Lead Opinion
Both parties appeal separate holdings of the Court of Appeals. This action originated as a paternity action pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 406.021 in the Nelson District Court. The issues before the Court have been consolidated into one action. We now address each issue in turn and affirm in part and reverse in part the holding of the Court of Appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
Harry Seeger ("Seeger") and Sharon Lanham ("Lanham"), while each married to other partners, engaged in a relationship leading to the birth of a child on June 13, 2007. On December 30, 2009, Lanham filed a paternity action. In January 2011, during the pendency of the action to resolve child support and other issues, Seeger retired and began receiving Social Security Retirement Income of $1,969,00 per month. As a result, Seeger and Lanham's child also began receiving monthly dependent benefits in the amount of $1,204.00 in November 2011. In May 2012, the Nelson District Court, Paternity Division, entered its final findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. Relevant to this appeal are three conclusions and judgments: (1) the court had jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to KRS 406.021
Lanham first appealed several issues to the Nelson Circuit Court. As to the issues presented in this appeal, the Nelson Circuit Court found that it was error for the district court to credit the social security benefits to the pre-petition liabilities owed by Seeger but that it had not erred in holding attorneys' fees were inappropriate in this case.
Both parties have moved this Court for discretionary review on separate issues. We have granted discretionary review in both cases and now address each issue presented to this Court.
II. ANALYSIS
A. A paternity action can be brought by a private attorney.
Seeger first argues that the district court lacked the jurisdictional authority to even hear this paternity case pursuant to KRS 406.021. As this question would be dispositive were we to rule in Seeger's favor, we will address it first. To address this issue, we must analyze questions of law, including statutory interpretation. We conduct such analysis de novo, with no deference to the analysis of the lower courts. Commonwealth v. Love,
There are three separate types of jurisdiction: personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and jurisdiction over a particular or specific case before the court. See Nordike v. Nordike,
KRS 406.021(1) states that paternity actions "shall be brought by the county attorney or by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services or its designee upon the request of complainant ..." Seeger argues that the word "shall" in the statute is dispositive of the jurisdictional issue. Because Lanham chose to hire a private attorney to initiate this paternity action, he argues that there is no statutory authority allowing a private attorney to bring a paternity action under this chapter. His reading of the statute requires that all paternity actions be brought by the Cabinet or County Attorney.
We agree with the generally mandatory meaning of the word "shall" in statutory interpretation. See Alexander v. S & M Motors, Inc.,
However, the term "shall" is not mandatory as to how the complainant must proceed, be it through government agency action or by hiring a private attorney. Seeger cites to an unreported case in
We must look first to the plain language of a statute and, if the language is clear, our inquiry ends. See Revenue Cabinet v. O'Daniel,
B. Attorneys' Fees are not recoverable in paternity actions.
Lanham moved the Nelson District Court to award attorney fees. As the basis for her motion, Lanham cited to KRS 406.051. The statute states that "[a]ll remedies under the, uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act are available for enforcement of duties of support under this chapter." She linked this provision to KRS 407.5313, which states that "[a]ttorney's fees may be taxed as costs, and may be ordered paid directly to the attorney ..." The district court denied the motion, finding that KRS 406.051 specifically referred to the enforcement of judgments and duties of support. The district court also found that, had the legislature intended attorneys' fees to be recoverable, it would have created a specific statute allowing so, similar to KRS 403.220, which allows attorneys' fees for maintaining or defending dissolution proceedings.
On appeal, the Nelson Circuit Court similarly held that the remedies referenced in KRS 406.051 are limited to those "provided for the enforcement of previously entered judgments under a statutory framework designed to facilitate reciprocal recognition of support orders from other states." Citing a Latin maxim meaning that "the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other," the circuit court concluded that the legislature did not intend to provide a statutory avenue for attorneys' fees in paternity actions.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Lanham reiterated her argument that KRS 406.051, referencing Chapter 407, provides an avenue for attorneys' fees to be awarded. However, she also argued that KRS 406.025, which permits child support orders in paternity actions to be based upon the guidelines encoded in KRS 403.212, therefore confers upon a paternity action the applicability of KRS 403.220. KRS 403.220 permits a trial court to "order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorney's fees ..." (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals held that the specific reference in the trial court's order
1) KRS 403 does not provide an avenue for a party in a paternity action to recover attorneys' fees.
KRS 406.025(5) specifically requires the trial court to utilize the child support guidelines in KRS 403.212 in ordering temporary child support.
The relevant statute in Chapter 403 is KRS 403.220, which states that "[t]he court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorney's fees ..."
The purpose of the fee-shifting statute, we have noted, is simply to ensure the fairness of domestic relations proceedings: 'to prevent one party to a divorce action from controlling the outcome simply because he or she is in a position of financial superiority,' [ Neidlinger v. Neidlinger,, 521 (Ky. 2001) ], and 'to equalize the status of the parties to a dissolution proceeding ... in an effort to eliminate the inequities resulting from the termination of the relationship.' [ Sullivan v. Levin, 52 S.W.3d 513 , 263 (Ky. 1977) (overruled on other grounds by Hale v. Hale, 555 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1989) ) ]. 772 S.W.2d 628
Rumpel v. Rumpel,
At this juncture, we cannot hold that the purpose of KRS 403.220 applies to paternity actions. While it may seem perfunctory, we are constrained to the plain language of the statute, if that statute is clear. When examining the plain language of a statute, "[w]here there is no ambiguity in the statute, there is no need to resort to the rules of statutory construction in interpreting it. The words of the statute are simply accorded their commonly understood meaning." Stewart v. Estate of James Cooper,
Lanham valiantly attempts to tie KRS 403 to 406 by means of multiple references in Chapter 406 to the child support guidelines in KRS 403. However, KRS 403 guides practitioners and courts in the dissolution of marriage and divorce. It is not a chapter solely devoted to the child support tables and guidelines. If it were, Lanham's argument may bear more weight. However, this action was simply not an action under KRS 403; it was, properly, a proceeding pursuant to KRS 406. We hold that the references to use of the child support tables is insufficient to make this action one "under this chapter" of KRS 403. As such, the attorneys' fees provision in KRS 403.220 is inapplicable to Lanham's paternity action. We, therefore, reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals as to this holding.
2) KRS 407 does not provide an avenue for a prevailing obligee to recover attorneys' fees in a paternity action.
As we reject the argument made by Lanham that was accepted by the Court of Appeals, we will address the alternative argument she made in the courts below. KRS 406.051 states that "All remedies under the uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act are available for enforcement of duties of support under this chapter." While the Nelson Circuit Court deemed that this final sentence "clearly refers to the remedies provided in KRS 407," we are inclined to further examine to what exactly the legislature was inferring.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("URESA") was a model act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") "[i]n response to the need for a simple, inexpensive, and consistent interstate approach" in child support proceedings. Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, ESSENTIALS FOR ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 330 (3rd ed. 2002) (available at https: //www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/essentials-for-attorneys-in-child-support-enforcement-3rd- edition)
KRS 406.051 was first enacted in 1964, undergoing amendments and reenactments in 1976, 1984, and 1996. In 1964, Kentucky's statutes included Chapter 407, entitled the Uniform Support of Dependents Act. Although Kentucky's legislature titled it differently than URESA, it seems to be based in part or in whole on URESA. Additionally, our courts have referred to UIFSA as replacing URESA in our statutory scheme. See Lichtenstein v. Barbanel,
At the time that KRS 406.051 was enacted, the Uniform Support of Dependents Act had no provision regarding attorney fees. It was only with the passage of UIFSA that the Kentucky legislature created a statutory avenue for the recovery of attorneys' fees in KRS 407.5101. Thus, we must question whether the legislature intended to allow a remedy that had not theretofore been created when it enacted KRS 406.051. Our answer must, logically, be no.
While the reference to KRS 407.5101 seems strong, KRS 407.5101 is not a remedy under URESA. As such, the remedies referenced in KRS 406.051 cannot include the option for attorneys' fees. We question the legislature's decision to single out paternity actions as the only cause of action related to domestic matters in which there is no statutory basis for the shifting of fees. However, it is the duty of the General Assembly to legislate, and it is our duty to interpret such legislation. As such, we must hold that KRS 406.051 also fails to provide Lanham the statutory basis necessary for the award of attorneys' fees in this case.
3) A court is no longer imbued with equitable power to award attorneys' fees.
The Court of Appeals made passing reference to the fact that neither of the parties claimed attorneys' fees as a matter of equity and only addressed the statutory bases presented by Lanham. The courts of the Commonwealth were previously empowered to award attorneys' fees as an equitable measure, when, within the discretion of the court, it was deemed appropriate. See Dorman v. Baumlisberger,
Thus, we take this opportunity to clarify that, without a sound basis in contract or statute, a trial court may not award attorneys' fees. The trial court is still empowered to order a party to pay attorneys' fees as a sanction, but only when the integrity of the court is at stake.
C. The trial court must make additional findings before crediting the excess social security income payments to the pre-petition liabilities.
Lanham and Seeger's child began receiving a monthly Social Security dependent benefit of $1,204 per month in November 2011. The Nelson District Court, in an order dated after the child began receiving these benefits, set current support obligation for Seeger at $409 per month. The district court also ordered that the dependent benefits be applied to current support, leaving an extra monthly benefit of $795.
The Nelson District Court also ordered that Seeger pay a statutory liability of $46,820 for birthing expenses, child care costs, pre-petition child care costs, and pre-petition KRS 403.212 child support (hereinafter referred to as "pre-petition liabilities"). The district court specifically found that Seeger's "statutory liability for birthing expenses, child care costs and child support shall be deemed satisfied by the social security benefits paid to [Lanham] for the benefit of the Subject Child which are in excess of [Seeger]'s KRS 403.212 base monthly child support obligation." The court cited to the Court of Appeals decision in Miller v. Miller,
Upon appeal, the Nelson Circuit Court remanded back to the district court for further findings. The circuit court stated that "[a]pplying the rule in Miller, Seeger may receive the benefit of the 'excess' dependent benefit payments to pay the arrearage accruing between the date of his retirement and the date the child received the first dependent benefit payment." Seeger retired in January 2011 and the child began receiving monthly benefits in November 2011. Thus, from January to November 2011, the excess payment could be credited toward the pre-petition liabilities. However, "the remaining arrearage cannot be paid through the benefit payments." Thus, the circuit court remanded to the district court to apportion the credit accordingly.
The Court of Appeals also addressed the issue and held that a trial court may, "in its discretion," "apply excess social security retirement dependent benefits as a credit against the pre-petition ... liabilities a father incurs when a paternity action is initiated before a child turns four years
In reviewing this issue, we have a dual standard in our review. First, we must determine whether this credit is even permissible under the appropriate law. This being a purely legal issue, we review it de novo. Jones v. Hammond,
First, we shall clarify the issues that are not before us today. We are not presented with the issue of whether a benefit payment to a child, be it through government-sponsored retirement or disability benefits, can be used to satisfy a current support order of the non-custodial parent. This Court and the Court of Appeals have already determined that allowing such a satisfaction is well within the trial court's "general authority and discretion to determine child-support questions." C.D.G. v. N.J.S.,
The issue before us today is narrow. Can a non-custodial parent receive credit for a surplus government benefits payment to the child (received because of the non-custodial parent's status as either retiree or disabled) towards pre-petition liabilities? It is markedly different from the situations we have already decided. It is not a debt which was legally owed or collectable prior to a judgment. But neither is it a payment towards the current support of the child. It is a debt owed for past costs that only become legally due after adjudication and decision by the court. Our decision in this case is limited to such situations.
In making this decision, we have a clash between the interests of the child and those of the non-custodial parent. On one hand, "the primary purpose of ... social security payments ... [is to] meet the current needs of the dependents." Miller,
Several other jurisdictions have addressed similar issues and tried to determine which of these two parties is entitled to the greater benefit. In Ohio, the courts recognized that "the benefit [of Social Security benefits] inures directly to the child, notwithstanding the prerequisite status of the parent." Fuller v. Fuller,
[allow[ed] such credits, the defendant would receive a windfall, since the delinquent support payments would be made with the funds of the social security administration and not with his own. If [the court] disallow[ed] the credits, the daughter will receive the benefit of the extra payments since she will receive not only the support arrearages but also the monthly social security checks.
Id. at 886. Faced with this conundrum, the court determined that "[w]hen the windfall comes, equitably it should inure not to the defaulting husband's benefit, but to his bereft children." Id.
The interests before us are diverse and divergent. Yet, "[a]mong the highly varied holdings of these and other cases, we find one consistent similarity: the consideration of equitable factors in an effort to reach a fair and just result." Grays v. Ark. Office of Child Support Enf't,
As in determining whether the guidelines for child support would be "unjust or inappropriate," courts should look to the factors enumerated in KRS 403.211(3) to decide whether the credit as described would be equitably appropriate. Those factors are:
(a) A child's extraordinary medical or dental needs;
(b) A child's extraordinary educational, job training, or special needs;
(c) Either parent's own extraordinary needs, such as medical expenses;
(d) The independent financial resources, if any, of the child or children;
(e) Combined monthly adjusted parental gross income in excess of the Kentucky child support guidelines;
(f) [Agreements to child support differentiating from the guidelines]; and
(g) Any similar factor of an extraordinary nature....
KRS 403.211(3). These factors assist the trier of fact in concluding whether the needs of the parties would be equitably served by this credit or would be better served by allowing the excess to go towards the needs of the child. This list of factors is not exhaustive for the trial court's determination; instead, it should serve as a starting point for the court's equitable consideration. The trial court is most familiar with each party's situation and can deem whether there are other factors relevant in each case.
Additionally, our family courts are cognizant of the overarching purpose of child support orders: to benefit the dependent child in question. "The purpose of the [Kentucky child support] statutes and the guidelines ... is to secure the support needed by the children commensurate with the ability of the parents to meet those needs." Gossett v. Gossett,
Thus, we have determined that the trial court is empowered with discretion to determine whether to allow the credit. However, our courts have also acknowledged that the trial court's discretion in these matters is not without some limitation. Marshall,
There is no such requirement. It is within the court's discretion to determine whether the credit is equitably just under the guidelines we have described. This decision, then, was not "supported by sound legal principles." See Jones,
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that a paternity action pursuant to KRS 406.021 may be brought by a private attorney. Only upon request of the complainant must the
All sitting.
Minton, C.J., Cunningham, Hughes, Keller, VanMeter and Venters, JJ., concur.
Wright, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion.
Notes
This issue was also resolved pursuant to Seeger's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the Court's subsequent order. The grounds addressed are the same grounds raised in the appeal and will be discussed herein.
The jurisdictional issue was not addressed again until appeal to this Court.
"The court shall, within fourteen (14) days from the filing of the motion, order an amount of temporary child support based upon the child support guidelines as provided by KRS 403.212...." KRS 406.025(5).
"The District Court may exercise jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the Circuit Court, to determine matters of child custody and visitation in cases where paternity is established.... The District Court, in making these determinations shall utilize the provisions of KRS Chapter 403 relating to child custody and visitation...." KRS 406.051(2).
The findings of fact here have not been questioned. Such facts would be reviewed under a clear error standard. See Miller v. Eldridge,
Concurrence in Part
While I agree with the majority's well-reasoned opinion in all other respects, I dissent as to its remand for the trial court to determine whether it would be equitable to offset the father's pre-petition liabilities with the child's "excess" social security income. While I firmly believe that trial courts should be afforded a great deal of discretion in such matters, the child's dependent social security benefits are funds that the federal government has paid for the benefit of the child. How can a state court have the authority to take a child's money to pay an existing debt of the father?
To quote the majority, "the overarching purpose of child support orders [is] to benefit the dependent child in question." In this case, Seeger's current support obligation is set at $409 per month, and his child receives social security benefit of $1204 per month based on Seeger's Social Security retirement. While the amount of the child's dependent social security benefit is greater than the amount of the father's child support obligation, that does not change the fact the funds belong to the child. This is clear from the statute providing the entitlement. U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) reads, in pertinent part: "Every child ... of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, ... shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit...." (Emphasis added.) The child is entitled to the benefit-not a parent. While it might be appropriate to reduce child support payments by the amount of any support benefit paid the child based on the retirement of the parent, it is beyond the authority of the court to take any child's money and use these funds to pay debts the father already owes.
This Court's precedent allows the portion of the current support obligation owed by the non-custodial parent to be derived from the child's benefit. This is logical, as the father is no longer working and the child's Social Security benefit is for the child's support. Therefore, what our precedent allows is a direct substitution of these sources of future child support. Here, the majority gives the trial court the authority to take the child's benefits in excess of what was awarded as child support under the guidelines to pay a debt already owed by the father. The trial court lacks the authority to take the child's assets to pay
The child support benefit is paid by Social Security to support and care for the child and it is totally inappropriate to take that child's money to pay the father's past debts. A trial court should not have the discretion to do so. Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to this issue.