JEFFREY F. SAYERS, Petitioner v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent
2018-2195
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Decided: March 31, 2020
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No. SF-0714-18-0067-I-1.
DAVID L. SCHER, Hoyer Law Group, PLLC, Tampa, FL, argued for petitioner. Also represented by NATALIE KHAWAM, Whistleblower Law Firm, PA, Tampa, FL.
BRINTON LUCAS, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, JOSEPH H. HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
RUSHAB SANGHVI, Office of General Counsel, American Federation of Government Employees, Washington, DC, argued for amicus curiae American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO.
Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
In 2017, Congress enacted the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act, which gave the Department of Veterans Affairs a new, streamlined authority for disciplining employees for misconduct or poor performance, and placed certain limitations on the review of those actions by the Merit Systems Protection Board. Later in 2017, the Department applied
Our primary issue on appeal is whether
I
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) promoted Dr. Sayers to his position as the Chief of Pharmacy Services for the Greater Los Angeles (GLA) Health Care System in 2003. In that role, Dr. Sayers managed about 175 full-time employees across five pharmacies and three opioid-treatment facilities. In June 2016, a VA site-visit team investigating GLA Health Care System practices discovered violations of VA policy in the pharmacies under Dr. Sayers‘s supervision. When Dr. Sayers failed to follow orders to immediately correct these violations, the VA detailed him from the Chief of Pharmacy Services position pending further review.
Nine months later, while Dr. Sayers remained detailed from the Chief position, the VA sent another site-visit team to review GLA pharmacy internal control systems. [J.A. 5.] The review team visited four of the five GLA pharmacies, discovering violations of VA policy so numerous and concerning that the team did not even review the internal control systems. Because compliance with these policies fell within Dr. Sayers‘s purview as the Chief of Pharmacy Services, the GLA Chief of Staff proposed Dr. Sayers‘s removal under
II
Dr. Sayers appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Administrative Judge affirmed his removal under
Dr. Sayers timely petitioned for review. We have jurisdiction to review final Board decisions under
III
We review a final decision of the Board to determine whether it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Purifoy v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting
On appeal, Dr. Sayers primarily argues that the Board erred in upholding his removal under
A
Before proceeding to the retroactivity analysis, we first must resolve the differences between the parties regarding
Congress enacted the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 on June 23, 2017.
The ordinary meaning of “the decision” reviewed by the Board refers to the entire decision—including the VA‘s choice of penalty. The “decision” referred to in
Secretary to remove, demote, or suspend an employee under subsection (a) if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” (emphasis added)). Subsection (a)—
An adverse action “decision” based on misconduct has meant a decision to impose a certain penalty since long before the enactment of
See, e.g.,
In the absence of a clearer statement than
meant reviewing the adverse action decision in its entirety, not just the factual basis for the alleged conduct. Cf. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 297 (“[A]n adverse action may be adequately supported by evidence of record but still be arbitrary and capricious, for instance if there is no rational connection between the grounds charged and the interest assertedly served by the sanction.“).
And although
The legislative history of the VA Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act supplies meager discussion of penalty mitigation, never directly addressing whether the Board can review the agency‘s penalty decision. The Senate debates show that the overall intent of the Act was to make it easier and faster for the VA to
(remarks of Sen. Nelson) (“I also believe that it is important to protect the rights of the employees who may have been wrongly terminated, especially at the lower levels, by giving them the opportunity to appeal a supervisor‘s decision to fire them. This bill we are going [to] pass does that.“); id. at S3268 (remarks of Sen. Tester) (“It does not gut due process protections. It keeps all the existing due process protections under current law. Unlike the House bill, it doesn‘t shorten or eliminate the appeals process for employees who are fired.“). The government‘s reading—allowing the agency to remove an employee for the tiniest incident of misconduct so long as the agency could present substantial evidence that the trifling misconduct occurred—could “gut due process protections” in a way Congress did not intend.
Further persuasive evidence of congressional intent arises from the interaction between Congress and the Board leading up to the enactment of
Besides the text itself and the legislative history, our reading also accords with basic precepts of administrative law and judicial review. Even if we adopted the government‘s construction of
Our interpretation also fits with the historical practice of reviewing the penalty in adverse action decisions. Cf. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 290 (“It cannot be doubted, and no one disputes, that the Civil Service Commission was vested with and exercised authority to mitigate penalties imposed by employing agencies.” (footnote omitted)). The longstanding acceptance of penalty review, with or without mitigation authority, comes with good reason: it avoids absurd, unconstitutional results. Under the government‘s reading, an agency could remove an employee for an
extremely trivial offense—theft of a paperclip being the example given at oral argument—so long as substantial evidence supports that the employee actually stole a paperclip. This implausible scenario becomes far more likely if the government alleges several specifications supporting a charge that merits removal, but only meets its burden of showing substantial evidence for the most minor specifications. Cf. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 308 (“Whenever the agency‘s action is based on multiple charges[,] some of which are not sustained, the presiding official should consider carefully whether the sustained charges merited the penalty imposed by the agency.“). Our interpretation of
For its contrary interpretation, the government relies largely on this Court‘s decision in Lisiecki v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 769 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Lisiecki dealt with the portion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) codified at
requirement that the MSPB review the agency‘s decision for preponderant evidence. See id.; see also
would . . . permit the [B]oard to require an agency to retain an incompetent worker in situations where it proposed removal.“). In addition, the agency has a unique view on how its employees’ incompetence impacts the agency, compared to the more generalized impact that misconduct has on an agency. See id. (“Management best knows its needs and the potential of its employees to further an agency‘s statutory mission.“). These considerations provide a key distinction from misconduct removals: if the facts supporting an employee‘s incompetence exist, the choice of penalty is based not on the employee‘s conduct, but on the agency‘s work requirements; Board review or mitigation of that choice does not make sense. Cf. id. at 1566–67 (providing Mr. Lisiecki‘s removal as a concrete example of how mitigation disrupts agency function in chapter 43 removals).
Beyond these pragmatic considerations lurk constitutional concerns. Employees enjoy much greater pre-termination due process protections under chapter 43 than under
For these reasons, we hold that
than merely confirming that the record contains substantial evidence that the alleged conduct leading to the adverse action actually occurred.6
B
Having addressed the disputed interpretation of
Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 354 (1999) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263, 280).
“If there is no congressional directive on the temporal reach of a statute, we determine whether the application of the statute to the conduct at issue would result in a retroactive effect.” Id. at 352. “If so, then . . . we presume that the statute does not apply to that conduct.” Id. The Supreme Court describes “retroactive effect” as “whether [a statute] would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party‘s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. In other words, we make a “commonsense, functional judgment about ‘whether the new [statute] attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment,‘” making this judgment “informed and guided by ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.‘” Martin, 527 U.S. at 357–58 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). If the statute attaches new legal consequences to events before its enactment (and is otherwise silent about its retroactivity), the statute must not apply to those prior events.
Landgraf recognized that “[t]he largest category of cases in which we have applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting contractual or property rights.” 511 U.S. at 271. Dr. Sayers had a property right in his continued employment, see Stone v. F.D.I.C., 179 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1999), so
When a statute “change[s] standards of proof and persuasion in a way favorable to a State, the statute goes beyond ‘mere’ procedure to affect substantive entitlement to relief.” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); see also United States v. $814,254.76 in U.S. Currency, Contents of Valley Nat. Bank Account No. 1500-8339, 51 F.3d 207, 212 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a statute that “effectively permits the Government to achieve the identical results available under the criminal forfeiture statute, but with a lower standard of proof” to have impermissible retroactive effect if applied retrospectively). And the Supreme Court has held the loss of “reasonable reliance on the continued availability of discretionary relief” akin to penalty mitigation to have an impermissible retroactive effect. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324-25 (“There is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity analysis, between facing possible [removal] and facing certain [removal].“). The imposition of a penalty supported only by substantial evidence, instead of preponderant evidence, with no possibility of mitigation for an error in judgment by the VA, rises to the level of substantive impact. Under
This retroactive effect occurs despite the VA‘s protestation that it did not propose Dr. Sayers‘s removal until after the passage of
Nor can we agree with the VA‘s assertion that finding
IV
Because the Department of Veterans Affairs cannot remove Dr. Sayers under
VACATED and REMANDED
No costs.
