BYRON SIGCHO-LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS and 25TH WARD REGULAR DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION, Respondents.
No. 1-20-0561
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division
April 9, 2021
2021 IL App (1st) 200561
Decision Under Review: Petition for review of order of Illinois State Board of Elections, No. 19-CD-094. Judgment: Affirmed.
Michael C. Dorf, of Law Offices of Michael C. Dorf, LLC, of Skokie, for 25th Ward Regular Democratic Organization.
No brief filed for other respondent.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Cunningham and Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.
¶ 1 The petitioner, Byron Sigcho-Lopez, filed this administrative review proceeding from a final order of the Illinois State Board of Elections (Board), dismissing his complaint that alleged a violation of article 9 of the Election Code (campaign disclosure statute) (
¶ 2 The following factual scenario necessary to our resolution of this matter is taken from the exhibits and pleadings introduced and filed during the proceedings before the Board and its hearing officer, the report of the hearing officer, and the admissions contained in the parties’ briefs before this court. The facts related herein are essentially uncontradicted.
¶ 3 The Committee was formed with the filing of its statement of organization as required by section 9-3 of the campaign disclosure statute (
¶ 4 Solis served as the alderman and Democratic committeeman of Chicago‘s 25th ward. Beginning in June 2016, while serving as alderman and committeeman, Solis began cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in their investigation of alleged political corruption. Acting at the direction of the FBI and DOJ, he recorded conversations with other public officials.
¶ 5 On November 24, 2018, Solis announced his intention to retire as alderman of the 25th ward, and he did not run for reelection as alderman in 2019 or for Democratic committeeman in 2020. Sigcho-Lopez succeeded Solis as alderman of the 25th ward and was sworn in to that office on May 20, 2019.
¶ 6 On May 21, 2019, the Committee paid $220,000 for legal fees incurred by Solis. On October 17, 2019, Sigcho-Lopez filed a verified complaint with the Board alleging that the Committee violated section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute (
¶ 8 On February 19, 2020, the Board, in closed session, heard arguments from the attorneys representing Sigcho-Lopez and the Committee. Following those arguments, the eight members of the Board unanimously voted to dismiss Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint. On March 19, 2020, in open session, the Board issued its written “Final Order on Complaint,” adopting the recommendations of its general counsel and the hearing officer and dismissing Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint, finding that the complaint was not filed on justifiable grounds. Sigcho-Lopez timely filed the instant petition for administrative review of the Board‘s final order.
¶ 9 The Board is an administrative agency (Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 209 (2008)), and the review of its decisions is governed by the Administrative Review Law (
¶ 10 Decisions of an administrative agency such as the Board must contain sufficient findings to allow for a judicial review. Cook County Republican Party v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 242 (2009). The Board‘s final order in this case contains no specific findings. However, when, as in this case, the Board‘s final order states that the Board read the hearing officer‘s report, which contains a detailed explanation for finding that Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint was not filed on justifiable grounds, and that the Board adopted the recommendations of the hearing officer and its general counsel, we are able to meaningfully conduct our review by reviewing the reasons for dismissing the complaint stated in the hearing officer‘s report. See id. at 243.
¶ 11 Before addressing the merits of Sigcho-Lopez‘s arguments, we must first determine our standards of review. We consider the Board‘s findings and conclusions of fact to be prima facie true and correct.
¶ 12 In urging reversal, Sigcho-Lopez argues first that “[t]he Committee‘s use of $220,000 in campaign funds to pay for Solis‘s criminal defense is prohibited as a matter of law by section
¶ 13 In relevant part, section 9-1.5(A)(1) of the campaign disclosure statute defines an “expenditure” as “a payment, distribution, purchase, loan, advance, deposit, gift of money, or anything of value, in connection with the nomination for election, election, or retention of any person to or in public office or in connection with any question of public policy.”
¶ 14 Section 3.1-10-5(c) of the Illinois Municipal Code provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person is not eligible to take the oath of office for a municipal office if that person ***, at the time required for taking the oath of office *** has been convicted in any court located in the United States of any infamous crime, bribery, perjury, or other felony.”
¶ 15 In a related argument, Sigcho-Lopez contends that the Committee‘s payment of Solis‘s legal fees was not an “expenditure” within the meaning of that term as defined in section 9-1.5(A)(1) of the campaign disclosure statute because the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Solis had retired from public office before the Committee paid his legal fees. We reject the argument for two reasons. First, Sigcho-Lopez cited no authority in support of the argument, resulting in its forfeiture.
¶ 16 Sigcho-Lopez has also argued that the Committee‘s payment of Solis‘s legal fees constituted a prohibited expenditure under section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute. As noted earlier, section 9-8.10(a) lists 11 categories of expenditures that political committees registered with the Board are prohibited from making. Legal fees are not specifically included within any of the categories. As the Committee correctly argues, the enumeration of exceptions in a statute is considered to be an exclusion of all other exceptions.
¶ 17 The only enumerated category of prohibited expenditures that Sigcho-Lopez has alleged was violated by the Committee‘s payment of Solis‘s legal fees is the category of expenditures set forth in section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Ҥ 9-8.10. Use of political committee and other reporting organization funds.
(a) A political committee shall not make expenditures:
* * *
(3) For satisfaction or repayment of any debts other than loans made to the committee or to the public official or candidate on behalf of the committee under a credit agreement. Nothing in this Section authorizes the use of campaign funds to repay personal loans.”
10 ILCS 5/9-8.10(a)(3) (West 2018).
¶ 18 Construed literally, section 9-8.10(a)(3) appears to prohibit the satisfaction or repayment of all debts of every name and nature except those specifically exempted. The hearing officer, however, found that the term “debts” as used in the statute does not refer to all debts “but only debt[s] from personal loans.” Sigcho-Lopez contends that, “[u]nder a reasonable reading of subsection 9-8.10(a)(3), the word ‘debts’ does not refer to ‘all debts’ but only ‘personal debts.’ ” The Committee agrees.
¶ 19 Whether the term “debts” as used in section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute refers only to personal loans as found by the hearing officer, or personal debts as the parties assert, is a matter of statutory construction. In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The best indication of the legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). “Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must give it effect as written without ‘reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.’ ” Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996) (quoting Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994)). If the statute is ambiguous, we give substantial weight and deference to its interpretation by the agency charged with its administration if the interpretation is defensible. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm‘n, 2016 IL App (1st) 150425, ¶ 19; Quality Saw & Seal, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm‘n, 374 Ill. App. 3d 776, 781 (2007).
¶ 20 The language of section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute does not limit its proscription to the payment of personal loans as the hearing officer found or personal debts as the parties contend; rather, it speaks in terms of “any debts.” In interpreting the statute, we are guided by the principle that “statutes should be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to all of their provisions; so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant; and so that one section will not destroy another.” In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d 519, 561 (2010).
¶ 22 We agree with the parties’ assertions that the term “debts” as used in section 9-8.10(a)(3) is reasonably interpreted to refer only to personal debts and reject the hearing officer‘s interpretation that the term refers only to debts for personal loans. The second sentence of subsection (3) of section 9-8.10(a) refers specifically to the use of campaign funds to repay “personal loans.” If, as the hearing officer found, the prohibition contained in the first sentence of subsection (3) against a political committee‘s expenditure of funds in satisfaction or repayment of any debts refers only to the satisfaction or repayment of personal loans, the second sentence in that subsection is superfluous.
¶ 23 Having found that section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute prohibits only a political committee‘s expenditures for satisfaction or repayment of personal debts and not the payment of debts incurred by an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions, we turn next to the question of whether the debt incurred by Solis for legal fees and which was paid by the Committee, was a personal debt.
¶ 24 Sigcho-Lopez contends that the legal fees paid by the Committee on behalf of Solis were a personal debt incurred in the defense of allegations of criminal conduct that he has characterized as public corruption. He argues that the Committee‘s payment of those fees was in satisfaction of that personal debt in violation of section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute. The Committee argues that Solis‘s legal fees did not constitute a personal debt, as those fees were incurred “solely because of Solis’ official position as an alderman and [Chicago City Council] committee chairman, and would never have been incurred if Solis was a private citizen.”
¶ 25 In resolving the question of whether or not the legal fees that it paid on behalf of Solis constituted an expenditure for satisfaction of a personal debt, the Committee urges this court to adopt the federal “irrespective test” set forth in section 30114(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Federal Act) (
¶ 26 Application of the federal “irrespective test” is done on a case-by-case basis. See Federal Election Comm‘n v. Craig for U.S. Senate, 816 F.3d 829, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The payment of legal fees incurred irrespective of an individual‘s duties as an officeholder, such as fees associated with a divorce or a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, is considered a personal use, irrespective of the fact that the underlying proceeding might have some impact on the officeholder‘s status. Id. at 837-39. Whereas, the payment of legal fees for an individual‘s defense of allegations relating directly to his or her duties as an officeholder are not considered a personal use. Id. at 839. Allegations that are related to an individual‘s duties as an officeholder would not exist if the individual had no official status. Id. at 839. Under that analysis, the payment of legal fees in defense of allegations of official misconduct is not a personal use. Id. at 842.
¶ 27 If, as the parties contend and we have found, the prohibition against the payment by a political committee in satisfaction or repayment of debts set forth in section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute refers only to personal debts, then there must be a test to determine if a debt is personal. We conclude, as the Committee argues, that the federal “irrespective test” is the appropriate test to resolve the issue. Allegations of misconduct in the discharge of an officeholder‘s official duties would not exist independent of the individual‘s status as an elected official. The payment of legal fees incurred in defense of such allegations by a political committee can, therefore, qualify as an expenditure to defray a reasonable expense of an officeholder in connection with the performance of a governmental function as permitted pursuant to section 9-8.10(c) of the campaign disclosure statute.
¶ 28 In this case, Sigcho-Lopez has repeatedly asserted that the legal fees that the Committee paid on behalf of Solis were incurred in defense of “allegations of public corruption.” Acts of public corruption do not exist irrespective of the accused‘s status as a public official. Solis was an elected alderman of the City of Chicago and the chairman of a city council committee. Allegations of public corruption on his part relate directly to his duties as an officeholder. Applying the “irrespective test,” the legal fees that he incurred in defense of those allegations were not a personal debt, and the Committee‘s payment of those fees was not an expenditure prohibited by section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the campaign disclosure statute.
¶ 29 The essential inquiry in this case is whether Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint is facially and legally justified. The Board was required to apply the campaign disclosure statute to the facts presented at the closed hearing before the hearing officer to determine whether the complaint was filed on justifiable grounds. Cook County Republican Party, 232 Ill. 2d at 245. The inquiry presents a mixed question of fact and law that we review for clear error. Id.; Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 211.
¶ 30 In his report, the hearing officer found that “money spent on defenses as presented in this case can be an acceptable use of campaign funds *** [and] these types of expenditures can be made.” He recommended that Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint “be found not to have been filed on justifiable grounds and [that the] ***complaint be dismissed.” On February 18, 2020, the Board‘s general counsel concurred with the hearing officer‘s recommendations, and on March 19, 2020, the Board issued its final order, adopting the recommendations of its general counsel and the hearing officer and dismissing Sigcho-Lopez‘s complaint, finding that the complaint was not filed on justifiable grounds.
¶ 32 Affirmed.