SHEET METAL WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL UNION NO. 33, APPELLANT, v. MOHAWK MECHANICAL, INC., APPELLEE.
No. 98-403
Supreme Court of Ohio
September 29, 1999
86 Ohio St.3d 611 | 1999-Ohio-209
PFEIFER, J.
Emрloyer and employee—Wages and hours on public works—Alleged violations of prevailing wage law—Union meets requirements of an “interested party” under R.C. 4115.03(F) and is authorized to file complaints pursuant to R.C. 4115.16, when.
[Cite as Sheet Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Mohawk Mechanical, Inc., 1999-Ohio-209.]
(No. 98-403—Submitted January 27, 1999—Decided September 29, 1999.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Knox County, Nо. 97CA13.
{¶ 1} This case arises from a civil action brought by appellant, Sheet Metal Workers’ Union International Association, Local Union No. 33 (“Local 33”), against appellee, Mohawk Mechanical, Inc. (“Mohawk”), for Mohawk’s alleged violations of Ohio’s prevailing wage law for work it did on the Knox County Career Center project (“career center”).
{¶ 2} Mohawk wаs a subcontractor on the project, contracting with the general contractor, American Standard, Inc. (“Standard”), to install some of the necessary heating and cooling equipment at the career center. The contract price was $123,805. The career center project was exempt from the competitive bidding requirements normally assоciated with public works because it fell under
{¶ 3} Mohawk performed various installation and replacement tasks on the project between June 1995 and November 1995. Mohawk did not pay prevailing wage rates to its employees who worked on the career center and did not attempt to
{¶ 4} Local 33 is a labor organization that represents various members involved in the building trades in Knox County. While Mohawk was engaged in the career center project, Local 33 was involved in a labor organization and representation drive with Mohawk’s employees. Thrоugh its involvement with Mohawk’s employees, Local 33 reviewed the employees’ pay stubs and learned that Mohawk was not paying its employees prevailing wages. Local 33 asserts that some Mohawk employees, fearful of retaliation by their employer if they sought to enforce their prevailing wage rights, requested that Local 33 do so on their behalf.
{¶ 5} On Seрtember 18, 1995, Local 33 filed a prevailing wage complaint before the appropriate administrative bureau (such complaints were under the jurisdiction of the Department of Industrial Relations at the time of the filing, but during its pendency became the responsibility of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services [“OBES”]), asserting that Mohawk failed to pay its employees prevailing wages on the career center project. By November 6, 1995, three Mohawk employees, Harry Matheny, John Vesper, and Michael Howell, had signed authorization forms that expressly granted authority to Local 33 to pursue the complaint on their behalf. Over the course of the next year, three other men who had worked for Mohawk on the projeсt signed authorization forms.
{¶ 6} The OBES administrator did not rule on the prevailing wage complaint within sixty days. Pursuant to
{¶ 8} The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
Allotta & Farley Co., L.P.A., Joseph J. Allotta, Richard P. James and Marilyn L. Widman, for appellant.
Weldon, Huston & Keyser and David D. Carto, for appellee.
Ross, Brittain & Schonberg Co., L.P.A., Alan G. Ross and Brian A. Paton, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio ABC, Inc.
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff L.L.P., N. Victor Goodman and Mark D. Tucker, urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Ohio State Building & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO.
Stewart Jaffy & Associates, Stewart Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio AFL-CIO.
Bricker & Eckler L.L.P. and Luther L. Liggett, Jr., urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Mechanical Contracting Industry, Inc.
PFEIFER, J.
{¶ 9} We find that Local 33 meets the requirements of an interested party under
{¶ 10}
“ ‘Interested party,’ with respect to a particular public improvement, means: (1) Any person who submits a bid for the purpose of securing the award of a contract for construction of the public improvement; (2) Any person acting as a subcontractor of a person mentioned in division (F)(1) of this section; (3) Any bona fide organization of labor which has as members or is authorized to represent employees of a person mentioned in division (F)(1) or (2) of this section and which exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of negotiating with employers concerning the wages, hours, or terms and cоnditions of employment of employees; (4) Any association having as members any of the persons mentioned in division (F)(1) or (2) of this section.”
{¶ 11} This case turns on whether Local 33 meets the requirements of
{¶ 12} Standard meets the requirements of division (F)(1). The appellate court seemed to indicate that no one on the career center project could meet the description of division (F)(1), since the project was not competitively bid. However,
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} Since a competitive bid situation is not an element of
{¶ 15} The key question is whether Local 33 was “authorized to represent employees of a рerson mentioned in division * * * (2) of this section.” While the statute requires that the labor organization “exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of negotiating with employers concerning the wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment of employees,” it does not require that it perform that function for the employees at issue.
{¶ 16} The court of appeals еrred in interpreting the statute as stating that “[t]he term ‘authorized’ refers to a bona fide organization being permitted to represent employees * * * for the purpose of negotiating with the employer concerning wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment.” The court concluded that, since Local 33 did not have a collective bargaining agreement with Mohawk, it could not represent those employees in a prevailing wage action.
{¶ 17} There is not even a hint of a requirement in the statute that the labor organization be a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the employer in
{¶ 18} The statute does not require that a majority of employees authorize the representation. Employees of Mohawk took affirmative acts to authorize Local 33 to file a complaint on their behalf. Local 33 сlaims that the union received oral authorization from Mohawk employees to represent them in the prevailing wage complaint. While verbal authorization may be enough under the terms of the statute to allow a union to file a complaint, the record is devoid of any evidence of such authorization. However, within sixty days of the filing of the complaint, threе Mohawk employees had given written authorization to Local 33 to represent them in the prevailing wage action. That action cured any jurisdictional defect that may have been present.
{¶ 19} Therefore, we find that Local 33 met the requirements of an “interested party” under
{¶ 20} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this question and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent.
SHEET METAL WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL UNION NO. 33, APPELLANT, v. MOHAWK MECHANICAL, INC., APPELLEE.
No. 98-403
Supreme Court of Ohio
September 29, 1999
86 Ohio St.3d 611
{¶ 21}
{¶ 22} The union contends that it falls within the definition of “interеsted party” provided by subsection (F)(2) of
{¶ 23} The sole issue before us is whether the union had standing to file a prevailing wage complaint on behalf of employees of Mohawk. We need not, and should not, address Mohawk’s proposition of law on the broad terms presented by it. Instead, this case should be narrowly resolved solely based on statutory interpretation of the language the General Assembly chose to use in
{¶ 24} Had the General Assembly chosen to limit subsection (F)(1) “interested party” status to persons who had submitted competitive bids, it could have expressly so provided. It did not. I agree with the majority to the extent that it recognizes that “interested part[ies],” as defined in
{¶ 26} Like the majority, I also reject Mohawk’s argument that Local 33 does not fall within subsection (F)(3) of the
{¶ 27} I dissent to the judgment of the majority because I believe the record before us fails to demonstrate that the union met the second branch of the three-prong test prescribed by subsection (F)(3). The record fails to prove that the union was “authorized to represent” Mohаwk employees at the time the union filed its administrative complaint.
{¶ 28} On September 18, 1995, Local 33 filed an administrative complaint alleging that Mohawk had violated the prevailing wage law. Local 33 acknowledges that it had no members who were Mohawk employees on that date or at any other time. It contends, however, that it had obtained signed authorization fоrms from six Mohawk employees. The forms stated that the signatories “authorize[d] * * * Local 33, its agents and representatives to represent me in all manners [sic] pertaining to my claims regarding prevailing wage payments, pursuant to any Federal or State law.”
{¶ 29} In my view, the execution of authorization forms may be used to authorize a union to stand in the place of non-member employees in regard to alleged prevailing wage claims. Execution of authorization forms such as those used in this case is analogous to the creation of an attorney-in-fact relationship, and sufficient to satisfy subsection (F)(3), if the forms are executed before the union takes any action on behalf of the employees. That would seem to be a basic principle that applies in a myriad of circumstances.
{¶ 30} In the case at bar, the union did not hold “interested party” status at the time the administrative complaint was filed. In order to demonstrate its standing as an interested party pursuant to
{¶ 31} The majority holds that the execution by Mohawk employees of written authorization forms after the filing of the administrative complaint cured the deficiency. I do not agree. There is no evidence that the union advised the Department of Industrial Relations of the subsequent signing of these forms, and the department’s failure to act on the complaint may well have been based on an administrative determinаtion that the complainant had not demonstrated standing. I note that the printed complaint form provided by the Department of Industrial Relations, and used
{¶ 32}
{¶ 33} There is no statutory provision allowing a complainant to retroactively obtain the necessary interested party status so as to validate a prematurely filed complaint by a complainant who lacked standing. Rather,
{¶ 34} The majority gives new meaning to the legal status of an interested party and to the words “is authorized.” I trust we would not so easily change the meaning of “authorized” if a lawyer who has a right as a member of the Ohio bar to represent a person in a court does so with no authorization by the person to act as the person’s lawyer.
{¶ 35} I would hold that, becаuse Local 33 was not authorized to act for Mohawk employees on the date it filed the prevailing wage complaint, Local 33 lacked standing when it filed the complaint and that the complaint thereby was legally deficient. Accordingly, I would hold that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the prevailing wage claims.
{¶ 36} I therefore respectfully dissent to the judgment of the majority.