SIERRA CLUB еt al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF FRESNO et al., Defendants and Respondents; FRIANT RANCH, L.P., Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
S219783
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
December 24, 2018
Fifth Appellate District F066798; Fresno County Superior Court 11CECG00726, 11CECG00706, 11CECG00709
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, and Robie* concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
We granted review to determine whether an Environmental Impact Report (EIR), issued as part of a master plan to develop a partial retirement community in Fresno, California, violates the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for failing to include sufficient information on topics the Act requires. (
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Friant Ranch project (Project) consists of real party in interest Friant Ranch, L.P.‘s (real party) planned development of the Central Valley‘s first master-planned “pedestrian friendly” community on a 942-aсre site (formerly zoned agricultural) that sits adjacent to the unincorporated community of Friant in north central Fresno County, just south of the San
The Project includes the Friant Ranch Specific Plan (Specific Plan), which contemplates the construction of approximately 2,500 single and multi-family residential units that are age restricted to “active adults” age 55 and older, other residential units that are not age restricted, a commercial village center, a recreation center, trails, open space, a neighborhood electric vehicle network, and parks and parkways. The Project also includes 250,000 square feet of commercial space on 482 acres and the dedication of 460 acres to open space. An additional Friant Community Plan Update expands the Specific Plan area and adds policies that are consistent with the Specific Plan and the County‘s General Plan. The Project‘s construction is divided into five phases with an estimated 10-year build-out.
Through its Board of Supervisors, the County received written comments to the draft EIR, held a public hearing, and prepared responses to the comments. After making the findings required under
On February 1, 2011, the County‘s Board of Supervisors approved Project Alternative 3, certified the EIR, and approved a version of the Specific Plan that prohibited the discharge of treated effluent into the river from the wastewater treatment plant. The County also adopted a Mitigation Monitoring Program (MMP), which noted in part that compliance with the mitigation measures would be “enforced through subsequent conditions of approval for future discretionary actions,” including use permits and tentative subdivision maps for the Specific Plan area. By petition for writ of mandamus filed in the trial court, plaintiffs Sierra Club, Revive the San Joaquin, and League of
The court‘s judgment also observed that regarding air quality impacts, the County explained why the EIR‘s mitigation measures would reduce the Project‘s greenhouse gas emissions. The court agreed with the County that plaintiffs did not cite to the record in sufficient detail to show any error.
At the end of its judgment, the court noted that it retained jurisdiction to allow the County a reasonable amount of time to circulate a Park Impact analysis on the Project‘s effect on adjoining parks, including Lost Lake Park and Millerton Lake. This analysis is not at issue here. Otherwise, the court denied all of plaintiffs’ claims and entered judgment in favor of real party.
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment before the County could implement the mitigation measures. They claimed in relevant part that the Project‘s EIR failed to comply with CEQA because its discussion of air quality impacts was inadequate.
The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiffs’ contentions involving the EIR‘s consideration of the Project‘s air quality impacts on the following grounds: “(1) the EIR was inadequate because it failed to include an analysis that correlated the [P]roject‘s emission of air pollutants to its impact on human health; (2) the mitigation measures for the [P]roject‘s long-term air quality impacts violate CEQA because they are vague, unenforceable and lack specific performance criteria; and (3) the statement that the air quality
We granted real party‘s petition for review on the issues concerning the Court of Appeal‘s reversal of the trial court judgment upholding the air quality impact findings and conclusions in the EIR‘s chapter 3 (discussing air quality impacts). The scope of our review concerns how courts should determine the adequacy of an EIR‘s discussion, including: What standard of review a court must apply when adjudicating a challenge to the adequacy of an EIR‘s discussion of adverse environmental impacts and mitigation measures, and whether CEQA requires an EIR to connect a project‘s air quality impacts to specific health consequences. We must also decide whether a lead agency impermissibly defers mitigation measures when it retains the discretion to substitute later adopted measures in place of those proposed in the EIR, and whether a lead agency may adopt mitigation meаsures that do not reduce a project‘s significant and unavoidable impacts to a less-than-significant level.
We conclude as follows: When reviewing whether a discussion is sufficient to satisfy CEQA, a court must be satisfied that the EIR (1) includes sufficient detail to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues the proposed project raises (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 405 (Laurel Heights I)), and (2) makes a reasonable effort to substantively connect a project‘s air quality impacts to likely health consequences. As explained below, the EIR in this case failed to do so. The EIR should be revised to relate the expected adverse air quality impacts to likely health consequences or explain in meaningful detail why it is not feasible at the time of drafting to provide such an analysis, so that the public may make informed decisions regarding the costs and benefits of the Project.
DISCUSSION
A. Adequacy of the EIR‘s discussion of health impacts of the Project‘s long-term effects on air quality
Plaintiffs claim that the EIR was insufficient as an informational document because it failed to adequately explain how the air pollutants the Project generated would impaсt public health. To address that claim, we must first decide what standard of review applies to a challenge to the adequacy of an EIR‘s discussion of a required topic.
1. Standard of review
“The foremost principle under CEQA is that the Legislature intended the act ‘to be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.‘” (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 390, quoting Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259.) “With narrow exceptions, CEQA requires an EIR whenever a public agency proposes to approve or to carry out a project that may have a significant effect on the environment. [Citations.]” (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 390-391; see
The standard of review in a CEQA case, as provided in
This distinction between de novo review and substantial evidence review has worked well in judicial review of agency determinations. In most cases, the question whether an agency has followed proper procedures will have a clear answer. Did the agency provide sufficient notice and opportunity to comment on a draft EIR? (
This court‘s decision in Laurel Heights I illustrates how a court should assess a claim of inadequate discussion. The case involved a challenge to an EIR‘s discussion of alternatives to the proposed construction of the University of California, San Francisco‘s (UCSF) Laurel Heights campus. This court concluded that the discussion was inadequate: “UCSF‘s treatment of alternatives was cursory at best. The draft EIR identified three types of alternatives: no project anywhere, alternative sites on the UCSF Parnassus campus, and alternative sites off-campus. The three categories received a scant one and one-half pages of text in an EIR of more than 250 pages. The EIR stated the obvious cоnclusion that the ‘no project’ alternative, i.e., no relocation to Laurel Heights, would not have the environmental effects identified in the EIR. It then stated in a mere two-sentence paragraph that ‘. . . no alternative sites on [the Parnassus] campus were evaluated as possible candidates for the location of the basic science units of the School of Pharmacy.’ This is not a sufficient discussion of on campus alternatives; it is merely an admission that such alternatives were not considered.” (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 403.)
Laurel Heights I continued: “Even if the Regents are correct in their conclusion that there are no feasible alternatives to the Laurel Heights site, the EIR is nonetheless defective under CEQA. As we stated in a context similar to CEQA, there must be a disclosure of the ‘analytic route the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action.’ (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 [construing requirements of Gov. Code, § 65906 for zoning variances]; [citation].) The EIR prepared by UCSF contains no analysis of any alternative locations. An EIR‘s discussion of alternatives must contain analysis sufficient to allow informed decision making. (San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 738, 751 [202 Cal.Rptr. 423].)” (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 404.)
In Laurel Heights I this court was clear that its inquiry was not a matter of reviewing the record for substantial evidence: “The Regents also contend the
Recently, in Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Assn. of Governments (2017) 3 Cal.5th 497, 514-515 (Cleveland National Forest), this court made a similar point that the adequacy of an EIR‘s discussion of environmental impacts is an issue distinct from the extent to which the agency is correct in its determination whether the impacts are significant. “[A]n EIR‘s designation of a particular adverse environmental effect as ‘significant’ does not excuse the EIR‘s failure to reasonably describe the nature and magnitude of the adverse effect. (See Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay Com. v. Board of Port Cmrs. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1371 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 598] [‘The EIR‘s approach of simply labeling the effect “significant” without accompanying analysis of the project‘s impact on the health of the Airport‘s employees and nearby residents is inadequate to meet the environmental assessment requirements of CEQA.‘]; Galante Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1123 [71 Cal. Rptr.2d 1].) An adequate description of adverse environmental effects is necessary to inform the critical discussion of mitigation measures and project alternatives at the core of the EIR. (See
However, there are instances where the agency‘s discussion of significant project impacts may implicate a factual question that makes substantial evidence review appropriate. For example, a decision to use a particular methodology and reject another is amenable to substantial evidence review, as Sierra Club concedes. But whether a description of an environmental impact is insufficient because it lacks analysis or omits the magnitude of the impact is not a substantial evidence question. A conclusory discussion of an environmental impact that an EIR deems significant can be determined by a court to be inadequate as an informational document without reference to substantial evidence.
We also affirm that in reviewing an EIR‘s discussion, we do not require technical perfection or scientific certainty: “‘[T]he courts have looked not for an exhaustive analysis but for adequacy, completeness and a good-faith effort at full disclosure.‘” (California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 979; accord Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 406; see
Three basic principles emerge from our decisions and those of the Court of Appeal: (1) An agency has considerable discretion to decide the manner of the discussion of potentially significant effects in an EIR. (2) However, a reviewing court must determine whether the discussion of a potentially
Real party draws a distinction for standard of review purposes between claims that a required discussion has been omitted altogether and claims that a required discussion is insufficient, with the former subject to de novo review and the latter subject to substantial evidence review. But such a distinction is neither consistent with our precedent (see Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 403-405) nor logically defensible. Whether or not the alleged inadequacy is the complete omission of a required discussion or a patently inadequate one-paragraph discussion devoid of analysis, the reviewing court must decide whether the EIR serves its purpose as an informational document.
The Court of Appeal‘s opinion presents a concise summary of the EIR‘s discussion regarding the Project‘s air quality impacts on public health.
“The EIR‘s discussion of Impact No.3.3.2, the long-term area and operational emissions, estimated that, at build-out, the proposed Friant Community Plan would emit approximately 117.38 tons per year of PM10 [particulate matter 10 microns in diameter or smaller], 109.52 tons per year of reactive organic gases (ROG), and 102.19 tons per year of nitrogen oxides (NOx). Estimates were made for ROG and NOx because they are precursors to ozone, which is formed when ROG and NOx undergo chemical reactions in the presence of sunlight.
“The Air District‘s thresholds of significance are 15, 10 and 10 tons per year for PM10, ROG and NOx, respectively. Because the project‘s estimated emission of PM10, ROG and NOx were from seven to 10 times larger than that of the thresholds of significance, the EIR concluded these air pollutants would have a significant adverse effect on air quality. Because Mitigation Measure 3.3.2 could not reduce these emissions below the Air District‘s thresholds of significance, the EIR concluded that the significant impacts were unavoidable.
“The draft EIR included a page of background information about ozone and nearly a page of background information about PM10. Each included a paragraph about the adverse health effects associated with the pollutant. The discussion of the adverse health effects, however, was not connected to the levels of the pollutant that would be emitted by the completed project. Instead, the discussion of adverse health effects was general in nature. For example, the description of the health effects of ozone noted that the effects were primarily to the respiratory system and stated:
‘Exposure to ambient levels of ozone ranging from 0.10 to 0.40 [parts per million] for 1 to 2 hours has been found to significantly alter lung functions by increasing respiratory rates and pulmonary resistance, decreasing tidal volumes, and impairing respiratory mechanics.’
“As to PM10, the EIR stated its adverse health effects depended upon ‘the specific composition of the particulate matter.’ The EIR, however, provided no information about the composition of the particulate matter that was expected to be produced by the Project.”
3. Adequacy of the EIR‘s discussion of public health impacts from air pollutants that the Project is expected to generate
Real party contends that the EIR satisfied all CEQA requirements because it analyzed the Project‘s air quality impacts and disclosed the
The Court of Appeal held that the EIR‘s analysis of air quality impacts was inadequate because it did not connect the raw particulate numbers and their effect on air quality with specific adverse effects on human health in the built environment. (See Bakersfield, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.) Bakersfield considered EIRs relating to the construction and operation of two shopping centers in the City of Bakersfield. (Ibid.) The shopping centers featured a Wal-Mart Supercenter as their primary tenant and anchor. (Id. at p. 1194.) Both EIRs concluded that the projects would have “significant and unavoidable adverse impacts on air quality.” (Id. at p. 1219.) But neither EIR specifically identified the health impacts that would result from the adverse air quality effects. The appellate court criticized the EIRs because they lacked an “acknowledgement or analysis of the well-known connection between reduction in air quality and increases in specific respiratory conditions and illnesses. After reading the EIRs, the public would have no idea of the health consequences that result when more pollutants are added to a nonattainment basin.” (Id. at p. 1220.) Bakersfield concluded that brief references to adverse health impacts on human respiratory health rеndered the EIRs in that case inadequate as a matter of law because they failed to connect the adverse air impact with negative health effects. (Ibid.) The court held that “the health impacts resulting from the adverse air quality impacts must be identified and analyzed in the new EIRs.” (Ibid., italics added.)
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the EIR at issue here went “much further than” the Bakersfield EIRs, noting that the EIR not only listed the type and tons per year of the pollutants the Project is expected to produce, but also provided a general description of each pollutant and how it affects human health. The Court of Appeal found, however, that the EIR was inadequate under CEQA because its analysis failed to correlate the increase in emissions that the Project would generate to the adverse impacts on human health.
Real party had argued below that “the reader can infer from the provided information that the Project will make air quality and human health worse.” But the Court of Appeal concluded that “although the better/worse dichotomy is a useful starting point for analyzing adverse environmental impacts, including those to human health, more information is needed to understand that adverse impact.”
the immune system, carcinogenesis, and premature death.” The EIR explained, however, that a more detailed analysis of health impacts is not possible at this early planning phase. According to the EIR, “Health Risk Assessments are typiсally prepared for inclusion in development specific project EIRs when certain types of development commonly known to have the potential to result in a human health risk are being proposed (automobile fueling stations [for example]). Due to the broad nature of the planning approvals analyzed in this EIR, it is impossible to conduct a human health risk assessment based on specific proposed uses at specific locations within the boundaries of the Project Area because such specific information has not been determined.”
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the EIR‘s discussion of health impacts found in Impact No. 3.3.2 is inadequate as an informational document, similar to what the court found in Bakersfield, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220. The EIR‘s discussion of health impacts of the named pollutants provides only a general description of symptoms that are associated with exposure to the ozone, particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), and nitrogen dioxide (NOx), and the discussion of health impacts regarding each type of pollutant is at most a few sentences of general information. The disclosures of the health effects related to PM, CO, and sulfur dioxide fail to indicate the concentrations at which such pollutants would trigger the identified symptoms. As in Bakersfield, “[a]fter reading the EIRs, the public would have no idea of the health consequences that result when more pollutants are added to a nonattainment basin.” (Bakersfield, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220.) And as mentioned above, a sufficient discussion of significant impacts requires not merely a determination of whether an impact is significant, but some effort to explain the nature and magnitude of the impact. (See Cleveland National Forest, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 514-515.) The EIR in this case fails to meet the standards articulated in Bakersfield and Cleveland National Forest.
Even in the one area in which the EIR goes into some detail about health effects—ozone—the analysis is inadequate. The EIR states: “Exposure to ambient levels of ozone ranging from 0.10 to 0.40 [parts per million of ozone] has been found to significantly alter lung functions by increasing
At first glance, this information appears to potentially illuminate the health impacts of ozone produced by the Project. But the EIR presents no evidence of the anticipated parts per million (ppm) of ozone as a result of the Project. Rather, the EIR provides the estimated tons per year of reactive organic material (ROG) and NOx, the two components that react with sunlight to form ozone (i.e., ROG + NOx + sunlight → ozone). The raw numbers estimating the tons per year of ROG and NOx from the Project do not give any information to the reader about how much ozone is estimated to be produced as a result. Therefore, the disclosure of the health impacts associated with exposure to 0.10 to 0.40 ppm of ozone is not meaningful within the context of the Project because the reader has no idea how much ozone will be produced (i.e., whether the amount of ozone resulting from the ROG and NOx pollution will bring the ozone ppm within the 0.10 to 0.40 range).
Relying on various amici curiae briefs submitted to the court, the County and real party attempt to explain why the connection between emissions and human health that plaintiffs seek cannot be provided given the state of environmental science modeling in use at this time. The parties may be correct; we express no view on the question, except to note that scientific certainty is not the standard. But if it is not scientifically possible to do more than has already been done to connect air quаlity effects with potential human health impacts, the EIR itself must explain why, in a manner reasonably calculated to inform the public of the scope of what is and is not yet known about the Project‘s impacts. Contained in a brief, such explanation is directed at the wrong audience. The relevant informational document here is the EIR, and the EIR must communicate not to the reviewing court, but “the public and the government officials deciding on the
We further reject real party‘s argument that the EIR sufficiently accounted for its lack of specificity by explaining that a “Health Risk Assessment” is typically prepared later in the CEQA process, in connection with development-specific EIRs. A “Health Risk Assessment” is defined in the
CEQA does not mandate such an in-depth risk assessment. CEQA requires that the EIR have made a reasonable effort to discuss relevant specifics regarding the connection between two segments of information already contained in the EIR, the general health effects associated with a particular pollutant and the estimated amount of that pollutant the project will likely produce. This discussion will allow the public to make an informed decision, as CEQA requires. Because the EIR as written makes it impossible for the public to translate the bare numbers provided into adverse health impacts or to understand why such trаnslation is not possible at this time (and what limited translation is, in fact, possible), we agree with the Court of Appeal that the EIR‘s discussion of air quality impacts in this case was inadequate.
The Court of Appeal identified several ways in which the EIR could have framed the analysis so as to adequately inform the public and decision makers of possible adverse health effects. The County could have, for example, identified the Project‘s impact on the days of nonattainment per year. But the Court of Appeal was clear that, ultimately—though the EIR must provide an analysis that is adequate to inform (
B. Mitigation measures
1. “Substantially reduce air quality impacts”
At the outset of the discussion of proposed Mitigation Measure 3.3.2 (discussed more fully in part D below), the EIR stated that “Implementation of the following mitigation measures will substantially reduce air quality impacts related to human activity within the entire Project area but not to a level that is less than significant.”
The Court of Appeal concluded that the EIR‘s use of the term “substantial” to describe the impact the proposed mitigation measures would have on reducing the Project‘s significant health effects, without further explanation or factual support, amounted to a “bare conclusion” that did not satisfy CEQA‘s disclosure requirements.
We agree with the Court of Appeal on this point. (See Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 404-405 [“‘To facilitate CEQA‘s informational role, the EIR must contain facts and analysis, not just the agency‘s bare conclusions or opinions.‘“].) Here, the EIR included no facts or analysis to support the inference that the mitigation measures will have a quantifiable “substantial” impact on reducing the adverse effects. The EIR must accurately reflect the net health effect of proposed air quality mitigation measures. (Cleveland National Forest, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 514 [“an EIR‘s designation of a particular adverse environmental effect as ‘significant’ does not excuse the EIR‘s failure to reasonably describe the nature and magnitude of the adverse effect“].)
We next decide whether, as the Court of Appeal concluded, the County, as the lead agency, impermissibly deferred mitigation measures when it approved real party‘s EIR, which included mitigation measurеs to “at least partially reduce” the Project‘s air quality impacts, as well as a substitution clause for future mitigation methods. Plaintiffs contend that the Project‘s EIR is insufficient, because “the mitigation analysis is devoid of criteria for measuring the effectiveness of mitigation measures.” (
The general rule is that an EIR is required to provide the information needed to alert the public and the decision makers of the significant problems a project would create and to discuss currently feasible mitigation measures. Mitigation measures need not include precise quantitative performance standards, but they must be at least partially effective, even if they cannot mitigate significant impacts to less than significant levels. (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 404;
In the present matter, the Project‘s EIR noted that the air quality impacts will be significant and unavoidable. But the EIR‘s 12 mitigation measures in Mitigation Measure 3.3.2 were designed to reduce the Project‘s air quality impacts by providing shade trees, utilizing efficient PremAir or similar model heating, ventilation, and air conditioning [HVAC] systems, building bike lockers and racks, creating bicycle storage spaces in units, and developing transportation related mitigation that will include trail maps and commute alternatives.
Mitigation Measure 3.3.2 includes a substitution clause that allows the lead agency to “substitute different air pollution control measures for individual projects, that are equally effective or superior to those propose[d] [in the EIR], as new technology and/or other feasible measures become available
The County concluded that the Project‘s air quality impacts will be significant, and that the 12 mitigation measures set forth in the Specific Plan should be at least partially effective in reducing thе significant impacts. The substitution clause will allow for additional and presumably better mitigation measures when they become available and it should be encouraged. (See Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342, 357-358 [recognizing county must have power to modify land use plans].) Allowing future substitutions for equal or more efficient technology to mitigate a project‘s acknowledged significant effects promotes CEQA‘s goal of environmental protection and is not an impermissible deferral of mitigation or an abuse of discretion. It is simply a recognition that substitutions of adopted mitigation measures may be implemented to further minimize the Project‘s environmental impacts.
3. Failure to reduce impacts to less than significant levels
Plaintiffs also ask us to decide whether a lead agency violates CEQA when its proposed mitigation measures will not reduce a significant environmental impact to less than significant levels. We conclude that as long as the public is able to identify any adverse health impacts clearly, and the EIR‘s discussion of those impacts includes relevant specifics about the environmental changes attributable to the project, the inclusion of mitigation measures that partially reduce significant impacts does not violate CEQA.
We have stated that protection of the environment and of California‘s resources has long been considered of the utmost importance. However, in enacting CEQA to protect the environment, the Legislature did not seek to prevent all development.
If, after the feasible mitigation measures have been implemented, significant effects still exist, a project may still be approved if it is found that the “unmitigated effects are outweighed by the project‘s benefits.” (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 391.) Even when a project‘s benefits outweigh its unmitigated effects, agencies are still required to implement all mitigation
4. Enforceability of mitigation measures
Plaintiffs argue that mitigation measures involving the installation of HVAC systems and tree planting, and any required mitigation efforts that “are fully enforceable through permit conditions, agreement, or other measures,” are unenforceable. (
The Court of Appeal found the EIR mitigation “provision about equipping HVAC units with a catalyst system does not identify who will determine if the system is ‘reasonably available and economically feasible‘” and is unenforceable. In its analysis, the court omitted the next sentence, “[c]atalyst systems are considered feasible if the additional cost is less than 10% of the base HVAC cost.” This definition of what constitutes “economically feasible” catalyst systems eliminates the need to have individuals make such determinations. The Court of Appeal also found the phrase “‘PremAir or similar catalyst system‘” vague for not defining what performance criteria must be met to be a “‘similar catalyst system.‘” The term is not vague. PremAir is a brand name for an HVAC catalyst system. The individuals proposing new projects, or those tasked with evaluating the proposals for approval, would necessarily have knowledge of HVAC systems and catalyst systems, including PremAir. It is also impossible to require specific performance criteria, given that the type, size, model, and efficiency levels of the HVAC systems being installed in these future projects are unknown. Given the uncertainty of these future proposed projects, the language “PremAir or similar catalyst system” is sufficient under CEQA to provide an enforceable mitigation measure for any HVAC systems associated with those projects.
In finding the mitigation measures cannot be enforced through permit conditions, agreements, or other measures, the Court of Appeal also misintеrpreted
CONCLUSION
In
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeal‘s judgment and remand the matter for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
ROBIE, J.*
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to