Sergio PEREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
No. 10-1315.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
June 8, 2012.
354 N.W.2d 354
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer A. Miller, County Attorney, and James S. Scheetz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
MANSFIELD, Justice.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 299 (2010), the United States Supreme Court decided a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to receive advice from counsel regarding the risk of deportation before pleading guilty. Sergio Perez argues he did not receive such advice from his attorney in 2000 before he pled guilty to a misdemeanor drug possession charge. For this reason, Perez has filed an application for postconviction relief seeking to have that conviction set aside.
We conclude Perez is not entitled to relief because only two possibilities exist here. One alternative is Padilla establishes a “new” rule of constitutional criminal procedure. If that is so, however, Padilla does not apply retroactively, and Perez may not rely upon it to set aside an earlier conviction. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1075, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 356 (1989) (generally denying retroactivity when a Supreme Court decision establishes a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure). The other possibility is that Padilla is not a new rule. But if that is the case, then Perez‘s application is time-barred because he could have filed it within three years of the date when his conviction became final and failed to do so. See
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
According to the original minutes of testimony, on October 22, 2000, a large fight broke out at the El Parral Bar in Marshalltown. Police found the defendant Sergio Perez dazed but conscious lying on the ground outside. An ambulance soon arrived. One of the emergency medical technicians (EMT) who was treating Perez saw a plastic bag fall from his pants pocket. The EMT informed a Marshalltown police officer, who retrieved the bag. It contained a powdery substance which was
Perez was initially charged with possession of more than five grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of
Perez‘s plea was accepted by the district court, and judgment was entered on December 22, 2000. As part of the plea agreement, Perez received a thirty-day jail sentence, with credit for thirty days already served. Perez did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
Perez is not a United States citizen. On April 12, 2010, over nine years after final judgment was entered in his criminal case and less than two weeks after the Supreme Court‘s Padilla decision, Perez filed an application for postconviction relief. In the application, he alleged his attorney had not notified him of the immigration implications of his guilty plea. Iowa precedent at that time did not require attorneys to provide this information. See State v. Ramirez, 636 N.W.2d 740, 745-46 (Iowa 2001). Perez also sought relief on the grounds that his rights to an interpreter and a recording of proceedings under
The State filed a motion to dismiss, urging that
Following a hearing, the district court denied Perez‘s application on all grounds. Perez filed a timely appeal, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court‘s dismissal of Perez‘s application for postconviction relief, holding among other things that Perez had “failed to establish Padilla should apply retroactively to his postconviction relief application.”
We granted Perez‘s application for further review.
II. Standard of Review.
“Generally, an appeal from a denial of an application for postconviction relief is reviewed for correction of errors at law.” Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 2009). We must “affirm if the trial court‘s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and the law was correctly applied.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003). Where the applicant alleges constitutional error, our “review is de novo ‘in light of the totality of the circumstances and the record upon which the postconviction court‘s rulings w[ere] made.‘” Goosman, 764 N.W.2d at 541 (quoting Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 1994)).
III. Analysis.
A. The Padilla Decision. Perez‘s primary argument on appeal is that his trial counsel failed to advise him regarding the risk of deportation, a constitutional duty recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Padilla. See 559 U.S. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1486, 176 L.Ed.2d at 299. Padilla, like the present case, involved a defendant who pled guilty to drug-related charges. Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1477, 176 L.Ed.2d at 290. He later petitioned for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not told that his plea could negatively affect his immigration status (and allegedly was affirmatively told he “did not have to worry about [his] immigration status since he had been in the country so long“). Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1478, 176 L.Ed.2d at 290 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).1 The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Padilla‘s petition. Id. It held, as had eleven federal circuit courts and most state supreme courts, that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel did not require an attorney to notify his or her client about collateral consequences of a guilty plea, including the effect on immigration status. Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1481, 176 L.Ed.2d at 293; id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1487, 176 L.Ed.2d at 300 (Alito, J., concurring).
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1487, 176 L.Ed.2d at 299. The Court concluded that “constitutionally competent counsel” should have informed Padilla of the risk of deportation resulting from his plea. Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1478, 1480, 176 L.Ed.2d at 290. The Court noted it had “never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.” Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1481, 176 L.Ed.2d at 293 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984)). The Court concluded that “[t]he collateral versus direct distinction is ... ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation” and that “advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1482, 176 L.Ed.2d at 294.
Thus, applying the first part of the Strickland framework, the Court found that the assistance of Padilla‘s attorney fell below an objective standard of reasonableness established by “prevailing professional norms” as defined by American Bar Association standards and similar practice guides. Id. The Court noted that “[f]or at least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client‘s plea.” Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d at 297-98. The Court added that “the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla‘s conviction.” Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1483, 176 L.Ed.2d at 295. Hence, the Court concluded that “[o]ur longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand” that counsel inform a defendant if his or her plea subjects him or her to the risk of deportation. Id. at —, 130 S.Ct. at 1486, 176 L.Ed.2d at 299.
The Court did not ultimately find that Padilla was entitled to relief. Under the two-part framework established in Strickland, Padilla still had to demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that he would not have pled guilty if properly informed of the risk of deportation. The Court noted that those “who collaterally attack their guilty pleas
B. Teague Standards for Retroactivity. As we have noted, within two weeks of the Padilla decision, Perez applied for postconviction relief, asserting his trial counsel had failed to advise him of the risk of deportation when he pled guilty in 2000. Perez maintains that Padilla applies retroactively and that he may rely upon it to collaterally attack his 2000 conviction. Teague is the Supreme Court‘s leading pronouncement on when a federal constitutional rule of criminal procedure may be applied retroactively to a conviction that became final before the rule was announced. There, the Court indicated that “[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” Id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 1075, 103 L.Ed.2d at 356 (emphasis added).2
Teague defined a new rule as one that “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or, to put it another way, “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction became final.” Id. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d at 349. Such new rules “generally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.” Id. at 305, 109 S.Ct. at 1073, 103 L.Ed.2d at 352. The Teague Court determined that it is “‘sounder, in adjudicating [collateral] petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of [collateral] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.‘” Id. at 306, 109 S.Ct. at 1073, 103 L.Ed.2d at 353 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 689, 91 S.Ct. 1171, 1178, 28 L.Ed.2d 404, 418 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The Court invoked the principle of finality:
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.
Id. at 309, 109 S.Ct. at 1074, 103 L.Ed.2d at 355. In sum, the Court concluded, “The costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on [collateral review] ... generally far outweigh the benefits of this application.” Id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 1075, 103 L.Ed.2d at 355 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Teague allowed for two narrow exceptions to its principle that new rules do not apply retroactively. One is for new rules of criminal procedure that are actually substantive because they place “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. at 1075, 103 L.Ed.2d at 356 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the first exception to non-retroactivity arises when previously illegal conduct is no longer prohibited by the law. The second exception is “reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure ... without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.” Id. at
Padilla clearly falls into neither exception. Padilla does not shield previously illegal conduct from the reach of the criminal law, nor is it based on a concern about the accuracy of prior determinations of guilt. In fact, no court has so far held the Padilla rule qualifies for the watershed/ordered liberty exception, and we agree that the exception does not apply. See, e.g., Figuereo-Sanchez v. United States, 678 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir.2012) (holding that ”Padilla did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure“); see also United States v. Aceves, No. 10-00738, 2011 WL 976706, *4 (D.Haw. Mar. 17, 2011) (stating that “this court has found no judicial decision construing Padilla as stating a new rule that falls within the ‘ordered liberty’ exception“). Therefore, Padilla only applies retroactively if it is not deemed a new rule.
There is a substantial split of authority on this point. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and two state supreme courts have held that Padilla is merely an application of the general principle announced in Strickland that defendants are entitled to “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel. See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir.2011); Denisyuk v. State, 422 Md. 462, 30 A.3d 914, 923-25 (2011); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 949 N.E.2d 892, 904 (2011); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Generally, these courts have reasoned that if Strickland was the basic law at the time that counsel neglected to properly inform a defendant concerning potential immigration issues, then the Padilla application, interpretation, or restatement of Strickland should be applied retroactively even if it was only raised in a collateral attack on the conviction. These courts do not consider Padilla a new rule, but rather a new application or clarification of an old rule, and therefore eligible for retroactivity. See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641 (stating that ”Padilla followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional norms“); Denisyuk, 30 A.3d at 925 (stating that ”Padilla is an application of Strickland to a specific set of facts“); Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 904 (stating that “the defendant in Padilla sought only an application of Strickland that several courts had already reached“).
On the other hand, the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that Padilla announced a new rule of law and have declined to apply it retroactively, citing among other things the previously prevailing view among lower federal courts and state courts that counsel did not have an obligation to advise concerning deportation risk. See United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.2012) (”Padilla departed markedly from the ‘legal landscape’ extant when [the defendants‘] conviction became final in February 2009.” (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 2511, 159 L.Ed.2d 494, 504 (2004))); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir.2011) (“We find a reasonable jurist at the time of Hong‘s conviction would not have considered Supreme Court precedent to compel the application of Strickland to the immi
On April 30, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Chaidez, the Seventh Circuit case. Chaidez, 566 U.S. at —, 132 S.Ct. at 2101, 182 L.Ed.2d at 867. Thus, the Supreme Court will determine in its October 2012 term whether Padilla is to be applied retroactively. However, as we discuss below, we can decide this case without predicting how the Supreme Court will decide Chaidez.
C. Iowa Code Section 822.3.
We agree with the State that it would be “contradictory” for Perez to argue that Padilla is merely an application of preexisting law for Teague retroactivity purposes while simultaneously arguing that he could not have raised the issue within the three-year limitations period. “A reasonable interpretation of the statute compels the conclusion that exceptions to the time bar would be, for example, newly-discovered evidence or a ground that the applicant was at least not alerted to in some way.” Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1994).
We recognize that prior to Padilla, our precedents (like those of the federal courts of appeals and most other states) rejected the notion that counsel had a constitutional duty to advise clients about deportation consequences. See Ramirez, 636 N.W.2d at 745-46; Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583-84 (Iowa 1987). But we acknowledged there was “some merit” in the contrary position. Ramirez, 636 N.W.2d at 746; Mott, 407 N.W.2d at 583. The Ramirez case, which considered whether Mott should be overruled, was pending at the time Perez‘s conviction became final and was not decided until almost nine months thereafter. Furthermore, at any time our precedents could have been overturned by the United States Supreme Court, which is in fact what happened when Padilla was decided. And shortly after our decision in Ramirez, we amended rule 2.8 to require defendants pleading guilty to be informed that “a criminal conviction, deferred judgment, or deferred sentence may affect a defendant‘s status under federal immigration laws.” See
The federal postconviction relief statute has a one-year statute of limitations that is subject to tolling when the right asserted “has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”
A few state courts have similarly rejected claims that Padilla constitutes both an old rule, eligible for retroactive application, and a new rule in the context of a postconviction relief statute of limitations. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1064-66 (Pa.Super.Ct.2011) (stating that the holding in Padilla was a clarification and did not constitute a “new constitutional right” as required to qualify for Pennsylvania‘s postconviction relief statute‘s timeliness exception); State v. Cervantes, 273 P.3d 484, 487 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (”Padilla does not represent a significant change in the law and therefore does not create an exception to the one-year time limit in [Washington‘s postconviction relief statute].“).
Perez‘s filings in this court, although generally helpful and well-written, illustrate the internal contradiction in his position. In his original appellate brief, Perez urged that the district court erred in applying
Accordingly, we leave it to the Supreme Court to decide next term whether Padilla is retroactive. We hold only that if it is, Perez should have raised his claim regarding failure to advise of immigration consequences within the three-year limitations period of
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Perez‘s application for postconviction relief.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.