SET CAPITAL LLC, STEFAN JAGER, NIKOLAY DROZHZHINOV, ALEKSANDR GAMBURG, ACM, LTD., Lead Plaintiffs-Appellants, RAJAN CHAHAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, SHAOLEI QIU, GLENN EISENBERG, Plaintiffs, v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG, DAVID R. MATHERS, TIDJANE THIAM, CREDIT SUISSE AG, CREDIT SUISSE INTERNATIONAL, JANUS HENDERSON GROUP PLC, JANUS INDEX & CALCULATION SERVICES LLC, JANUS DISTRIBUTORS, LLC, DBA JANUS HENDERSON DISTRIBUTORS, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19-3466-cv
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DECIDED: APRIL 27, 2021
19-3466
Set Capital LLC v. Credit Suisse Group AG
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
________
AUGUST TERM, 2019
ARGUED: APRIL 30, 2020
DECIDED: APRIL 27, 2021
No. 19-3466-cv
SET CAPITAL LLC, STEFAN JAGER, NIKOLAY DROZHZHINOV,
ALEKSANDR GAMBURG, ACM, LTD.,
Lead Plaintiffs-Appellants,
RAJAN CHAHAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, SHAOLEI QIU, GLENN EISENBERG,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG, DAVID R. MATHERS, TIDJANE THIAM,
CREDIT SUISSE AG, CREDIT SUISSE INTERNATIONAL, JANUS HENDERSON
GROUP PLC, JANUS INDEX & CALCULATION SERVICES LLC, JANUS
DISTRIBUTORS, LLC, DBA JANUS HENDERSON DISTRIBUTORS,
Defendants-Appellees.
________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.
________
2 No. 19-3466-cv
Before: WALKER, POOLER, and LYNCH,
________
Set Capital LLC, Stefan Jager, Nikolay Drozhzhinov, Aleksandr
Gamburg, and ACM, Ltd. (collectively, Set Capital) brought this
securities class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse Group AG, Credit
Suisse AG, and Credit Suisse International (collectively, Credit
Suisse); Credit Suisse’s CEO Tidjane Thiam and CFO David R.
Mathers (together, the Individual Defendants); and Janus Henderson
Group PLC, Janus Index & Calculation Services LLC, and Janus
Distributors, LLC, doing business as Janus Henderson Distributors
(collectively, Janus). Set Capital principally alleges that, on February
5, 2018, Credit Suisse, Janus, and the Individual Defendants executed
a complex fraud to collapse the market for VelocityShares Daily
Inverse VIX Short Term Exchange Traded Notes (XIV Notes), earning
hundreds of millions of dollars in profit at their investors’
The district court (Torres, J.) dismissed the complaint for failure to
plead a strong inference of scienter. For the reasons that follow, we
AFFIRM in part and VACATE and REMAND in part.
________
MICHAEL EISENKRAFT (Laura H. Posner, Carol V.
Gilden, and Eric S. Berelovich, on the brief), Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, New York, New
York, for Appellants Set Capital LLC, Stefan Jager,
Nikolay Drozhzhinov, Aleksandr Gamburg, and ACM,
Ltd.
HERBERT SCOTT WASHER (David G. Januszewski,
Nola B. Heller, Peter J. Linken, on the brief), Cahill
Gordon & Reindel LLP, New York, New York, for
Appellees Credit Suisse Group AG, Credit Suisse AG,
Credit Suisse International, Tidjane Thiam, and David
R. Mathers
3 No. 19-3466-cv
JASON M. HALPER (Jared J. Stanisci, Gillian Groarke
Burns, Tianyin Luo, Victor M. Bieger, on the brief),
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, New York,
New York, for Appellees Janus Henderson Group
PLC, Janus Index & Calculation Services LLC, and
Janus Distributors, LLC
________
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
Set Capital LLC, Stefan Jager, Nikolay Drozhzhinov, Aleksandr
Gamburg, and ACM, Ltd. (collectively, Set Capital) brought this
securities class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse Group AG, Credit
Suisse AG, and Credit Suisse International (collectively, Credit
Suisse); Credit Suisse’s CEO Tidjane Thiam and CFO David R.
Mathers (together, the Individual Defendants); and Janus Henderson
Group PLC, Janus Index & Calculation Services LLC, and Janus
Distributors, LLC, doing business as Janus Henderson Distributors
(collectively, Janus). Set Capital principally alleges that, on February
5, 2018, Credit Suisse, Janus, and the Individual Defendants executed
a complex fraud to collapse the market for VelocityShares Daily
Inverse VIX Short Term Exchange Traded Notes (XIV Notes), earning
hundreds of millions of dollars in profit at their investors’ expense.
The district court (Torres, J.) dismissed the complaint for failure to
plead a strong inference of scienter. For the reasons that follow, we
AFFIRM in part and VACATE and REMAND in part.
BACKGROUND
This appeal stems from the February 5, 2018 collapse of the
market for certain investment vehicles called XIV Notes. XIV Notes
were a derivative financial product that increased in value when the
market was calm and decreased in value when the market was
volatile. The notes were issued by Credit Suisse and priced based on
the inverse of a volatility index called the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term
4 No. 19-3466-cv
Futures Index (VIX Futures Index).
This case concerns Set Capital’s allegation that, after observing
prior episodes of market volatility, Credit Suisse discerned an ability
to depress prices for XIV Notes by purchasing VIX futures contracts
on days when volatility spiked. In essence, Set Capital claims that
Credit Suisse used this knowledge as part of a scheme to sell millions
of XIV Notes before engineering a near-total collapse in their price
through just 15 minutes of its own trading. Set Capital further alleges
that Janus, although not directly involved in this manipulative
scheme, exacerbated the damage by failing to publish accurate prices
for XIV Notes during the window of time when the value of those
notes collapsed. The complaint alleges that the scheme cost investors
$1.8 billion while at the same time allowing Credit Suisse to realize
more than $475 million in gains.
In the background section that follows, we explain in detail: (1)
the characteristics of XIV Notes, including their relationship to the
VIX Futures Index; (2) the way Credit Suisse’s trading impacted
prices for XIV Notes during prior episodes of market volatility; (3) the
extent to which Credit Suisse and Janus warned investors about risks
of investing in XIV Notes; and (4) the remarkable collapse of XIV
Notes following significant volatility on February 5, 2018. As always
at this stage of the litigation, we draw our discussion of the facts from
the complaint, which must be taken as true.1
1. The Characteristics of XIV Notes
XIV Notes were Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs) issued and
sold by Credit Suisse and placed and marketed by Janus. The notes
were traded on NASDAQ and were related to the Chicago Board
Options Exchange’s VIX Index (VIX Index). The VIX Index is not an
5 No. 19-3466-cv
asset, but rather a measure of expected volatility in the stock market.
When the market expects higher volatility, the VIX Index increases.
When the market expects lower volatility, the VIX Index decreases.
Because it measures expected swings in the market, the VIX Index is
sometimes referred to as Wall Street’s “fear index” or “fear gauge.”2
Although the VIX Index is not a tradable asset, investors may
take a position on future levels of market volatility by purchasing
futures contracts on the VIX Index.3 When viewed in the aggregate,
commodity on a later date at a predetermined price.
the prices of these futures contracts provide a window into whether
investors expect market volatility to rise or fall over a specified period
of time. To help investors digest this information, S&P created the
S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index (VIX Futures Index), which
tracks a portfolio of
The XIV Notes at issue in this case were designed to track the
inverse (or opposite) of the VIX Futures Index. This inverse
relationship between XIV Notes and the VIX Futures Index meant
that investors in XIV Notes would profit from low volatility in the
stock market. As market volatility declined and prices underlying the
VIX Futures Index decreased, the value of XIV Notes would increase
by an equivalent amount. The converse, of course, was also true. As
market volatility increased and prices underlying the VIX Futures
Index rose, the value of XIV Notes would decline proportionally.
In the event of early redemption, acceleration, or maturity of
the XIV Notes, Credit Suisse agreed to pay noteholders based on the
notes’ “closing indicative value.” An affiliate of Janus, Janus Index &
Calculation Services LLC (JIC), calculated the closing indicative value
at the end of each trading day using a formula that automatically
6 No. 19-3466-cv
adjusted the notes’ value based on the inverse of price changes
observed on the VIX Futures Index.4 Because the closing indicative
Indicative Value” of the XIV Notes. J. App. at 187.
value was calculated only once each day, JIC also computed an
“intraday indicative value” every 15 seconds, which was used by
investors trading their notes in the secondary market.5 JIC used the
is responsible for computing and disseminating the Intraday Indicative
Value.” Id. at 135, 145.
same formula to automatically calculate this value, which was
promptly distributed by NASDAQ. Although the intraday indicative
value reflected only a theoretical price for XIV Notes, the secondary
market price tracked the intraday indicative value on a typical day.
To receive a payment from Credit Suisse based on the closing
indicative value, XIV noteholders could redeem their notes early or
attempt to hold their notes through maturity. But noteholders could
not fully control the timing of their notes’ redemption: As disclosed
to investors, Credit Suisse could accelerate the redemption of all XIV
Notes either at its option or upon the occurrence of one or more predefined “Acceleration Events.”6 If Credit Suisse accelerated the notes
sole ability to make determinations with respect to . . . certain Acceleration
Events.” Id. at 187.
at its option, noteholders would receive a payment based on the
closing indicative value on a predetermined date no earlier than five
business days after receiving notice of the acceleration. If Credit
Suisse declared an Acceleration Event, noteholders would receive a
payment based on the closing indicative value on the day the
acceleration was declared. As relevant here, one Acceleration Event
would occur if, at any point, the intraday indicative value of the XIV
7 No. 19-3466-cv
Notes fell such that it was less than or equal to 20 percent of the prior
day’s closing indicative value.7
2. Prior Episodes of Market Volatility Impacting XIV Notes
Due to sustained periods of stability in the market, XIV
noteholders for the most part saw the value of XIV Notes climb from
2010 until 2018. On three occasions in 2011, 2015, and 2016, however,
significant episodes of market volatility caused the value of VIX
futures contracts to spike and, correspondingly, the value of
Notes to drop. During these three volatility spikes, Credit Suisse, as
well as other issuers of volatility-related ETNs, bought large
quantities of VIX futures contracts, which were increasing in value, in
order to offset or “hedge” against potential losses in the ETNs they
issued, which were decreasing in value.8 Each time they attempted
positions on VIX futures contracts. Thus, a drop in the VIX Futures Index
would increase Credit Suisse’s obligations to XIV noteholders but would
also allow Credit Suisse to profit from its short position. See Compl. ¶ 66.
to do so, however, there was insufficient liquidity in the VIX futures
market—that is, not enough VIX futures contracts to meet the
hedging demand. As a result of this liquidity squeeze, Credit Suisse’s
hedging purchases caused the price of VIX futures contracts to spike
over and above what would have been expected based on market
volatility alone. At the same time, these spikes caused the value of
XIV Notes—the inverse of the VIX Futures Index—to temporarily
plummet.
Pursuant to Credit Suisse’s internal risk protocols, all three of
these liquidity incidents were promptly reported to Credit Suisse’s
Capital Allocation and Risk Management Committee (CARMC), of
which the Individual Defendants were members. In response, Credit
8 No. 19-3466-cv
Suisse sought alternative ways to hedge its own exposure to XIV
Notes. On July 1, 2016, Credit Suisse announced (July 2016
Announcement) that it may condition all future sales of XIV Notes on
the counterparty’s agreement “to sell to Credit Suisse certain hedging
instruments consistent with Credit Suisse’s hedging strategy,
including but not limited to swaps.”9
Following the July 2016 Announcement, Credit Suisse
increased the volume of XIV Notes in the market. On June 30, 2017,
it offered an additional 5,000,000 notes on top of the roughly 9,000,000
notes that were already issued and outstanding. And on January 29,
2018, it offered another 16,275,000 notes on top of the roughly
10,800,000 notes then-outstanding. While only a portion of the
16,275,000 notes were ultimately sold between January 29 and
February 5, this last offering flooded the market with millions of XIV
Notes just days before their value collapsed.10 Notably, Credit Suisse
4,200,000 of the 16,275,000 XIV Notes offered, increasing the volume of XIV
Notes outstanding by more than 38.9%. This increase does not account for
additional sales of XIV Notes that may have occurred between February 3
and February 5, 2018, at which point the market for XIV Notes collapsed.
offered and issued these notes despite shareholder pressure to
eliminate sales of volatility-related ETNs. It also took these actions
even though increasing the volume of XIV Notes outstanding would
require Credit Suisse, in the event of another jump in market
volatility, to increase its hedging activity by purchasing additional
VIX futures contracts. As Credit Suisse knew, these purchases would
exacerbate the illiquidity that contributed to the three prior price
drops of XIV Notes in 2011, 2015, and 2016.
9 No. 19-3466-cv
3. Disclosures in the Offering Documents
Credit Suisse and Janus issued a prospectus for the XIV Notes
as well as a supplement (together, the Offering Documents) in
connection with their offering of the 16,275,000 notes on January 29,
2018. The Offering Documents detailed the structure of XIV Notes
(referred to in the documents as “ETNs”), the conditions under
Credit Suisse would pay XIV noteholders, and the methods for
calculating the closing and intraday indicative values.
The Offering Documents also contained numerous warnings
concerning risks of investing in XIV Notes. They informed investors
that XIV Notes were “designed as short-term trading vehicles for
investors managing their portfolios on a daily basis.”11 They warned
investors that “[t]he long term expected value of your ETNs is zero,”
and emphasized that “[i]f you hold your ETNs as a long term
investment, it is likely that you will lose all or a substantial portion of
your investment.”12
The Offering Documents also cautioned investors that Credit
Suisse intended to hedge its exposure to XIV Notes through trading
in related securities, including VIX futures contracts used to calculate
the VIX Futures Index. In one section, the Offering Documents stated
that “this hedging activity could affect the value of the [VIX Futures]
Index, and accordingly the value of the ETNs.”13 In another section,
they stated, “Although we and our affiliates have no reason to believe
that our or their hedging activities will have a material impact on the
level of the applicable underlying [VIX Futures] Index, there can be
no assurance that the level of the applicable underlying Index will not
10 No. 19-3466-cv
be affected.”14 The Offering Documents acknowledged that Credit
Suisse’s hedging trades “may result in [Credit Suisse’s] receipt of a
profit, even if the market value of the ETNs declines,”15 and further
warned that Credit Suisse’s trading activity “may present a conflict”
between the bank’s interests and the interests of investors.16
The Offering Documents additionally advised investors of risks
related to the pricing of XIV Notes and Credit Suisse’s rights to
accelerate the notes. With respect to the pricing of XIV Notes, they
disclosed that the intraday indicative value may not accurately reflect
the economic value of XIV Notes traded on the secondary market.
They advised that “[t]he Intraday Indicative Value calculation is not
intended as a price or quotation, or as an offer or solicitation for the
purchase, sale, redemption, acceleration or termination of your ETNs,
nor will it reflect hedging or transaction costs, credit considerations,
market liquidity or bid-offer spreads.”17 The Offering Documents
further warned that the published prices on the VIX Futures Index
could be subject to “delay or postponement,” which in turn would
affect the accuracy of the intraday indicative value.18 With respect to
acceleration, they specifically advised investors that Credit Suisse
retained the right to accelerate the notes at any time19 and warned
day. See id. at 183. It could declare an Acceleration Event only in certain
circumstances. Id.
that, in the event of an acceleration, investors were “likely to lose part
or all of [their] initial investment.”20
11 No. 19-3466-cv
Following their review of the Offering Documents, Set Capital
purchased XIV Notes during the class period of January 29 through
February 5, 2018. During this
for prices as high as $135 per note, and the market cap for XIV Notes
increased to approximately $1.9 billion.
4. Market Volatility on February 5, 2018 and the Collapse of the
Market for XIV Notes
On February 5, 2018, the S&P 500 dropped 4.1 percent. As
before, this spike in market volatility increased prices for VIX futures
contracts comprising the VIX Futures Index and accordingly
decreased the value of XIV Notes. Over the course of regular trading
on February 5, the intraday indicative value of the nearly 15 million
XIV Notes outstanding dropped more than 30 percent from $108.37
to $72.59.
Within 15 minutes after the close of regular trading at 4:00 p.m.,
Credit Suisse purchased more than 105,000 VIX futures contracts to
hedge its exposure in sales of XIV Notes. Credit Suisse’s purchases
amounted to roughly one-fourth of the entire VIX futures market,
which drove up trading to more than 167 times the usual volume. As
was the case with the three prior incidents of market volatility, Credit
Suisse’s hedging trades contributed to a liquidity squeeze that caused
the prices of VIX futures contracts to skyrocket. By 4:09 p.m., just nine
minutes into Credit Suisse’s hedge, this further spike in prices on the
VIX Futures Index caused the value of XIV Notes to plummet to
approximately $20. Six minutes later, by 4:15 p.m., Credit Suisse’s
continued purchases of VIX futures contracts drove down the value
12 No. 19-3466-cv
of XIV Notes to just over $4—a drop of more than 96 percent from the
prior day’s closing indicative value.21
in the S&P 500 should have caused prices for VIX futures contracts to jump
by approximately 15 to 25 percent. As a result of Credit Suisse’s hedging
trades, those prices in fact increased by nearly 100 percent. See Compl.
¶ 170.
On top of all this, for one hour from 4:09 p.m. to 5:09 p.m., the
intraday indicative value for XIV Notes was not updated every 15
seconds as required and did not reflect an accurate valuation of the
notes. Instead, during this hour, the intraday indicative value
updated only sporadically and valued the XIV Notes at about $24 to
$27 per note (the Flatline Value). This published Flatline Value
persisted notwithstanding that, in reality, each note almost
immediately was worth between $4.22 and $4.40.22 It was not until
intraday indicative value failed to accurately track the inverse of the VIX
Futures Index, because that index had itself flatlined during the one hour
in question. See Br. of Def.-Appellee Janus at 30–31; J. App. at 414–71.
5:09 p.m. (and after more than thirty minutes during which the
intraday indicative value failed to update at all) that NASDAQ
disseminated the correct intraday indicative value of $4.22.23 During
reported as $27.0855, before updating at 4:12:33 p.m. to a value of $27.1951,
updating at 4:12:47 p.m. to a value of $26.3182 and then, at 4:13:03 p.m.,
updating to a value of $24.8933. There were slight fluctuations in the
intraday indicative value until 4:38:34 p.m. when the value froze at
$24.6961. See Compl. ¶ 174. There was no update thereafter until 5:09:05
p.m. when the value was reported as $4.2217. Id.
this hour, investors purchased more than $700 million in XIV Notes
at inflated secondary market prices based on their incorrect belief that
XIV Notes had weathered the spike in market volatility without
triggering an Acceleration Event.
13 No. 19-3466-cv
intraday indicative value of the XIV Notes plummeted more than 80
percent from the prior day’s closing indicative value. Accordingly,
on February 6, 2018, Credit Suisse issued a press release stating that
the XIV Notes had experienced an Acceleration Event and that Credit
Suisse would permanently cease issuing new XIV Notes. Shortly
thereafter, Credit Suisse delivered an irrevocable call notice for all
notes outstanding, selecting February 15 as the accelerated valuation
date. On February 21, Credit Suisse terminated all XIV Notes and
paid each investor $5.99 per note, the closing indicative value on
February 15, 2018. This resulted in approximately $1.8 billion in
market losses to investors, many of whom were Credit Suisse’s own
clients.
On April 25, 2018, Credit Suisse’s quarterly report stated that
its equity sales and trading division earned approximately $490
million for its own account in the prior fiscal quarter “due to more
favorable trading conditions, particularly higher levels of volatility
which benefited our derivatives business.”24 Although Credit
Suisse’s records are not publicly available, Set Capital estimates that
Credit Suisse earned between $475 and $542 million in profits when
it redeemed the XIV Notes.
5. Prior Proceedings
After several plaintiffs sued Credit Suisse and Janus following
the collapse of the XIV Notes, the actions were consolidated and Set
Capital, one of the lead plaintiffs, filed a class action complaint. The
complaint principally asserts three theories of primary liability under
Sections 9(a) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)25 and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
14 No. 19-3466-cv
(Securities Act).26 First, Set Capital claims that Credit Suisse and the
Individual Defendants engaged in a scheme to manipulate the market
in violation of Section 10(b) by issuing millions of XIV Notes in
January and February 2018 knowing or recklessly disregarding that
their own hedging activity would trigger a liquidity squeeze in VIX
futures contracts, destroy the value of XIV Notes, and allow Credit
Suisse to accelerate the notes’ redemption at a substantial loss to
investors while locking in a profit for its own account. Second, Set
Capital claims that Credit Suisse and Janus made a material
misstatement or omission in violation of Sections 9(a) and 10(b) by
failing to correct the Flatline Value during afterhours trading on
February 5. Third, Set Capital claims that the Offering Documents
issued by Credit Suisse and Janus contained material misstatements
or omissions in violation of Sections 10(b) and 11 by repeatedly
warning of “risks” they knew were certain to occur. In addition, Set
Capital claims that Credit Suisse and Janus are secondarily liable as
“control persons” of Credit Suisse International (CSI) and JIC under
Section 15 of the Securities Act27 and Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act.28
Credit Suisse, Janus, and the Individual Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint on November 2, 2018. On August 16, 2019, the
magistrate judge (Netburn, J.) recommended dismissal of all claims
on the basis that Set Capital failed to plead a primary violation of
Section 10(b), which overlaps in substance with the elements of
Set Capital failed to allege an actionable misstatement or omission in
the Offering Documents and that, although Set Capital sufficiently
alleged acts of market manipulation and a misrepresentation in the
15 No. 19-3466-cv
Flatline Value, the complaint failed to support a strong inference of
scienter. Because in the magistrate judge’s view the complaint failed
to allege a primary violation, the magistrate judge also recommended
dismissal of Set Capital’s secondary claims under Sections 15 and
20(a). On September 25, the district court issued an order adopting
the recommendations of the magistrate judge in full and dismissing
the action with prejudice. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure
to state a claim de novo, “accepting all factual claims in the complaint
as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor.”29 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
2012) (quoting Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d
Cir. 2010)).
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’”30 A claim is facially plausible “when the
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”31
2021) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
A complaint alleging securities fraud must also satisfy
heightened pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA).32 Rule 9(b) requires litigants to “state with
2007).
16 No. 19-3466-cv
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”33 To do so, a
plaintiff must “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends
were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when
the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were
fraudulent.”34 The PSLRA, in turn, requires a plaintiff alleging
Anschutz, 690 F.3d at 108).
securities fraud to (1) specify each misleading statement, (2) set forth
the facts on which a belief that a statement is misleading was formed,
and (3) state with particularity facts giving rise to a “strong inference”
that the defendant acted with scienter—the required state of mind.35
In this appeal, Set Capital argues that the district court erred by
dismissing its market manipulation and Flatline Value claims for
failure to plead a strong inference of scienter. Set Capital also argues
that the district court erred when it concluded that the complaint does
not allege actionable misstatements or omissions in the Offering
Documents. For the reasons that follow, we agree with Set Capital in
part. We conclude that the complaint plausibly alleges a strong
inference of scienter to support Set Capital’s claim for market
manipulation, and that it has identified
omissions in the Offering Documents. We agree with the district
court, however, that the complaint does not support a strong
inference that Credit Suisse and Janus acted with scienter when they
failed to correct the Flatline Value during afterhours trading on
February 5.
17 No. 19-3466-cv
I. The Manipulative Scheme
In proscribing the use of a “manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance,”36 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act “prohibits not
Rule 10b-5).
only material misstatements but also manipulative acts.”37 To state a
(2019) (explaining that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b5 “capture a wide range of conduct” and are “intended to root out all
manner of fraud in the securities industry”).
claim for market manipulation under Section 10(b), a plaintiff must
plausibly allege “(1) manipulative acts; (2) damage (3) caused by
reliance on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation;
(4) scienter; (5) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities;
(6) furthered by the defendant’s use of the mails or any facility of a
national securities exchange.”38
As we have described above, Set Capital claims that Credit
Suisse and the Individual Defendants manipulated the market by
issuing millions of additional XIV Notes knowing or recklessly
disregarding the virtual certainty that their own hedging activity
would trigger a liquidity squeeze in VIX futures contracts, destroy the
value of XIV Notes, and allow Credit Suisse to accelerate and redeem
the notes at a substantial loss to investors while locking in a profit for
its own account. Credit Suisse and the Individual Defendants
contend that, even accepting these allegations as true, the complaint
fails to allege a “manipulative act” and does not plead a strong
inference of “scienter.” We disagree and hold that Set Capital has
alleged a plausible claim of liability for market manipulation.
18 No. 19-3466-cv
A. Manipulative Act
We turn first to the threshold question of whether Set Capital
has plausibly alleged a “manipulative act.” As the Supreme Court
has observed, the word “manipulative” is “virtually a term of art
when used in connection with securities markets.”39 It “refers
generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting
market activity,”40 and “connotes intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securities.”41 For market activity to “artificially”
affect a security’s price, we generally ask whether the transaction or
series of transactions “sends a false pricing signal to the market”42 or
otherwise distorts estimates of the “underlying economic value” of
the securities traded.43 While a defendant may manipulate the market
Cir. 1995)).
through open-market
nondisclosure is required.45 Deception is the gravamen of a claim for
Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1100–01 (holding that “dissemination of false or
misleading statements with intent to defraud” can qualify as a
“manipulative or deceptive device” prohibited by Section 10(b) and SEC
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)).
market manipulation, and “the market is not misled when a
transaction’s terms are fully disclosed.”46
citation omitted).
19 No. 19-3466-cv
The complaint alleges manipulative conduct that is actionable
under Section 10(b). Accepting the well-pleaded facts as true, three
prior volatility spikes in 2011, 2015, and 2016 demonstrated the
impact of Credit Suisse’s hedging trades. Each time volatility spiked,
Credit Suisse’s hedging contributed to a liquidity squeeze in VIX
futures contracts that depressed the value of XIV Notes further than
what would have been expected from market volatility alone. The
complaint alleges that Credit Suisse and the Individual Defendants
used this knowledge as part of an undisclosed scheme to profit at
their investors’ expense. By offering 5,000,000 XIV Notes on June 30,
2017 and another 16,275,000 notes on January 29, 2018—millions of
which were ultimately issued—Credit Suisse exacerbated the risk of
illiquidity in the VIX futures market and created conditions in which
it knew that its hedging trades would destroy the value of XIV Notes
during the next volatility spike. When that spike occurred days later
on February 5, 2018, Credit Suisse executed on the alleged scheme. It
purchased more than 105,000 VIX futures contracts, caused the price
of XIV Notes to plummet by more than 96 percent, and declared an
Acceleration Event to lock in its profit. If proven at trial, this alleged
conduct was manipulative under our precedents.
Credit Suisse argues that the complaint fails to allege any
“artificial” impact on the price of XIV Notes because its hedging
trades were “done openly” for the legitimate purpose of “manag[ing]
risk,” not deceiving investors.47 To be sure, it is generally true that
short selling or other hedging activity is not, by itself, manipulative—
even when it occurs in high volumes and even when it impacts the
market price for a security.48 But here, the complaint alleges more
than routine hedging activity: It alleges that Credit Suisse flooded the
market with millions of additional XIV Notes for the very purpose of
20 No. 19-3466-cv
enhancing the impact of its hedging trades and collapsing the market
for the notes. In this context, it is no defense that Credit Suisse’s
transactions were visible to the market and reflected otherwise legal
activity. Open-market transactions that are not inherently
manipulative may constitute manipulative activity when
accompanied by manipulative intent.49 In some cases, as here,
investors as to how other market participants have valued a security”).
“scienter is the only factor that distinguishes legitimate trading from
improper manipulation.”50 To
cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1235 (2016) (holding that a “burst of trading” on the
open market, combined with manipulative intent, was enough to violate
the Exchange Act); Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding that “manipulation can be illegal solely because of the actor’s
purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
hedged for a legitimate purpose, its position contradicts the
complaint. As we discuss in detail below, Set Capital specifically
alleges that Credit Suisse executed its hedging trades on February 5
for a manipulative purpose—to trigger a liquidity squeeze that would
destroy the value of XIV Notes.
B. Scienter
We turn next to the element of scienter. To establish scienter,
“a complaint may (1) allege facts that constitute strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness, or (2) allege facts
to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit
fraud.”51 As the Supreme Court has instructed, we evaluate the
Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2000)).
sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations of scienter “holistically,”
considering “all of the facts alleged, taken collectively,” rather than
“any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation.”52 For an inference of scienter to be “strong,” as required by the
Evidence of Conscious Misbehavior or Recklessness
The complaint alleges circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness that, when viewed holistically and together with the allegations of motive and opportunity, supports a strong inference of scienter.
First, the complaint plausibly alleges that Credit Suisse and the Individual Defendants knew that, on days when market volatility increased, Credit Suisse’s hedging trades would cause a spike in the price for VIX futures contracts and an equally significant drop in the price for XIV Notes. As alleged in the complaint, Credit Suisse and the Individual Defendants would have become aware of this dynamic by observing the impact of their hedging trades during the three prior volatility spikes. On each of those occasions, Credit Suisse observed a liquidity squeeze in the VIX futures market which, as it caused prices for VIX futures contracts to spike, contributed to a sharp drop in the price for XIV Notes. A juror could reasonably infer that Credit Suisse was aware of this dynamic not only because the bank is a highly sophisticated financial institution and had experienced it first-hand on prior occasions, but also because of the actions that Credit
Suisse and the Individual Defendants took in response. Just seven days after the third spike in 2016, Credit Suisse (with approval from CARMC) issued the July 2016 Announcement conditioning the sale of new ETNs on the counterparty’s agreement to sell to Credit Suisse additional hedging instruments. Drawing all inferences in favor of Set Capital, a reasonable juror could conclude from this evidence that Credit Suisse recognized the danger of illiquidity in the VIX futures
Second, the complaint plausibly alleges that Credit Suisse knowingly or recklessly exacerbated the liquidity squeeze it had already observed in the VIX futures market by increasing the number of XIV Notes outstanding through its offerings of June 30, 2017 and January 29, 2018. When Credit Suisse offered 16,275,000 XIV Notes on the latter date, it knew that the scale of its hedging strategy would have to increase to account for its additional sales even though the liquidity in the VIX futures market would remain roughly the same. From these facts, a reasonable juror could conclude that Credit Suisse and the Individual Defendants sold millions of these notes either knowing or recklessly disregarding a substantial risk that, when the next volatility event occurred, Credit Suisse’s hedging trades would have an even greater negative impact on the value of XIV Notes than they had before. Moreover, the complaint specifically alleges that the Individual Defendants were aware of this risk, as Credit Suisse’s expansion of XIV Notes breached internal risk limits and thus required approval by CARMC. Accepting these allegations as true, the complaint invites a reasonable inference that Credit Suisse increased the volume of XIV Notes for a manipulative purpose—specifically, to ensure that Credit Suisse’s hedging trades would
destroy the value of XIV Notes during the next volatility spike so that Credit Suisse could profit by declaring an Acceleration Event.
In addition to these central facts, the complaint alleges supporting evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness that bolsters the inference of manipulative intent. Most significantly, Credit Suisse made false or misleading public statements regarding the expected impact of its hedging trades and the basis for Credit Suisse’s decision to declare an Acceleration Event. In the Offering Documents, for example, Credit Suisse minimized the expected impact of its hedging trades by stating that its hedging activity “could affect” the value of the VIX Futures Index54 while at the same time affirming that it had “no reason to believe” that any impact would be “material.”55 One of the Individual Defendants, Credit Suisse CEO Tidjane Thiam, also stated on February 14, 2018 that Credit Suisse announced an Acceleration Event because XIV Notes had “stopped trading,” when in fact they had not.56 Although these statements are relevant only if we assume the truth of other allegations in the complaint, they tend to support a culpable inference because the complaint plausibly alleges that Credit Suisse and Thiam “knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements were not accurate.”57 In addition to these facts, the massive economic impact of the alleged manipulation, as well as the SEC’s decision to
investigate Credit Suisse following the collapse of the XIV Notes, strengthen the inference that Set Capital asks us to draw.58
Credit Suisse also contends that the July 2016 Announcement does not qualify as a “specific document” demonstrating that Credit
Suisse understood the impact of its hedging activity and knew that a future volatility spike would occur.60 We disagree. At the time of the July 2016 Announcement, Credit Suisse had observed five years of low market volatility punctuated by three volatility spikes. During each spike in volatility, Credit Suisse’s hedging trades created a liquidity squeeze that depressed the value of XIV Notes. Although we readily acknowledge that “no market movements are certain,”61 sophisticated investors like Credit Suisse routinely analyze patterns in market data to attempt to predict and profit from future market activity. Here, the July 2016 Announcement was issued only seven days after the most significant volatility spike in 2016 and it granted Credit Suisse the right to obtain additional instruments to hedge its exposure to sales of XIV Notes. Drawing all inferences in favor of Set Capital, the announcement directly reflected Credit Suisse’s awareness of the impact of its hedging strategy as well as its view that occasional spikes in market volatility would likely continue.
Finally, Credit Suisse and the Individual Defendants argue that the SEC’s investigation cannot animate Set Capital’s “far-fetched” theory of scienter, and that the magnitude of the alleged fraud was necessarily de minimis because Credit Suisse fully hedged its position.62 We agree with Credit Suisse that neither the SEC investigation nor the magnitude of the alleged fraud independently raises a compelling inference of manipulative intent; we view these facts principally as supporting culpable inferences drawn from stronger allegations discussed earlier. We disagree, however, with
Credit Suisse’s renewed assertion
Evidence of Motive or Opportunity
The complaint also points to evidence supporting Credit Suisse’s motive and opportunity to engage in the alleged manipulative scheme. First, the structure of the XIV Notes, which would allow Credit Suisse to profit if the value of the notes collapsed, provided both motive and opportunity for Credit Suisse to manipulate the market. Credit Suisse’s effort, through its January 29 offering, to more than double the volume of XIV Notes outstanding enhanced the opportunity for manipulative acts in the days leading up to the market’s collapse. Second, the complaint plausibly alleges that Thiam was under significant pressure to shift Credit Suisse’s investment arm away from volatile assets like XIV Notes. Accepting these allegations as true, Credit Suisse’s scheme to expand and then destroy the value of XIV Notes would have allowed the bank to profit substantially while realizing Thiam’s strategic goal of “right-sizing” Credit Suisse’s investment division.64 Third, the complaint alleges that, in March 2018, Thiam was awarded a $10.2 million bonus for successfully shifting Credit Suisse away from volatile assets such as XIV Notes. We conclude that, on balance, these allegations support a
strong inference of scienter when viewed together with the evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.
Credit Suisse first argues that the structure of the XIV Notes does not demonstrate motive or opportunity to commit fraud because Credit Suisse had fully hedged its exposure to sales of XIV Notes. We have already rejected this argument in a related context, and we conclude that it is no more persuasive here. Even assuming that Credit Suisse had fully hedged its position, Credit Suisse’s argument does not account for its offer to more than double the volume of XIV Notes in the market, use its hedging trades to depress prices for XIV Notes, and leverage the favorable redemption rights that it built into the Offering Documents so that it could profit at investors’ expense. As alleged in the complaint, this perfect storm was created through Credit Suisse’s market activity, but it would not have been possible without the self-dealing structure of the XIV Notes.
Credit Suisse also challenges Set Capital’s theory of Thiam’s motive to manipulate the market. Specifically, it asserts that “it would have been illogical for Mr. Thiam and Credit Suisse to attempt to reduce Credit Suisse’s exposure to risky assets by increasing its exposure to risky assets.”65 Credit Suisse also points to the fact that it “made good on Thiam’s promise” to reduce exposure to such assets by closing two other VIX-related ETNs through the “simple exercise” of its right to do so—without an allegation of fraud.66 But these arguments falter in the face of the facts alleged in the complaint. If Thiam intended to
exposure through the alleged manipulative scheme.67 The fact that Credit Suisse could have offloaded these risky assets without expanding its position does not diminish the inference of scienter but rather supports it.
Finally, Credit Suisse argues that Thiam’s $10.2 million bonus had no connection to the February 2018 collapse of XIV Notes because it was issued as compensation for the prior fiscal year. While Set Capital emphasizes that the discretionary bonus was paid after the XIV Notes collapsed and specifically celebrated that Thiam’s “strategic shift” was “paying off,”68 we agree with Credit Suisse that the culpable inference here is not strong because the complaint alleges that the bonus was compensation for 2017. We therefore accord this fact only limited weight.
In summary, we conclude that the complaint plausibly alleges both motive and opportunity to commit a manipulative act, as well as strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. Taken together, these allegations are “cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”69 We therefore VACATE and REMAND to the district court to reinstate the manipulative scheme claims. Because we remand as to the primary violation, Set Capital’s secondary “control person” claims under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act are reinstated as well.
II. The Failure to Correct the Flatline Value
Sections 9(a) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibit materially false or misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.70 To state a claim for a material misrepresentation or omission under these provisions, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”71
Set Capital claims that Credit Suisse and Janus, through their subsidiaries CSI and JIC, made material misstatements by failing to correct the intraday indicative value when it flatlined for nearly one hour on the evening of February 5, 2018. CSI and JIC contend that there was no misrepresentation in the Flatline Value because it accurately reflected the inverse of the VIX Futures Index (which itself had failed to update) and that, in any event, the complaint fails to allege scienter. Assuming without deciding that the Flatline Value materially misled investors, we agree
The complaint does not allege any facts showing that either CSI or JIC had motive or opportunity to falsify the Flatline Value.72 The complaint does not identify specific evidence that CSI profited by selling XIV Notes in the secondary market at prices reflecting the
inflated Flatline Value. Nor does it allege that CSI benefitted by delaying investors’ realization that an Acceleration Event had occurred. Likewise, the complaint does not allege facts demonstrating that JIC, which was simply a “Calculation Agent,” materially benefitted by failing to correct the Flatline Value.
Without an adequate showing of motive or opportunity, Set Capital argues that the complaint nonetheless alleges scienter based on strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.73 Specifically, Set Capital argues as follows. According to the Offering Documents, CSI and JIC were jointly listed as “Calculation Agents” responsible for announcing a “Market Disruption Event,” which could occur if S&P “fails to publish or compute the [VIX Futures Index].”74 In order to identify computing errors in the VIX Futures Index, CSI and JIC would have been required to monitor the VIX Futures Index and compare it to the values of its underlying inputs—i.e., the real-time prices for VIX futures contracts. Because careful monitoring would have allowed CSI and JIC to observe the flatline in the VIX Futures Index, they must have known that a derivative flatline was reflected in the intraday indicative value. We are unpersuaded.
First and foremost, CSI was under no obligation to calculate or monitor the intraday indicative value. Although the Offering Documents referred to CSI as a “Calculation Agent” for some purposes, the Offering Documents specified that “JIC or its affiliate”—not CSI—was “responsible for computing and
disseminating the Intraday Indicative Value.”75 Thus, we are not convinced that CSI’s status as a “Calculation Agent” is specific evidence of scienter.
Second, the complaint does not set forth facts raising a strong inference that JIC knew that the intraday indicative value had flatlined. As stated in the supplement, JIC calculated the intraday indicative value every 15 seconds using an automated formula “based on the most recent intraday level of [the VIX Futures] Index at the particular time.”76 The complaint alleges in a conclusory fashion that JIC had access to real-time pricing data for VIX futures contracts such that it could have monitored the accuracy of the VIX Futures Index. But the complaint does not point to any “specific reports or statements” showing that JIC could access this data or that it ever monitored the Index.77 The Offering Documents specified that
Finally, the Offering Documents do not support a finding of scienter. While the Offering Documents provide that a Market Disruption Event may occur if S&P “fails to publish or compute the [VIX Futures Index],” they afford CSI and JIC “discretion in making [that] determination[].”78 Because neither CSI nor JIC was required to
declare a Market Disruption Event—either immediately or at any time—there can be no reasonable inference that either entity “[n]ecessarily” monitored the accuracy of the VIX Futures Index.79 Moreover, the Offering Documents warned investors that published prices on the VIX Futures Index “may occasionally be subject to delay or postponement,” which in turn “will affect” the accuracy of the intraday indicative value.80 In light of these facts, the complaint does not allege a compelling inference of scienter.
In summary, we hold, as the district court found, that the complaint fails to plausibly plead that CSI and JIC knowingly or recklessly failed to correct the Flatline Value. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of these claims.81
III. Misstatements or Omissions in the Offering Documents
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 11 of the Securities Act also prohibit material misstatements or omissions in registration statements filed with the SEC.82 Unlike claims brought under Section 10(b), a plaintiff bringing a claim under Section 11 “need not allege scienter, reliance, or loss causation.”83 Instead, Section 11 imposes absolute liability on the issuer of a registration statement if: “(1) the statement ‘contained an untrue statement of a material fact,’ (2) the statement ‘omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein,’ or (3) the omitted information was
‘necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.’”84 In this Circuit, “a statement or omission is material if a reasonable investor would view it as significantly altering the total mix of information made available.”85
Set Capital claims that the Offering Documents misled investors by repeatedly warning of “risks” they knew were certain to occur. Among other things, they allege that the Offering Documents misrepresented Credit Suisse’s knowledge of the impact
The Offering Documents warned investors of extensive risks related to the purchase of XIV Notes. They urged that the notes were intended for “sophisticated investors to manage daily trading risks”86 and advised purchasers that, should they hold the notes long term, “it is likely that [they] will lose all or a substantial portion of [their] investment.”87 They also prominently disclosed Credit Suisse’s intention to hedge its exposure to sales of XIV Notes.88 But, with respect to the impact of that hedging, the Offering Documents
provided a more equivocal advisory. They stated that, while “there can be no assurance that the level of the [VIX Futures] Index will not be affected,” Credit Suisse and the Individual Defendants “have no reason to believe that [their] . . . hedging activities will have a material impact on the level of the [VIX Futures] Index.”89
As we explained in Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., “the law is well settled that so-called ‘half-truths’—literally true statements that create a materially misleading impression—will support claims for securities fraud.”90 In a similar vein, cautionary words about future risk cannot insulate from liability an issuer’s failure to disclose that the risk has, in fact, materialized in the past and is virtually certain to materialize again.91 As the D.C. Circuit explained in Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC, there is a “critical distinction between disclosing the risk a future event might occur and disclosing actual knowledge that the event will occur”—particularly where that distinction holds “enormous significance” for investors.92
Here, the complaint alleges that, following three prior volatility spikes, Credit Suisse and the Individual Defendants knew with virtual certainty that, upon the next volatility spike, their hedging activity would significantly depress the value of XIV Notes. It further alleges that Credit Suisse issued millions of additional XIV Notes without disclosing its intent to capitalize on this dynamic and trigger an
For the reasons discussed in Section I, above, we have already concluded that the complaint alleges a strong inference of scienter with respect to the manipulative scheme. Because the Offering Documents misrepresented Credit Suisse’s knowledge and its intent to engage in manipulative acts, we conclude that the complaint pleads actionable misrepresentations or omissions that must be reinstated and therefore REMAND these claims to the district court. Moreover, because we remand as to the primary violations, Set Capital’s secondary “control person” claims under Section 15 of the Securities Act and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act are reinstated as well.95
* * *
To summarize this opinion, the dismissals of the market manipulation claim, the actionable misstatements and omissions claims, and the related “control person” claims are vacated. We affirm the dismissal of the Flatline Value claims. Our decision today in Proshares addressed different disclosures related to a different underlying securities product—an exchange traded fund (ETF), which bundles securities together. See In re Proshares Tr. II Sec. Litig., No. 19 cv 0886 (DLC), 2020 WL 71007, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2020). In part because of the material differences between ETFs and ETNs, the complaint in Proshares did not allege market manipulation or the failure to fully disclose a conflict of interest. See id. Here, unlike in Proshares, the complaint plausibly alleges that Credit Suisse gave itself the right to accelerate the notes it issued such that it could use its own trading to depress their price, force redemptions, and profit at its investors’ expense. Compl. ¶ 7.
to reinstate the foregoing claims is based on what we determine to be plausible allegations by Set Capital in
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment dismissing the claims pertaining to the manipulative scheme, the alleged misstatements or omissions in the offering documents, and the corresponding liability of control persons. We therefore REMAND those claims for further proceedings. We AFFIRM the judgment dismissing the claims for failure to correct the Flatline Value, while VACATING the district court’s denial of leave to amend those claims.
