Save Ohio Parks et al. v. Oil & Gas Land Management Commission
No. 24AP-206 (C.P.C. No. 23CV-8540)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
March 13, 2025
2025-Ohio-847
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on March 13, 2025
On brief: Eаrthjustice, Megan M. Hunter, James Yskamp, Claire Taigman, Chris Tavenor, and Nathan Johnson, for appellants Save Ohio Parks, Backcountry Hunters & Anglers, Buckeye Environmental Council, and Ohio Environmental Council. Argued: Megan M. Hunter.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Thomas J. Puckett, and Daniel Martin, for appellee. Argued: Daniel Martin.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{1} Appellants, Save Ohio Parks, Backcountry Hunters & Anglers, Buckeye Environmental Council, and Ohio Environmental Council (“appellants“) appeal from a decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss filed by appellee, Oil & Gas Land Management Commission (the “Commission“) pursuant to
{2} Appellants filed an appeal in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on November 30, 2023, seeking to challenge certain decisions of the Commission made pursuant to
{3} On December 29, 2023, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
{4} On February 23, 2023, the trial court issued its decision and entry granting the motion to dismiss filed by the [Commission] on December 29, 2023 and dismissing appellants’ appeal. (Feb. 23, 2023 Decision & Entry.)
{5} This timely appeal to this court followed and is now before us.
II. Assignments of Error
{6} Appellants assert the fоllowing assignments of error for our review:
[1.] The Trial Court erred when it found that the Oil and Gas Land Management Commission‘s approval of Nomination Nos. 23-DNR-0001, 23-DNR-0002, 23-DNR-0003, 23-DNR-0004, 23-DNR-0005, 23-DNR-0006, and 23-DNR-0007 was not subject to appeal under
R.C. 119.12 because these approvals were adjudicatory orders of a state agency performing a licensing function, providing subject matter jurisdiction to the Frаnklin County Court of Common Pleas to adjudicate the appeal pursuant toR.C. 119.12 .[2.] The Trial Court erred when it found the Appellants lacked standing because the Commission‘s decision to approve the leasing of Salt Fork State Park and two state wildlife areas
without offering a hearing and without considering the mandatory decisional statutory factors has procedurally harmed Appellants and their members, and the Commission‘s leasing approvals threaten Appellants’ members with concrete and particularized harms from the imminent oil and gas development of these state lands. [3.] In the alternative, the Trial Court erred when it proceeded to decide the issue of whether Appellants had standing after the Trial Court had already determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
III. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{7} When reviewing a judgment on a
{8}
{9} A court presented with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must determine whether the complaint states any cause of action cognizable by the forum. State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989); PNC Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Botts, 2012-Ohio-5383, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). Subject-matter jurisdiction is “a condition precedent to the court‘s ability to hear the case. If а court acts without
B. First Assignment of Error
{10} In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred when it found that the Oil & Gas Land Management Commission‘s approval of the seven nominations delineated above was not subject to appeal under
{11} In the administrative appeals context, “[c]ourts of common pleas only have ‘such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.’ ” Clifton Care Ctr. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2013-Ohio-2742, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), quoting
{12} Generally, ”
{13} In Brown, this court was faced with the question of whether the owners of a motel had the right to rely upon
An agency action does not qualify for an appeal pursuant to [
R.C. 119.12 ] unless: (1) the agency is specifically named inR.C. 119.01(A) ; (2) the agency action involves licensing functions of the agency; or (3) some other statute specifically makes the agency or agency action subject toR.C. 119.12 .
Brown at 881, citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 66 Ohio St.2d 192 (1981); Asphalt Specialist, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 53 Ohio App.3d 45 (1988); Augustine v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 3 Ohio App.3d 398, 399 (10th Dist. 1981); Fair v. School Emp. Retirement Sys., 44 Ohio App.2d 115, 117 (10th Dist. 1975); State ex rel. Citizens for Van Meter v. Ohio Elections Comm., 78 Ohio App.3d 289, 293-294 (10th Dist. 1992).
{14} The appellants in Brown argued that because
{15} Subsequent to our decision in Brown, we had another opportunity to analyze whether an appeal pursuant to
{16} In affirming the trial court‘s judgment, we rejected appellant‘s argument that SFM‘s action involved a “licensing function.” Specifically, we stated as follows:
The “licensing function” factor is derived from the language in the first paragraph of
R.C. 119.12 1 that permits an affected party to appeal an agency order, issued pursuant to an “adjudication denying * * * the issuance or renewal of a license or registration of a licensee, or revoking or suspending a license[.]”R.C. 119.01(B) defines the term “license” as including “any license * * * issued by any agency.” In turn,R.C. 119.01(A) defines “agency,” in pertinent part, as including “the licensing functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state having the authority or responsibility of issuing, suspending, revoking, or canceling licenses.”
(Emphasis added.) Springfield Fireworks, Inc. at ¶ 21. We then found that “SFM‘s action regarding the request for a transfer of Springfield‘s wholesaler fireworks license did not
{17} We further determined that because SFM‘s denial of the transfer request was not an “agency” decision,
it necessarily was not a decision “issued pursuant to an adjudication,” as additionally required by both: (1) the “licensing function” provision оf the first paragraph of
R.C. 119.12 ; and (2) the statute‘s second paragraph, which expressly provides an appeal to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for “any order of an agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication,” regardless whether a licensing function is involved.R.C. 119.01(D) defines an “adjudication” as a “determination by the highest or ultimate authority оf an agency.” In the absence of an “adjudication” as defined inR.C. 119.01(D) , the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, together with other common pleas courts, lacks jurisdiction underR.C. 119.12 to review SFM‘s decisions.
Id. at ¶ 25, citing Brown; In the Matter of CBM Homes for the Devel. Disabled, Inc., 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2015 (10th Dist. Apr. 6, 1993). We thus concluded that the manufacturer could not rely on
{18} In sum then, based on the foregoing authorities, absent “an order of an agency issued рursuant to an adjudication denying . . . the issuance or renewal of a license or registration of a licensee, revoking or suspending a license . . .“, an agency action is not subject to an appeal pursuant to
{19} Here, just as in Brown, “no license was ever applied for nor is there evidence of any license revocation or suspension.” (Emphasis added.) Brown at 882, quoting
{20} In short, in this case there simply was no “order of an agency issued pursuant to an adjudication denying . . . the issuance or renewal of a license or registration of a licensee, revoking or suspending a license . . . .” Thus, the action of appellee in approving the seven nominations under the authority of
{21} Therefore, based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant‘s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled.
C. Second Assignment of Error
{22} In their second assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred when it found the appellants lacked standing because the Commissiоn‘s decision to approve the leasing of Salt Fork State Park and two state wildlife areas without offering a hearing has procedurally harmed appellants and their members, and the Commission‘s leasing approvals threaten appellants’ members with concrete and particularized harms
{23} The Supreme Court of Ohio has “recognized that standing is a ‘jurisdictional requirement’ and [has] stated: ‘It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the aсtion.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 22, quoting State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 179 (1973). “Because standing to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, ‘standing is to be determined as of the commencement of suit.’ ” Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-571, fn. 5 (1992).
{24} It is well-established that before an Ohio court may consider the merits of a legal claim, ” ‘the person or entity seeking relief must estаblish standing to sue.’ ” Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, 2020-Ohio-6724, ¶ 12, quoting Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27. “At a minimum, common-law standing requires the litigant to demonstrate that he or she has suffered (1) an injury (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful conduct and (3) is likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Id., citing Moore v. Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 22. Standing does not turn on the merits of the plaintiff‘s claims but rather on whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that he is entitled to have a court hear his case. Id., citing ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 2014-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7.
{25} Whether a litigant has established standing is a question of law which we review de novo. Ohioans for Concealed Carry at ¶ 12; Wilkins v. Harrisburg, 2015-Ohio-5472, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.), citing LULAC v. Kasich, 2012-Ohio-947, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.), citing Ohio Concrete Constr. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2009-Ohio-2400, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.).
{26} Here, appellants have alleged that they have suffered a direct injury or specific harm due to the Commission‘s action of nominating seven parcels of land owned by the state for the purpose of negotiating leases for oil and gas exploration, development and production, and therefore they have standing to assert their grievances. More specifically, they have essentially alleged that if such exploration, development and production ensue on the nominated lands, they will no longer be аble to enjoy these lands and further, that the lands may be negatively impacted by such exploration, development and production. Thus, at best, appellants speculate that they may be harmed in the future. We find this is far too tenuous of a connection to the actions of the Commission of which appellants complain to be able to аssert standing. As we have previously explained,
[i]njury that is borne by the population in general and does not affect plaintiff in particular is typically insufficient to confer standing upon the plaintiff to bring suit against a defendant. Tiemann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 127 Ohio App.3d 312, 325, 712 N.E.2d 1258 (10th Dist.1998), citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984). The proposed plaintiff‘s injury cannot be merely speculative. A bare allegation that plaintiff fears that some injury will or may occur is insufficient to confer standing. Id., citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
Wurdlow v. Turvy, 2012-Ohio-4378, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.).
{27} Furthermore, it is well-settled that “a general interest as a citizen does not convert an individual right into a right which would permit any citizen who suffers no distinct harm to sue a government agency.” Yost v. Jones, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5123, *8 (3rd Dist. Nov. 15, 2001), citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-578. “The emotional impact from, loss of faith in, or personal distaste for a particular situation, law, or governmental
{28} In sum, the trial court was correct in finding that even if appellants’ challenge to the Commission‘s action was amenable to an appeal pursuant to
D. Third Assignment of Error
{29} In their third assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred when it proceeded to decide the issue of whether appellants had standing after it had already determined it lacked subjeсt-matter jurisdiction over this matter. We disagree.
{30} Appellants do not dispute that standing and subject-matter jurisdiction are distinct issues, either of which might be a reason the trial court lacked jurisdiction, whether that be subject-matter jurisdiction or general jurisdiction, over appellants’ challenge to the Commission‘s action in approving the nine nominations of land in this case. Indeed, they fail to cite any authority directly supporting their argument that the trial court erred by speaking on the standing issue after it had already found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over their claim. As the two issues are distinct, we do not agree that the trial court erred in speaking on the standing issue as an alternative basis for granting the Commission‘s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
{32} Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ third assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{33} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellants’ three assignments of error, and we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
MENTEL and BOGGS, JJ., concur.