ALTAGRACIA SANCHEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. OFFICE OF THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 18-975 (RC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
January 13, 2021
Re Document Nos.: 32, 33
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
This case involves regulations promulgated by the D.C. Office of the State Superintendent
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
The Child Development Facilities Regulation Act of 1998 (Facilities Act), D.C. Law 12-215, 46 D.C. Reg. 274 (1999) (codified as amended at
Pursuant to this authority, OSSE issued regulations that set minimum education requirements for childcare staff at child development facilities. See generally
The regulations make three distinctions relevant to the current case. First, the regulations, like the Facilities Act, specifically exempt certain childcare providers, such as babysitters and nannies, from the degree requirements.
B. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Altagarcia Sanchez is subject to the new education requirements as an expanded home caregiver. See generally
Plaintiff Dale Sorcher is what the regulations refer to as a teacher at a child development center. See
Plaintiff Jill Homan is a parent whose young daughter attends a licensed daycare center subject to the regulations. id. ¶¶ 234, 245-50. Ms. Homan is afraid that the caregivers she trusts will not be able to comply with the college requirement and will lose their jobs. id. ¶ 247. She worries that daycare providers forced to attend college in addition to their work duties will be exhausted, stressed, and overwhelmed and will provide worse care than those who do not have to worry about attending school. id. ¶ 250. She also believes that day care will continue to become more expensive under the college requirement. id. ¶ 251.
Plaintiffs bring three counts against the District of Columbia and OSSE (together Defendants) related to the OSSE regulations. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Facilities Act‘s delegation of authority to the Mayor to promulgate minimum educational standards violates the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (the D.C. Home Rule Act),
This Court previously considered a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Compliant. See Sanchez v. Off. of State Superintendent of Educ., No. 18-cv-975, 2019 WL 935330 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2019). The Court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims on threshold, jurisdictional grounds. See id. at *5-6 (dismissing Ms. Homan‘s claims for lack of standing); id. at 6-9 (dismissing other claims as moot and unripe). The Court thus declined to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ challenges under the nondelegation doctrine, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding that the doctrines of mootness and ripeness did not bar any of Plaintiffs’ claims, the D.C. Circuit determined that Plaintiffs’ purely legal challenges are presumptively reviewable. See Sanchez, 959 F.3d at 1124-26. The court reversed and remanded for consideration of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, finding that the claims are justiciable. See id. at 1123.
After remand, Plaintiffs’ filed an Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. Defendants’ motion to dismiss argues that, even accepting the factual allegations as true, Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim to relief with respect to each count in the Amended Complaint. See Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (Defs.’ Mot.), ECF No. 33. In addition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a motion for discovery notwithstanding the pending motion to dismiss. See Pls.’ Mot. Notwithstanding Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 32. Plaintiffs’ motion argues that the Court should permit limited discovery despite the pending motion to dismiss. See id. at 1-3. Both motions are ripe for decision.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim in order to give the defendant fair notice of
IV. ANALYSIS
As explained above, Plaintiffs bring three claims against Defendants. First, Plaintiffs argue that the rulemaking provision of the Facilities Act is an impermissible delegation of legislative power in violation of the D.C. Home Rule Act and the U.S. Constitution. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the OSSE regulations violate Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Third, Plaintiffs argue that the OSSE regulations violate the equal protection clause by making arbitrary and irrational distinctions. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss with respect to each claim.2 The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Nondelegation Doctrine Claim
Article I of the Constitution states that [a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.
(noting that Congress need not provide direction to EPA to define “country elevators” but must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national economy). Though the D.C. Court of Appeals has not held that the nondelegation doctrine applies to the District‘s government, both parties apparently agree that it applies by application of the Home Rule Act. See Defs.’ Mot. at 14-15; Pls.’ Opp‘n at 14, ECF No. 34 ; see also Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 238 A.3d 222, 232 (D.C. 2020) (assuming without deciding applicability of nondelegation doctrine and applying Supreme Court precedent to resolve issue). For purposes of the present motion to dismiss, the Court assumes the applicability of the nondelegation doctrine to delegations by the District Council to District agencies.
Defendants argue that the delegation of authority in the Facilities Act contains an intelligible principle to establish minimum qualifications that are appropriate given the nature of the job to which [childcare providers] apply. Defs.’ Mot. at 19. Defendants first note that the standards for any permissible delegation ‘are not demanding, id. at 16 (quoting Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (plurality op.)), and that the Supreme Court has consistently upheld even broad delegations of authority, see id. Defendants argue that the Facilities Act instructs the Mayor3 as to the limits of [her] authority (that [she] may set ‘minimum standards of operation‘) as well as the targets (child development facilities) and content (staff qualification, requirements and training) of any regulations. id. at 17 (quoting
Department of Homeland Security, the Treasury Secretary, and the Secretary of the Interior). Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs offer no legal support for their argument that some stricter scrutiny should be required because the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA),
In opposition, Plaintiffs claim that the delegation of authority in the Facilities Act does not contain an intelligible principle. Pls.’ Opp‘n at 15-17. This is so, they claim,
that because the DCAPA limits judicial review to contested cases—in other words, adjudications—the delegation of authority should be struck down even if the statute contains an intelligible principle. See id. (Therefore, even if OSSE‘s statute had ordered it to pursue an intelligible principle, there was no mechanism by which a court could determine that is was failing to actually do so or was acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or without substantial evidence.); id. at 20 (For nondelegation purposes, what matters is whether there is any authority ensuring that an agency‘s exercise of its delegated legislative power is not arbitrary or capricious. (footnote omitted)).
The Court agrees with Defendants; the delegation of power in
guidance for children, infants, and toddlers. The narrow scope of this delegation of power does not require further direction or guidance. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475. The Mayor‘s delegated authority is cabined by ‘intelligible principles’ delineating both the area in and the purpose for which the minimum operating standards should apply. TOMAC, 433 F.3d at 867.
The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ contention that some other standard should apply because the DCAPA does not provide for judicial review of D.C. agency rulemaking. Plaintiffs apparently contend that even with an intelligible principle to guide the delegation of power the delegation should
trial court for review in an original proceeding and can argue that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious). In any event, whether or not the Mayor‘s actions pursuant to the Facilities Act might be unreviewable does not control the nondelegation doctrine analysis. See Michigan Gambling Opposition, 525 F.3d at 33 n.8.4
Because the Facilities Act contains an intelligible principle to guide the Mayor‘s rulemaking authority, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim to relief with respect to their nondelegation challenge.
B. Due Process Claim
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Waters v. Rumsfeld, 320 F.3d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Under rational basis review, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead facts that establish that there is not ‘any reasonable conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Dumaguin v. Sec‘y of Health and Hum. Servs., 28 F.3d 1218, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Am. Fed‘n, 330 F.3d at 523 (applying same standard for rational basis review to substantive due process and equal protection challenges).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot overcome the deferential standard under a rational basis review. Defs.’ Mot. at 23. Defendants state that the rational relationship here is no more than that involved in requiring a science teacher to have science degree, an accountant to have an accounting degree, or a lawyer to have a law degree. id. at 24. Defendants say that questioning whether the regulations will actually improve childcare, or whether some childcare workers will be unable to comply, or whether the data underlying OSSE‘s action actually supports the regulations does not change the deferential analysis. See id. at 24-29. In opposition, Plaintiffs point to a number of cases in other contexts where courts have struck down statutes after a rational basis review. See Pls.’ Opp‘n at 29-30. Plaintiffs say that here, the degree requirements in the regulations do absolutely nothing to further the legitimate government interest of promoting optimal childcare outcomes. id. at 30 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs argue that they should be entitled to develop a record to show that the degree requirements are unrelated to OSSE‘s purpose. id. at 31. Defendants argue in reply that whether there is a rational basis for the regulations is a legal conclusion and that Plaintiffs cannot allege facts that survive a motion to dismiss in this case because one could at least rationally speculate that requiring more advanced education would yield improved child care. Defs.’ Reply at 16-17, ECF No. 37.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim to relief under the Due Process Clause. The Court agrees with Defendants that OSSE‘s regulations are plainly ‘rational on [their] face. id. at 17 (quoting Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 479). The regulations require individuals who will be caring for children, infants, and toddlers to take classes or obtain a degree in early childhood education, early childhood development, child and family studies, or a closely related field.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim under the Due Process Clause.
C. Equal Protection Claim
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim alleges that OSSE‘s rules draw arbitrary distinctions with respect to the degree requirement. See Am. Compl. 283-88. Such distinctions are subject to rational basis review. See Gebresalassie v. District of Columbia, 170 F. Supp. 3d 52, 60 (D.D.C. 2016). A statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 478 (quoting Beach Commc‘ns, 508 U.S. at 313). Like rational basis review of due process claims, at the motion to dismiss stage, an equal protection challenge to a statute that does not involve a classification along suspect lines or fundamental rights—like the challenge here—requires overcoming a strong presumption of validity, Tate v. District of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2010), by plead[ing] facts that establish that there is not ‘any reasonable conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification, Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 479 (quoting Dumaguin, 28 F.3d at 1222). Again, like with a due process challenge, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Beach Commc‘ns, 508 U.S. at 315.
Plaintiffs challenge three distinctions made in the OSSE regulations on equal protection grounds. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 283-286. First, Plaintiffs argue that the regulations draw an arbitrary and irrational distinction between day-care providers . . . and other kinds of child-care providers, such as nannies Id. ¶ 283. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the regulations draw an arbitrary and irrational distinction between private, parochial, and independent schools with full-time elementary or secondary education programs with day cares attached . . . and private, parochial, and independent schools with attached day cares . . . that serve elementary and
secondary-school age children in other capacities. Id. ¶ 284. Third, Plaintiffs argue that the regulations draw an arbitrary and irrational distinction between day-care center teachers who already have a college degree and those who do not. Id. ¶ 286. Day-care center teachers who already have a college degree must obtain at least 24 semester credit hours in an early-childhood field whereas those who do not have a degree must obtain an associate‘s degree with a major in an early-childhood field, which may require less than 24 semester credit hours. Id. Plaintiffs argue that none of these distinctions rationally relate to a legitimate government purpose. See Pls.’ Opp‘n at 24-28.
The District argues that the three distinctions Plaintiffs point to all survive rational basis scrutiny. Defs.’ Mot. at 30-35.
that the twenty-four-credit hour requirement is an appropriate approximation even though there may be some degree programs that require more or fewer credits. id. at 34-35 (citing Beach Commc‘ns, 508 U.S. at 316 n.7 (The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific. (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 288 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913)).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible equal protection claim with respect to each distinction. The Court agrees with Defendants that each distinction survives a rational basis review. First, distinguishing between child development facility employees and other childcare givers, like nannies and babysitters, makes sense. The Court agrees with Defendants that these other caregivers have a different set of demands on their time, usually care for smaller numbers of children, and are generally individually selected by parents. See Defs.’ Reply at 10-11. It is completely rational to exempt more informal childcare from the degree and licensure requirements precisely because they are more informal. It would also be rational for OSSE to conclude that the other types of caregivers perform work that is different in kind from the caregivers covered by the regulations. Plaintiffs fail to address this conceivably rational basis for the distinction. Instead, Plaintiffs dismiss the potential differences between different types of caregivers and argue that child-care providers are performing the same work, wherever they happen to work. Pls.’ Opp‘n at 26. This is no answer, though, to the plausible basis for the distinction offered by Defendants.
Second, treating day cares attached to full-time elementary or secondary schools differently from day cares attached to institutions that do not offer full-time educational services also has a conceivably rational basis. As Defendants note, OSSE could reasonably think that day cares operated by and co-located with full-time elementary or secondary schools are already
more likely than other institutions to have staff with relevant college degrees, and that there is thus less need to impose a degree requirement on them. Defs.’ Mot. at 33. Plaintiffs do not address this potential basis for the distinction. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that this distinction
Third, the distinction between teachers who already have a college degree and those who do not also has a plausible rational basis. Plaintiffs suggest that because it may be possible for a teacher without a college degree to obtain the requisite associate‘s degree with fewer than twenty-four credit hours in early-childhood education classes, it is irrational to require twenty-four credit hours for those who already possess a college degree in some other subject. Pls.’ Opp‘n at 24-25. The Court agrees with Defendants, who argue that OSSE had to set the bar somewhere and selecting twenty-four credit hours as an approximation of a major‘s worth of
study easily passes constitutional muster. Defs.’ Mot. at 35; see also Beach Commc‘ns, 508 U.S. at 316 n.7 (The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific. (quoting Metropolis Theatre, 288 U.S. at 69-70)). Choosing to set the bar at twenty-four credit hours represents a rational, while perhaps rough, estimate for the appropriate amount of early childhood education for teachers in child development facilities. Plaintiffs complain that the regulations will allow some teachers to comply with the degree requirements while taking fewer early childhood education classes than others who already have college degrees. Pls.’ Opp‘n at 25. But this argument fails to account for the fact that teachers without a college degree will be required to take far more courses to obtain their associate‘s degree, see Am. Compl. ¶ 175 (estimating sixty credit hours for Ms. Sanchez), than teachers who already have college degrees. OSSE could have rationally added the additional classes required for an associate‘s degree to its calculus for determining the appropriate amount of education. But even crediting Plaintiffs’ argument, OSSE did not have to review all possible associate‘s degree programs to ensure logical coherence because it had to draw the line somewhere and must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally. Beach Commc‘ns, 508 U.S. at 316.
At bottom, Plaintiffs failed to overcome the strong presumption of validity that rational basis review
Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement—much like classifying governmental beneficiaries—inevitably requires that some persons
who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.
Id. at 315-16 (quoting Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 479 (Although the classification might indeed be unfair to [plaintiffs], mere disparity of treatment is not sufficient to state an equal protection violation.). Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that there is not ‘any reasonable conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 479 (quoting Dumaguin, 28 F.3d at 1222).8 As such, Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible equal protection claim.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 33) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motion for discovery notwithstanding the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 32) is DENIED AS MOOT. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: January 13, 2021
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge