SEARCY, DENNEY, SCAROLA, BARNHART & SHIPLEY, etc., et al., Petitioners, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
No. SC15-1747
Supreme
[January 31, 2017]
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. State, 194 So. 3d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). In a separate decision, the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance:
AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 768.28, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND THE ADOPTION OF FLORIDA SENATE RULE 4.81(6), IS IT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES PAID FROM A GUARDIANSHIP TRUST ESTABLISHED BY A LEGISLATIVE CLAIMS BILL?
Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. State, 190 So. 3d 120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction. See
As we explain, we answer the certified question in the negative when such limitation impairs an existing contract. Although the Legislature has complete discretion in its decision whether to grant a legislative claims bill, which is an act of grace, the claims bill may not unconstitutionally impair the preexisting contract between the claimant and the law firm for attorneys’ fees, which may be recovered subject to the limits set forth in
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arose after the birth of Aaron Edwards, during which he sustained a catastrophic brain injury as a result of the negligence of employees at Lee Memorial Health System (Lee Memorial) in 1997. The law firm of Searcy Dennеy Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. (Searcy Denney) was retained by the family to seek compensation under a standard contingency fee agreement providing for a payment of 40 percent of any recovery if a lawsuit was filed, plus costs. The agreement also stated that “[i]n the event that one of the parties to pay my claim for damages is a governmental agency, I understand that Federal and Florida Law may limit the amount of attorney fees charged by [Searcy Denney], and in that event, I understand that the fees owed to [Searcy Denney] shall be the amount provided by law.”
The case proceeded to a five-week jury trial in 2007, at which the jury found Lee Memorial Health System‘s employees negligent, and that the negligence resulted in damages to the child in the amount of $28.3 million. The jury also awarded the mother $1.34 million and the father $1 million. Because the hospital was an independent special district of the State of
Searcy Denney and various other firms were involved in litigation of the medical malpractice suit, the first appeal, and a subsequent two-year lobbying effort to secure a claims bill from the Legislature on behalf of the injured child and his parents.1 Because the waiver of sovereign immunity in
$1 million each to “the Guardianship of Aaron Edwards, to be placed in a special needs trust created for the exclusive use and benefit of Aaron Edwards, a minor.” Ch. 2012-249, § 2, Laws of Fla. The claims bill further stated that payment of fees and costs from funds awarded in the claims bill shall not exceed $100,000. No funds were awarded in the claims bill for the parents. In November 2012, the child‘s mother petitioned to establish a guardianship over the minor son‘s property, and Lee Memorial subsequently made its first payment of $10 million.
Searcy Denney, with the full support of the family, then petitioned the guardianship court to approve a closing statement allowing $2.5 million for attorneys’ fees and costs. This requested amount was based on the contract that existed with the Edwards family, as limited by the provisions of
Because the petition to approve the closing statement also contended that the limit on fees contained in the claims bill was unconstitutional, the State of Florida intervened to defend the constitutionality of the claims bill enactment. And because of competing claims for a portion of the proceeds of the claims bill, the guardianship court appointed a guardian ad litem for the injured child. The
evidence presented to the guardianship court revealed that the firms seeking fees and costs spent more than 7000 hours representing the family at trial, on appeal, and during the claims bill process. The evidence also demonstrated that costs of more than $500,000 were expended during the representation. As to the law firm‘s request for fees and costs of $2.5 million from funds provided by the claims bill, the guardianship court, relying on precedent from this Court and the Fourth District,2 denied thе request for fees in that amount, concluding that the court lacked judicial authority to contravene the fee and cost limitation the Legislature placed in the claims bill. The guardianship court also denied the request to find the fee limitation invalid and sever it from the remainder of the claims bill.
limitation because
The Fourth District rejected these contentions, stating that “[a]lthough sympathetic to Appellants’ situation, we must disagree with their legal arguments based on separation of powers principlеs, supported by reasoning set forth from the Florida Supreme Court.” Searcy Denney, 194 So. 3d at 349. After reciting a brief history of sovereign immunity, both federal and state, the district court noted that
In finding the fee limitation in the claims bill valid, the district court relied on this Court‘s decision in Gamble v. Wells, 450 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1984), the underlying facts of which predated the waiver of sovereign immunity statute. In Gamble, we held that an attorney‘s fee limitation in a “private relief act” granted by the Legislature was not an unconstitutional impairment of contract because the
private rеlief act was “an act of grace,” and the Legislature could “allow compensation, decide the amount of compensation, and determine the conditions, if any, to be placed on the appropriation.” Gamble, 450 So. 2d at 853. The Fourth District also noted its earlier case in which it held that the amount allowed in a claims bill was voluntarily given by the Legislature and was separate and apart from the recovery in the lawsuit—and that the Legislature could limit attorneys’ fees in a claims bill “no matter what the underlying fee contract provides.” Searcy Denney, 194 So. 3d at 353-54 (quoting Noel v. Sheldon J. Schlesinger, P.A., 984 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).
Based on the precedent discussed above, the majority of the district court panel held that the guardianship court was correct in recognizing the Legislature‘s prerogative to limit the payment of fees and costs to $100,000. While sympathizing with the plight of the attorneys, and of persons in the future who might have difficulty obtaining counsel tо take these types of cases, the Fourth District found those concerns to be beyond the court‘s focus and more a policy consideration to be taken up by the Legislature. Id. at 355 n.5.
Chief Judge Ciklin dissented and opined that under
the claims bill. Searcy Denney, 194 So. 3d at 360-61 (Ciklin, C.J., dissenting). He also
Chief Judge Ciklin also concluded that the Gamble decision relied on by the circuit court and the majority was no longer controlling because the cause of action accrued before the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in
claims bill, essentially required the Edwards family to “lawyer up.” Id. at 364 (Ciklin, C.J., dissenting).
Further, Chief Judge Ciklin opined that the ability to employ legal counsel has long been an important part of the right of access to courts, which includes a prohibition on the imposition of unreasonable financial burdens that serve to obstruct individual access to courts; and contingency fee agreements are directly related to the right of access to courts. Id. at 365-66 (Ciklin, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, Chief Judge Ciklin concluded that the fee limitation in the claims bill has a chilling effect on the fundamental constitutional right of access to courts and should be severed from the bill. Id. at 367-68 (Ciklin, C.J., dissenting).
Thus, the certified question presented in this case turns on the validity of the additional provision in the claims bill that states: “The total amount paid for attorney‘s fees, lobbying fees, costs, and other similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed $100,000.” Ch. 2012-249, § 3, Laws of Fla.
ANALYSIS
Standards of Review
Searcy Denney‘s challenge to the fee limitation in the claims bill enacted in chapter 2012-249, Laws of Florida, is primarily based on contentions that the fee limitation is unconstitutional and that the district court misinterpreted the prоvisions of
being an enactment of the Legislature, is reviewed under the same standard as we apply to review of a statute. The constitutionality of a statute is a pure question of law that is subject to de novo review. City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002). However, we remain mindful that a statute comes to the Court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and all reasonable doubt about its validity must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010).
We are also called upon in this case to interpret the provisions of
Statutory interpretation in any case “begin[s] with the actual language used in the statute because legislative intent is determined first and foremost from the statute‘s text.” Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So. 3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007)). “When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite mеaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Bennett v. St. Vincent‘s Med. Ctr., Inc., 71 So. 3d 828, 837-38 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Fla. Birth-Related Neuro. Injury Comp. Ass‘n v. Dep‘t of Admin. Hearings, 29 So. 3d 992, 997 (Fla. 2010)).
Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d 989, 991 (Fla. 2016).
In giving effect to the text of a statute, courts may not extend, modify, or limit the statute‘s express terms or its reasonable or obvious implications because
to do so would be an abrogation of legislative power. See McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). “[T]he statute‘s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent.” Daniels v. Fla. Dep‘t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64-65 (Fla. 2005) (citing State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004)). All parts of the statute must be given effect, and the Court should avoid a reading of the statute that renders any part meaningless. See Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 199. Moreover, “all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.” Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis omitted)).
This case also requires us to construe the terms of the contingency fee agreement entered into by the attorneys and the Edwards family; therefore, our interpretation of the contract is also de novo. See Jackson v. Shakespeare Foundation, Inc., 108 So. 3d 587, 593 (Fla. 2013). With these standards in mind, we turn to the certified question in this case.
Discussion
As we stated above, the Fourth District certified the following question to this Court:
AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 768.28, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND THE ADOPTION OF FLORIDA SENATE RULE
4.81(6), IS IT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES PAID FROM A GUARDIANSHIP TRUST ESTABLISHED BY A LEGISLATIVE CLAIMS BILL?
The Fourth District held in the affirmative, concluding that the Legislature in its discretion could place conditions in the claims bill, including a limitation on the amount of attorneys’ fees and other fees and costs that could be paid from that amount.
We agree with the district court that a claims bill is a “voluntary recognition of its moral obligation by the legislature” and is firmly entrenched in legislative discretion. Searcy Denney, 194 So. 3d at 354 (quoting Noel, 984 So. 2d at 1267 (quoting Gamble, 450 So. 2d at 853)). This principle is not in dispute. We disagree,
be; and that portion of the judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature.”
intended in
Impairment of Contract
1992) (explaining that “each right” in the Declaration of Rights is “a distinct freedom guaranteed to each Floridian against government intrusion” and “operates in favor of the individual, against [the] government“)). To impair a preexisting contract, a law must “have the effect of rewriting antecedent contracts” in a manner that “chang[es] the substantive rights of the parties to existing contracts.” Manning v. Travelers Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 872, 874 (Fla. 1971).
The Searcy Denney “Contract for Services” executed January 19, 1999, provides for a contingency fee of up to 40 percent of the recovery if suit is filed, plus 5 percent if an appeal is filed or if, “[f]ollowing a judgment entered either as a result of Court or arbitration proceedings, additional proceedings (such as garnishment, attachment, or supplementary proceedings) are brought by or at the direction of SEARCY DENNEY SCAROLA BARNHART & SHIPLEY, P.A. in an effort to collect on any judgment.” The contract also provides that
[i]n the event that one of the parties responsible to pay my claim for damages is a governmental agency, I understand that Federal and Florida law may limit the amount of attorney fees charged by SEARCY DENNEY SCAROLA BARNHART & SHIPLEY, P.A. In that event, I understand that the attorney fees owed to SEARCY DENNEY SCAROLA BARNHART & SHIPLEY, P.A. shall be the amount provided by law.
Searcy Denney‘s services under the contract resulted in a $28.3 million judgment. Because the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in
Searcy Denney and the other firms assisting the family followed the express provisions of
As noted earlier, the law firms’ services were in accord with Senate Rule 4.81(6), which provides that a claims bill may not be considered by the Senate until all available administrative and judicial remedies have been exhausted. We are constrained to conclude that in entering into this contract with the Edwards family, and in pursuing this case through trial, appeal, and the legislative claims bill process, Searcy Denney and the other firms assisting the family were acting in good faith and with the expectation that, pursuant to contract, fees may be recovered in an amount up to 25 percent of any portion of the judgment recovered—regardless of the method or vehicle of recovery.
State regulations that restrict a party to gains it reasonably expected from the contract do not constitute substantial impairment. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Dep‘t of Ins., 453 So. 2d 1355, 1360 (Fla. 1984) (quoting Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983)). In this case, the
contract at issue called for a fee of 40 percent of the recovery, which is a standard contingency
We reiterated in Pоmponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condominium, Inc., 378 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1979), as we earlier held in Yamaha Parts Distributors Inc. v. Ehrman, 316 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1975), that “virtually no degree of contract impairment is tolerable.” Pomponio, 378 So. 2d at 780; see also Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass‘n, Inc. v. Devon Neighborhood Ass‘n, Inc., 67 So. 3d 187, 193 n.6 (Fla. 2011). However, we also recognized that the holding that “virtually” no impairment is tolerable “necessarily implies that some impairment is tolerable.” Pomponio, 378
So. 2d at 780. The question thus becomes how much impairment is tolerable and how to determine that amount. To answer that question, in Pomponio we proposed a balancing test that “allow[ed] the court to consider the actual effect of the provision on the contract and to balance a party‘s interest in not having the contract impaired against the State‘s source of authority and the evil sought to be remedied.” Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379, 385 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass‘n, 67 So. 3d at 193 n.6). “[T]his becomes a balancing process to determine whether the nature and extent of the impairment is constitutionally tolerable in light of the importance of the State‘s objective, or whether it unreasonably intrudes into the parties’ bargain to a degree greater than is necessary to achieve that objective.” Pomponio, 378 So. 2d at 780.
An impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. Id. at 778-79 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)). However, where the impairment is severe, “[t]he severity of the impairment is said to increase the level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be subjected.” U.S. Fidelity, 453 So. 2d at 1360 (quoting Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411). There must be a “significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411.
Where a legislatively imposed fee limitation substantially impairs a party‘s preexisting contract for representation and payment of agreed-upon attorneys’ fees,
especially when those fees meet the measure that the Legislature has found reasonable under
Nor do we see any significant or legitimate public purpose to be achieved by the limitation. Because up to 25 percent of the
attorney‘s fees and costs was necessary to accomplish some type of ‘important public purpose.‘” Id. at 361 (Ciklin, C.J., dissenting).
The right to contract for legal services in order to petition for redress is a right that is related to the
The
For all these reasons, we conclude that the $100,000 fee limitation contained in the
We also agree with Chief Judge Ciklin that our prior decision in Gamble does not compel a different result in this case, as we discuss next.
Gamble v. Wells
In 1984, we held in Gamble v. Wells, 450 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 1984), thаt the Legislature could place a monetary limitation on the attorneys’ fees for Gamble‘s attorney in a private relief act that awarded Gamble, as guardian, compensation for injuries to her ward that were inflicted while the State had custody of the ward. 450 So. 2d at 851. Because the State had not waived sovereign immunity at the time the cause of action accrued, “the only possible means available for recovery would be a private relief act” by the Legislature. Id. at 852. When the Legislature passed the private relief act, it limited the attorneys’ fees payable to Gamble‘s attorney to an amount less than that provided by the standard contingency fee contract that Gamble and her attorney had executed. We held in Gamble that the limitation in the private relief act was not an unconstitutional impairment of contract because the Legislature was voluntarily recognizing its mоral obligation based on justice and fair treatment for someone “who was legally remediless to seek damages.” Id. at 853. We held that the private relief act was a matter of legislative grace in which the Legislature could place any conditions it determined appropriate. Id.
However, since our decision in Gamble, circumstances and the law have changed. Plaintiffs such as Gamble are no longer remediless, but have a remedy by way of the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in
Chief Judge Ciklin set forth a clear explanation of why Gamble is no longer dispositive. He states in his dissent:
[C]hanges in the law and legislative procedure have rendered Gamble distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts at hand. After the cause of action accrued in Gamble and before Aaron‘s family formally entered into the subject contingency fee agreement, the Legislature enacted
section 768.28 , which, for the first time, (1) afforded a limited monetary waiver of immunity for tort actions; (2) required finality in an official judicial or administrative proceeding as a condition precedent to invoking the claim billprocess; (3) recognized the possibility of a contingency fee agreement in procuring the official judicial or administrative final order by imposing a twenty-five percent cap as to any attorneys’ fees payable under a contingency fеe agreement; and (4) provided for ultimate presentation to the Legislature for its consideration when the newly required official administrative or judicial action exceeded the limits of liability. With the enactment of
section 768.28 , the Legislature‘s exercise of its prerogative to choreograph rights pertaining to sovereign immunity went from a blank page with no codified rights, save for some undefined historical doctrine, to a multi-step process for those who suffered damages because of the negligence of a sovereign entity. It was in reliance on this legislative action that the Edwards family and the firm came to a rock solid agreement.
Searcy Denney, 194 So. 3d at 363 (Ciklin, C.J., dissenting).
We agree that because of these changes in the law, Gamble is not dispositive of the question presented in this case. The enactment of
We emphasize that our decision here is in no way intended to impinge on legislative discretion in the decision whether to enact a claims bill in the first instance. That legislative discretion to perform an act of grace in passing such a claims bill, and in determining the amount of compensation to be included in a claims bill, is sacrosanct pursuant to separation of powers. See
Severability
We also agree with Chief Judge Ciklin‘s conclusion that the invalid fee limitation may properly be severed from the claims bill. He concludes, as do we, that the intent and purpose of the bill can be accomplished without the invalid fee limitation. Searcy Denney, 194 So. 3d at 368 (Ciklin, C.J., dissenting). “The rule is well established that the unconstitutionality of a portion of a statute will not necessarily condemn the entire act.” Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 137 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. 1962). We have held that “[s]everability is a judicially created doctrine which recognizes a court‘s obligation to uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments where it is possible to remove the unconstitutional portions.” State v. Catalano, 104 So. 3d 1069, 1080 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Fla. Dept. of State v. Mangat, 43 So. 3d 642, 649 (Fla. 2010)). It is designed to show deference to the Legislature
Part of a statute that is declared unconstitutional will be severed if “(1) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provisions, (2) the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other and, (4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken.” Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 518 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Cramp, 137 So. 2d at 830). The key is whether the overall legislative intent is still accomplished without the invalid provision. See Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1173 (Fla. 1991) (quoting E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311, 317 (Fla. 1984)).
The Legislature clearly intended to provide compensation for Aaron Edwards’ significant injuries and future care well beyond the limited amounts recоverable under
In this case, we conclude that the remаinder of the act—providing substantial compensation for Aaron‘s injuries and care—can still be accomplished if the fee limitation is severed. The act, after severance, would still meet the requirement of being “complete in itself.” Thus, we hold that the valid portions of the claims bill may be severed from the invalid fee limitation without disrupting the integrity of the remainder of the act; and the overall purpose of the act—compensation to benefit the injured child in this case—can still be accomplished. See Ray, 742 So. 2d at 1283. In a different context, we refused to strike an entire enactment that was intended to serve an important and beneficial purpose in Schmitt. There, we severed an unconstitutional portion of a statute intended to prevent exploitation of children, leaving the remainder of the statute intact because it served the legislative purpose of rooting out child exploitation and because “this Court would do a grave disservice . . . by striking the remainder of the statute simply because a single clause is unconstitutional.” Schmitt, 590 So. 2d at 415. We also found in Schmitt that the remainder of the act was “complete in itself . . . after the invalid portion has been removed.” Id.
Similarly, in this case, we are loathe to strike the entire claims bill, which is clearly intended to provide critical compensation for Aaron‘s injuries in this case. To do so would be a grave disservice to both the
For all these reasons, we conclude there is no impediment to the law firms seeking contractual attorneys’ fees and costs in this case pursuant to the preexisting contract up to and including the amount previously sought—an amount that the Edwards family has urged the courts to award—based on the limitation contained in
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the fee limitation in the claims bill, chapter 2012-249, Laws of Florida, is unconstitutional and may not stand when such a limitation impairs a preexisting contract. We further hold that the valid portion of the act may be severed from the invalid portion and still accomplish the beneficial purpose of the act in providing compensation due to the injured child in this case. Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District in Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. State of Florida, 194 So. 3d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this decision.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and PERRY, Senior Justice, concur.
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion.
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA, C.J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANADY, J., dissenting.
I dissent from the majority‘s decision regarding both the certified question and the issue of severability.
I would adhere to our decision in Gamble v. Wells, 450 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1984), and answer the certified question in the affirmative. The enactment of
[The claimant] could only request that the legislature grant the compensation sought. The legislature then, as a matter of grace, could allow compensation, decide the amount of compensation, and determine the conditions, if any, to be placed on the appropriation. Parties cannot enter into a contract to bind the state in the exercisе of its sovereign power. The legislature had the power to place the attorney‘s fee limitation in [the claims bill]. [The claimant], by the terms of his contingent fee contract with [his attorney], could not deprive the legislature of this power. The legislature was in no way bound to pass legislation conforming with the provisions of the prior contingent fee contract.
Id. at 853. The Legislature‘s action in adopting
We have recognized that “if severance would cause results unanticipated by the legislature, there can be no severance of the invalid parts[, and] the entire law must be declared unconstitutional.” E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311, 317 (Fla. 1984) (citing Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1958)). Severance is permissible only “if the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void; and the good and bad features are not inseparable and the Legislature would have passed one without the other.” Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida v. Wood, 297 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla. 1974) (citing Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 137 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1962)). Here, there is no basis for concluding that the Legislature would have anticipated that appropriated funds would be used for a purpose that was expressly prohibited. And there is no basis for the view that the specific allocations of funds for distinct purposes mandated by the Legislature are “not inseparable.” The result of severance here is that the Legislature‘s purpose is thwarted in two ways: less funds than appropriаted are provided to the special needs trust and more funds than appropriated are provided for attorneys’ fees. Severance thus wreaks havoc on the legislative scheme.
POLSTON, J., dissenting.
I would answer the certified question in the affirmative. The Florida law limiting the amount of attorneys’ fees does not unconstitutionally impair a preexisting contract that expressly contemplates and accepts that Florida law may limit the amount of attorneys’ fees.
As acknowledged by the majority, it is well-settled law that the Florida Legislature has complete discretion in its decision to grant a legislative claims bill, which is an act of grace. See Gamble v. Wells, 450 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1984). The Legislature could indisputably have chosen to make no award to the injured person and pay no attorneys’ fees. But the Legislature awarded $15,000,000 to the Guardianship of Aaron Edwards. Ch. 2012-249, Laws of Florida. It also provided $100,000 for attorneys’ fees and other costs:
Section 3. The amount paid by Lee Memorial Health System pursuant to s. 768.28, Florida Statutes, and the amount awarded under this act are intended to provide the sole compensation for all present and future claims arising out of the factual situation described in this act which resulted in the injuries suffered by Aaron Edwards. The total amount paid for attorney‘s fees, lobbying fees, costs, and other similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed $100,000.
The majority holds that this award of attorneys’ fees unconstitutionally impairs the fee agreement between the Searcy Denney firm and its clients. However, the fee agreement specifically provides that “[i]n the event that one of the parties to pay my claim for damages is a governmental agency, I understand that Federal and Florida Law may limit the amount of attorney fees charged by [Searcy Denney], and in that event, I understand that the fees owed to [Searcy Denney] shall be the amount provided by law.” (Emphasis added.) Lee Memorial Health System of Lee County is a governmental agency, and the Florida law enacted by the Legislature limited the amount of attorneys’ fees to
The majority also severs the award of attorneys’ fees that it claims is unconstitutional so that the award to Aaron Edwards remains and is left untouched by its ruling. Although this is a favorable result for the plaintiff and his attorneys, it is not what the law requires. The Legislature was very clear that it was awarding only $100,000 for anyone оther than Aaron Edwards. However, the result of the majority‘s ruling is to take $2,500,000 from the Guardianship of Aaron Edwards for attorneys’ fees, a result that was explicitly rejected by the Legislature with its enactment of the claims bill. Unlike the majority, I cannot read a different legislative intent and purpose into the claims bill. See Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 518 (Fla. 2008) (delineating the four-part test for determining whether severance is appropriate, including whether “the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void” and whether “the good and the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other” (quoting Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange Cty., 137 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. 1962))).
I respectfully dissent.
LABARGA, C.J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified Great Public Importance
Fourth District - Case No. 4D13-3497
(Palm Beach County)
Edna Louise Caruso of Edna L. Caruso P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; Christiаn Dietrich Searcy and Jack Patrick Hill of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; and George Alexander Vaka of the Vaka Law Group, P.L., Tampa, Florida, for Petitioners
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Rachel Erin Nordby, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent
Jessie Leigh Harrell, Rebecca Bowen Creed, and Bryan Scott Gowdy of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Association
Edward Downey and Robert Lee McElroy, IV of Downey | McElroy, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Guardian Ad Litem
George T. Levesque, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amici Curiae the Florida Senate and Andy Gardiner, in his official capacity as President of the Florida Senate
Matthew Joseph Carson, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amici Curiae the Florida House of Representatives and Steve Crisafulli, in his official capacity as Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives