THOMAS J. SEPHAKIS v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE BUREAU OF RECORDS AND IDENTIFICATION, MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH/DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, MCES, INC.
No. 2194 EDA 2018
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FILED JULY 10, 2019
2019 PA Super 212
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY
Thomas J. Sephakis (“Appellant”) seeks review of the Order denying his Petition to expunge his mental health commitment records and restore his right to possess firearms pursuant to
The trial court has provided a thorough recitation of the facts underlying this case, which we need not repeat in detail. See Trial Ct Op., dated Aug. 17, 2018. In sum, on October 15, 2015, Appellant’s business partner reported to the Pottsgrove Township Police Department that Appellant was suicidal. Officer Robert Greenwood transported Appellant to a Montgomery County Mental Health Facility, and Appellant’s parents confirmed that Appellant had
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
been talking about killing himself for the past few days. Appellant was involuntarily committed to the hospital pursuant to Section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”),
At the scheduled hearing, Appellant, his privately-retained counsel, and the solicitor for the county facility appeared before the Mental Health Review Officer (“MHRO”). However, the solicitor informed the MHRO that Officer Greenwood was unable to appear that day and requested a continuance of two days. Rather than continue the hearing for two days, Appellant and his
counsel negotiated a Stipulation whereby Appellant agreed that he was in need of further treatment as alleged in the Section 303 application and to an additional 20 days’ outpatient treatment in exchange for his immediate release from the hospital.
The MHRO set forth the Stipulation in a “Certification by the Court for Extended Involuntary Emergency Treatment-Section 303.” The Certification indicated that failure to comply with the Order would result in Appellant’s return to inpatient status. Appellant did not seek review of the Section 303 Certification. He complied
Over one year later, on January 12, 2017, Appellant filed a Petition seeking the expungement of his Sections 302 and 303 mental health commitment records and the restoration of his right to possess firearms pursuant to
to appeal nunc pro tunc from his 302 and 303 commitments. Appellant asserted that insufficient evidence supported the Section 302 and 303 commitments and the commitments resulted from a violation of his due process rights. On February 20, 2018, Appellant filed, with permission from the court, an amended Petition asserting that he was proceeding pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act generally and
The court held a hearing on February 20, 2018, at which Appellant testified, inter alia, that he and his attorney negotiated the agreement at the scheduled Section 303 conference after Appellant agreed that he needed continuing treatment, but did not want to stay in the hospital for even two more days. He stated that he agreed to attend outpatient therapy for 20 days so that he could be immediately discharged from the hospital. See N.T., 2/20/18, at 121, 125-27. In response to extensive questioning by the court, Appellant testified that he was aware of his rights, including his right to appeal the Section 303 certification, as well as the loss of his right to possess firearms. Id. at 134-38. The court ordered the parties to submit briefs.
After consideration of the parties’ briefs, the court denied the Petition on May 25, 2018.
Appellant appealed. Both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following Statement of Questions Involved in his brief:
1. Did the trial court commit an error of law by failing to apply the holding in In re JMY, 179 A.3d 1140 ([Pa. Super.] 2018)[(en banc)] (hereinafter JMY), to this case?
2. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it found that the Section 303 Hearing Stipulation was an “Agreed Order” and therefore [Appellant] was precluded altogether from appealing it even if timeliness was not an issue?
3. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it ruled that much of the evidence that was going to be presented was irrelevant because the court had no intention of considering [Appellant’s] argument that JMY controls the outcome of this case, or in allowing [Appellant] to develop the case in his own manner?4
Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.
Our standard of review is well-settled. We review the trial court’s denial of a
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court could have reviewed his Section 302 and 303 commitments based on the holding provided in In Re: Petition of J.M.Y., 179 A.3d 1140 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal
granted, 194 A.3d 121 (Pa. 2018). In support, Appellant asserts a bare due process argument, contending that “the stipulation was obtained through coercion, specifically by ‘threatening’ petitioner with two more days of inpatient incarceration unless he agreed to some amicable resolution.” Appellant’s Brief at 12.5 Appellant’s argument is unavailing.
This Court provided the following concise overview of the applicable law in J.M.Y.:
[P]revailing case law has interpreted
18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g) as providing no opportunity to obtain expungement of a mental health record pursuant to a commitment under section 303 and only allows for a trial court to review commitments under section 302. In re [Kevin] Jacobs, 15 A.3d 509, 511 (Pa. Super. 2011). In addition, an appellant seeking expungement and restoration of firearms rights cannot “bootstrap” review of a section 303 commitment to a petition seeking review of a section 302 commitment undersection 6111.1(g) , because the section 303 commitment is “an entirely separate judicial proceeding, complete with its own avenue of appeal.” Id.The law in Pennsylvania is “well-settled that involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill persons constitutes deprivation of liberty and may be accomplished only in accordance with due process protections.” In re Hutchinson, 454 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Pa. 1982); In re Chiumento, 688 A.2d 217, 220 (Pa. Super. 1997). “The very nature of civil commitment ... entails an extraordinary deprivation of liberty.... A statute sanctioning such a drastic curtailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly,
even grudgingly construed, in order to avoid deprivations of liberty without due process of law.” In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293, 1298 (Pa. Super. 1997) (quoting In Re S.C., 280 Pa.Super. 539, 421 A.2d 853, 857 (1980)).
* * *
As we ultimately held in In re Ryan, [784 A.2d 803, 808 (Pa. Super. 2001]), when an appellant‘s due process rights under the MHPA are violated, “we may vacate the certification for involuntary treatment pursuant to section [ ]303, and direct that all records pertaining to this matter be expunged.” [Id.] See also In re A.J.N., 144 A.3d 130, 139 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that “case law uniformly mandates expungement and destruction of records when the procedural, due process requirements of the MPHA are violated during a commitment proceeding”). Thus, only a section 303 commitment that provides adequate due process may preclude an expungement of a section 302 commitment.
In Re: Petition of J.M.Y., 179 A.3d at 1143-44.
On appeal, J.M.Y. asserted a due process violation because he had not been aware that there had been a Section 303 hearing. This Court ultimately agreed and concluded that the trial court erred in finding that the Section 303
certification was valid. Id. at 1148. Sitting en banc, we observed that the evidence showed that the appellant had been unaware that any Section 303 commitment hearing had been requested or held, and the certified record reflected that Appellant did not attend the hearing. Id. at 1146. The Court also observed that at Appellant’s expungement hearing, an officer from the University police department testified that he did not appear at a Section 303 commitment hearing for the appellant and could not recall if he was ever informed that such a hearing was to be held. Id. In addition, we noted that the appellant had not signed the Section 303 certification, no evidence showed the appellant knew of his right to appeal under Section 303(g), no evidence showed the appellant knew of his continuing right to an attorney, and no evidence showed that the appellant had been served a copy of the Section 303 commitment certification. The Court concluded that “[t]hese failures amount to a deprivation of [the a]ppellant’s due process rights” and found the Section 303 certification, thus, invalid. Id. at 1147.
J.M.Y. is factually and procedurally inapposite to Appellant’s case. As the trial court here observed:
The testimony of [Appellant] on February 20, 2018, belies any argument that his records should be expunged based on a denial of due process in connection with his Section 303 agreement. He was provided with the application for Section 303 treatment, as was his counsel. He was ably represented by his private counsel and was fully informed of the consequences of his stipulation and extended treatment, negotiated by his lawyer and the mental health department’s lawyer. . . .
[Unlike in J.M.Y., supra,] in our case, [Appellant] testified that he was fully aware that a 303 hearings was to take place, obtained representation by private counsel of his choosing, went to the hearing with his counsel, and then negotiated, through his private counsel, to be released that day and undergo outpatient treatment under court supervision by a mental health provider of his choosing (his own mental health doctor with whom he had been treating for six months) and, thus, avoided a further proceedings that could have resulted in twenty days of inpatient treatment.
. . . In this case, the evidence shows that this court did not abuse its discretion. This court applied the law that agreed or stipulated orders are not appealable; recognized that [Appellant] was not appealing nunc pro tunc and presented no evidence thereon; applied the law that an agreed upon order cannot be attacked except upon pleading and presenting clear and convincing evidence of fraud[,] accident or mistake, which [Appellant] utterly failed to do because
there was none; and, applied the binding precedent of In re Kevin Jacobs, supra. It is clear, as his parents and business partner, along with police officer concluded, that [Appellant] was in need of treatment when he was first committed. Unlike the facts in J.M.Y., it is likewise clear that [Appellant] was represented by competent counsel at his section 303 hearings and was provided with the protections required before he stipulated to receive extended outpatient treatment [pursuant to Section 303]. Fundamental fairness was not violated.
Trial Court Opinion, dated 8/17/18, at 15-17.
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s analysis. Appellant received notice of the Section 303 hearing, attended the Section 303 hearing with his privately-retained counsel, and acknowledged that his counsel had apprised of him of his rights prior to entering into the Stipulation supporting the Section 303 certification. Appellant was afforded, and fully availed himself, of all due process required in connection with the Section 303
commitment proceeding and subsequent certification.6 Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding the Section 303 certification to be valid. This first issue, thus, warrants no relief.7
In the second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the Section 303 Stipulation precluded Appellant from appealing, “even if timeliness were not indicate [sic] involved.” Appellant’s Brief at 16-17. Because Appellant failed to develop this issue, we are unable to provide meaningful review. This issue is, thus, waived.
Our Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and our case law provide the well-established requirements for preserving a claim for appellate review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111-2119 (discussing required content of appellate briefs and
addressing specific requirements of each subsection of brief on appeal). An appellate court will address only those issues properly presented and developed in an appellant’s brief as required by our Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Where defects in a brief “impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1175 (Pa. 1999) (recognizing “the unavailability of relief based upon undeveloped claims for which insufficient arguments are presented on appeal”); Commonwealth v. McDermitt, 66 A.3d 810, 814 (Pa. Super. 2013)
In support of this issue, Appellant presents a two-paragraph “argument” comprised of conclusory, self-serving statements with no citation to the record or legal authority, and no legal analysis. We are, thus, unable to provide meaningful review. Accordingly, Appellant has waived this second issue.
In the argument purporting to correspond to his third issue, Appellant avers that the court should not have relied on In re Kevin Jacobs, 15 A.3d 509 (Pa. Super. 2011), to find that expungement of his Section 303
commitment was not available to him under
Appellant does not provide any indication of what authority would allow this panel to “overturn” a prior Superior Court Opinion. Appellant also fails to cite any authority pertaining to statutory construction that would enable this Court to consider his alternative application of
Having concluded Appellant’s issues are without merit and waived, we affirm the trial court’s Order denying Appellant’s Petition for expungement of his mental health commitment records.
Order affirmed.
Judge Olson concurs in result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/10/19