SANTOSKY ET AL. v. KRAMER, COMMISSIONER, ULSTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ET AL.
No. 80-5889
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 10, 1981—Decided March 24, 1982
455 U.S. 745
Martin Guggenheim argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Alan N. Sussman.
Steven Domenic Scavuzzo argued the cause pro hac vice for respondents. With him on the brief was H. Randall Bixler. Wilfrid E. Marrin and Frederick J. Magovern filed a brief for respondents Balogh et al.*
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under New York law, the State may terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their natural child upon a finding that the child is “permanently neglected.”
Today we hold that the Due Process Clause of the
I
A
New York authorizes its officials to remove a child temporarily from his or her home if the child appears “neglected,” within the meaning of Art. 10 of the Family Court Act. See
The State bifurcates its permanent neglect proceeding into “fact-finding” and “dispositional” hearings.
At the factfinding hearing, the State must establish, among other things, that for more than a year after the child entered state custody, the agency “made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.”
New York‘s permanent neglect statute provides natural parents with certain procedural protections.2 But New York permits its officials to establish “permanent neglect” with less proof than most States require. Thirty-five States, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands currently specify a higher standard of proof, in parental rights termination proceedings, than a “fair preponderance of the evidence.”3 The only analogous federal statute of which we are aware
B
Petitioners John Santosky II and Annie Santosky are the natural parents of Tina and John III. In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under
In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners’ parental rights in the three children.4 Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard specified in
Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of § 622‘s standard of proof.6 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard “proper and constitutional.” In re John AA, 75 App. Div. 2d 910, 427 N. Y. S. 2d 319, 320 (1980). That standard, the court reasoned, “recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child . . . with those of the natural parents . . . .” Ibid.
The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners’ appeal to that court “upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.” App. 55. We granted certiorari to consider petitioners’ constitutional claim. 450 U. S. 993 (1981).
II
Last Term, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U. S. 18 (1981), this Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that the
In Lassiter, it was “not disputed that state intervention to terminate the relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.” Id., at 37 (first dissenting opinion); see id., at 24-32 (opinion of the Court); id., at 59-60 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). See also Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1, 13 (1981). The absence of dispute reflected this Court‘s historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to
In Lassiter, the Court and three dissenters agreed that the nature of the process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the “three distinct factors” specified in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976): the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State‘s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. See 452 U. S., at 27-31; id., at 37-48 (first dissenting opinion). But see id., at 59-60 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). While the respective Lassiter opinions disputed whether those factors should be weighed against a presumption disfavoring appointed counsel for one not threatened with loss of physical liberty, compare 452 U. S., at 31-32, with id., at 41, and n. 8 (first dissenting opinion), that concern is irrelevant here. Unlike the Court‘s right-to-counsel rulings, its decisions concerning constitutional burdens of proof have not turned on any presumption favoring any particular standard. To the contrary, the Court has engaged in a straightforward consideration of the factors identified in Eldridge to determine whether a particular standard of proof in a particular proceeding satisfies due process.
In Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), the Court, by a unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: “The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to
Thus, while private parties may be interested intensely in a civil dispute over money damages, application of a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard indicates both society‘s “minimal concern with the outcome,” and a conclusion that the litigants should “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.” 441 U. S., at 423. When the State brings a criminal action to deny a defendant liberty or life, however, “the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.” Ibid. The stringency of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard bespeaks the “weight and gravity” of the private interest affected, id., at 427, society‘s interest in avoiding erroneous convictions, and a judgment that those interests together require that “society impos[e] almost the entire risk of error upon itself.” Id., at 424. See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The “minimum requirements [of procedural due process] being a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491 (1980). See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., ante, at 432. Moreover, the degree of proof required in a particular type of proceeding “is the kind of question which has
This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—“clear and convincing evidence“—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both “particularly important” and “more substantial than mere loss of money.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 424. Notwithstanding “the state‘s ‘civil labels and good intentions,‘” id., at 427, quoting In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 365-366, the Court has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with “a significant deprivation of liberty” or “stigma.” 441 U. S., at 425, 426. See, e. g., Addington v. Texas, supra (civil commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S., at 285 (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350, 353 (1960) (denaturalization);
In Lassiter, to be sure, the Court held that fundamental fairness may be maintained in parental rights termination proceedings even when some procedures are mandated only on a case-by-case basis, rather than through rules of general application. 452 U. S., at 31-32 (natural parent‘s right to court-appointed counsel should be determined by the trial court, subject to appellate review). But this Court never has approved case-by-case determination of the proper standard of proof for a given proceeding. Standards of proof, like other “procedural due process rules[,] are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 344 (emphasis added). Since the litigants and the factfinder must know at the outset of a given proceeding how the risk of error will be allocated, the standard of proof necessarily must be calibrated in advance. Retrospective case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard.9
III
In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight. Evaluation of the three Eldridge factors compels the conclusion that use of a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard in such proceedings is inconsistent with due process.
A
“The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.‘” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262-263 (1970), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Whether the loss threatened by a particular type of proceeding is sufficiently grave to warrant more than average certainty on the part of the factfinder turns on both the nature of the private interest threatened and the permanency of the threatened loss.
Lassiter declared it “plain beyond the need for multiple citation” that a natural parent‘s “desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children‘” is an interest far more precious than any property
In government-initiated proceedings to determine juvenile delinquency, In re Winship, supra; civil commitment, Addington v. Texas, supra; deportation, Woodby v. INS, supra; and denaturalization, Chaunt v. United States, supra, and Schneiderman v. United States, supra, this Court has identified losses of individual liberty sufficiently serious to warrant imposition of an elevated burden of proof. Yet juvenile delinquency adjudications, civil commitment, deportation, and denaturalization, at least to a degree, are all reversible official actions. Once affirmed on appeal, a New York decision terminating parental rights is final and irrevocable. See n. 1, supra. Few forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.
Thus, the first Eldridge factor—the private interest affected—weighs heavily against use of the preponderance standard at a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding. We do not deny that the child and his foster parents are also deeply interested in the outcome of that contest. But at the factfinding stage of the New York proceeding, the focus emphatically is not on them.
The factfinding does not purport—and is not intended—to balance the child‘s interest in a normal family home against the parents’ interest in raising the child. Nor does it purport to determine whether the natural parents or the foster parents would provide the better home. Rather, the factfinding hearing pits the State directly against the parents. The State alleges that the natural parents are at fault.
At the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversaries. After the State has established parental unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge. See
However substantial the foster parents’ interests may be, cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S., at 845-847, they are not implicated directly in the factfinding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding against the natural parents. If authorized, the foster parents may pit their interests directly against those of the natural parents by initiating their own permanent neglect proceeding.
B
Under Mathews v. Eldridge, we next must consider both the risk of erroneous deprivation of private interests resulting from use of a “fair preponderance” standard and the likelihood that a higher evidentiary standard would reduce that risk. See 424 U. S., at 335. Since the factfinding phase of a permanent neglect proceeding is an adversary contest between the State and the natural parents, the relevant question is whether a preponderance standard fairly allocates the risk of an erroneous factfinding between these two parties.
At such a proceeding, numerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding. Permanent neglect proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S., at 835, n. 36. In appraising the nature and quality of a complex series of encounters among the agency, the parents, and the child, the court possesses unusual discretion to underweigh probative facts that might favor the parent.12
The State‘s ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents’ ability to mount a defense. No predetermined limits restrict the sums an agency may spend in prosecuting a given termination proceeding. The State‘s attorney usually will be expert on the issues contested and the procedures employed at the factfinding hearing, and enjoys full access to all public records concerning the family. The State may call on experts in family relations, psychology, and medicine to bolster its case. Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing will be the agency‘s own professional caseworkers whom the State has empowered both to investigate the family situation and to testify against the parents. Indeed, because the child is already in agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the historical events that form the basis for termination.13
Coupled with a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard, these factors create a significant prospect of erroneous termination. A standard of proof that by its very terms demands consideration of the quantity, rather than the quality, of the evidence may misdirect the factfinder in the marginal case. See In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 371, n. 3 (Harlan, J., concurring). Given the weight of the private interests at stake, the social cost of even occasional error is sizable.
Raising the standard of proof would have both practical and symbolic consequences. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 426. The Court has long considered the heightened standard of proof used in criminal prosecutions to be “a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.” In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 363. An elevated standard of proof in a parental rights termination proceeding would alleviate “the possible risk that a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 427. “Increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the im-
The Appellate Division approved New York‘s preponderance standard on the ground that it properly “balanced rights possessed by the child . . . with those of the natural parents. . . .” 75 App. Div. 2d, at 910, 427 N. Y. S. 2d, at 320. By so saying, the court suggested that a preponderance standard properly allocates the risk of error between the parents and the child.14 That view is fundamentally mistaken.
The court‘s theory assumes that termination of the natural parents’ rights invariably will benefit the child.15 Yet we have noted above that the parents and the child share an interest in avoiding erroneous termination. Even accepting the court‘s assumption, we cannot agree with its conclusion that a preponderance standard fairly distributes the risk of error between parent and child. Use of that standard reflects the judgment that society is nearly neutral between erroneous termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring). For the child, the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is preservation of
C
Two state interests are at stake in parental rights termination proceedings—a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings. A standard of proof more strict than preponderance of the evidence is consistent with both interests.
“Since the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the parent‘s interest in an accurate and just decision” at the factfinding proceeding. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U. S., at 27. As parens patriae, the State‘s goal is to provide the child with a permanent home. See
The State‘s interest in finding the child an alternative permanent home arises only “when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal family home for the child.”
Unlike a constitutional requirement of hearings, see, e. g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 347, or court-appointed counsel, a stricter standard of proof would reduce factual error without imposing substantial fiscal burdens upon the State. As we have observed, 35 States already have adopted a higher standard by statute or court decision without apparent effect on the speed, form, or cost of their factfinding proceedings. See n. 3, supra.
Nor would an elevated standard of proof create any real administrative burdens for the State‘s factfinders. New York Family Court judges already are familiar with a higher evidentiary standard in other parental rights termination proceedings not involving permanent neglect. See
IV
The logical conclusion of this balancing process is that the “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard prescribed by
In Addington, the Court concluded that application of a reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings for two reasons—because of our hesitation to apply that unique standard “too broadly or casually in non-criminal cases,” id., at 428, and because the psychiatric evidence ordinarily adduced at commitment proceedings is
Like civil commitment hearings, termination proceedings often require the factfinder to evaluate medical and psychiatric testimony, and to decide issues difficult to prove to a level of absolute certainty, such as lack of parental motive, absence of affection between parent and child, and failure of parental foresight and progress. Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U. S., at 30; id., at 44-46 (first dissenting opinion) (describing issues raised in state termination proceedings). The substantive standards applied vary from State to State. Although Congress found a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard proper in one type of parental rights termination case, another legislative body might well conclude that a reasonable-doubt standard would erect an unreasonable barrier to state efforts to free permanently neglected children for adoption.
A majority of the States have concluded that a “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof strikes a fair balance between the rights of the natural parents and the State‘s legitimate concerns. See n. 3, supra. We hold that such a standard adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process. We further hold that determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than that standard
We, of course, express no view on the merits of petitioners’ claims.19 At a hearing conducted under a constitutionally proper standard, they may or may not prevail. Without deciding the outcome under any of the standards we have approved, we vacate the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE O‘CONNOR join, dissenting.
I believe that few of us would care to live in a society where every aspect of life was regulated by a single source of law, whether that source be this Court or some other organ of our complex body politic. But today‘s decision certainly moves us in that direction. By parsing the New York scheme and holding one narrow provision unconstitutional, the majority invites further federal-court intrusion into every facet of state family law. If ever there were an area in which federal courts should heed the admonition of Justice Holmes that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic,”1 it is in the area of domestic relations. This area has been left to the States from time immemorial, and not without good reason.
Equally as troubling is the majority‘s due process analysis. The
I
State intervention in domestic relations has always been an unhappy but necessary feature of life in our organized society. For all of our experience in this area, we have found no fully satisfactory solutions to the painful problem of child abuse and neglect. We have found, however, that leaving the States free to experiment with various remedies has produced novel approaches and promising progress.
Throughout this experience the Court has scrupulously refrained from interfering with state answers to domestic relations questions. “Both theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of family and family-property arrangements.” United States v. Yazell, 382 U. S. 341, 352 (1966). This is not to say that the Court should blink at clear constitutional violations in state statutes, but rather that in this area, of all areas, “substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals [administering a program] . . . that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the . . . claims of individuals.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 349 (1976).
This case presents a classic occasion for such solicitude. As will be seen more fully in the next part, New York has enacted a comprehensive plan to aid marginal parents in regaining the custody of their child. The central purpose of the New York plan is to reunite divided families. Adoption of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard represents New York‘s good-faith effort to balance the interest of par
The majority may believe that it is adopting a relatively unobtrusive means of ensuring that termination proceedings provide “due process of law.” In fact, however, fixing the standard of proof as a matter of federal constitutional law will only lead to further federal-court intervention in state schemes. By holding that due process requires proof by clear and convincing evidence the majority surely cannot mean that any state scheme passes constitutional muster so long as it applies that standard of proof. A state law permitting termination of parental rights upon a showing of neglect by clear and convincing evidence certainly would not be ac
After fixing the standard of proof, therefore, the majority will be forced to evaluate other aspects of termination proceedings with reference to that point. Having in this case abandoned evaluation of the overall effect of a scheme, and with it the possibility of finding that strict substantive standards or special procedures compensate for a lower burden of proof, the majority‘s approach will inevitably lead to the federalization of family law. Such trend will only thwart state searches for better solutions in an area where this Court should encourage state experimentation. “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). It should not do so in the absence of a clear constitutional violation. As will be seen in the next part, no clear constitutional violation has occurred in this case.
II
As the majority opinion notes, petitioners are the parents of five children, three of whom were removed from petitioners’ care on or before August 22, 1974. During the next four and one-half years, those three children were in the custody of the State and in the care of foster homes or institutions, and the State was diligently engaged in efforts to prepare petitioners for the children‘s return. Those efforts were un
It is well settled that “[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the
A
Due process of law is a flexible constitutional principle. The requirements which it imposes upon governmental actions vary with the situations to which it applies. As the Court previously has recognized, “not all situations calling for
Given this flexibility, it is obvious that a proper due process inquiry cannot be made by focusing upon one narrow provision of the challenged statutory scheme. Such a focus threatens to overlook factors which may introduce constitutionally adequate protections into a particular government action. Courts must examine all procedural protections offered by the State, and must assess the cumulative effect of such safeguards. As we have stated before, courts must consider “the fairness and reliability of the existing . . . procedures” before holding that the Constitution requires more. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 343. Only through such a broad inquiry may courts determine whether a challenged governmental action satisfies the due process requirement of “fundamental fairness.”3 In some instances, the Court has even looked to nonprocedural restraints on official action in determining whether the deprivation of a protected interest was effected without due process of law. E. g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977). In this case, it is just such a broad look at the New York scheme which reveals its fundamental fairness.4
The termination of parental rights on the basis of permanent neglect can occur under New York law only by order of the Family Court.
The Family Court has jurisdiction only over those children who are in the care of an authorized agency.
Court proceedings to order the temporary removal of a child are initiated by a petition alleging abuse or neglect, filed by a state-authorized child protection agency or by a person designated by the court.
Parents subjected to temporary removal proceedings are provided extensive procedural protections. A summons and copy of the temporary removal petition must be served upon the parents within two days of issuance by the court,
An order of temporary removal must be reviewed every 18 months by the Family Court.
One or more years after a child has been removed temporarily from the parents’ home, permanent termination proceedings may be commenced by the filing of a petition in the court which ordered the temporary removal. The petition must be filed by a state agency or by a foster parent authorized by the court,
As in the initial removal proceedings, two hearings are held in consideration of the permanent termination petition.
As petitioners did in this case, parents may appeal any unfavorable decision to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. Thereafter, review may be sought in the New York Court of Appeals and, ultimately, in this Court if a federal question is properly presented.
As this description of New York‘s termination procedures demonstrates, the State seeks not only to protect the interests of parents in rearing their own children, but also to assist and encourage parents who have lost custody of their children to reassume their rightful role. Fully understood, the New York system is a comprehensive program to aid parents such as petitioners. Only as a last resort, when “diligent efforts” to reunite the family have failed, does New
The three children to which this case relates were removed from petitioners’ custody in 1973 and 1974, before petitioners’ other two children were born. The removals were made pursuant to the procedures detailed above and in response to what can only be described as shockingly abusive treatment.10 At the temporary removal hearing held before the Family Court on September 30, 1974, petitioners were represented by counsel, and allowed the Ulster County Department of Social Services (Department) to take custody of the three children.
Temporary removal of the children was continued at an evidentiary hearing held before the Family Court in December 1975, after which the court issued a written opinion concluding that petitioners were unable to resume their parental responsibilities due to personality disorders. Unsatisfied with the progress petitioners were making, the court also di
A plan for providing petitioners with extensive counseling and training services was submitted to the court and approved in February 1976. Under the plan, petitioners received training by a mother‘s aide, a nutritional aide, and a public health nurse, and counseling at a family planning clinic. In addition, the plan provided psychiatric treatment and vocational training for the father, and counseling at a family service center for the mother. Brief for Respondent Kramer 1-7. Between early 1976 and the final termination decision in April 1979, the State spent more than $15,000 in these efforts to rehabilitate petitioners as parents. App. 34.
Petitioners’ response to the State‘s effort was marginal at best. They wholly disregarded some of the available services and participated only sporadically in the others. As a result, and out of growing concern over the length of the children‘s stay in foster care, the Department petitioned in September 1976 for permanent termination of petitioners’ parental rights so that the children could be adopted by other families. Although the Family Court recognized that petitioners’ reaction to the State‘s efforts was generally “non-responsive, even hostile,” the fact that they were “at least superficially cooperative” led it to conclude that there was yet hope of further improvement and an eventual reuniting of the family. Exhibit to Brief for Respondent Kramer 618. Accordingly, the petition for permanent termination was dismissed.
Whatever progress petitioners were making prior to the 1976 termination hearing, they made little or no progress thereafter. In October 1978, the Department again filed a termination petition alleging that petitioners had completely failed to plan for the children‘s future despite the considerable efforts rendered in their behalf. This time, the Family Court agreed. The court found that petitioners had “failed in any meaningful way to take advantage of the many social
In accordance with the statutory requirements set forth above, the court found that petitioners’ failure to plan for the future of their children, who were then seven, five, and four years old and had been out of petitioners’ custody for at least four years, rose to the level of permanent neglect. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the court terminated petitioners’ parental rights, thereby freeing the three children for adoption.
As this account demonstrates, the State‘s extraordinary 4-year effort to reunite petitioners’ family was not just unsuccessful, it was altogether rebuffed by parents unwilling to improve their circumstances sufficiently to permit a return of their children. At every step of this protracted process petitioners were accorded those procedures and protections which traditionally have been required by due process of law. Moreover, from the beginning to the end of this sad story all judicial determinations were made by one Family Court Judge. After four and one-half years of involvement with petitioners, more than seven complete hearings, and additional periodic supervision of the State‘s rehabilitative efforts, the judge no doubt was intimately familiar with this case and the prospects for petitioners’ rehabilitation.
It is inconceivable to me that these procedures were “fundamentally unfair” to petitioners. Only by its obsessive
focus does not comport with the flexible standard of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause of the
B
In addition to the basic fairness of the process afforded petitioners, the standard of proof chosen by New York clearly reflects a constitutionally permissible balance of the interests at stake in this case. The standard of proof “represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423 (1979). In this respect, the standard of proof is a crucial component of legal process, the primary function of which is “to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”12 Greenholtz v. Nebraska
In determining the propriety of a particular standard of proof in a given case, however, it is not enough simply to say that we are trying to minimize the risk of error. Because errors in factfinding affect more than one interest, we try to minimize error as to those interests which we consider to be most important. As Justice Harlan explained in his well-known concurrence to In re Winship:
“In a lawsuit between two parties, a factual error can make a difference in one of two ways. First, it can result in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff when the true facts warrant a judgment for the defendant. The analogue in a criminal case would be the conviction of an innocent man. On the other hand, an erroneous factual determination can result in a judgment for the defendant when the true facts justify a judgment in plaintiff‘s favor. The criminal analogue would be the acquittal of a guilty man.
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes. If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.” 397 U. S., at 370-371.
When the standard of proof is understood as reflecting such an assessment, an examination of the interests at stake in a particular case becomes essential to determining the propriety of the specified standard of proof. Because proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires that “[t]he litigants . . . share the risk of error in a roughly equal fashion,” Addington v. Texas, supra, at 423, it rationally should be applied only when the interests at stake are of roughly equal societal importance. The interests at stake in this case demonstrate that New York has selected a constitutionally permissible standard of proof.
On one side is the interest of parents in a continuation of the family unit and the raising of their own children. The importance of this interest cannot easily be overstated. Few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties. Even the convict committed to prison and thereby deprived of his physical liberty often retains the love and support of family members. “This Court‘s decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent‘s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’ Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651.” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U. S. 18, 27 (1981). In creating the scheme at issue in this case, the New York Legislature
On the other side of the termination proceeding are the often countervailing interests of the child.13 A stable, loving
risks is magnified by the fact that the only families faced with termination actions are those which have voluntarily surrendered custody of their child to the State, or, as in this case, those from which the child has been removed by judicial action because of threatened irreparable injury through abuse or neglect. Permanent neglect findings also occur only in families where the child has been in foster care for at least one year.
In addition to the child‘s interest in a normal homelife, “the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child.” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U. S., at 27.16 Few could doubt that the most valuable resource of a self-governing society is its population of children who will one day become adults and themselves assume the responsibility of self-governance. “A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 168 (1944). Thus, “the whole community” has an interest “that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed . . . citizens.” Id., at 165. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 640-641 (1968).
When, in the context of a permanent neglect termination proceeding, the interests of the child and the State in a sta
III
For the reasons heretofore stated, I believe that the Court today errs in concluding that the New York standard of proof in parental-rights termination proceedings violates due process of law. The decision disregards New York‘s earnest efforts to aid parents in regaining the custody of their children and a host of procedural protections placed around parental rights and interests. The Court finds a constitutional violation only by a tunnel-vision application of due process principles that altogether loses sight of the unmistakable fairness of the New York procedure.
Even more worrisome, today‘s decision cavalierly rejects the considered judgment of the New York Legislature in an area traditionally entrusted to state care. The Court thereby begins, I fear, a trend of federal intervention in state family law matters which surely will stifle creative responses to vexing problems. Accordingly, I dissent.
Notes
As to maintaining contact with the child, New York law provides that “evidence of insubstantial or infrequent contacts by a parent with his or her child shall not, of itself, be sufficient as a matter of law to preclude a determination that such child is a permanently neglected child. A visit or communication by a parent with the child which is of such a character as to overtly demonstrate a lack of affectionate and concerned parenthood shall not be deemed a substantial contact.”
Failure to plan for the future of the child means failure “to take such steps as may be necessary to provide an adequate, stable home and parental care for the child within a period of time which is reasonable under the financial circumstances available to the parent. The plan must be realistic and feasible, and good faith effort shall not, of itself, be determinative. In determining whether a parent has planned for the future of the child, the court may consider the failure of the parent to utilize medical, psychiatric, psychological and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources made available to such parent.”
“Diligent efforts” are defined under New York law to “mean reasonable attempts by an authorized agency to assist, develop and encourage a meaningful relationship between the parent and child, including but not limited to:
“(1) consultation and cooperation with the parents in developing a plan for appropriate services to the child and his family;
“(2) making suitable arrangements for the parents to visit the child;
“(3) provision of services and other assistance to the parents so that problems preventing the discharge of the child from care may be resolved or ameliorated; and
“(4) informing the parents at appropriate intervals of the child‘s progress, development and health.”
The majority finds, without any reference to the facts of this case, that “numerous factors [in New York termination proceedings] combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding.” Ante, at 762. Among the factors identified by the majority are the “unusual discretion” of the Family Court judge “to underweigh probative facts that might favor the parent“; the often uneducated, minority status of the parents and their consequent “vulnerab[ility] to judgments based on cultural or class bias“; the “State‘s ability to assemble its case,” which “dwarfs the parents’ ability to mount a defense” by including an unlimited budget, expert attorneys, and “full access to all public records concerning the family“; and the fact that “natural parents have no ‘double jeopardy’ defense against repeated state” efforts, “with more or better evidence,” to terminate parental rights “even when the parents have attained the level of fitness required by the State.” Ante, at 762, 763, 764. In short, the majority characterizes the State as a wealthy and powerful bully bent on taking children away from defenseless parents. See ante, at 761-764. Such characterization finds no support in the record.
The intent of New York has been stated with eminent clarity: “the [S]tate‘s first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the child has already left home.”
A brief examination of the “factors” relied upon by the majority demonstrates its error. The “unusual” discretion of the Family Court judge to consider the “affectio[n] and concer[n]” displayed by parents during visits with their children, ante, at 763, n. 12, is nothing more than discretion to consider reality; there is not one shred of evidence in this case suggesting that the determination of the Family Court was “based on cultural or class bias“; if parents lack the “ability to mount a defense,” the State provides them with the full services of an attorney,
It is worth noting that the significance of the standard of proof in New York parental termination proceedings differs from the significance of the standard in other forms of litigation. In the usual adjudicatory setting, the factfinder has had little or no prior exposure to the facts of the case. His only knowledge of those facts comes from the evidence adduced at trial, and he renders his findings solely upon the basis of that evidence. Thus, normally, the standard of proof is a crucial factor in the final outcome of the case, for it is the scale upon which the factfinder weighs his knowledge and makes his decision.
Although the standard serves the same function in New York parental termination proceedings, additional assurances of accuracy are present in its application. As was adduced at oral argument, the practice in New York is to assign one judge to supervise a case from the initial temporary removal of the child to the final termination of parental rights. Therefore,
The majority dismisses the child‘s interest in the accuracy of determinations made at the factfinding hearing because “[t]he factfinding does not purport to balance the child‘s interest in a normal family home against the parents’ interest in raising the child,” but instead “pits the State directly against the parents.” Ante, at 759. Only “[a]fter the State has established parental unfitness,” the majority reasons, may the court “assume . . . that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge.” Ante, at 760.
This reasoning misses the mark. The child has an interest in the outcome of the factfinding hearing independent of that of the parent. To be sure, “the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.” Ibid. (emphasis added). But the child‘s interest in a continuation of the family unit exists only to the extent that such a continuation would not be harmful to him. An error in the factfinding hearing that results in a failure to terminate a parent-child relationship which rightfully should be terminated may well detrimentally affect the child. See nn. 14, 15, infra.
The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, which allocates the risk of error more or less evenly, is employed when the social disutility of error in either direction is roughly equal—that is, when an incorrect finding of fault would produce consequences as undesirable as the consequences that would be produced by an incorrect finding of no fault. Only when the disutility of error in one direction discernibly outweighs the disutility of error in the other direction do we choose, by means of the standard of proof, to reduce the likelihood of the more onerous outcome. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 370-372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
New York‘s adoption of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard reflects its conclusion that the undesirable consequence of an erroneous finding of parental unfitness—the unwarranted termination of the family relationship—is roughly equal to the undesirable consequence of an erroneous finding of parental fitness—the risk of permanent injury to the child either by return of the child to an abusive home or by the child‘s continued lack of a permanent home. See nn. 14, 15, infra. Such a conclusion is well within the province of state legislatures. It cannot be said that the New York procedures are unconstitutional simply because a majority of the Members of this Court disagree with the New York Legislature‘s weighing of the interests of the parents and the child in an error-free factfinding hearing.
This is a hazardous assumption at best. Even when a child‘s natural home is imperfect, permanent removal from that home will not necessarily improve his welfare. See, e. g., Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 993 (1975) (“In fact, under current practice, coercive intervention frequently results in placing a child in a more detrimental situation than he would be in without intervention“).
Nor does termination of parental rights necessarily ensure adoption. See Brief for Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 22-23. Even when a child eventually finds an adoptive family, he may spend years moving between state institutions and “temporary” foster placements after his ties to his natural parents have been severed. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S., at 833-838 (describing the “limbo” of the New York foster care system).
The New York Legislature recognized the potential harm to children of extended, nonpermanent foster care. It found “that many children who have been placed in foster care experience unnecessarily protracted stays in such care without being adopted or returned to their parents or other custodians. Such unnecessary stays may deprive these children of positive, nurturing family relationships and have deleterious effects on their development into responsible, productive citizens.”When the termination proceeding occurs, the child is not living at his natural home. A child cannot be adjudicated “permanently neglected” until, “for a period of more than one year,” he has been in “the care of an authorized agency.”
Under New York law, a judge has ample discretion to ensure that, once removed from his natural parents on grounds of neglect, a child will not return to a hostile environment. In this case, when the State‘s initial termination effort failed for lack of proof, see n. 4, supra, the court simply issued orders under
