JENNIFER SILIKO, et al., Appellants, - vs - MIAMI UNIVERSITY, et al., Appellees.
CASE NO. CA2021-12-162
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY
11/21/2022
[Cite as Siliko v. Miami Univ., 2022-Ohio-4133.]
Mendenhall Law Group, and Thomas W. Connors and Warner Mendenhall, for appellants.
Jackson Lewis P.C., and Patricia Anderson Pryor and Adair M. Smith, for appellees.
O P I N I O N
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶1} Appellants, Jennifer Siliko, Ronald Siliko, and Judy Vest, appeal from a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas dismissing their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against appellees, Miami University and David H. Budig, Sandra D. Collins, Rod Robinson, John C. Pascoe, Zachary Haines, Mary Shell, and Deborah Feldman in their official capacity as members of the board of trustees of Miami University (collectively, “Miami University“) regarding a COVID-19 vaccination policy
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On August 31, 2021, Miami University implemented the “COVID-19 Vaccination Program and Policy,” for all students and employees who had “any on-campus presence on any Miami University owned or controlled property.” The vaccination policy provided that “[u]nless exempted * * * all employees and students must be fully vaccinated by November 22, 2021. Requests for exemption must be submitted by October 15, 2021. Faculty, staff and students must receive at least their first COVID-19 vaccine dose by October 25, 2021.” The policy further provided that “[e]xemptions may be granted for medical reasons, sincerely held religious beliefs or reasons of conscience (philosophical or ethical reason) and a deferral granted for pregnancy or nursing. * * * Individuals with an approved exemption shall be required to comply with COVID-19 testing and other educational and preventative health and safety measures.” Students who had not been fully vaccinated or received an exemption or deferral would not be permitted to attend in-person classes, events, or access campus facilities, including housing, after January 1,
{¶3} On October 4, 2021, Jennifer Siliko, an employee of Miami University, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the university and its board of trustees seeking an injunction against enforcement of the vaccination policy. Jennifer Siliko also sought declaratory judgment that the vaccine policy violated her constitutional right to refuse medical treatment in violation of
{¶4} On October 14, 2021, an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed which added Ronald Siliko and Judy Vest, also employees of Miami University, as plaintiffs. The amended complaint again set forth claims that the vaccination policy violated
31. Defendants’ religious exemption form requires all those who apply for exemption to agree to release defendants from certain liabilities and to agree to comply with testing and preventative measures, including masking. The release provision unlawfully limits plaintiffs’ right to a religious exemption. To the extent that the preventative measures provision treats plaintiffs differently than those vaccinated with vaccines that are not FDA-approved, it discriminates in violations [sic] of
R.C. 3792.04 .
32. On or about October 4, 2021, defendants announced a bonus program available only to their employees who have taken Covid-19 vaccines, including taking the first dose by October 25, 2021. This treats plaintiffs differently than employees of defendants who have taken vaccines that are not FDA-approved, and therefore the [vaccine policy] violates
R.C. 3792.04 .
The amended complaint also added a fourth claim asserting that Miami University lacked statutory authority to implement the vaccine policy based on
{¶5} A few days after filing their amended complaint, appellants moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO“) and preliminary injunction to preclude Miami University from enforcing the vaccination policy. A hearing on the request for a TRO was held on October 20, 2021. At the hearing, Miami University argued appellants could not meet the burden for a TRO and, for the first time, raised the issue of standing. Miami University argued that none of the appellants had standing as they “don‘t have any harm to them because they have the right and ability to ask for an exemption. Two of them have and they have [the] exemption. One has chosen not to. * * * [Case law has] held that if you didn‘t ask for the exemption or you already got the exemption, you don‘t have a standing to bring a claim, and that would apply here as well.” Appellants’ counsel informed the trial court of appellants’ status, explaining that as of the filing of the amended complaint Ronald Siliko and Judy Vest had applied for and received COVID-19 vaccine exemptions but Jennifer
{¶6} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellants’ request for a TRO upon finding that there was not any irreparable harm caused by implementation of the vaccination policy. The trial court did not address the standing argument raised by Miami University.
{¶7} On October 27, 2021, Miami University filed a memorandum in opposition to appellants’ request for a preliminary injunction. In addition to arguing that appellants could not meet the standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it argued that the “[a]mended [c]omplaint does not set forth sufficient facts to establish standing or a justiciable controversy. [Appellants] fail to assert whether they have requested an exemption, and what harm they have or will suffer.” Attached to the memorandum in opposition was the affidavit of Dawn Fahner, the Associate Vice President for Miami University. Fahner described the university‘s COVID-19 vaccination policy, stating “[e]mployees are required to be vaccinated unless they request and are approved for an exemption, which we are currently allowing for medical reasons, sincerely held religious beliefs, and reasons of conscience, or a deferral due to pregnancy or nursing.” Fahner attested that “[c]urrently, our employee safety protocols, including masking and testing, do not distinguish between vaccinated and unvaccinated status.” Though the vaccination policy required employees to request exemptions by October 15, 2021, Fahner stated that “[e]mployees where advised they could still submit a request for exemption until October 25, 2021.” She advised that Ronald Siliko and Judy Vest had both “timely requested and received an exemption” to the vaccination policy and though “Jennifer Siliko initially did not request an exemption * * * she subsequently requested an exemption on October 21, 2021, which has now been granted.”
{¶8} Appellants filed a reply memorandum in support of their motion for preliminary
{¶9} On November 30, 2021, Miami University filed a motion to dismiss appellants’ amended complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing the amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Miami University argued that appellants did not have standing to bring their claims and, even if they did, their amended complaint did not set forth sufficient facts to assert a cause of action for a violation of
{¶10} Appellants filed a memorandum in opposition to Miami University‘s motion to dismiss. On December 6, 2021, the trial court issued a decision granting Miami University‘s motion to dismiss upon finding that appellants lacked standing to challenge the vaccination policy as “[n]one of the [appellants] in this case are being forced to receive a COVID-19 vaccination.” The court noted that at the time the amended complaint had been filed, Ronald Siliko and Judy Vest had applied for and received an exemption to the vaccine requirement. The court found that “as unvaccinated employees Ronald Siliko and Judy Vest are subject to the same testing and safety measures as vaccinated employees. They are not subject to any additional requirements * * * [and] have not established an injury.” As for Jennifer Siliko, the court noted that at the time of filing the amended complaint, Jennifer Siliko had not requested an exemption. “By failing to request an exemption Jennifer Siliko cannot show she is injured by the policy exemptions.”
II. ANALYSIS
{¶11} Appellants appealed the dismissal of their complaint for lack of standing, raising the following as their sole assignment of error:
{¶12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE FACTS ESTABLISHING STANDING, SINCE THERE IS A SET OF FACTS CONSISTENT WITH THE COMPLAINT WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH SUCH STANDING.
A. Standard of Review
{¶14} “Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 20. See also Honeywell Internatl., Inc. v. Vanderlande Industries, Inc., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-12-114, 2022-Ohio-2986, ¶ 6. Likewise, a trial court‘s order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is subject to de novo appellate review. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5.
{¶15} “In construing a complaint upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we must presume that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). As long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the plaintiffs’ complaint, that would allow them the relief sought, a court may not grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss. York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1991). With regards to standing, though “the court must presume that all the factual allegations in the complaint are true * * * ‘legal conclusions, even when cast as factual assertions, are not presumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss.‘” (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Revision, 166 Ohio St.3d 255, 2021-Ohio-4486, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 161 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-4777, ¶ 12.
B. General Principles of Standing
{¶16} Standing is a “jurisdictional requirement” and, before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue. Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, 164 Ohio St.3d 291, 2020-Ohio-6724, ¶ 12 and 42. “Standing is defined at its most basic as ‘[a] party‘s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.‘” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1442 (8th Ed.2004). “Standing does not turn on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims but rather on ‘whether the plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case.‘” Ohioans for Concealed Carry at ¶ 12, quoting ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7.
{¶17} “‘[S]tanding is to be determined as of the commencement of the suit.‘” Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 24, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-571, 112 S.Ct. 2130, fn. 5 (1992). “‘While the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, * * * the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.‘” Ohioans for Concealed Carry at ¶ 35, fn. 3, quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm., 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008). “Standing ‘is not dispensed in gross,’ it must be demonstrated for each claim and each form of relief.” Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. v. Kasich, 153 Ohio St.3d 157, 2018-Ohio-441, ¶ 30. However, for purposes of jurisdiction, only one plaintiff must have standing for the claims of the remaining plaintiffs to be heard and the court to proceed to decide the case on the merits. Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa, 134 Ohio St.3d 565, 2012-Ohio-5776, ¶ 16. Here, appellants claim to have standing to bring their claims under traditional common-law standing principles and under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
1. Common-Law Standing
{¶18} “[C]ommon-law standing requires the litigant to demonstrate that he or she has suffered (1) an injury, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful
2. Standing Under the Declaratory Judgment Act
{¶19} “In addition to standing authorized by common law, standing may also be conferred by statute.” ProgressOhio.org, 2014-Ohio-2382 at ¶ 17. To that end, appellants have argued that they have standing under
Subject to division (B) of section
2721.02 of the Revised Code, any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writing constituting a contract or any person whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a constitutional provision, statute, rule as defined in section119.01 of the Revised Code, municipal ordinance, township resolution, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, constitutional provision, statute, rule, ordinance, resolution,
contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.
“The three prerequisites to declaratory relief include ‘(1) a real controversy between the parties, (2) justiciability, and (3) the necessity of speedy relief to preserve the parties’ rights.‘” Ohioans for Concealed Carry at ¶ 30, quoting ProgressOhio.org at ¶ 19.
{¶20} Appellants argue they have standing under
{¶21} With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the claims set forth in appellants’ amended complaint.
C. Appellants’ Claims
1. Constitutional Claim under Article I, Section I
{¶22} Appellants allege that Miami University‘s vaccination policy violates their constitutional right to refuse medical treatment pursuant to
{¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized an Ohioan‘s fundamental right to refuse medical treatment on the basis that “personal security, bodily integrity, and autonomy are cherished liberties.” Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health Bd., 90 Ohio St.3d 176, 180 (2000). “These liberties were not created by statute or case law. Rather, they are rights inherent in every individual.” Id. at 180-181, citing
{¶24} Looking at the amended complaint, we find that appellants have failed to set forth facts demonstrating standing under traditional common-law principles or under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Appellants’ complaint alleges that Miami University‘s vaccination policy requires its employees “who are not exempted, [to] take a first Covid-19 vaccine dose by October 25, 2021 and be fully vaccinated by November 22, 2021. * * * Employees who do not meet these requirements will face disciplinary action.”
{¶25} By its express terms, Miami University‘s vaccination policy allows employees to obtain exemptions for medical reasons, for sincerely held beliefs, or for reasons of conscience (philosophical or ethical reasons). The amended complaint does not contain any allegations as to appellants’ exemption status. The complaint does not indicate whether appellants applied for and received an exemption, applied for and were denied an exemption, had an open application for an exemption, or had refused to apply for an
{¶26} Normally, when considering a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), a court is limited to the allegations set forth in the complaint. “When a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion depends on extrinsic evidence, the ‘proper procedure is for the court to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and provide the opposing party with notice and an opportunity to respond.‘” State ex rel. Evans v. Mohr, 155 Ohio St.3d 579, 2018-Ohio-5089, ¶ 5, quoting Jefferson v. Bunting, 140 Ohio St.3d 62, 2014-Ohio-3074, ¶ 12. However, where a party repeatedly admits to facts in their written filings and when appearing before the court, we find it appropriate for the court to rely on such admissions in ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for lack of standing.2
{¶27} At the TRO hearing, in their memorandum in support of their motion for preliminary injunction, in their memorandum in opposition to Miami University‘s motion to dismiss, and during appellate oral arguments, appellants, through counsel, represented that at the time of filing the amended complaint, two of the plaintiffs (Ronald Siliko and Judy Vest) had sought and obtained exemptions to the vaccination policy. As for the third plaintiff, Jennifer Siliko, she had not applied for an exemption as of the filing of the complaint or amended complaint. After the October 20, 2021 TRO hearing, Jennifer Siliko applied for and received a religious exemption, despite her “refusal to agree to the exemptions’
{¶28} In Wade v. Univ. of Conn. Bd. of Trs., 554 F.Supp.3d 366 (D.Conn.2021), the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut considered whether two students and the parents of a third student had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a COVID-19 vaccination policy implemented by the University of Connecticut (“UConn“). UConn‘s vaccination policy required all students to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 for the 2021-2022 school year and stated that the “[f]ailure to comply with the policy may result in loss of privileges and/or sanctions.” Id. at 372. The policy allowed for exemptions “under certain circumstances,” and permitted students to apply for medical or non-medical exemptions by filling out an online form. Id. At the time the lawsuit was filed against UConn, the two student plaintiffs had applied for non-medical exemptions under the policy, but the exemptions had not been granted. Id. at 373. Subsequently, these two students were granted exemptions. Id. The third student, represented by her parents, had not sought an exemption at the time the suit was filed. Id. UConn filed a motion to dismiss contending the plaintiffs lacked standing. The district court agreed, stating in relevant part the following:
Two of the three plaintiffs have applied for and received exemptions from the UConn vaccination requirement. Having received exemptions, their claims are moot because they are unlikely to face any continuing injury form the vaccination requirement. The third plaintiff has declined even to seek an exemption. Having failed to avail herself of a simple process that may allow her to avoid the vaccination requirement, she has not suffered an injury that the law recognizes as the basis for a right to complain in federal court.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 368.
{¶29} In Klassen v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 549 F.Supp.3d 836 (N.D.Ind.2021)
{¶30} In Bare v. Cardinal Health Inc., E.D.Tenn. No. 3:21-CV-00389-DCLC-DCP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40759 (Mar. 8, 2022), an employee sought to challenge the COVID-
{¶31} Just like the plaintiffs in Wade, Klassen I and II, and Bare, appellants do not have standing due to lack of injury or a real justiciable controversy between the parties. Ronald Siliko and Judy Vest received exemptions to Miami University‘s COVID-19 vaccination policy before filing suit. They are not being forced to undergo medical treatment and, therefore, have not been injured by Miami University. No real controversy exists between the parties with respect to this claim.
{¶32} Jennifer Siliko, like the third student in Wade, had not sought an exemption to Miami University‘s COVID-19 vaccination policy at the time she filed suit. She therefore failed to avail herself of the process that would allow her to avoid the vaccination
{¶33} Furthermore, even if Jennifer Siliko had standing at the time she initiated the suit, her constitutional claim became moot when she applied for and was granted an exemption from Miami University. “If the plaintiff ceases to have standing, such that a live case or controversy no longer exists, the case becomes moot.” Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 715 (6th Cir.2016). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944 (1969) (“a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome“). Because Jennifer Siliko requested and obtained an exemption to the vaccination requirement, she can no longer claim a real or expected imminent injury from the university‘s policy. See Wade at 376 (“In light of the granting of their exemption requests, [the two students] have no continuing real or expected imminent injury from UConn‘s vaccination requirements. In such circumstances, where a plaintiff seeks to challenge a government requirement that no longer burdens or applies to the plaintiff, a federal court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff‘s claims“).3
{¶34} Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, appellants’ claims under
2. R.C. 2905.12 Claim
{¶35} Appellants’ amended complaint sets forth a claim that Miami University
[n]o person, with purpose to coerce another into taking or refraining from action concerning which the other person has a legal freedom of choice, shall * * * [t]ake, withhold, or threaten to take or withhold official action, or cause or threaten to cause official action to be taken or withheld.
{¶36} As noted above, appellants were not required or coerced into taking a COVID-19 vaccine. All three appellants were granted exemptions to the vaccine and therefore cannot show any injury. Though appellants claim they have standing as the university‘s COVID-19 vaccination policy injured them by “threaten[ing] those exempted with masking, surveillance testing, and activity limitation requirements,” the amended complaint did not contain any such allegations.
{¶37} Furthermore, appellants do not have standing to bring their coercion claim as
{¶39} The circumstances in Peltz differs significantly from those in the present case. In Peltz, a plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights under a criminal ordinance (i.e., whether his placement of a political sign in his yard would violate the ordinance and subject him to penalties). Here, appellants are not seeking to have the court rule on the validity, construction, or application of
3. R.C. 3709.212 Claim
{¶40} Appellants’ amended complaint also alleges that Miami University acted beyond its statutory authority by implementing the COVID-19 vaccination policy. Appellants
{¶41}
Any order or regulation for the public health or for the prevention or restriction of disease issued by a board of health of a city or general health district under section
3709.20 or3709.21 of the Revised Code may apply to only the following persons:(A) Those who have been medically diagnosed with the disease that is the subject of the order or regulation;
(B) Those who have come in direct contact with someone who has been medically diagnosed with the disease that is the subject of the order or regulation;
(C) Those that have had a documented incident in the building of the disease that is the subject of the order or regulation.
As used in this section, “person” has the same meaning as in section
1.59 of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.) Appellants argue that with the enactment of
{¶42} By its express terms,
{¶43} Additionally, by enacting
{¶44} As alleged, appellants’ amended complaint has failed to identify an injury or a justiciable controversy that resulted under
4. R.C. 3792.04 Claims
{¶45} Appellants’ amended complaint alleges that Miami University‘s COVID-19 vaccination policy violated
{¶46}
(B) Notwithstanding any conflicting provision of the Revised Code, a public school or state institution of higher education shall not do either of the following:
(1) Require an individual to receive a vaccine for which the United States food and drug administration has not granted full approval;
(2) Discriminate against an individual who has not received a
vaccine described in division (B)(1) of this section, including by requiring the individual to engage in or refrain from engaging in activities or precautions that differ from the activities or precautions of an individual who has received such a vaccine.
a. Non-FDA approved vaccine requirement
{¶47} Appellants’ amended complaint alleges that the university‘s COVID-19 vaccination policy forces them to take a vaccine that has not been granted full FDA approval. Appellants assert that at the time the university‘s vaccination policy was implemented, the only COVID-19 vaccines that were available had received only emergency use authorization from the FDA.
{¶48} We find that appellants do not have standing to bring a claim pursuant to
b. Discrimination claim
{¶49} Appellants’ amended complaint also alleged that Miami University‘s vaccination policy unlawfully discriminated against them in violation of
{¶50} In finding that appellants did not have standing to bring their
{¶51} “[A] court cannot rely upon evidence outside the complaint when considering a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.” Tankersley v. Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting Assn., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-01-003, 2018-Ohio-4386, ¶ 34. Only the complaint, and those documents attached to the complaint, may be considered by the court. Id. “If facts beyond those alleged in the complaint are necessary to dispose of a case, those facts must be developed and appropriately brought before the court utilizing the proper procedural vehicle.” Ward v. Graue, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2011-04-032, 2012-Ohio-760, ¶ 15.
{¶52} Limiting ourselves to the allegations set forth in the amended complaint, we find that appellants have sufficiently alleged facts establishing standing to bring their discrimination claim under
III. CONCLUSION
{¶54} For the reasons discussed above, we sustain appellants’ assignment of error in part and overrule it in part. To the extent that appellants have sufficiently alleged facts establishing standing to bring their discrimination claim under
{¶55} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
M. POWELL, P.J., concurs.
PIPER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
PIPER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶56} I concur with the majority opinion that appellants lack standing to bring their claims that the COVID-19 vaccination policy violates
{¶57} While a court evaluating a complaint pursuant to a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion must presume all factual allegations in the complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, I find that appellants’ amended complaint has not set forth facts that would allow them the declaratory or injunctive relief they seek due to a lack of standing to bring their discrimination claim. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). “At a minimum, common-law standing requires the litigant to demonstrate that he or she has suffered (1) an injury (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful conduct and (3) is likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, 164 Ohio St.3d 291, 2020-Ohio-6724, ¶ 12. Within their amended complaint, appellants’ discrimination claim fails to identify an injury that is fairly traceable to Miami University‘s implementation of the COVID-19 vaccination policy. Appellants rely on a general and vague suggestion of injury as a result of receiving a vaccine exemption and being required to sign a release, engage in preventative measures to stop the spread of COVID-19, and being deemed ineligible under a separate bonus program. Appellants seek to have the trial court and this court assume injuries that were not pled or identified in their complaint. “[A] plaintiff must * * * demonstrate ‘actual present harm or significant possibility of future harm to justify preenforcement relief.‘” Id. at ¶ 32, citing Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.1998). Here, the complaint is simply devoid of any allegation on which this court can conclude the significant possibility of future injury.
{¶58} To “discriminate” means to “make an unjust or prejudicial distinction in the treatment of different categories of people.” Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC., 43 F.4th 254, 259 (2d Cir.2022), citing The New Oxford American Dictionary (2001). Appellants’ amended
{¶59} Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, I would affirm the trial court‘s dismissal of appellants’