Dye v. SmithDye v. Smith
{¶ 1} Briоn and Misty Dye filed suit against Celesta Smith, Bradley Smith, Steve Carson, Kyle Carson, and Michael Ash (collectively, “appellants”). The Dyes alleged that the appellants removed a garage from property the Smiths were renting from the Dyes and that during the removal, Mr. Smith, the Carsons, and Ash attacked Mr. Dye. The trial court entered a default judgment against the appellants and found that they were jointly and severally liable for $14,000 in damages for removing the garage.
{¶ 2} The appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding the Carsons and Ash liable because the complaint did not seek damages for injury to the real estate from them.
{¶ 3} In addition, the appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the Smiths’ motion for relief from the default judgment. The Smiths claim that their failure to respond to the complaint constitutes inadvertence or excusable neglect because they thought that the complaint related to a grand-jury investigation of Mr. Dye and his father-in-law for their role in the altercation during the garage removal. However, at the motion hearing, the Smiths admitted that they had received the complaint, read it, knew they were being sued for money damages, and knew they had 28 days to respond to the complaint. And though the Smiths claimed to believe that an attorney was
I. Facts
{¶ 4} In June 2009, the Dyes filed a complaint against the appellants. The Dyes alleged that with their permission, the Smiths had constructed a garage, affixed by a concrete foundation, on рroperty they leased from the Dyes. Subsequently, the Smiths gave the Dyes notice that they wanted to terminate their month-to-month tenancy and planned to dismantle the garage and remove it from the property. Over the Dyes’ objection, the Smiths began to dismantle the garage with the assistance of the Carsons and Ash. The Dyes claimed that when Mrs. Dye and her mother-in-law approached the appellants and demanded that they stop, Mr. Smith, the Carsons, and Ash threatened to physically harm them. When Mr. Dye and Anthony Atkinson (his father-in-law) went to the property, Mr. Smith, the Carsons, and Ash attacked them, causing “significant bodily injury.” The Dyes alleged that after the fight, Mr. Smith, the Carsons, and Ash finished removing the garage from the property. The Dyes claimed that the appellants’ actions were “willful, wanton and intentional” and made the following demand for judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs * * * respectfully demand * * * thаt they be awarded a judgment against the Defendants, CELESTA J. SMITH AND BRADLEY N. SMITH, in an amount sufficient to compensate them for the destruction of the garage on the Plaintiffs’ property, plus interest, both prejudgment and post judgment; that the Plaintiffs be awarded a judgment against the Defendants, BRADLEY N. SMITH, STEVE L. CARSON, KYLE L. CARSON and MICHAEL L. ASH, jointly and severally, fоr bodily injuries suffered by the Plaintiff, BRION K. DYE, as a result of the physical attack on him, plus interest, both pre-judgment and post judgment; that the Plaintiffs be awarded a judgment for punitive damages against the Defendants, CELESTA J. SMITH, BRADLEY N. SMITH, STEVE L. CARSON, KYLE L. CARSON and MICHAEL L. ASH, jointly and severally, plus interest, both pre-judgment and post judgment; that the Plaintiffs be awarded their attorney’s fees and the costs of this action, and other relief as to the Court may seem [sic] just and equitable.
(Boldface sic.)
{¶ 5} After the appellants received service of process and failed to respond to the complaint, the Dyes filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 6} Appellants assign the following errors for our review:
The trial court erred when it granted judgment for damages against defendants-appellants other than Celesta and Bradley Smith for the reduction in value of plaintiffs-appellees’ real property on the assertion that the statute (R.C. Sec. 5301.61) allowed for the recovery of such damages from persons who were not buyers, lessees, tenants, occupants, and who have no interest in the real property.
The trial court erred when it granted judgment fоr damages against defendants-appellants other than Celesta and Bradley Smith for the reduction in value of plaintiffs-appellees’ real property when the demand contained in the complaint only demanded such damages from Celesta and Bradley Smith, who were lеssees and occupants of the real property.
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion for relief from judgment filed by the defendants-appellants Celesta and Bradley Smith.
For ease of analysis, we will address the appellants’ assignments of error out of order.
III. Default-Judgment Damages
{¶ 7} In their second assignment of error, the appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding the Carsons and Ash liable for the damages caused by the garage removal because the Dyes did not request those damages in their complaint. We review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for default judgment under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Ramsey v. Rutherford, Ross App. No. 09CA3094,
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} The Dyes’ complaint alleged that the Carsons and Ash participated in the removal of the garage. However, in the demand for judgment, the Dyes specifically requested a judgment against “CELESTA J. SMITH AND BRADLEY N. SMITH, in an amount sufficient to compensate them for the destruction of the garage on the Plaintiffs’ property.” The Dyes did not similarly request a judgment against the Carsons or Ash to compensate them for the destruction of the garage. Thereforе, the trial court erred in entering a default judgment against them for those damages. See Natl. City Bank at ¶ 2, 8 (finding court erred in granting bank a default judgment and awarding damages against a guarantor on a line of credit because complaint only contained demand for judgment against borrower and nоt against guarantor). Moreover, our resolution of this assignment of error renders moot the appellants’ first assignment of error, in which they argue that
{¶ 10} We note that the Dyes alleged in their complaint that the Carsons and Ash joined Mr. Smith in attacking Mr. Dye. In the demand for judgment, the Dyes specifically requested “a judgment against the Defendants, BRADLEY N. SMITH, STEVE L. CARSON, KYLE L. CARSON and MICHAEL L. ASH, jointly and severally, for bodily injuries suffered by the Plaintiff, BRION K. DYE, as a result of the physical attack on him.” And the court entered a default judgment “against each of the Defendants, jointly and sеverally, on the issue of
IV.
{¶ 11} The appellants jointly filed a
{¶ 12} Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
{¶ 13} The appellants argue that the Smiths (1) timely filed their motion for relief from judgment, (2) were entitled to relief based on excusable neglect or inadvertence under
{¶ 15} The appellants contend that the Smiths’ failure to respond to the complaint constitutes excusable neglect or inadvertence because the Smiths believed that the complaint was “part of the criminal case against the Appellees.” In an affidavit accompanying the
{¶ 16} The Smiths were clearly aware of the pending lawsuit and essentially ignored the matter until after the trial court granted a default judgment on the issue of liability. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
V. Conclusion
{¶ 17} We overrule the appellants’ third assignment of error. We sustain their second assignment of error, and this decision renders moot their first assignment of error. Accordingly, we remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment accordingly.