Shanika Day v. Franklin WootenShanika Day v. Franklin Wooten
Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
I. Background
A. Assumed Facts
Before relating the facts, we first address which facts we must accept or assume for purposes of this interlocutory ap peal of the denial of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs argue we must accept both “the ‘facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment,’ and ... ‘the plaintiff‘s version of the facts.‘” This misstates the standard established by our case law. We are instead presented with a choice be tween “[s]everal sources of undisputed facts [that] may frame our review” of the purely legal question presented by a denial of qualified immunity. White v. Gerardot, 509 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2007). We may “take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment.” Id. (quot ing Washington v. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 549 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007)). Alternatively, “we may conduct our review by ‘accept ing the plaintiff‘s version of the facts.‘” Id.; see also Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 2008). And finally, whether we accept the district court‘s assumed facts or the plaintiff‘s ver sion of the facts, we may also look to undisputed evidence in the record even if the district court did not consider it. White, 509 F.3d at 833 n.5; see also Thompson v. Cope, 900 F.3d 414, 419 (7th Cir. 2018).
Although we are free to choose either the district court‘s assumed facts or the plaintiff‘s version, it is most often appro priate to accept the facts assumed by the district court in its denial of summary judgment. Haupert, 481 F.3d at 549 n.2. Ac cordingly, we accept the district court‘s statement of facts. See Day v. City of Indianapolis, 380 F. Supp. 3d 812, 817–21 (S.D. Ind. 2019). In a few instances, which we note, we look to un disputed evidence not included in the district court‘s order but provided elsewhere in the record.
Terrell Day was eighteen years old and weighed approxi mately 312 pounds1 at the time of his death, with a history of obesity and an underlying heart condition. On September 26, 2015, Day was confronted by a loss-prevention officer outside the Burlington Coat Factory at Washington Square Mall in In dianapolis after Day apparently shoplifted a watch from the store. Day returned the watch but refused to return to the store with the loss-prevention officer. A mall security officer who joined the confrontation noticed Day had a gun in his pocket. There are varying accounts of what occurred next, but it is undisputed that a chase ensued in which Day ran out of the mall, through the parking lot, and across a street to a gas station. He there collapsed on a grassy slope. Law enforce ment soon arrived in response to a radio call describing an armed shoplifter. At this point, the gun was no longer on Day‘s person, but was lying in the grass a few feet away and out of his reach.
Officer Denny, the second officer to arrive on scene, hand cuffed Day behind his back with a single set of handcuffs. He testified that Day‘s hands came together easily behind his back. He noticed Day was overweight, sweating, and breath ing heavily. Day told the officers he was having
Officer Denny initially instructed Day to remain in an up right seated position, which he believed to be the most com fortable position for Day and ideal for the officers’ safety. However, Day would not maintain this position, but instead laid down and rolled down the slope. After two attempts to keep Day seated upright, Officer Denny instead positioned Day to lie on his side. Officer Denny believed this was the best course of action to prevent Day from asphyxiating by rolling onto his stomach. While repositioning Day, Officer Denny ob served Day had defecated on himself. He attributed this to Day having over-exerted himself during the chase.
Sergeant Wooten arrived shortly after Officer Denny de tained Day. Sergeant Wooten monitored Day while Officer Denny completed his investigative duties as the arresting of ficer. Sergeant Wooten and other officers repositioned Day several times when he rolled onto his stomach. Day com plained to Sergeant Wooten that he could not breathe; how ever, Sergeant Wooten was skeptical of these complaints be cause Day also claimed to have done nothing wrong and was asking to be released. All the same, Sergeant Wooten called for an ambulance to evaluate Day approximately five minutes after Day was initially detained. Sergeant Wooten observed that Day appeared to calm down and began to breathe nor mally.
The ambulance arrived, and two paramedics examined Day. In response to their questions, Day told the paramedics he had no preexisting medical conditions. He was able to speak to them in clear, full sentences. Their examination in volved multiple tests, including listening to Day‘s breathing and checking his heart rate, respiratory rate, and blood oxy gen saturation.2 Day‘s hands remained cuffed behind his back throughout the examination. The paramedics concluded Day was breathing regularly and normally. Based on their exami nation, the paramedics believed Day did not need to go to a hospital.
At that point, the paramedics asked Sergeant Wooten to sign a release form so they could transfer custody of Day back to law enforcement. Sergeant Wooten did so. The form he signed was called a “Treatment/Transport Refusal,” and is meant to be signed by a patient when he refuses to be trans ported to the hospital after being evaluated by paramedics. However, when the paramedics determine a handcuffed pris oner does not need to be transported to the hospital, they have an officer sign the form as a witness of the transfer, not as a representative of the prisoner.
Officer Denny requested a “jail wagon” to transport Day to a detention facility. When the jail wagon arrived, the driver found Day unresponsive. At that point Day was lying on his back on the asphalt with his hands still cuffed behind his back. When the driver and Sergeant Wooten attempted to stand Day up, his legs straightened and his knees locked. When Day failed to respond either verbally or physically to two “ster num rubs” (a painful stimulus administered to an unrespon sive subject‘s chest to invoke a reaction), the driver asked Ser geant Wooten to call a second ambulance.
The second ambulance arrived with a different team of paramedics, approximately forty-three minutes after the first
Throughout his time in custody, Day never complained the handcuffs were too tight. Day complained of trouble breathing, but never indicated this was caused or exacerbated by the handcuffs. The first team of paramedics never asked the officers to remove or modify the handcuffs or add a sec ond pair. In addition to the coroner‘s report that Day exhib ited no visible signs of trauma, the autopsy report states there were no “encircling contusions” or lacerations around Day‘s wrists.5 The only indication that the handcuffs were causing a respiratory issue was the autopsy report, which also identi fied for the first time his underlying heart condition.
B. District Court Proceedings
Day‘s mother and father sued under
In arriving at this conclusion, the district court cited an un reported district court case to establish that officers act unreasonably by failing to consider an injury or condition when handcuffing an arrestee. Id. (citing Salyers v. Alexandria Police Dep‘t, 2016 WL 2894438, at *3 (S.D. Ind. May 18, 2016)). The district court also quoted a decision of this court for the proposition that using excessively tight handcuffs and yank ing the arms of non-resisting, non-dangerous arrestees sus pected of committing only minor crimes is clearly established as unlawful. Id. at 828 (quoting Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2003)). Based on these cases, and
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
We first address jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction is lim ited to review of final decisions of the district courts.
The plaintiffs assert we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the defendants, despite claiming to concede the dis trict court‘s assumed facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, are asserting their own preferred version of facts on disputed questions. We have already discussed why the plaintiffs are wrong to argue that we and the defendants must accept the plaintiffs’ version of the facts in this appeal. It is true, however, that we cannot decide disputed fact ques tions in a qualified immunity appeal. We only have jurisdic tion “when the party seeking to invoke it makes a purely legal argument that does not depend on disputed facts.” White, 509 F.3d at 833. Therefore, we must first determine whether the defendants’ argument depends on disputed issues of fact, which would preclude our review.
The primary factual dispute identified by the plaintiffs is whether the first team of paramedics’ medical evaluation was terminated because Day was medically cleared or because Wooten refused further medical treatment. They assert the district court acknowledged this as a disputed issue by stating “Plaintiffs believe Sergeant Wooten refused hospitalization on Day‘s behalf, and had he not signed the Treat ment/Transport Refusal form, the paramedics may have de cided to transport Day to the hospital.” Day, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 820. At argument, the plaintiffs also pointed to evidence that the paramedics may have included false information in their medical report or may have been prevented from con ducting a full examination due to Day‘s hands being cuffed behind his back.
As an initial matter, the suggestion that the paramedics in cluded false information in their report or failed to properly complete a full evaluation are irrelevant to what Officer Denny and Sergeant Wooten knew at the time of the incident. Our analysis hinges on whether reasonable officers under the circumstances would know their conduct violated a clearly established right. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); Sow v. Fortville Police Dep‘t, 636 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that, in an excessive force case, “the ‘reasonableness’ of the use of force is judged from the perspective of a reason able officer on the scene“). Therefore, the only relevant ques tion is what the paramedics communicated to the officers at the scene.
Moreover, even assuming a factual dispute exists regard ing the termination of the examination, we need not resolve that dispute to reach our conclusion today. Even if the officers were not entitled to rely on the judgment of the medical professionals, they were still entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law to put the offic ers on notice that handcuffing Day under the circumstances of this case violated his constitutional rights.
The plaintiffs also dispute whether a second pair of hand cuffs was added to Day‘s wrists and, if so, when it was added. But the district court assumed in its statement of facts that a second pair of handcuffs was added, and that the second pair was added before the second ambulance arrived. Id. at 821. Since we accept the district court‘s assumed facts for this ap peal, we assume this as well. Furthermore, as we explain be low, the addition of the second pair of handcuffs does not change the outcome of this case. Accordingly, we have juris diction to address the purely legal question presented by this appeal.
B. Denial of Qualified Immunity
We review de novo a district court‘s denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense. Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2014). As explained previously, we ac cept the facts assumed by the district court and the undis puted record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. White, 509 F.3d at 833 & n.5.
A public official defendant is entitled to qualified immun ity unless two disqualifying criteria are met. First, the evi dence construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff must support a finding that the defendant violated the plain tiff‘s constitutional right. Second, that right must have been clearly established at the time of the violation. Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2009). Courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). “A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable of ficial would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.‘” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (emphasis added).
The
To defeat qualified immunity, however, the right must be defined more specifically than simply the general right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The Supreme Court has stated that “[s]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where ... it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here ex cessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer con fronts.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018).
The district court defined the rights at issue as Day‘s right to be free from excessively tight handcuffs and his right to have the officers consider his injury or condition in determin ing the appropriateness of the handcuff positioning. The court concluded that the officers’ conduct violated those rights. However, there is no Seventh Circuit precedent clearly estab lishing that the conduct the officers engaged in violated either of those rights.
The plaintiffs point to Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2003), and identify it as the best case to clearly establish the right to be free from excessively tight handcuffs. The district court quoted and cited this case for that principle as well. In Payne, we established the following right: “it was unlawful to use excessively tight handcuffs and violently yank the arms of arrestees who were not resisting arrest, did not disobey the orders of a police officer, did not pose a threat to the safety of the officer or others, and were suspected of committing only minor crimes.” Id. at 780. In Payne, the plaintiff alleged (and we accepted for purposes of the appeal) that two police offic ers grappled and struggled over her arm for thirty minutes as they argued about who would handcuff her, jerked her arm behind her back, slammed handcuffs onto her wrist, tight ened them so tight that she experienced pain and numbness in her hands, and refused to loosen them when she com plained. Id. at 774–75. The plaintiff alleged she was treated this way even though she was not resisting and had commit ted no offense other than voicing disagreement with an irate officer‘s racist remarks. Id.
Payne does not help the plaintiffs because it involves cir cumstances and conduct drastically different than this case. Day was suspected of shoplifting while armed with a gun, a much more serious offense than the plaintiff in Payne (who had allegedly done nothing wrong). It is also undisputed that Day was not cooperative: he repeatedly changed position de spite the officer‘s instructions to remain seated upright, and he argued with the officers to let him go. More importantly, Officer Denny and Sergeant Wooten did not violently yank or jerk Day‘s arms and shoulders, or any of Day‘s person for that matter. Furthermore, the handcuffs in Payne were much tighter than they needed to be to accomplish the purpose of detaining the arrestee, to the point of causing visible physical injury. There is no suggestion that the handcuffs used on Day were any tighter than would have been typically used to re strain an arrestee in similar circumstances. In fact, the coroner noted no visible signs of trauma, and the autopsy report indi cated no lacerations or contusions on Day‘s wrists. The rule announced in Payne is inapposite.
The other cases pointed to by the plaintiffs to establish a right to be free from excessively tight handcuffs—Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2006),
Likewise, Rooni establishes the right of a person “to be free from an officer‘s knowing use of handcuffs in a way that would inflict unnecessary pain or injury, if that person pre sents little or no risk of flight or threat of injury.” 742 F.3d at 742. Once again, the key fact is that the officer must know the handcuffs will cause unnecessary pain or injury. Rooni fo cused on the importance of multiple and specific complaints by the arrestee about the nature of his pain or injury. Id. at 742–43 (collecting cases, distinguishing Tibbs because “plaintiff complained the handcuffs were on too tight but did not indicate the degree of pain,” and a case in which the plain tiff complained once but did not elaborate on degree or nature of pain). Because the plaintiff complained only once that the handcuffs were too tight without further elaboration, we con cluded “there was nothing that would have alerted [the of ficer] to the fact that a constitutional violation was looming.” Id. at 743.
Day never complained that the tightness of the handcuffs was restricting his breathing. The record contains no evidence that there was any indication the handcuffs were the cause of Day‘s breathing difficulty until the autopsy report was re leased. Thus, Day‘s right “to be free from an officer‘s knowing use of handcuffs in a way that would inflict unnecessary pain or injury” was not violated.6
The closely related right asserted by the district court and the plaintiffs is the right to have the arresting officer consider the arrestee‘s injury or condition when handcuffing the ar restee. The district court erred, however, by relying on Salyers v. Alexandria Police Department for the principle that “officers act unreasonably by failing to consider an injury or condition while handcuffing an individual.” Day, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 827. Salyers is an unreported district court opinion. We have con clusively stated that district court opinions cannot clearly es tablish a constitutional right because they are not binding precedential authority. Mason-Funk v. City of Neenah, 895 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 2018). Therefore, if the right relied upon in Salyers is a clearly established one, it must be clearly estab lished by some other source.
Salyers relied on, and the plaintiffs direct our attention to, our 2009 decision in Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2009). That case involved an arrestee with preexisting arm and-shoulder injuries that were exacerbated when law en forcement handcuffed him behind his back. The arrestee in Stainback complained the handcuffs were hurting his shoul ders, but never told the officers of his preexisting injuries. If the officers had
Thus, Stainback only clearly establishes the right to have a known injury or condition considered, together with other cir cumstances, by officers when handcuffing. Stainback fails to clearly establish that Officer Denny and Sergeant Wooten‘s conduct was violative. Just as the arrestee in Stainback com plained generally of shoulder pain but never explained the ef fect of the handcuffs on his preexisting injury, Day com plained he was having trouble breathing but never complained that this was caused or exacerbated by his hand cuffs as opposed to his exertion during the chase preceding his arrest. The officers (and apparently Day himself) were also unaware of Day‘s underlying heart condition, which also con tributed to his lack of oxygen according to the autopsy report.
In Stainback, we acknowledged “in some cases, the fact that an act will cause pain or injury will be clear form the nature of the act itself.” Id. at 772. We concluded, however, that it would not be clear to the officers that the arrestee‘s shoulder pain was caused by the act of cuffing his hands behind his back. Id. at 773. It is even less obvious under the circumstances of this case that Day‘s trouble breathing was caused by hand cuff positioning. The record does not show this would be ap parent to the officers at the time of the arrest.7 Accordingly, like the right in Payne, Rooni, and Tibbs, the right at issue in Stainback to have a known injury or condition considered by officers when handcuffing an arrestee is not implicated by the facts of this case.
Given the facts as assumed by the district court and the information known to the officers at the time of the arrest, the only right plaintiffs can assert would be the right of an out-of breath arrestee to not have his hands cuffed behind his back after he complains of difficulty breathing. We find no Seventh Circuit precedent clearly establishing such a right. The cases relied upon by the district court and the plaintiffs present cir cumstances far different,
One further point must be addressed. The Supreme Court has stated that even in the absence of existing precedent ad dressing similar circumstances, “there can be the rare ‘obvi ous case,’ where the unlawfulness of the officer‘s conduct is sufficiently clear.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018). This case is certainly not one of those rare obvious cases. As already discussed, the handcuffs were used in a manner that would not have harmed an average arrestee, and there is no evidence the officers were aware the handcuffs were causing Day‘s breathing trouble. The officers’ conduct under the circumstances was not obviously unlawful.
III. Conclusion
This case arose from an unfortunate tragedy. However, the officers did not violate any clearly established right. Ac cordingly, the district court‘s judgment denying Officer Denny and Sergeant Wooten‘s qualified immunity defense is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings con sistent with this opinion.