Seariver Maritime Financial Holdings Inc. v. Norman Y. MinetaSeariver Maritime Financial Holdings Inc. v. Norman Y. Mineta
Mark B. Stern, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, H. Russel Holland, Chief Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-00060-HRH.
Before D.W. NELSON, THOMPSON and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PAEZ, Circuit Judge.
At midnight on March 23, 1989, the T/V Exxon Valdez ran aground onto Bligh Reef in Alaska, spilling nearly eleven million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound (the “Sound“). The following year, Congress passed the
SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. and SeaRiver Maritime International, the owners of the Exxon Valdez, and SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., its operator, (collectively, “SeaRiver“) brought this action seeking, inter alia, a declaration that, as applied to SeaRiver,
We affirm. We hold that
The T/V Exxon Valdez began operation in 1986 as an oil tanker, transporting oil from Valdez, Alaska, to California. It was constructed at a cost of $125 million for the purpose of carrying oil from the Alaska North Slope to United States oil refineries. It is undisputed that the ship ran aground as a result of the actions of its master and crew.
On August 18, 1990, the President signed the Oil Pollution Act.
Section 2737 addressed the operation in Prince William Sound of vessels with histories of oil spills:
Notwithstanding any other law, tank vessels that have spilled more than 1,000,000 gallons of oil into the marine environment after March 22, 1989, are prohibited from operating on the navigable waters of Prince William Sound, Alaska.
Between March 22, 1989, and August 18, 1990, when the Oil Pollution Act was enacted, no other tank vessel engaged in transporting Alaska North Slope oil from Prince William Sound had spilled more than one million gallons of oil into the marine environment. Within that same period, at least nine tank vessels transporting oil in other regions had each spilled more than one million gallons of oil into the water. Prior to March 22, 1989, and since the passage of the Act, numerous tank vessels have spilled more than the requisite amount of oil.
SeaRiver repaired the Exxon Valdez. On August 29, 1990, it passed all Coast Guard inspections, confirming that it met federal regulatory standards. The tanker was renamed the S/R Mediterranean.1 It has apparently operated without spillage since its repair.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill spawned numerous civil and criminal actions. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1224 n. 12 (9th Cir.2001) (listing cases).2 The United States filed criminal charges against Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping, SeaRiver‘s predecessors, resulting in a plea agreement and fines that were remitted to $25 million. See id. at 1245-46. A consent decree resolving civil claims of the United States and the State of Alaska required Exxon to pay $100 million in restitution for governmental expenses spent on the cleanup and $900 million to restore damaged natural resources in exchange for the federal and state governments’ release of all civil claims. Id.
Plaintiffs brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking a declaration that
Ultimately, the case was transferred to the United States District Court fоr the District of Alaska. On June 4, 1998, the district court dismissed SeaRiver‘s claims, concluding that it had waived the right to challenge
DISCUSSION
SeaRiver advances three constitutional grounds for invalidating
A. Bill of Attainder
SeaRiver urges us to reverse the district court‘s determination that
The Constitution instructs Congress that “No Bill of Attainder ... shall be passed.”
Three key features brand a statute a bill of attainder: that the statute (1) specifies the affected persons, and (2) inflicts punishment (3) without a judicial trial4 Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984). Statutes are presumed constitutional. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). Only the clearest proof suffices to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute as a bill of attainder. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 83 (1961). In judging the constitutionality of
Whether
The Supreme Court, and our case law, have established various guideposts to aid in determining whether legislation singles out a person or class within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause. First, we look to whether the statute or provision explicitly names the individual or class, or instead, describes the affected population in terms of general applicability. Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 847; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469-71; see also Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485, 1495 (9th Cir.1993). Our second foсus, intricately connected with the first, is whether the identity of the individual or class was “easily ascertainable” when the legislation was passed. Brown, 381 U.S. at 448-49; United States v. Munsterman, 177 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir.1999). Third, we examine whether the legislation defines the individual or class by “past conduct [that] operates only as a designation of particular persons.” Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 847; Atonio, 10 F.3d at 1495. Finally, we review whether the past conduct defining the affected individual or group consists of “irrevocable acts committed by them.” Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 848.
None of these characteristics alone determines the question before us, and we do not view them in isolation. Nor is this constellation of factors exclusive of other hallmarks of specificity that legislation may exhibit when it singles out a person or group in violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. We conclude that, although the first of these guideposts does not support SeaRiver‘s position, the remaining three do. We also analyze whether
a. Terms of general applicability
The first guidepost does not support specificity here because the provision does not name SeaRiver. It is couched in general terms applicable to all tank vessels and to any oil spill of the requisite magnitude, in any marine environment. On its face,
b. Easily ascertainable individual or class
Our remaining guideposts, however, lead us to conclude otherwise. A statute need not identify an individual or group by name to incur suspicion. Atonio, 10 F.3d at 1495. Here, the class of vessels that
c. Past conduct
The third inquiry bolsters this conclusion. The “singling out of an individual for legislatively prescribed punishment constitutes an attainder whether the individual is called by name or described in terms of conduct which, because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular persons.” Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 847 (quoting Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 86). Thus, this third inquiry seeks to determine whether the statute is retrospective, or whether it carries the potential to encompass a larger class than the individual or group allegedly targeted.
Section 2737 has a dual focus: it describes the affected class by both past and рotential conduct. It defines the class of vessels excluded from Prince William Sound by the act of spilling a certain quantity of oil. The statute excludes from the Sound both vessels that spill oil after the date of enactment, and those that spilled oil between March 22, 1989 and the date of enactment. The effect of the March 22, 1989 date of the statute is to exclude the Exxon Valdez, while maintaining the status quo for other vessels that had spilled more than the requisite gallons of oil prior to March 22, 1989.
In ruling that
For that reason we do not, as SeaRiver urges, exclude from our analysis the open-ended nature of the provision in favor of a myopic focus on its retrospective effect. We agree with SeaRiver, however, that there is an overriding significance to the specific date in the statute. The date singles out the Exxon Valdez on the basis of a past act that other oil tank vessels operating in Prince William Sound had not committed as of the date the Act was passed.
d. Irreversible acts
The fourth guidepost requires us to examine whether the provision defines the specific class of persons affected by the “irreversible acts committed by them.” Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 848. If the defining act is irrevocable, the individual or class may not escape the effect of the legislation by correcting the past conduct, thereby exiting the targeted class. See id. at 851 (upholding a statute denying financial aid to students who failed to register for the draft because ineligibility was “‘made to turn upon [a] continuingly contemporaneous fact’ which a student who wants public assistance can correct” (quoting Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 87)).
Section 2737 focuses on irrevocable conduct. In reaching back prior to its date of enactment, the retrospective aspect of
If the law targets the Exxon Valdez, and not its owners, it is not a bill of attainder. The Clause is concerned with punishment of individuals, not objects. See Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir.1992) (clarifying that a statute restricting the use of assault weapons and listing those weapons by the manufacturer‘s name specified punishment based not only on the manufacturer‘s identity, but on “particular firearms which it has found are particularly dangerous,” and holding that the statute was not an attainder);6 see also Cummings, 71 U.S. at 320 (striking down a statute when it “was intended to reach the person, not the calling“).
A statute that singles out individuals or groups by targeting their property may still be a bill of attainder. “A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both. In this form the power of the legislature over the lives and fortunes of individuals is expressly restrained.” Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810). In Cummings, the Supreme Court articulated the link between an attainder and its potential to unconstitutionally impact property rights: “‘[T]he people of the United States, in adopting [the Constitution containing the Bill of Attainder Clause] have manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed.‘” 71 U.S. at 322 (quoting Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137). Thus, we must decide whether
On its face,
Having decided that the provision jointly addresses the Exxon Valdez and the persons who own and оperate it, and having encountered in
That the March 22, 1989, date of the statute sweeps into its purview only the Exxon Valdez is not dispositive here. Section 2737 is not a bill of attainder because it does not inflict punishment on SeaRiver. Three inquiries determine whether a statute inflicts punishment on the specified individual or group: “(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, ‘viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes‘; and (3) whether the legislative record ‘evinces a congressional intent to punish.‘” Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 852 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475-76, 478); see also Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728. We also consider whether less burdensome alternatives would have achieved the same non-punitive purpose. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 482.
A statute neеd not satisfy all of these factors to constitute a bill of attainder. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-78; Consolidated Edison, 292 F.3d at 350. Rather, we weigh these factors together in resolving a bill of attainder claim. Id.
a. The historical meaning of legislative punishment
Section 2737 evinces none of the historical means of punishment that characterize an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Traditionally, bills of attainder sentenced the named individual to death, imprisonment, banishment, the punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign, or erected a bar to designated individuals or groups participating in specified employments or vocations. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-74.
The district court correctly rejected SeaRiver‘s contention that prohibiting the Exxon Valdez from entering Prince William Sound falls within the historical meaning of banishment. Banishment has traditionally been associated with deprivation of citizenship, and “does more than merely restrict one‘s freedom tо go or remain where others have the right to be: it often works a destruction of one‘s social, cultural, and political existence.” Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 897 (2d Cir.1996). Banishment thus refers to individuals, not to property such as an oil tanker. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (analogizing to banishment in holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of denationalization as punishment). It describes an ouster from the individual‘s home city, country, or territory, not the exclusion of a ship from a body of water. Id.; Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 n. 11 (9th Cir.1993). The statute does not banish from Prince William Sound either SeaRiver or any individual associated with SeaRiver.
Nor does the statute bar the SeaRiver plaintiffs from any form of employment. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474. It is undisputed that SeaRiver continues to transport oil through Prince William Sound.
b. Furtherance of non-punitive legislative purposes
Whether a statute falls within the historical meaning of punishment is only one factor in our analysis. We would not decline to hold that legislation with an indisputably punitive purpose was а bill of attainder merely because Congress employed unconventional means. Rather, we apply a “functional test” to ensure that the legislature has not fashioned new burdens and deprivations that are inconsistent with the Constitution‘s guarantee against bills of attainder. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475. This test inquires:
whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes. Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of the decisionmakers.
Id. at 475-76 (internal citations omitted). Thus, even if the Act singles out an individual on the basis of irreversible past conduct, if it furthers a nonpunitive legislative purpose, it is not a bill of attainder. Id.
SeaRiver has not cаrried its burden, as the “one who complains of being attainted,” of establishing “that the legislature‘s action constituted punishment and not merely the legitimate regulation of conduct.” Id. at 476 n. 40. Section 2737 furthers a non-punitive purpose: that of protecting the environment within Prince William Sound from a heightened risk of harm from oil spills. The provision affords protection to Prince William Sound by excluding from it the risk of a future spill from the tank vessel involved in one of the largest oil spills in U.S. history.
1. Legitimate justification
First,
The fact that the provision places an additional burden upon SeaRiver does not affect our conclusion. Although Congress was aware when it passed
In this respect, this case is similar to Gerling Global, where we upheld a statute that placed new burdens on insurance companies on the basis of past actions. 296 F.3d at 850-51. The statute required insurance companies that held policies from the Holocaust era to publicly register with a state agency. Id. at 836. Although the statute potentially subjected the companies to embarrassment and increased claims, id. at 850, we upheld it. The statute‘s legitimate nonpunitive purposes included providing data to Holocaust victims and their families about claims, protecting California citizens from insurance companies with histories of questionable practices, and disclosing to California citizens the character of the insurance companies. Id. at 850-51.
This case and Gerling Global are unlike cases in which there was no link between the consequence that the statute imposed and the individual‘s past conduct. In Cummings, for instance, the Court concluded that in imposing a loyalty oath as a requisite for certain professions, “a qualification having no possible relation to [] fitness” for those professions, the statute “was intended to reach the person, not the calling.” 71 U.S. at 320. Here, by contrast,
2. Focus on prospective risks
Second, the provision addresses a prospective risk to the environment and to third parties. See Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728 (holding that motivation behind statute was “to protect the safety and welfare of the citizens of California“). Congress may legitimately conclude that a vessel that has spilled over one million gallons of oil poses a greater risk to Prince William Sound than other tank vessels, either because of a pre-existing defect, damage incurred as a result of the spill, or because the spill calls into question the practices of its operators. See id. (“In light of the Legislature‘s concern that assault weapons present an unreasonable danger of harm to human life, legitimate justifications for passage of the Act are readily apparent.“) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The concern that the Exxon Valdez presents an unreasonable risk to Prince William Sound is sufficient to justify the restriction on SeaRiver‘s use of the vessel in that area.
Finally, SeaRiver contends that Congress‘s intent can only have been to punish the tanker‘s owners because it is undisputed that the tanker ran aground as a result of the actions of its master and crew and the ship‘s construction did not cause the collision. Defendants counter that Congress could have rationally concluded that tank vessels involved in major spills could subsequently prove less safe due to damage or an antecedent defect.
It is of no import whether Congress acted on the basis that the owners of the vessel may be more likely than others to tolerate practices that risk a future spill, that the vessel‘s construction contributed to the magnitude of the event, or that the collision reduced the likelihood of subsequent safe operation. Congress may decline to undertake a prolonged factual inquiry into the allocation of responsibility between vessel and operator for the occurrence and magnitude of the spill, and instead allocate responsibility to both in a single provision designed to prevent a recurrence of a similar incident.
c. The legislative record and the intent to punish
The third hallmark of a punitive statute is a legislative record that “‘evinces a congressional intent to punish.‘” Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 852. We seek to determine whether the legislative record is probative of nonpunitive intentions or instead evidences legislative overreaching that enlivens “the fear that the legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency,” found it “expedient oрenly to assume the mantle of judge — or, worse still, lynch mob.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480. The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act does not unmistakably manifest such a motive. See Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 855 n. 15 (explaining that there was no congressional motive to punish underlying § 12(f)).
Because
During the congressional debate over the conference report, the causes of the Exxon Valdez oil spill were still under investigation. S.Rep. No. 101-99, at 2 (1990). It was not clear “whether it was the ship or its captain that actually caused the disaster.” SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F.Supp. 9, 11 (D.D.C.1997). It is therefore difficult to determine whether, in including
Because these statements relate to the Act as a whole, or to the provisions surrounding
A “formal legislative announcement of moral blame worthiness or punishment” is not a necessary aspect of an unlawful bill of attainder. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480. And departure from established legislative procedures may suggest an improper purpose. Arlington Heights v. Met. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977). The congressional silence surrounding
d. Less Burdensome Alternatives
Finally, “[i]n determining whether a legislature sought to inflict punishment on an individual, it is often useful to inquire into the existence of less burdensome alternatives by which [Congress] could have achieved its legitimate nonpunitive objectives.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 482. SeaRiver argues that Congress could have restricted its actions to purely prophylactic measures. However, this would not have achieved the purpose of excluding from Prince William Sound a vessel with a history of major oil spillage. A “rational and fairminded Congress” may have decided that tailoring the provision to the ship involved in the disaster, rather than prohibiting its owners or operators entirely from oil-transporting activities in the Sound, would be less objectionable. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 483.
Nonetheless, SeaRiver argues that in passing
Were we to declare unconstitutional Congress‘s decision to include the Exxon Valdez (and all other vessels involved in large oil spills between March 22, 1989, and the date of enactment) within the scope of the statute, or require that the statute regress infinitely in time to encompass all oil-spilling tank vessels, we would ourselves encroach on legislative territory. We decline to assume the mantle of the legislature in determining the datе that a statute must take effect, or in framing and quantifying the class that the legislation may permissibly affect.
We conclude, in sum, that
Section 2737 does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. SeaRiver contends that
Here, assuming that Congress intended that
C. The Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Challenge
SeaRiver alleges that
The statutory classification that SeaRiver defines does not implicate a “suspect class,” and SeaRiver does not allege that the classification, by itself, infringes on fundamental constitutional rights. Therefore, the statute comports with equal protection if there is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982) (“Generally, a law will survive that scrutiny if the distinction it makes rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.“); see also Atonio, 10 F.3d at 1493-94. Although the legislative history of
SeaRiver contends that there is no rational relationship between the March 22, 1989, “trigger date” and the government‘s proffered reason that Congress could have been concerned that the Exxon Valdez would rupture again because
The fact that the legislature could have chosen an earlier or later effective date does not establish an equal protection violation. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (noting “the fact the line might have been drawn differеntly at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration“). A legislative choice “may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315. “It is enough that plausible reasons for Congress’ action exist.” Atonio, 10 F.3d at 1494.
We conclude, therefore, that
CONCLUSION
In sum,
AFFIRMED.