacity is on the party contesting the will.” Neumeyer v. Penick, 180 Ohio App.3d 654, 2009-Ohio-321, 906 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 47 (5th Dist.), citing Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336 (1928).
{30} In granting summary judgment to Esther on the issue of testamentary capacity, the trial court reasoned:
The court finds that even if Mr. Eidelman suffered from Alzheimer‘s or dementia, it does not appear that he was ever officially diagnosed, nor is there evidence that he was not lucid at the time of the making or execution of the will. Mr. Eidelman seemed to know the person around him, his family and his property, and he was clear about changing his estate plans.
{31} Joann argues that the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion given the expert opinion of Dr. Dines, who expressly stated that “it is more likely than not that [decedent] did not manifest testamentary capacity.” Joann‘s argument, however, hinges on whether Dr. Dines‘s opinion was admissible and properly presented as
{32} The only other evidence that Joann offered in support of her claim that decedent lacked testamentary capacity was her own affidavit. The question therefore is whether this evidence sufficiently rebutted the presumptive validity of the June 22, 2011 will and the evidence offered by Esther. We find that it does not.
{33} Joann‘s affidavit incorporated her “chronology of events,” detailing her relationship with the decedent, decedent‘s wishes upon his death, decedent‘s strained
{34} To the extent that Joann accounted for some of her own personal observations of decedent in her chronology of events, we still find these references insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Joann describes the decedent as: (1) being “anxious * * *, agitated, and verbally abusive” toward her in May and June of 2011, (2) exhibiting signs of paranoia in May 2011, (3) exhibiting distorted speech and confusion on June 8, 2011 and June 14, 2011, and (4) experiencing “possible hallucinations on June 16, 2011.” Notably, Joann fails to offer any evidence to corroborate these allegations contained in her affidavit. As this court has previously recognized,
Generally, a party‘s unsupported and self-serving assertions, offered by way of affidavit, standing alone and without corroborating materials under
Civ.R. 56 , will not be sufficient to demonstrate material issues of fact. Otherwise, a party could avoid summary judgment under all circumstances solely by simply submitting such a self-serving affidavit containing nothing more than bare contradictions of the evidence offered by the moving party.
Davis v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83665, 2004-Ohio-6621, ¶ 23, quoting Bell v. Beightler, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-569, 2003-Ohio-88, ¶ 33.
{35} But aside from being self-serving, Joann‘s affidavit fails to rebut the affidavits of Buzney and Katz. Joann‘s affidavit, at best, evidences that the decedent was becoming increasingly more disenchanted with her. As for Joann‘s concern of the decedent “hallucinating,” she describes this as a “possible” hallucination. Further, Joann failed to offer a single other affidavit or deposition testimony in support of her claims. Nor did she offer authenticated medical records to corroborate her claim.
{36} Moreover, Ohio law is clear that a party challenging a will must demonstrate more than just the decedent having suffered from an illness — “the plaintiff must also show that the illness actually affected the testator‘s capacity to execute the will.” In re Estate of Geohring, 7th Dist. Columbiana Nos. 05CO27 and 05CO35, 2007-Ohio-1133, ¶ 54 (defendant was entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff failed to show that testator‘s Alzheimer‘s disease actually affected testator‘s capacity to execute the will); see also Martin v. Dew, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-734, 2004-Ohio-2520, ¶ 20 (summary judgment granted because plaintiff “offered no evidence that decedent was affected by dementia on the date she executed will, and the uncontradicted statements by the
{37} Here, Joann failed to rebut both (1) the presumption of validity afforded the June 22, 2011 will, and (2) the evidence presented by Esther as to decedent‘s testamentary capacity. Accordingly, we find no merit to her claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to testamentary capacity.
{38} The first assignment of error is overruled.
Undue Influence
{39} In her second assignment of error, Joann argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her undue influence claim because genuine issues of material fact exist.
{40} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that the doctrine of “undue influence,” noting that “[g]eneral influence, however strong or controlling, is not undue influence unless brought to bear directly upon the act of making the will. If the will or codicil, as finally executed, expresses the will, wishes and desires of the testator, the will is not void because of undue influence.” West v. Henry, 173 Ohio St. 498, 501, 184 N.E.2d 200 (1962).
{41} The essential elements of undue influence are: (1) a susceptible testator, (2) another‘s opportunity to exert influence on the testator, (3) the fact of improper influence
{42} Joann argues that the evidence construed in her favor reveals that a “confidential relationship” existed between decedent and Esther, namely, Esther was the decedent‘s power of attorney, and therefore a presumption of undue influence arises. Relying on the Eleventh District‘s decision in Thorp v. Cross, 11th Dist. Portage No. 97-P-0079, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4885 (Oct. 16, 1998), Joann contends that “if a confidential relationship is found to have existed, there is a presumption that any transaction between [the decedent] and [the beneficiary] is invalid.” Id.; see also Diamond v. Creager, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18819, 2002-Ohio-916. Further, once a confidential relationship is established, “[t]he burden of going forward with evidence would then shift to [defendant] to show the absence of undue influence.” Id.
{43} Conversely, Esther contends that the confidential relationship doctrine is inapplicable in this case. Relying on a different Eleventh District decision, Esther contends that the rebuttable presumption of undue influence does not arise in a will-contest case when (1) she is related by blood to the decedent, and (2) she was not involved in the drafting of the document. See Lah v. Rogers, 125 Ohio App.3d 164, 707 N.E.2d 1208 (11th Dist.1997) (applying the Ohio Supreme Court‘s holding in Krischbaum v. Dillon, 58 Ohio St.3d 58, 567 N.E.2d 1291 (1991), that recognizes a presumption of undue influence does not apply to an attorney/beneficiary who is related by blood to the testator).
{44} We, however, need not resolve this issue because Joann‘s argument hinges on her establishing that Esther was the decedent‘s power of attorney and that she exercised her authority to influence the distribution of decedent‘s estate. The only evidence establishing this fact — the durable general power of attorney and the fee agreement attached to her brief in opposition — were never properly authenticated as required under
{45} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
{46} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTS (SEE SEPARATE OPINION)
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTING:
{47} I respectfully dissent. Although I understand the well-reasoned analysis of the majority, I have concerns that given the unique circumstances of this case, a legitimate question of fact exists.
{48} Although the testimony of Sandra Buzney and Gilda Katz is compelling to support the view that the last will is presumptively valid, Smith‘s affidavit, despite its shortcomings, contains enough objective facts to create a valid material issue of fact that is in dispute on the issue of undue influence.