Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, etc. v. State of Florida, 209 So. 3d 1181

Background

Aaron Edwards suffered catastrophic brain injury in 1997; Searcy Denney (and other firms) represented the family under a contingency agreement (up to 40%) and obtained a $28.3 million jury verdict.
Sovereign-immunity caps in § 768.28(5) limited judicial recovery against Lee Memorial (a state special district) to $200,000; the statute allows excess judgments to be paid only by a legislative claims bill.
The Legislature enacted chapter 2012-249, awarding $15 million ($10M lump sum + $5M in installments) to a guardianship trust for Aaron and expressly limited “attorney’s fees, lobbying fees, costs, and other similar expenses” payable from the award to $100,000.
Searcy Denney petitioned the guardianship court to approve $2.5 million in fees (consistent with the contingency contract and § 768.28(8)’s 25% cap); the guardianship court denied the request and declined to sever the $100,000 cap.
The Fourth DCA affirmed, relying on Gamble and holding legislative discretion over claims bills allowed the fee cap; the Supreme Court granted review on whether the Legislature may constitutionally limit attorneys’ fees paid from a guardianship trust created by a claims bill.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a legislative claims-bill fee cap that reduces preexisting contingency fees impairs contract obligations under the Contracts Clauses	Searcy Denney: the cap unconstitutionally impairs a preexisting fee contract (and chills access to courts); §768.28(8) contemplates up to 25% even for amounts paid by claims bill	State: claims bills are acts of legislative grace; Legislature may condition awards (Gamble); plaintiffs accepted legislative discretion when contracting	Held for Searcy Denney: the $100,000 cap impermissibly impairs the preexisting contract when it conflicts with §768.28(8) and the parties’ reasonable expectations
Whether §768.28(8)’s 25% fee limit applies to amounts paid by legislative claims bill	Searcy Denney: read §768.28(5) and (8) together; fees up to 25% are allowable whether recovery is via court judgment or legislative payment	State: Legislature may set different conditions in a claims bill case-by-case	Held: §768.28(8) applies to amounts recovered via claims bill; the claims-bill cap conflicted with statutory fee scheme
Whether Gamble v. Wells controls this dispute	State/Fourth DCA: Gamble permits Legislature to impose fee conditions in private relief acts	Searcy Denney: Gamble is distinguishable because §768.28 now provides a statutory remedy, fee cap, and a claims-bill procedure that parties reasonably relied upon	Held: Gamble is not dispositive given enactment of §768.28 and changed legal context; parties reasonably relied on §768.28’s fee framework
Whether the unconstitutional fee provision may be severed from the claims bill	Searcy Denney: sever to preserve the award for the child and allow contract fees per §768.28(8)	State: severance would frustrate legislative allocations and replace a clear legislative bargain	Held: fee cap severable; remainder of the claims bill remains valid and accomplishes legislative purpose

Key Cases Cited

Gamble v. Wells, 450 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1984) (legislature’s discretion in private relief acts)
Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condominium, Inc., 378 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1979) (balancing test for contract impairment)
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (U.S. 1983) (state regulation that impairs contracts must serve important public purpose; severity of impairment matters)
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Dep’t of Ins., 453 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1984) (regulatory limits on contractual expectation and impairment analysis)
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 137 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1962) (severability principles)
Ray v. Mortham, 742 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 1999) (severability: whether the remainder of the act can stand after excising invalid language)