SEIU 775, Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES ET AL., Respondents.
No. 48881-7-II
Division Two
April 25, 2017
198 Wn. App. 745
Dmitri L. Iglitzin and Jennifer L. Robbins (of Schwerin Campbell Barnard Iglitzin & Lavitt LLP), for appellant.
Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General, and Albert H. Wang and Margaret C. McLean, Assistants, for respondent Department of Social and Health Services.
James Abernathy and Stephanie D. Olson, for respondent Freedom Foundation.
¶2 SEIU appeals the trial court‘s denial of its request for an injunction. SEIU argues that provisions of the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA),
¶3 We hold that the PECBA does not provide an “other statute” exemption under the PRA because it does not expressly prohibit or exempt the release of specific records or information. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of SEIU‘s request for an injunction to prevent DSHS from disclosing the records the Foundation requested.
FACTS
¶4 SEIU is the collective bargaining representative in Washington for all IPs. The Foundation is a Washington-based organization with a stated purpose of educating public employees, including IPs, about their constitutional right not to join or pay dues to public sector unions.
¶5 DSHS requires IPs to attend contracting appointments and safety and orientation training presentations. These meetings generally take place at DSHS facilities and are not open to the public. Under the collective bargaining agreement between SEIU and the State, the State provides time during these meetings for an SEIU representative to meet with the IPs.
¶6 On January 12, 2016, the Foundation submitted a public records request to DSHS for certain information about meetings involving IPs. The request specifically sought “[t]he times and locations of all contracting appointments for individual providers” and “[t]he times and locations of any state-sponsored or facilitated opportunities for individual providers to view the initial safety and orientation training videos . . . held or to be held between November 1, 2015 and December 31, 2016.” Clerk‘s Papers at 95.
¶7 DSHS determined that it had responsive records and that the records were not subject to any exemptions preventing disclosure. DSHS notified SEIU of its intent to release the requested records to the Foundation.
¶8 SEIU filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, and then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin DSHS from releasing the records. SEIU argued that the records were subject to an “other statute” exemption under the PRA, asserting that the PECBA is a statute that prohibits the disclosure of the requested records. SEIU believed, based on the Foundation‘s previous actions, that the Foundation sought the information about the IPs’
meetings in order to show up at the meeting times and discourage the IPs from participating in the union.
¶9 Pursuant to
¶10 SEIU appealed the trial court‘s denial of a preliminary and permanent injunction. We subsequently enjoined DSHS from releasing the requested information until resolution of SEIU‘s appeal.
ANALYSIS
A. PRA DISCLOSURE
¶11 The PRA mandates the broad disclosure of public records. John Doe A v. Wash. State Patrol, 185 Wn.2d 363, 371, 374 P.3d 63 (2016). Therefore, a state agency has an affirmative obligation to disclose records requested under the PRA unless a specific exemption applies. Id. at 371-72. And we must liberally construe the PRA in favor of disclosure and narrowly construe its exemptions.
¶12 Although the PRA encourages openness and transparency, the legislature has made certain records exempt from disclosure. John Doe A, 185 Wn.2d at 371. There are three sources of PRA exemptions: (1) enumerated exemptions contained in the PRA itself, (2) any “other statute” that exempts or prohibits disclosure as provided in
Healthcare 775NW v. Dep‘t of Soc. & Health Servs., 193 Wn. App. 377, 391, 377 P.3d 214 (2016), review denied, 186 Wn.2d 1016 (2016).
¶13
¶14 We review de novo a trial court‘s actions under the PRA and the injunction statute. Id. at 370-71.
B. “OTHER STATUTE” EXEMPTION
¶15 SEIU argues that two provisions of the PECBA,
1. Legal Principles
¶16 The “other statute” exemption is found in
¶17 The Supreme Court in John Doe A emphasized that an “other statute” exemption applies only if that statute explicitly identifies an exemption, and that a court cannot imply such an exemption. Id. at 372. The court stated: “[W]e will find an ‘other statute’ exemption only when the legislature has made it explicitly clear that a specific record, or portions of it, is exempt or otherwise prohibited from production in response to a public records request.” Id. at 373. The statute “does not need to expressly address the PRA, but it must expressly prohibit or exempt the release of records.” Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
¶18 In John Doe A, the Supreme Court concluded that “courts consistently find a statute to be an ‘other statute’ when the plain language of the statute makes it clear that a record, or portions thereof, is exempt from production.” Id. at 375. The court reviewed several cases applying an “other statute” exemption that support this proposition. Id. at 375-77.
¶20 In Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Office of Attorney General, the Supreme Court held that the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)2 and certain Federal Trade Commission rules enacted pursuant to the GLBA provided an “other statute” exemption. 170 Wn.2d 418, 439-40, 241 P.3d 1245 (2010). That statute and related rules concerned privacy of bank customers’ personal information and provided that “the receiving nonaffiliated third party may not
reuse or redisclose the nonpublic personal information to another nonaffiliated third party unless an exception applies or the reuse or redisclosure would be lawful if done by the financial institution.” Ameriquest, 170 Wn.2d at 426 (citing
¶21 In Hangartner v. City of Seattle, the Supreme Court held that
¶22 In Planned Parenthood of Great Northwest v. Bloedow, Division One of this court held that
¶23 In Wright v. Department of Social & Health Services, this court held that
¶24 The Supreme Court in John Doe A essentially endorsed the holdings in these cases. Conversely, the court noted that courts will not find an “other statute” exemption when a statute is not explicit. 185 Wn.2d at 377. The court referenced this court‘s decision in Belo Management Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Click! Network, 184 Wn. App. 649, 343 P.3d 370 (2014). In Belo, the court addressed whether federal regulations allowing parties who submit materials to the Federal Communications Commission to request that the information “not be made routinely available for public inspection,”
¶25 In John Doe A itself, the Supreme Court held that
2. PECBA Provisions
¶26 SEIU relies on the PECBA in an effort to prevent disclosure of the requested records. The purpose of the PECBA is “to promote the continued improvement of the relationship between public employers and their employees” by regulating the “right of public employees to join labor organizations of their own choosing and to be represented by such organizations in matters concerning their employment relations with public employers.”
¶27
No public employer, or other person, shall directly or indirectly, interfere with, restrain, coerce, or discriminate against any public employee or group of public employees in the free exercise of their right to organize and designate representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining, or in the free exercise of any other right under this chapter.
¶28 Significantly, no PECBA provision prohibits a public employer from releasing records or even addresses the release of records. And no PECBA provision addresses the privacy or confidentiality of information.
3. “Other Statute” Analysis
¶29 SEIU argues that the PECBA and specifically
¶30 However, the Supreme Court in John Doe A stated that to qualify as an “other statute” under
exempt or prohibit the release of records or information that would constitute an unfair labor practice. In fact, the PECBA does not even mention any records or information. Holding that the PECBA provides an “other statute” exemption would require us to imply such an exemption, which John Doe A expressly prohibits. Id. If the legislature had wanted to prevent the disclosure of information related to public employees and their unions, it could have done so expressly through explicit language.
¶31 SEIU argues that John Doe A is consistent with its position because in applying the rule stated in that case, the court favorably discussed cases that analyzed statutes that did not expressly deal with records disclosure. SEIU refers to Hangartner, 151 Wn.2d at 453, and Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. University of Washington (commonly known as PAWS II), 125 Wn.2d 243, 262, 884 P.2d 592 (1994).
¶32 Hangartner does not support SEIU‘s position. The court in that case considered
¶33 PAWS II is more similar to this case. There, the court considered
searchers may seek to enjoin the release of certain portions of public records if the nondisclosure of those portions is necessary to prevent harassment as defined under the antiharassment statute.” Id. at 263. Specifically, the court held that the names of researchers and certain other information were exempt from PRA disclosure. Id. at 263-64.
¶34 The court in John Doe A cited PAWS II for general “other statute” principles. 185 Wn.2d at 372. However, the court did not endorse the holding in PAWS II regarding the antiharassment statute like it did for the cases discussed above. See id. at 375-77. To the extent that PAWS II is inconsistent with the holding in John Doe A that a statute must expressly prohibit or exempt the release of records to qualify as an “other statute,” John Doe A‘s holding controls.
¶35 SEIU also relies on the statement in John Doe A that “when courts have found an ‘other statute’ exemption, they have also identified a legislative intent to protect a particular interest or value.” Id. at 377-78. SEIU points out that the PECBA reflects the legislature‘s intent to protect a particular value – public employees’ free exercise of their right to organize. But the court in John Doe A did not identify a legislative interest as an independent basis for finding an “other statute” exemption. Instead, the court was noting that the statutes that explicitly prevented the disclosure of certain information – the court‘s test for finding an “other statute” exemption – were designed to protect a particular interest or value.
¶36 The PECBA is not concerned with the privacy or confidentiality of specific records or information, and it does not explicitly prohibit the release of records or information that would constitute an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, we hold that the PECBA does not provide an “other statute” exemption to the PRA under
CONCLUSION
¶37 We affirm the trial court‘s denial of SEIU‘s request for an injunction to prevent DSHS from disclosing the records the Foundation requested.
WORSWICK and SUTTON, JJ., concur.
Review denied at 189 Wn.2d 1011 (2017).