In this аppeal, appellant Henry Franklin Davis, a prison inmate, challenges the constitutionality of the three-year statute of limitations for postconviction relief. See Iowa Code § 663A.3 (1987). He contends this section violates the Iowa Constitution’s prohibition against the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus found in Article I, section 13. He also urges that in the post-conviction relief context, due process requires an aрplicant be given an opportunity to explain the reason for a delayed application.
On March 5, 1982, Davis pled guilty to the charge of second-degree burglary. He received a suspended sentеnce and was placed on probation for five years. When his probation was revoked on August 12, 1982, he was imprisoned.
On April 18,1988, Davis applied for post-conviction relief, challenging the constitutionality of his 1982 guilty plеa. He claims his conviction was flawed by denial of his rights to equal protection, due process and effective assistance of counsel. Without reaching the merits of the application, the district court sustained the State’s motion to dismiss, grounded on section 663A.3’s time limitations. This section provides, “[a]n application must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.”
Before addressing the merits of appellant’s issues, we briefly examine the propriety of raising the statute of limitations by a motion to dismiss. Generally, this defense must be affirmatively asserted by a responsive pleading.
Pride v. Peterson,
Here, the uncontroverted facts in appellant’s application show that the limitation period had passed. The 1988 pleadings attacked a 1982 conviction. No appeal was taken. The suspension of defendant’s sentence was revoked during the same year it was given. Thus, this postconviction proceeding was filed nearly three years beyond section 663A.3’s limitation period.
Section 663A.3 does furnish an escape clause from this limitation, though, by providing that “this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” This does not aid the appellant, however. Neither his pleading, nor his resistance to the motion to dismiss, claims any ground that could fall within this exception. Thus, the dismissal was appropriate unless appellant’s constitutional claims, asserted in his resistance and now on appeal, have merit.
I. Habeas Corpus. Appellant asserts that section 663A.3’s three-year statute of limitations violates the prohibition against suspension of the writ of habeas corpus *709 found in Article I, section 13, of the Iowa Constitution. Section 13, included as a part of our “Bill of Rights,” states:
The writ of habeas corpus shall nоt be suspended, or refused when application is made as required by law, unless in case of rebellion, or invasion the public safety may require it.
There is a nexus between the code and constitutional provisiоns. Section 663A.3’s time limitation for postconviction relief indirectly restricts the remedy of habeas corpus which was formerly available to prisoners challenging their convictions. Prior to the enactment of chapter 663A, 1970 Iowa Acts ch. 1276, §§ 1-11, we held that ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal action may properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Brewer v. Bennett,
The thrust of appellant’s argument is that postconviction relief, when utilized as a substitute remedy for habeas corpus, may not be limited by a statute оf limitations without violating the prohibition against suspending the writ. We do not agree.
The constitutional provision for habeas corpus neither speaks to, nor prohibits, the legislative enactment of a reasonable time restriction. Article I, section 13, allows a refusal of the writ, however, “when the application is made as required by law.” The term “required by law” ordinarily means required by statutory law.
In re Sorensen’s Estate,
Even without the express authority found in section 13, the legislature may impose reasonable restriсtions upon the exercise of a constitutional right.
Emberton v. County of San Diego,
Legislatures may pass laws regulating, within reasonable limits, the mode in which rights secured to the subject by bills of right and constitutions shall be enjoyed, and if the subject neglects to comply with these regulations he thereby waives his constitutional privileges.
Id.
at 361,
This restriction involves the time periоd to commence the action. It is a well-settled principle that a state may attach reasonable time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional rights.
United States v. Randolph,
Furthermore, statutes of limitations speak to matters of remedy and procedure, rather than the destruction of fundamental rights.
State ex rel. Krupke v. Witkowski,
*710 For the rеasons stated, we hold that the three-year limitation contained in section 663A.3 does not violate the constitutional prohibition against the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
II. Federal and State Due Process. Appellant also urges that the district court’s dismissal of his postconviction claim precluded him from showing his delay was due to justifiable excuse and from presenting the merits of his case. We find no merit in either contention.
Regarding the justifiable excusе claim, one jurisdiction has held that a similar statute, providing for a three-year limitation for collateral attack on a criminal conviction, violated due process.
Germany,
Appellant offered no such excuse to the district court in either his pleadings or his resistance to the motion to dismiss. Matters not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, including constitutional issues.
State v. Hamilton,
Appellant also claims violation of his federal and state due process rights because he was denied an opportunity to present the merits of his case. He maintains that a fundamental prerequisite to due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The issue is whether appellant was denied a reasonable opportunity to assert his post-conviction claims.
We believe the state has a legitimate interest in preventing the litigation of stale сlaims. The United States Supreme Court aptly stated:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are prаctical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappearеd, and evidence has been lost. Order of R. Telegraphers v. Railway Exp. Agency,321 U.S. 342 , 349,64 S.Ct. 582 , 586,88 L.Ed. 788 , 792. They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into thе law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate. Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a “fundamental” right or what used to be called a “natural” right of the individual. He may, of course, have the protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,
One of the goals of our criminal justice system is to afford both the accused and the state fair and prompt trials, appeals and further prоceedings to correct error. A legitimate concern is that the process also end within reasonable time limits. We believe that due process requires that the interest of the state and the defendant bе balanced in determining the reasonableness of a period of limitations.
We conclude that the three-year limitation provides a valid opportunity for persons to challenge their convictions. Thе test is whether this time period provided the applicant a reasonable opportunity to have the claimed issue heard and determined.
Michel v. Louisiana,
We also believe the legislature, within its sound discretion, may determine the proper limitation period. The legislature is the primary judge as to whether the time allowed is reasonable.
Oberst v. Mays,
AFFIRMED.