MATT SHARPE, Petitioner, v. CRYSTAL WESTMORELAND, Respondent-Appellant (Gregg Sharpe, Intervenor; Kris Fulkerson, Intervenor-Appellee).
No. 5-17-0321
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District
April 11, 2019
2019 IL App (5th) 170321
Rule 23 order filed March 29, 2019; Motion to publish granted April 11, 2019; Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, No. 11-D-1210; the Hon. Martin J. Mengarelli, Judge, presiding.
Decision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, No. 11-D-1210; the Hon. Martin J. Mengarelli, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Appeal Barbara L. Sherer, of Sherer Law Offices, of Edwardsville, for appellant.
Robert R. Stauffer, Clifford W. Berlow, and Sarah F. Weiss, of Jenner & Block LLP, John Knight, of Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., both of Chicago, and Jayni D. Lintvedt, of Courtney Clark Law, P.C., of Belleville, for intervenor-appellee.
OPINION
¶ 1 This interlocutory appeal arises from an order of the circuit court of Madison County issued on April 3, 2017, granting the petition fоr leave to intervene filed by Kris Fulkerson (hereinafter Kris), intervenor-appellee. In granting the petition, the court determined that Kris had standing as a stepparent under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Mаrriage Act) (
¶ 2 The marriage of Mother and Matt Sharpe (hereinafter Father) was dissolved in January 2013. As part of the dissolution, Mother and Father agreed to a joint parenting agreement with respect to their child A.S., who was then seven years old. While the parties shared equal parenting time, A.S.‘s legal residence was with Father. In November 2013, Father entered into a civil union with Kris. A.S. continued to reside with Father and now Kris and her three children. Unfortunately, Father died on January 2, 2017. After Father‘s death, Mother began to deny Kris visitation with A.S. even though A.S. expressed a desire to live with Kris and her children. As a result, Kris filed a petition seeking visitation rights and an allocation of parental responsibilities with respect to A.S.
¶ 3 The issues before us, as certified for interlocutory appeal, are whether a partner to a civil union as defined by the Civil Union Act has standing to request visitation with and parental responsibilities of his or her deceased partner‘s child as a stepparent under the Marriage Act. Questions of law, such as thе proper interpretation of statutes, are to be reviewed de novo. AT&T Teleholdings, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 2012 IL App (1st) 113053, ¶ 28.
*Justice Goldenhersh was originally assigned to participate in this case. Justice Welch was substituted on the panel subsequent to Justice Goldenhersh‘s rеtirement and has read the briefs and listened to the recording of oral argument.
¶ 4 The Civil Union Act provides persons entering into civil unions with the same obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to those persons entering into marriages.
¶ 5 The Marriage Act specifically addresses in part the allocation of parental responsibilities, including establishing visitation with a minor child by an individual who is a nonparent of such child. Requirements of nonparent standing to seek visitation and parental allocation of responsibilities are designed to safeguard the superior right of a natural parent to mаke decisions for his or her child. See In re Custody of M.C.C., 383 Ill. App. 3d 913, 917 (2008) (Illinois law clearly recognizes the superior rights of a natural parent to the care, custody, and control of his or her child). The law presumes the natural parent‘s right to physiсal custody of his or her child is superior to that of a nonparent and that it is in the best interest of the child to be raised by natural parents. In re Custody of M.C.C., 383 Ill. App. 3d at 917. This is the reason why the Marriage Act carves out specific exceptions dеlineating which nonparent individuals have standing to seek to establish rights to spend time or make decisions with or for a minor child not their own.
¶ 6 A stepparent under the Marriage Act is expressly defined as someone who is or wаs married to the parent, immediately prior to his or her death, of the child in question.
¶ 7 We initially note that Kris is asking for relief under the Marriage Act, yet Kris and her former civil union partner, Father, made a conscious choice to enter into a civil union as opposed to a marriage under the Marriage Act. At all times, they had the opportunity to avail themselves of the benefits the Marriage Act affords, but Kris and Father specifically chose not to do so.
¶ 8 More importantly, the provisions of the Marriage Act at issue here were adopted in 2016, well after Illinois began recognizing civil unions in 2011. The Mаrriage Act, even after the most recent amendments in 2017 and 2018, is devoid of any reference to partners joined in civil unions when defining parties that qualify as stepparents for purposes of determining nonparent stаnding under the Marriage Act. We agree that the omission of any reference to partners joined by civil unions in the definition of stepparents reflects a legislative intent not to include civil union partners in the category of nonparents who have standing to seek visitation.
¶ 9 Again, parents have a fundamental constitutionally protected interest to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their сhildren. There is no case law that completely addresses the issue of whether or not a party to a civil union is to be considered a stepparent for standing to seek visitation or allocation of parental responsibilities. Looking for guidance from similar situations of people involved in a minor child‘s life who were not the child‘s legal or biological parent, and were not married to the child‘s legal or biologiсal parent, but who sought visitation or allocation of parental responsibilities with respect to a minor child, we find that the nonparent, even though they may have had a close relationship with the child, could not seek visitation or allocation of parental responsibilities, because he or she lacked standing to do so. See In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 68; In re Visitation of J.T.H., 2015 IL App (1st) 142384, ¶ 28. The underlying principles guiding these decisions dictate that nonparent standing requirements bе strictly construed. Accordingly, we conclude that strictly construing and applying the
¶ 10 In summary, the plain language of sections 600(l) and 602.9(a)(3) of the Marriage Act defines a stepparent only as a person married to the child‘s parent; consequently, only a person who was married to a child‘s parent immediately prior to his or her death may be granted stepparent standing to petition for visitation and parental allocation of responsibilities. The circuit court therefore exceeded its authority in expanding the statutory definition that governs who may and may not petition for visitation and parental rights in relation to a child and erred in issuing the order that granted Kris‘s petition for leave to intervene in this instance.
¶ 11 For the aforementioned reasons, we answer both certified questions for interlocutory appeal in the negative. We reverse the ruling of the circuit court of Madison County and remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
¶ 12 Reversed and remanded.