SETTLERS BANK v. WILLIAM BURTON, ET AL.
Case Nos. 12CA36, 12CA38
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, WASHINGTON COUNTY
RELEASED: 01/28/14
2014-Ohio-335
Harsha, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Stephen D. Williger, Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Cleveland, Ohio, and Diane M. Goderre, Thompson Hine, L.L.P, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
James W. Peters, Peters Law Office Co., L.P.A., Woodsfield, Ohio, for appellant Jennifer S. Burton.
Gerald J. Tiberio, Jr., Scott D. Eickelberger, and Ryan H. Linn, Kincaid, Taylor & Geyer, Zanesville, Ohio, for appellee.
Harsha, J.
{1} Settlers Bank (“Settlers“) filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of real property owned by William L. Burton and Jennifer S. Burton to collect a judgment Settlers had obtained against Mr. Burton. In appeals that we consolidated, two of the defendants named in the complaint, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan“) and Mrs. Burton, appeal from certain rulings made by the Washington County Court of Common Pleas in favor of Settlers in the foreclosure case. JPMorgan challenges the trial court‘s entry of default judgment, which extinguished JPMorgan‘s mortgage lien on the Burtons’ property, and the trial court‘s decision denying JPMorgan‘s motion for relief
{2} JPMorgan contends that the trial court erred in entering default judgment against it. JPMorgan first claims that its failure to file an answer to Settlers‘s complaint constitutes an admission of the allegations in Settlers’ complaint that JPMorgan has the first and senior lien on the Burtons’ property. However, Settlers merely alleged that JPMorgan “may have or claim to have an interest in the premises” by virtue of a mortgage. Therefore, JPMorgan‘s failure to answer admitted only that JPMorgan may have an interest, not that the interest was valid and senior to Settlers‘s interest.
{3} JPMorgan next claims that the trial court erred in entering default judgment against it because it granted relief that Settlers had not requested by extinguishing JPMorgan‘s senior lien against the Burtons’ property. But the trial court‘s default judgment did not differ in kind or exceed the relief prayed for in Settlers‘s demand for judgment in its complaint. Settlers expressly requested: that the named defendants, including JPMorgan, be required to come forth and assert their interest in the premises or be forever barred therefrom; that all liens be marshaled; that upon Mr. Burton‘s failure to pay the judgment owed to Settlers within three days, the property be sold free and clear of all liens, claims, and interests of all of the defendants; and the proceeds were to be applied to pay Settlers’ judgment. Because JP Morgan failed to timely appear or otherwise defend against Settlers‘s foreclosure action, the trial court properly entered default judgment against JPMorgan removing its liеn from the property.
{4} JPMorgan further contends that a senior lienholder‘s interest cannot be extinguished by a default judgment rendered against it in a foreclosure action by a junior lienholder. But this rule does not apply where the senior lienholder, who is a party to the foreclosure action and has been sufficiently apprised that its failure to answer or otherwise defend will bar its interest, fails to do so.
{5} Finally, JPMorgan claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion for relief from the default judgment under
{6} In Mrs. Burton‘s appeal, she asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment in which she raises JPMorgan‘s argument that the default judgment did not extinguish its interest in the Burtons’ property. The trial court correctly determined that she failed to establish the requisite standing to raisе this claim and that even if she had standing to raise JPMorgan‘s claim, that argument fails.
{7} Because appellants’ assignments of error lack merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTS
{8} The Burtons own real property in Marietta, Ohio. In 2006, the Burtons executed and delivered to JPMorgan a mortgage of $154,000 securing the property. In
{9} Then in May 2010, Settlers filed a complaint in the common pleas court against the Burtons, JPMorgan, and other defendants. Settlers alleged that it had a valid lien on the Burtons’ property because of its judgment against Mr. Burton and that the оther named defendants, including JPMorgan because of its mortgage, “may have or claim to have an interest in” the same property. Settlers requested a declaration that it had a valid lien on the Burtons’ property, that the defendants “be required to come forth and assert their interest in the premises or be forever barred therefrom,” that all liens be marshaled, and that if Mr. Burton failed to exercise his equity of redemption, that the lien be foreclosed and the property be sold “free and clear of all liens, claims and interests of the Defendants,” with the proceeds going to pay off Settlers‘s judgment lien. The Burtons filed answers to the complaint, but JPMorgan did not, even though it was served with summons and a copy of the complaint.
{10} Settlers filed a motion for default judgment against JPMorgan, which the trial court granted on August 2, 2010. In its decision, the trial court declared that JPMorgan‘s mortgage was no longer valid and removed it from the Burtons’ property. The court mailed a copy of the decision to the parties, including JPMorgan.
{11} Subsequently, the parties filed a series of procedural motions. Settlers filed a motion and an amended motion for summary judgment. Mrs. Burton filed a motion for summary judgment in which she sought, among other things, a declaration that the mortgage executed by the Burtons to JPMorgan constitutes the first and best
{12} In January 2011, over seven months after it had been served with the summons on Settlers‘s complaint and over five months after it had been mailed a copy of the default judgment entered against it, JPMorgan filed a motion for leave to file a memorandum in opposition to Settlers‘s memorandum on its loss of lien priority. JPMorgan thereafter filed a motion for relief from the default judgment pursuant to
{13} On February 2, 2011, the trial court issued a decision granting Settlers‘s motion for summary judgment and denying Mrs. Burton‘s motion for summary judgmеnt. On April 14, 2011, the trial court issued a decision denying JPMorgan‘s
{14} In August 2012, the trial court entered a judgment that resolved all of the pending claims. The court determined that Settlers had a valid lien on the Burtons’ property, subject to the county treasurer‘s lien for real estate taxes owed and Mrs. Burton‘s undivided one-hаlf ownership interest, that JPMorgan was in default and no longer had a valid lien, and that if the Burtons failed to pay the judgment lien, the equity of redemption would be foreclosed and the property be sold, with the sale proceeds
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{15} JPMorgan assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The Court of Common Pleas erred in entering default judgment because the relief the Court of Common Pleas awarded to Plaintiff-Appellee Settlers Bank extinguished JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association‘s mortgage lien and is contrary to Ohio law.
II. The Court of Common Pleas erred in entering the judgment of foreclosure because the judgment entry extinguished JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association‘s mortgage lien and is contrary to Ohio law.
III. The Court of Common Pleas erred in denying the motion of Defendant-Appellant JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure because that motion was made within a reasonable time and less than one year after the entry of default judgment, Defendant-Appellant JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association has a meritorious defense to Plaintiff-Appellee Settlers Bank‘s сlaims, and Defendant-Appellant JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association‘s failure to respond was the result of excusable neglect as contemplated by
IV. The Court of Common Pleas erred in denying the motion of Defendant-Appellant JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure because that motion was made within a reasonable time and less than one year after the entry of default judgment, Defendant-Appellant JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association has a meritorious defense to Plaintiff-Appellee Settlers Bank‘s claims, and relief from default judgment is proper under
{16} Mrs. Burton assigns the following errors for our review:
1. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JENNIFER S. BURTON‘S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON DECEMBER 8, 2010.
2. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT J.P.MORGAN CHASE BANK LOST THE PRIORITY OF ITS MORTGAGE LIEN WHEN DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AGAINST IT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE SETTLERS BANK BY ORDER DATED AUGUST 2, 2010.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{17} JPMorgan‘s assignments of error contest the trial court‘s default judgment against it and the trial court‘s denial of its motion for relief from the default judgment. We review a trial court‘s decision to grant a motion for default judgment under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Queen v. Hanna, 2012-Ohio-6291, 985 N.E.2d 929 (4th Dist. Scioto), ¶ 20. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 103, 2013-Ohio-1777, 991 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 25.
{18} In addition, insofar as JPMorgan claims that the default judgment did not comply with
{19} We review trial court decisions on
{20} Mrs. Burton‘s assignments of error challenge the trial court‘s denial of her motion for summary judgment; appellate review of summary judgment decisions is de novo, governed by the standards of
IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Default Judgment and Judgment of Foreclosure
{21} In its first and second assignments of error, JPMorgan asserts that the trial court erred in entering default judgment against it and extinguishing its lien in its foreclosure judgment. Because these assignments of error are interrelated, we consider them jointly.
{22} JPMorgan first contends that JPMorgan‘s failure to file an answer to Settlers’ complaint in foreclosure constituted an admission that JPMorgan had the first and best lien on the Burtons’ property. Under
{23} In Settlers‘s complaint, it alleged that “Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., may have or claim to have an interest in the premises by virtue of a mortgage in the amount of $154,000 recorded at Official Record Volume 429, Page 821.” By not filing an answer to the complaint, JPMorgan admitted the allegation.
{24} But the allegation admitted by JPMorgan‘s failure to answer merely specifies that it “may have or claim to have an interest” in the Burtons’ property. Notwithstanding JPMorgan‘s claims to the contrary, Settlers‘s complaint did not allege that JPMorgan had a valid “first and best lien” on the property. The complaint averred only that JPMorgan “may have” an interеst in the property. This was permissible and did not represent a concession concerning lien priority. See Winemiller v. Laughlin, 51 Ohio St. 421, 38 N.E. 111 (1894), paragraph two of the syllabus (plaintiff in foreclosure action can bar claim of another lienholder should that lienholder not answer by stating in its complaint that the defendant claims some interest in the property and advising the defendant that its claim or lien will be barred if the defendant fails to appear and disclose it).
{25} JPMorgan‘s citation of Johnson v. Cromaz, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 98-G-2151, 1999 WL 1313552 (Dec. 23 1999), is not persuasive because it is clearly distinguishable. The foreclosure complaint in that case specifically alleged that the defendants were ownеrs of the property at issue. In fact, the majority opinion declared that “Appellees asserted the interest for her.” Id. at *5. Accordingly, a divided panel reversed a trial court‘s order denying a property owner‘s motion to participate in foreclosure sale proceeds even though she was in default for failure to answer. As noted previously, the allegation in our complaint stated only that JPMorgan “may have or claim to have an interest.” This did not constitute an admission or an assertion that JPMorgan‘s mortgage was valid or that it was the first and best lien on the property. Therefore, JPMorgan‘s first argument is meritless.
{26} JPMоrgan next contends that the trial court‘s default judgment should be reversed because the trial court awarded Settlers relief that it did not request by extinguishing JPMorgan‘s lien.
{27}
{28} Settlers‘s complaint specified that the named defendants, including JPMorgan, “be required to come forth and assert their interest in the premises or be forever barred therefrom,” that all liens be marshaled, and that if Mr. Burton failed to pay Settlers‘s judgment lien within the specified period, that the lien be foreclosed and the property be sold “free and clear of all liens, claims and interests of the Defendants,” with the proceeds to pay off the judgment lien.
{29} The demand for judgment in the foreclosure complaint advanced the purpose of
{30} To the contrary, the default judgment barring JPMorgan from asserting its interest in the property because of its failure to timely answer is supported by longstanding precedent. In Winemiller, 51 Ohio St. 421, 38 N.E. 111, at paragraph two of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio expressly held that a lienholder that is named a defendant in a foreclosure action, but fails to answer, is barred from raising its interest thereafter as long as the plaintiff alleged that the defendant claims some interest in the рroperty and advises the defendant that its claim will be barred if the defendant fails to appear and disclose it:
2. The plaintiff in an action to foreclose a mortgage is not required to set forth either the nature of or the facts constituting the claim of another lien holder, in order to bar the latter by a decree against his claim if he should fail to answer. If for that purpose anything more is required than to make him a party, and serve him with legal process, it will be sufficient for the petition to state that such defendant claims come interest in the mortgaged premises, and advises him that his claim or lien will be barred if he fails to аppear and disclose it.
{31} Similarly, in Lexington Ridge Homeowners Assn. v. Schlueter, 9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0087-M, 2013-Ohio-1601, ¶ 20-21, the Ninth District Court of Appeals recently held that a named senior lienholder‘s failure to answer or otherwise defend against a foreclosure complaint instituted by a junior lienholder authorized the default judgment specifying that the senior lienholder had no interest in the property; and that this relief did not exceed the relief requested in the complaint, which requested—as Settlers‘s complaint did here—that all liens on the property be marshaled:
Although the recording statutes provide rules in determining the priority of competing liens, where an action is brought by a lienholder
asking the court to marshal the liens against the property, the burden is upon those parties that allege to have an interest in the property to assert their claims and interests in the property. *** Here, [the senior lienholder] has argued that the division of sale proceeds among [the junior lienholder], [the property owners], and the trust, with no proceeds being distributed to [the senior lienholder], exceeded the relief requested in the complaint in violation of
Civ.R. 54(C) . [The senior lienholder‘s] argument is misplaced. The entry specifically provides that [the senior lienholder] has “no interest” in the property as a result of its default. This determination doеs not exceed the relief requested in the complaint, as [the junior lienholder] prayed that all liens on the property be marshaled, and [the senior lienholder], as a party named in the complaint as having a potential lien upon the property, bore the burden of establishing its interest. *** It chose not to assert its interest, enabling the default judgment that it had no interest in the property.
See also Provident Bank v. Murray, 2d Dist. Greene No. 84-CA-25, 1984 WL 3261 (Dec. 11, 1984) (trial court entered default judgment against senior lienholder in foreclosure action brought by junior lienholder and denied senior lienholder‘s motion for relief from the default judgment). Thus, JP Morgan‘s second argument is meritless.
{32} JPMorgan‘s final contention is that in Ohio, a senior lienholder maintains its lien even when default judgment is entered against it in a junior lienholder‘s foreclosure action. However, the breadth of the second paragraph of the Supreme Court‘s syllabus in Winemiller and the Ninth District‘s recent holding in Lexington Ridge dispel JPMorgan‘s erroneous notion.
{33} Moreover, the cases that JPMorgan cites in support of its proposition are distinguishable and unpersuasive. As discussed previously, the decision by a divided panel of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals in Johnson, 1999 WL 1313552, is distinguishable because the foreclosure complaint in that case included a concession concerning one of the property owners’ interest. And in Mueller v. Petri, 1st Dist. No. C-74692, 1975 WL 182122, *2, (Nov. 3, 1975), the First District Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court‘s order setting aside a confirmation and distribution order following a default judgment against a senior lienholder in a foreclosure action because the plaintiff knew of the lien and “even undertook to put a sum, although not the proper one, in the Confirmation of Sale.” By contrast, Settlers did not specify that JPMorgan had a valid senior lien that was required to be paid before Settlers‘s judgment lien.
{34} As a leading Ohio property treatise explains, a senior lienholder‘s failure to answer a junior lienholder‘s foreclosure action can result in the senior lienholder‘s interest being barred:
Although a senior mortgagee is not a necessary party to an action to foreclose a junior mortgage or lien, it is nevertheless highly desirable to make him a party. One purpose for making a senior mortgagee a party defendant, even though the mortgage to him is not in default, is to obtain an adjudication as to the amount of his lien, in order that the purchaser may be advised of what he is purchasing. Such purpose must be specifically indicated in the complaint. Another object would be to assert that the senior mortgage is fraudulent, or void, or has been paid. For these reasons it is strongly suggested that the holders of prior mortgаges be made defendants in an action to foreclose a junior mortgage or lien, whether the conditions of the prior mortgages have been broken, and whether the senior mortgagees might be cut off through failure to answer. As a practical matter a senior mortgagee is bound to answer, if only to set up whether the obligation to him is due. Otherwise, he runs the risk of having his interest cut off through failure to respond to service of summons.
(Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.) Kuehnle and Levey, Baldwin‘s Ohio Real Estate Law, Section 36:26 (2013); see also Galt Alloys, Inc. v. KeyBank Natl. Assn., 85 Ohio St.3d 353, 708 N.E.2d 701 (1999), paragraph three of the syllabus (“Where a party to a foreclosure proceeding has been served with process in compliance with the Civil Rules and has thereby been provided аn opportunity to answer and appear to protect his or her interests in connection with a foreclosure sale, but has neither answered nor
{35} Therefore, JPMorgan‘s final contention in its first two assignments of error is also meritless. The trial court properly granted default judgment against JPMorgan when it failed to timely answer or otherwise defend against Settlers‘s complaint in foreclosure. We overrule JPMorgan‘s first and second assignments of error.
B. Motion for Relief from Judgment
{36} In its third and fourth assignments of error, JPMorgan asserts that the trial court erred in denying its
{37} JPMorgan‘s argument fails because, as we held in its previous appeal, “JPMorgan could not file a
{38} Moreover, even if we were to consider JPMorgan‘s motion for relief from judgment as a properly filed motion for reconsideration of the default judgment, the trial
{39} The primary basis for JPMorgan‘s claim for relief from the default judgment is that its failure to answer and its delay of over seven months after it had been served with summons and over five months after it had been mailed a copy of the default judgment before it even entered an appearance and requested relief under
{40} “Excusable neglect” is “an elusive concept which has been difficult to define and to apply,” Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), and the determination of whether excusable neglect justifies relief depends upon a consideration of “all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Colley v. Bazell, 64 Ohio St.2d 243, 249, 416 N.E.2d 605 (1980). In general, “a failure to plead or respond after admittedly receiving a copy of a court document is not ‘excusable neglect,‘” Natl. City Home Loans Serv., Inc. v. Gillette, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 05CA3027, 2006-Ohio-2881, ¶ 18, and a defendant‘s inaction is not excusable neglect if it constitutes a “complete disregard for the judicial system.” Kay, 76 Ohio St.3d at 20.
{41} Consequently, “there is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court‘s determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion standard.” Norman v. Hanoverton Motor Cars, Inc., 7th Dist. Hanover No. 11CO13, 2012-Ohio-2697, ¶ 27.
{42} In this case, the trial court determined that JPMorgan‘s conduct constituted a “complete disregard for the judicial system because of its repeated ignorance of various court filings, including the summons on the complaint, numerous notices of hearings sent to it by the Court, the Clerk, and the motions filed by the attorneys,” as well as Mrs. Burton‘s daily rеquests that it intervene in the case.
{43} JPMorgan relies on this court‘s decision in Hopkins v. Quality Chevrolet, Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 578, 607 N.E.2d 914 (4th Dist. Ross 1992), in support of its claim of excusable neglect. In Hopkins, we affirmed a trial court‘s determination that the failure of an automobile dealership to file an answer to a customer‘s complaint was the result of excusable neglect warranting relief from a default judgment under
{44} The trial court rejected JPMorgan‘s argument because: it did not provide sufficient information about what its procedure was and how it was inadvertently not followed; the purported procedure was nоt followed by JPMorgan on many occasions by an unknown number of employees for an extended period of time; and JPMorgan
{45} Here, the only evidence submitted by JPMorgan to support its claim of excusable neglect was a conclusory affidavit of its Vice President, who stated that the company “has an established procedure for receiving legal process and directing legal process to the appropriate person to respond to litigation,” in the foreclosure case, this “process аnd procedure for responding to legal process appears to not have been followed,” and “it appears to that after the summons and complaint were reviewed by [the company], it may have been mischaracterized by [company] personnel.” (Emphasis added.)
{46} This evidence is significantly less detailed than the affidavit evidence presented to the trial court in Hopkins, in which the corporate president specified that the procedure was for all legal matters to be referred to either him or the general manager, that the summons and the complaint were not forwarded to anybody until they were placed on his desk, that neither he nor the general manager were aware of the pending action before that date, and that he had rеason to believe that a specific former employee who had been fired for, among other reasons, failing to follow up on assigned jobs, had failed to forward to summons and complaint to his supervisor. Hopkins at 581-582; see also Kormanik v. Haley, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-18, 2012-Ohio-5975, ¶ 27 (in case affirming denial of motion for relief from default judgment based on excusable neglect in a foreclosure case, the court distinguished Hopkins and a comparable case because “[i]n each of the cases, the defendant corporation‘s motion [for relief from default judgment] included the affidavits of officers and employees who
{47} Moreover, like Wagner v. Bank One Athens, N.A., 4th Dist. Gallia No. 95CA7, 1995 WL 761301, *5, fn. 4 (Dec. 20, 1995), Hopkins is distinguishable from the underlying foreclosure case because that case “involved papers being filed within weeks while the casе sub judice involves months before the first motion was filed.”
{48} To be sure, courts prefer to decide cases on the merits instead of procedural grounds, but that principle must be balanced against the competing principle favoring finality of litigation. Dye, 189 Ohio App.3d 116, at ¶ 14. And although the test for excusable neglect under
{49} In sum, “[g]iven the fine line between excusable neglect and inexcusable neglect and the trial court‘s reasoned decision, we cannot find that the court abused its discretion in finding no excusable neglect,“; we must defer to that reasonable decision rather thаn substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See Norman, 2012-Ohio-2697, ¶ 29, 31.
{50} JPMorgan also contends that it was entitled to relief from judgment under
{51} Therefore, the trial court did not act in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner in denying JPMorgan‘s
C. Summary Judgment
{52} Mrs. Burton asserts in her assignments of error that the trial court erred by failing to grant her motion for summary judgment to the extent she claimed that the court should have declared that the JPMorgan lien was the first and best lien on the Burtons’ property.
{53} However, as the trial court determined she did not present sufficient evidence to establish that she had standing to raise JPMorgan‘s claim. Standing has been held to be a jurisdictional requirement in cases, inсluding those involving foreclosure. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 22. Parties must have standing for a court to decide the merits of a dispute. Utility Serv. Partners, Inc. v. Pub. Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 124 Ohio St.3d 284, 2009-Ohio-6764, 921 N.E.2d 586, ¶ 49. In general, a litigant must
{54} On the record before us, the trial court acted rationally in determining that Mrs. Burton failed to present sufficient evidence and argument to establish that she met these requirements for third-party standing. See Emerson Tool, L.L.C. v. Emerson Family Ltd. Partnership, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24673, 2009-Ohio-6617, ¶ 17 (mortgagor lacked standing to request vacation of foreclosure judgment based on mortgagee‘s alleged failure to provide notice to junior lienholders).
{55} Furthermore, even assuming that Mrs. Burton had the requisite standing to raise JPMorgan‘s contention that it did not lose the priority of its mortgage lien when default judgment was entered against it, for the reasons previously discussed under JPMorgan‘s first and second assignments of error, her contention is meritless.
{56} Therefore, we overrule Mrs. Burton‘s first and second assignments of error.
V. Conclusion
{57} The trial court did not err in granting Settlers‘s motion for default judgment against JPMorgan, denying JPMоrgan‘s motion for relief from judgment, and denying
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellants shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Abele, P.J., & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: _________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.