BYRON SIGCHO-LOPEZ, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Appellees.
Docket No. 127253
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
March 24, 2022
2022 IL 127253
JUSTICE OVERSTREET
JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Garman, Michael J. Burke, and Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Theis and Neville took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶ 1 Byron Sigcho-Lopez, the alderman for Chicago‘s 25th Ward, filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections (Board), alleging that his predecessor‘s campaign committee, the 25th Ward Regular Democratic Organization
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 On July 20, 2000, the Committee (
¶ 4 In succeeding Solis as alderman of Chicago‘s 25th Ward, Sigcho-Lopez was sworn into that office on May 20, 2019. Solis did not seek reelection to retain his aldermanic position in 2019 or his Democratic committeeman position in 2020, and the last time he ran for office was in 2016 when he ran for committeeman. As of February 19, 2020, at a hearing before the Board, the Committee remained active.
¶ 5 Beginning in June 2016, while serving as alderman and Democratic committeeman of Chicago‘s 25th Ward, Solis began cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in their investigation of alleged political corruption by Illinois public officials. Acting at the direction of the FBI and DOJ, he recorded conversations with other Illinois public officials. The Committee states in its brief that Solis‘s assistance contributed to the indictment of at least one public official and other individuals on federal corruption charges and that his assistance is ongoing.
¶ 6 When the FBI requested Solis‘s assistance, he retained the law firm of Foley & Lardner LLP. On May 21, 2019, the Committee paid $220,000 to Foley & Lardner LLP for legal fees the Committee states were related to Solis‘s cooperation with the FBI. On July 15, 2019, the Committee disclosed “legal fees” as an expenditure
Board Proceedings
¶ 7 ¶ 8 On October 17, 2019, Sigcho-Lopez filed a complaint with the Board alleging that “[t]he expenditure of May 21, 2019, in the amount of $220,000, to the law firm of Foley & Lardner LLP for the criminal defense of Daniel Solis against federal allegations of corruption” violated campaign disclosure and regulation provisions of the Election Code (
¶ 9 On January 8, 2020, a closed preliminary hearing was held to determine whether the complaint had been filed on “justifiable grounds” such that the matter should proceed to a public hearing. See
¶ 10 The Committee countered that section 9-8.10(a) of the Election Code does not specifically prohibit the use of campaign money to pay for legal fees. See
¶ 11 The Committee noted that Solis had not been indicted or charged with any crime but that he was cooperating with the federal government. The Committee contended that Solis acted as “an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” by cooperating and acting on behalf of the federal government in his official capacity and, thus, the expense for legal fees was appropriate pursuant to section 9-8.10(c) of the Election Code (
¶ 12 On January 14, 2020, following the closed hearing, the hearing officer filed his written report containing suggested findings of fact and recommendations. Addressing whether the payment for Solis‘s legal defense was an expenditure as defined by section 9-1.5(A)(1) of the Election Code (
¶ 13 Addressing whether the payment of legal fees was prohibited as a payment for satisfaction or repayment of a personal debt, the hearing officer found that the word “debt” in section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the Election Code (
¶ 15 During the hearing, Board chair Charles W. Scholz asked acting general counsel Bernadette Matthews to confirm the Board policy on the expenditure of campaign funds for legal fees. Matthews responded that, although she had not previously dealt with a formal complaint, the payment of legal fees from campaign funds was questioned consistently and it was “just generally accepted as something that can be considered an expenditure.” Matthews stated that two bills were before the General Assembly prohibiting the payment of legal fees from campaign funds to defend criminal charges. Board member William M. McGuffage stated that the expenditure of funds for a criminal defense was not prohibited under the Election Code because it was connected with Solis‘s position as a public official and related to his future candidacy. McGuffage believed that, although reprehensible, the payment of legal fees from campaign funds to defend criminal activity was not prohibited under the current legislation. Board member William R. Haine stated, “We don‘t have any authority to add to what the General Assembly says are the prohibited uses.” Vice chair Ian Linnabary stated, “I find it absolutely reprehensible that a candidate can use [his] campaign fund to defer *** weekly expenses in association with criminal defense.”
¶ 16 The Board nevertheless adopted the recommendation of the general counsel and hearing officer and found that the complaint was not filed on justifiable grounds. On March 19, 2020, after ratifying its decision, the Board issued its written final order adopting the recommendations of its general counsel and the hearing officer and dismissed Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint.
Appellate Court Proceedings
¶ 17 ¶ 18 On March 25, 2020, Sigcho-Lopez filed a petition for administrative review of the Board‘s final order to the appellate court.
¶ 19 The appellate court then addressed whether the Committee‘s payment of Solis‘s legal fees was a prohibited expenditure under any of the enumerated categories set forth in section 9-8.10(a) of the Election Code. Id. ¶ 17. Specifically, the appellate court addressed the category of expenditures set forth in section 9-8.10(a)(3), noting that, “[c]onstrued literally, section 9-8.10(a)(3) appears to prohibit the satisfaction or repayment of all debts of every name and nature except those specifically exempted.” Id. ¶ 18. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the language of section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the Election Code does not limit its proscription to the payment of personal loans, as the hearing officer had found. Id. ¶ 20. The appellate court noted that the second sentence of subsection (a)(3) of section 9-8.10 specifically prohibits the use of campaign funds to repay “personal loans” and would be rendered superfluous if the hearing officer‘s interpretation that the prohibition contained in the first sentence of subsection (a)(3) against a political committee‘s expenditure of funds in satisfaction or repayment of “any debts” refers only to the satisfaction or repayment of personal loans. Id. ¶ 22.
¶ 20 The appellate court further considered section 9-8.10(c) of the Election Code, which provides that “[n]othing in this Section prohibits the expenditure of funds of a political committee controlled by an officeholder or by a candidate to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” (
¶ 22 Thus, the appellate court concluded that “the dismissal of Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint and the findings of the hearing officer supporting that dismissal *** [were] not clearly erroneous, and as a consequence, *** affirm[ed] the Board‘s final order, dismissing Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint.” Id. ¶ 31. On September 29, 2021, this court allowed Sigcho-Lopez‘s petition for leave to appeal.
ANALYSIS
¶ 23 ¶ 24 “Pursuant to article III, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the Board has general supervision of Illinois‘s election laws.” Cooke v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2021 IL 125386, ¶ 48. Any person may file a verified complaint with the Board alleging a campaign finance violation under the Election Code.
¶ 25 The purpose of a closed preliminary hearing is to elicit evidence on whether the complaint was filed on justifiable grounds and has some basis in fact and law. 26
¶ 26 Any party adversely affected by a judgment of the Board may obtain judicial review directly in the appellate court for the district in which the cause of action arose, and such judicial review shall be governed by the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (
¶ 27 “Although this case is before this court following review in the appellate court, we are reviewing the Board‘s decision and not that of the appellate court.” Cooke, 2021 IL 125386, ¶ 48. Before addressing the Board‘s application of the relevant statutory provisions to the established facts, we must interpret the relevant statutory provisions. Id. ¶ 51. “When determining how the Election Code should be construed, we employ the same basic principles of statutory construction applicable to statutes generally.” Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners, 2015 IL 118929, ¶ 21. The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent, and the most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Maksym v. Board of Election Commissioners, 242 Ill. 2d 303, 318 (2011); County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. 2d 593, 603-04 (2008). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will enforce it as written and will not read into it exceptions, conditions, or limitations that the legislature did not express. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 364 (2005).
¶ 29 “We *** keep in mind the subject addressed by the statute and the legislature‘s apparent intent in enacting it,” and the legislature‘s intent in enacting the campaign disclosure and regulation provisions of the Election Code is “‘to preserve the integrity of the electoral process by requiring full public disclosure of the sources and amounts of campaign contributions and expenditures.‘” Cooke, 2021 IL 125386, ¶ 52 (quoting Sorock v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2012 IL App (1st) 112740, ¶ 2). Article 9 of the Election Code governs the disclosure and regulation of campaign contributions and expenditures.
“(1) a payment, distribution, purchase, loan, advance, deposit, gift of money, or anything of value, in connection with the nomination for election, election, or retention of any person to or in public office or in connection with any question of public policy.”
Id. § 9-1.5(A)(1).
¶ 30 Thus, an expenditure, which a Committee pays from campaign funds and discloses pursuant to the Election Code (
¶ 31 Likewise, section 9-8.10(a) of the Election Code prohibits the use of a political committee‘s funds for personal matters that are neither campaign related nor for governmental or political purposes related to a candidate‘s or public official‘s duties and responsibilities.
¶ 32 In the present case, we decline to adopt the Committee‘s argument that the payment of criminal defense fees from campaign funds is in all circumstances consistent with the Election Code because the General Assembly declined to specifically designate criminal defense fees as a prohibited expenditure under section 9-8.10(a) of the Election Code. See
“[T]he principle that the expression of one thing in a statute excludes any other thing is only a rule of statutory construction, not a rule of law. It is merely a rule that courts use to help them ascertain the intent of the legislature where such intent is not clear from the statute‘s plain language. The maxim is applied only when it appears to point to the intent of the legislature, not to defeat the ascertained legislative intent. The rule may be overcome by a strong indication of legislative intent.” Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 153-54 (1997).
¶ 34 In this case, we find that the maxim is overcome by a strong indication of legislative intent, pursuant to the statute‘s plain language, including the remaining language of section 9-8.10, in particular the language of section 9-8.10(a)(3) in correlation with section 9-8.10(c). See
“Nothing in this Section prohibits the expenditure of funds of a political committee controlled by an officeholder or by a candidate to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions.”
Id. § 9-8.10(c).
¶ 35 Here, we partially adopt the reasoning of the appellate court and hold that section 9-8.10(a)(3) (
¶ 36 In the case sub judice, the parties ostensibly agree that campaign fund payments expended for personal use are prohibited by the Election Code. Sigcho-Lopez argues that legal fees expended for the criminal defense of public corruption charges amount to personal debt prohibited as a campaign fund expenditure, and the Committee argues that legal fees expended for the criminal defense of public corruption charges are not personal in nature because the public corruption charges would not exist irrespective of the public official‘s position.
¶ 37 Following the Committee‘s proposal to determine if its expenditure amounts to a prohibited personal debt, the appellate court adopted the federal “irrespective test” developed by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) for federal candidates and later codified into federal law. The “irrespective test” was applied in Federal Election Comm‘n v. Craig for U.S. Senate, 816 F.3d 829, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2016), where the United States Court of Appeals addressed the FEC‘s allegations that a former senator, his campaign committee, and the committee‘s treasurer converted campaign funds to the senator‘s personal use in violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (
¶ 38 The FEC had concluded that campaign funds disbursed by the senator to his attorneys to overturn his convictions of disorderly conduct and interference with privacy were similar to legal expenses associated with a divorce or driving while under the influence of alcohol, would exist irrespective of the officeholder‘s status, and constituted an impermissible personal use of campaign funds, even though the underlying proceedings may have impacted the officeholder‘s status. Craig, 816 F.3d at 838; see id. at 834 (FEC had determined that legal fees incurred in connection with Senate Ethics Committee‘s inquiry and for public relations fees incurred in responding to press inquiries were not incurred irrespective of the senator‘s campaign or official duties and were therefore permissible). The federal court of appeals in Craig agreed, concluding that the legal fees expended to withdraw the guilty plea would have existed irrespective of the senator‘s reelection campaign or official duties and, thus, the appellants violated
¶ 39 The “irrespective test” applied in Craig mirrored the language of the federal statute. See id. (“FEC‘s focus on the allegations of the legal proceedings fits well with the irrespective definition embodied in the statutory language“);
¶ 40 In doing so, we reject the Committee‘s argument that legal fees incurred as a result of public corruption and criminal activity, resulting in conviction even, may be subsidized by campaign funds because they are not personal debt incurred irrespective of the officeholder‘s position. We cannot ignore that a public official‘s actions that result, for example, in convictions of official misconduct or corruption are “clearly committed for their own interests.” See Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill. 2d 391, 406 (1996) (“[a] conviction for corrupt practices establishes that a public official exploited his fiduciary position for his personal benefit“). The essence of a conviction for official misconduct, conflict of interest, or public corruption is that the public official has attempted “to personally enrich himself or another by an act exceeding his lawful authority as a public servant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 406-07 (although public officials’ employment provided opportunity for misconduct, “by no stretch of the imagination could their actions be deemed an extension of their legitimate functions as elected officials“).
¶ 41 Moreover, considering the plain language of the campaign disclosure and regulation provisions of the Election Code, we also reject the contention that, because an officeholder could not engage in public corruption absent his position as officeholder, his personal legal defense fees for proven official misconduct or public corruption may be subsidized by campaign funds as an expenditure “to
¶ 42 This court has never condoned public corruption. See Peabody v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 330 Ill. 250, 261 (1928) (statute should be construed broadly to prohibit corrupt practices by public officers, state or local, holding office by election or appointment); Cook v. Shipman, 24 Ill. 614, 616 (1860) (“When official corruption can go unwhipt of justice, and when it may with impunity stalk forth in open day, with its hideous and monstrous form appearing through its transparent covering, and when courts shall cease to employ every power that the law has conferred upon them, to inflict the severest penalties it has denounced against such crime, then organized society is ready to dissolve, and governments cease to exist.“).
¶ 43 Accordingly, we find compelling the New Jersey Supreme Court‘s response when faced with a similar issue. In holding that the payment of legal fees from campaign funds to defend against an indictment alleging official corruption was not an ordinary and necessary expense of holding public office, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated the following:
“Despite blaring headlines that announce the most recent prosecution and conviction of a public official, we have yet to reach the point when it can be said that defending against a federal or state criminal indictment alleging corrupt practices is an ‘ordinary’ expense of holding public office. A grand jury indictment is not a customary, or usual, or normal incident of holding public office, nor does it occur in the regular course of events. The vast majority of elected public officials carry out their duties honestly and honorably and will not, in the course of their long careers, be the target of a criminal prosecution. We cannot conclude that the Legislature intended that defending against a federal or state criminal indictment would be an ordinary incident of holding public office, or that the use of campaign funds to cover such defense costs would be an expense that reasonably promotes or carries out the
responsibilities of a person holding elective public office. N.J.A.C. 19:25-6.7(a) .” (Emphasis in original.) In re Election Law Enforcement Comm‘n Advisory Opinion No. 01-2008, 989 A.2d 1254, 1259-60 (N.J. 2010).
This court agrees. Allowing campaign monies to subsidize public corruption amounts to an unreasonable interpretation of the Election Code.
¶ 44 On the other hand, we also reject Sigcho-Lopez‘s contention that legal fees incurred to pay for a public official‘s criminal defense against investigations or charges of public corruption amount to a per se prohibited personal debt pursuant to the plain language and spirit of section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the Election Code (
¶ 45 In such a case, the payment of legal defense fees from campaign funds may be appropriately considered as a payment “in connection with the nomination for election, election, or retention of any person to or in public office” (
¶ 46 Until the General Assembly amends the statute to, for example, specifically prohibit payment from campaign funds for legal fees incurred in defense of criminal allegations against a public official or candidate, the issue requires the Board‘s consideration on a case-by-case basis, applying the plain language of the applicable statutory provisions. In this case, despite the parties’ arguments regarding legal defense fees incurred as a result of public corruption allegations, the record here reveals that Solis had not been indicted on criminal charges but only that he had worked with federal investigators using his official capacity to expose public corruption. Considering the evidence before the Board, we find that the Board‘s conclusion—that Solis‘s legal fees amounted to a proper expenditure not prohibited as “satisfaction or repayment” of a personal debt (
¶ 47 ¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, and we affirm the Board‘s decision to dismiss Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint.
¶ 49 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
¶ 50 Board decision affirmed.
¶ 51 CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE and JUSTICES THEIS and NEVILLE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.