Shoop v. TwyfordShoop v. Twyford
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
Respondent Raymond Twyford was convicted by an Ohio jury of aggravated murder and other charges and was sentenced to death. The Ohio appellate courts affirmed his conviction and sentence. Twyford then sought state postconviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of a head injury Twyford sustained as a teenager. The Ohio courts rejected his claim, concluding that trial counsel had simply presented a competing psychological theory for Twyford‘s actions. Twyford then filed a petition for federal habeas relief. The District Court dismissed most of Twyford‘s claims as procedurally defaulted but allowed a few to proceed. He then moved for an order compelling the State to transport him to a medical facility, arguing that neurological testing would plausibly lead to the development of evidence to support his claim that he suffers neurological defects. The District Court granted Twyford‘s motion under the All Writs Act, which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
Held: A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court‘s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The State argues that the All Writs Act does not authorize the issuance of transportation orders for medical testing at all. The State also argues that the order issued in this case was not “necessary or
In habeas cases such as this, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) restricts a federal court‘s authority to grant relief. AEDPA provides that a federal habeas court cannot grant relief in a case adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court (1) contradicted or unreasonably applied this Court‘s precedents, or (2) handed down a decision “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
Twyford‘s transportation request was granted under the All Writs Act. This Court has held that the All Writs Act cannot be used to circumvent statutory requirements or otherwise binding procedural rules. See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 43. In federal habeas proceedings, AEDPA provides the governing rules. And this Court‘s precedents explain that a district court must consider AEDPA‘s requirements before facilitating the development of new evidence. By the same token, if an order issued under the All Writs Act enables a prisoner to fish for unusable evidence, such a writ would not be “necessary or appropriate in aid of” the federal court‘s jurisdiction, as all orders issued under the Act must be.
(b) The District Court and Court of Appeals in this case concluded that directing the State to transport Twyford to a medical facility would aid the adjudication of his habeas petition, but they never determined how this could aid his cause. For the reasons discussed, that was error. Applying the proper standard here is straightforward. Twyford never explained how the results of the neurological testing could be admissible in his habeas proceedings, and it is hard to see how they could be, since the District Court‘s AEDPA review is limited to “the record that was before the state court,” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 181, and Twyford made no attempt to explain how that bar would be inapplicable in his case. Twyford suggested that the results of his brain testing could “plausibly” bear on the question whether to excuse procedural default, but he did not identify the particular defaulted claims nor explain how the testing would allow him to resurrect those claims. Pp. 9–11.
11 F. 4th 518, reversed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
The All Writs Act authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
I
On the evening of September 23, 1992, Raymond Twyford and his co-conspirator lured Richard Franks to a remote location, and shot and killed him. To hide their crime, the pair mutilated Franks‘s body and pushed it into a pond. But a sheriff found the body a few days later, and his investigation led to Twyford. Twyford confessed, claiming that Franks had raped his girlfriend‘s daughter and that he had
Twyford then sought postconviction relief in Ohio state court. Relevant here, he claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of a head injury Twyford sustained as a teenager during a suicide attempt. That injury, Twyford argued, left him “unable to make rational and voluntary choices.” State v. Twyford, 2001 WL 301411, *10 (Ohio App. 7th, Mar. 19, 2001). The Ohio trial court and Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the merits, concluding that “a finding of ineffective assistance cannot be based upon the trial counsel‘s choice of one competing psychological explanation over another.” Id., at *13. The Court of Appeals noted that Twyford‘s counsel had called a psychologist who testified in support of a completely different theory: that Twyford‘s “commission of the murder was his way of protecting the alleged rape victim from the same type of abusive behavior [he] had experienced when he was young.” Ibid. Unlike the head injury theory, this one explained Twyford‘s seemingly deliberate and rational actions: planning a fake hunting trip as a ruse to lure Franks to a remote location, dismembering his body, and disposing of it in such a way as would conceal his identity. This theory was also consistent with Twyford‘s own written confession, which described his plan in detail. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review. State v. Twyford, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1436, 2002-Ohio-2084, 766 N. E. 2d 1002 (Table).
In 2003, Twyford filed a petition in federal court for habeas relief, from which this case stems. Despite the passing of two decades, relatively little has happened. The State moved in 2008 to dismiss many of Twyford‘s claims on the
Twyford then moved for an order compelling the State “to transport [him] to The Ohio State University Medical Center for medical testing necessary for the investigation, presentation, and development of claims.” Motion to Transport for Medical Testing in No. 2:03–cv–906 (SD Ohio), p. 1 (Motion to Transport). Twyford explained that such testing could not be conducted at the prison, and argued that it was necessary to determine whether he suffers neurological defects due to childhood physical abuse, alcohol and drug use, and the self-inflicted gunshot wound to his head. Id., at 3. In support of his motion, he attached a letter from a neurologist stating that “a CT/FDG-PET scan would be a useful next step to further evaluate [him] for brain injury,” in part because previous scans revealed 20 to 30 metal fragments in his skull. App. to Pet. for Cert. 272a. Twyford argued that it was “plausible” that the testing was “likely to reveal evidence in support of” claims and that it “could plausibly lead to the development of evidence and materials” that could counter arguments of “procedural default or exhaustion.” Motion to Transport 8. He also urged the court to disregard, at least for now, the question whether the results of the brain testing would be admissible.
The District Court granted Twyford‘s motion and ordered the State to transport him to the Medical Center. It determined that the order was appropriate under the All Writs Act, which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
The District Court stayed the transportation order pending appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 11 F. 4th 518 (CA6 2021). That court first concluded that transportation orders to gather evidence are “agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
Judge Batchelder dissented, contending that such an order is “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a court‘s jurisdiction only if “(1) the petitioner has identified specific claims for relief that the evidence being sought would support or further; and (2) the district court has determined that if that evidence is as the petitioner proposed or anticipated, then it could entitle the petitioner to habeas relief.” Id., at 529. The majority‘s approach, she argued, allowed Twyford to “proceed in reverse order by collecting evidence before justifying it.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ___ (2022).
II
The State argues that the lower courts erred for two independent reasons. First, the State contends that the All Writs Act does not authorize the issuance of transportation orders for medical testing at all. Second, the State argues that the transportation order was not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” the District Court‘s jurisdiction because Twyford failed to show that the evidence he hoped to find would be useful to his habeas case. We agree with the State‘s second argument and thus need not address the
A
A federal court‘s power to grant habeas relief is restricted under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which provides that the writ may issue “only on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Congress enacted AEDPA “to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases,” Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 206 (2003), and to advance “the principles of comity, finality,
AEDPA also restricts the ability of a federal habeas court to develop and consider new evidence. Review of factual determinations under
If a prisoner “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” a federal court may admit new evidence, but only in two quite limited situations.
We have explained that a federal court, in deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing or “otherwise consider new evidence” under
This is true even when the All Writs Act is the asserted vehicle for gathering new evidence. We have made clear that a petitioner cannot use that Act to circumvent statutory requirements or otherwise binding procedural rules. See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 43 (1985) (“Although [the Act] empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises, it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate.“); Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28, 32–33 (2002) (same). AEDPA provides the governing rules for federal habeas proceedings, and our precedents explain that a district court must consider that statute‘s requirements before facilitating the development of new evidence. See Schriro, 550 U. S., at 474; see also Shinn, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21).
By the same token, a writ seeking new evidence would not be “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal habeas court‘s jurisdiction, as all orders issued under the All Writs Act must be, if it enables a prisoner to fish for unusable evidence, in the hope that it might undermine his conviction in some way. In every habeas case, “the court must be guided by the general principles underlying our habeas corpus jurisprudence.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 554 (1998). A writ that enables a prisoner to gather evidence that would not be admissible would “needlessly prolong” resolution of the federal habeas case, Shinn, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21), and frustrate the “State‘s interest[] in finality,” Calderon, 523 U. S., at 556. Cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 300 (1969) (recognizing, before AEDPA, that a writ is “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal habeas court‘s jurisdiction if “specific allegations”
A federal court order requiring a State to transport a prisoner to a public setting—here, a medical center for testing—not only delays resolution of his habeas case, but may also present serious risks to public safety. See Brief for State of Utah et al. as Amici Curiae 7–18 (describing the dangers inherent in prisoner transport); cf. Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948) (a court should not require that a prisoner be transported if doing so would cause “undue inconvenience or danger“).2 Commanding a State to take these risks so that a prisoner can search for unusable evidence would not be a “necessary or appropriate” means of aiding a federal court‘s limited habeas review.
B
The District Court entered an order directing the State to transport Twyford to a medical facility, concluding that doing so would aid its adjudication of his habeas petition. But the court never determined how, in light of the limitations on its review described above, newly developed evidence could aid Twyford‘s cause. See Twyford v. Warden, 2020 WL 1308318, *4 (SD Ohio, Mar. 19, 2020) (“the Court does not find itself in a position at this stage of proceedings to make a determination as to whether or to what extent it would be precluded by Cullen v. Pinholster from considering any new evidence“). Nor did the Sixth Circuit. See 11 F. 4th, at 527 (“At this stage, on review of Twyford‘s interlocutory appeal seeking a transport order, we need not consider the admissibility of any resulting evidence.“). For the
Reviewing Twyford‘s request for transportation under the proper standard is straightforward, because his motion sheds no light on how he might persuade a court to consider the results of his testing, given the limitations AEDPA imposes on presenting new evidence. He argued that it is “plausible that the testing to be administered is likely to reveal evidence in support of” his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and expert witness, lack of competency to stand trial, and the involuntariness of his confession. Motion to Transport 8. Whether or not that is true, Twyford never explained how the results of the neurological testing could be admissible in his habeas proceeding, and it is hard to see how they could be. The Ohio courts already adjudicated and rejected most of these claims on the merits, and the District Court‘s AEDPA review will therefore be limited to “the record that was before the state court.” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 181. As for the claims that the state courts did not consider, Twyford never argued that he could clear the bar in
Twyford asserted in passing that the desired evidence could “plausibly” bear on the question whether to excuse procedural default. Motion to Transport 8. By way of background, a federal court may not review a claim a habeas petitioner failed to adequately present to state courts, unless he shows “cause to excuse his failure to comply with the state procedural rule and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Davila v. Davis, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). Twyford suggested that the results of his brain testing could help make that showing. But he did not identify the particular defaulted claims he hopes to resurrect, nor did he explain how the testing would matter to his ability to do so. And in any event, this Court has already held that, if
* * *
A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court‘s adjudication of a habeas corpus action,
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
The Court today reviews a District Court‘s pretrial order requiring Ohio “to transport a prisoner in its custody to a hospital for medical testing” in order to develop evidence to support the prisoner‘s habeas petition. Ante, at 1. The Court holds that the District Court‘s order did not comply with the All Writs Act because the District Court failed to consider whether the evidence sought could be admissible in the habeas proceeding. See ante, at 9–10. I would not reach the merits of that question because I do not believe that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the State‘s interlocutory appeal. I respectfully dissent.
I
Courts of Appeals generally have jurisdiction to review “final decisions of the district courts.”
At the same time, interlocutory appeals can sometimes have “important countervailing benefits.” Ibid. Balancing the harms and benefits can be a difficult task, and Congress has prescribed a means for accomplishing that task by way of rulemaking. It has authorized this Court to promulgate rules “defin[ing] when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291,”
It is true that, in the past, we have occasionally done so under what we have called the “collateral order doctrine.” That doctrine allows interlocutory appeal from a “small class” of orders that “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.” Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546. But we have repeatedly stated that this doctrine is a “‘narrow’ exception [that] should stay that way and never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 350 (2006) (“[A]lthough the Court has been asked many times to expand the ‘small class’ of collaterally appealable orders,
We must therefore exercise caution before extending the collateral order doctrine. We have “stringent[ly]” limited that doctrine to only those district court orders “[1] that are conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions completely separate from the merits, and [3] that would render such important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.” Digital Equipment Corp., 511 U. S., at 867–868.
II
A
The Court today extends the collateral order doctrine to a new category of orders, which it describes as “[t]ransportation orders issued under the All Writs Act.” Ante, at 5, n. 1. The Court believes these kinds of orders are collateral and therefore immediately appealable because, it says, they “(1) conclusively require transportation; (2) resolve an important question of state sovereignty conceptually distinct from the merits of the prisoner‘s claims; and (3) are entirely unreviewable by the time the case has gone to final judgment.” Ibid. (citation omitted). I agree that orders like the one at issue here “conclusively require transportation” and are largely “unreviewable by the time the case has gone to final judgment.” Ibid. But I do not agree that such orders “resolve an important question of state sovereignty conceptually distinct from the merits of the prisoner‘s claims.” Ibid. That is so for three reasons.
First, transportation orders do not appear to me to be especially “important.” Even if those orders are unreviewable
We have held that discovery orders are not immediately appealable, even where discovery would require revealing privileged information that, once shared, could not be unshared if the disclosing party prevailed on appeal after final judgment. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 558 U. S., at 108–109. Why should discovery-like transportation orders be immediately appealable when ordinary discovery orders are not? Neither touches upon substantial public interests. And, in both instances, the harms of interlocutory appeal are significant while the countervailing benefits are minimal.
Take first the harms. As I said above, interlocutory appeals “unduly delay the resolution of district court litigation and needlessly burden the courts of appeals.” See id., at 112. In this case, for example, the appeal of the District Court‘s transportation order has lasted over two years. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a (order entered March 19, 2020). If interlocutory appeals were permitted as of right in all similar cases requiring transportation of a prisoner, the resulting delays would impair the ability of district courts to manage their own dockets and supervise trial proceedings.
Second, the Court overstates transportation orders’ impact on “state sovereignty.” See ante, at 5, n. 1. The Court of Appeals noted respondent‘s argument that “discovery orders generally are not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine,” but it distinguished the transportation order at issue here on the ground that it “implicates . . . a federal court‘s authority to compel state action.” 11 F. 4th 518, 523 (CA6 2021). But the mere fact that the appealing party is a State is not, on its own, enough to justify interlocutory appeal. We have never suggested, for example, that a discovery order against a State is immediately appealable simply because it imposes costs on a sovereign State. To allow interlocutory appeal on such grounds would create an anomaly: The State would be able to immediately appeal a discovery order entered against it, but an opposing party would not.
The Court suggests that the transportation order here is not a mere discovery order because it “requir[es] a State to
Other orders might well create similar kinds of risks. A writ of habeas corpus might require the State to transport a prisoner to court to testify or for trial, see
Finally, we have also said that some interlocutory appeals “mak[e] unwise use of appellate courts’ time, by forcing them to decide in the context of a less developed record, an issue very similar to one they may well decide anyway later, on a record that will permit a better decision.” Johnson, 515 U. S., at 317. That warning is applicable here. The question whether the transportation order was proper under the All Writs Act is not conceptually distinct from the merits of respondent‘s habeas claims. In order to obtain a transportation order, the Court says, a prisoner must show that “the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief.” Ante, at 11. Of
All of these concerns suggest that transportation orders like the one here do not satisfy the requirements for interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine.
B
The Court points out in response that “[e]very Court of Appeals to consider the question” has found a transportation order to be immediately appealable. Ante, at 5, n. 1. True. But few Courts of Appeals have been asked to “consider the question.” The Court cites, over the last five decades, only four cases (besides this one) that have concluded that transportation orders are immediately appealable. Ibid. (citing Jones v. Lilly, 37 F. 3d 964, 965–966 (CA3 1994); Jackson v. Vasquez, 1 F. 3d 885, 887–888 (CA9 1993); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F. 2d 476, 479 (CA5 1977); Barnes v. Black, 544 F. 3d 807, 810–811 (CA7 2008)). An average of one decision every decade can hardly be thought to establish a lower court consensus. A contrary determination here would not disturb settled practice.
The Court also asserts that, on one occasion, we have previously reviewed a transportation order. See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34 (1985). But the precedential value of that decision is limited because the opinion did not discuss the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the order. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 511 (2006). It does not set forth a jurisdictional ruling at all.
For these reasons, I would not reach the merits of the questions presented by petitioner. I respectfully dissent.
Justice Gorsuch, dissenting.
The Court granted review to decide whether and under what circumstances a federal district court may order a State to transport a prisoner to a hospital for testing. Later, however, it became clear a potential jurisdictional defect threatened to preclude the Court from reaching that question. The District Court‘s transportation ruling was an interlocutory order, not a final judgment. To address its merits, the Court would first have to extend the collateral order doctrine to a new class of cases. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 545–547 (1949). In a terse footnote today, the Court does just that. Ante, at 5, n. 1.
Respectfully, I would have dismissed this case as improvidently granted when the jurisdictional complication became apparent. We did not take this case to extend Cohen. And this Court has repeatedly “admoni[shed]” other courts to keep “the class of collaterally appealable orders . . . ‘narrow and selective.‘” Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 113 (2009). If anything, this call for caution “has acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking . . . as the preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable.” Ibid.