SAN FRANCISCO TOMORROW еt al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents; PARKMERCED INVESTORS PROPERTIES, LLC., Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
No. A137753
First Dist., Div. Two
Aug. 14, 2014
229 Cal.App.4th 498
[CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION†]
Law Offices of Stuart M. Flashman and Stuart M. Flashman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Chatten-Brown & Carstens, Jan Chatten-Brown and Josh Chatten-Brown for Sierra Club and California Preservation Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Kate H. Stacy, Audrey Williams Pearson and Brian F. Crossman, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents.
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Daniel Kolkey, Jeffrey D. Dintzer and Matthew C. Wickersham for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
KLINE, P. J.—
INTRODUCTION
Appellants San Francisco Tomorrow and Parkmerced Action Coalition (PMAC) appeal the San Francisco Superior Court‘s denial of appellants’ petition for writ of mandate seeking to overturn the decision by respondents City and County of San Francisco (City) and its board of supervisors (Board) approving the Parkmerced Development Project (the project). The project involves the long-term redevelopment of the privately owned, 152-acre Parkmerced property by real party in interest Parkmerced Investors Properties, LLC.
Appellants challenge the court‘s denial of their writ petition contending: (1) The “Land Use Element” (sometimes called the “Urban Design Element“) of the San Francisco General Plan (General Plan) is inadequate for failing to include standards for population density and building intensity. (
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Project
The project involves major modifications to Parkmerced, a 3,221-unit residential rental complex on 152 acres. The site is located near Lake Merced, in the southwest corner of San Francisco. It is surrounded by the Stonestown Galleria shopping mall, San Francisco State University, two golf courses, and residential neighborhoods.
The original Parkmerced complex was built in the 1940s by MetLife as one of eight large-scale developments created around the country to provide affordable middle-income housing. The architect for Parkmerced was the New York City firm Leonard Schultze & Associates and its design involved
As described, “The proposed Project is a long-term (approximately 20-30 years) mixed-use development program to comprehensively re-plan and re-develop the approximately 116-acre Site (152-acres including streets). The Project proposes to increase the residential density, provide new commercial and retail services, provide new transit facilities, new parks and open space amenities and improve existing utilities and stormwater management systems within the development Site. Of the existing 3,221 residential units on the Site, approximately 1,683 units located within the 11 existing towers would remain and approximately 1,538 existing apartments would be demolished and replaced in phases over the approximately 20 to 30-year development period. As provided in the proposed [d]evelopment [a]greement, all 1,538 new replacement units would be subject to the San Francisco Rent Stabilization Ordinance and existing tenants in the to-be-replaced existing apartment units would have rights to relocate into new replacement units of equivalent size with the same number of bedrooms and bathrooms at their existing rents. An additional 5,679 net new units would also be added to the Site for a project total of 8,900 units. New buildings on the Site would range in height from 35 feet to 145 feet, and would not be taller than the existing towers, which will remain.
“Neighborhood-serving retail and office space would also be constructed as part of the proposed Project and concentrated on Crespi Drive, near the northeast part of the Site and the light-rail line. The proposed new neighborhood core would be located within walking distance of all the residences within Parkmerced. In addition, small neighborhood-serving retail establishments would be constructed outside of the neighborhood core, in proximity to residential units throughout the Site. A new preschool/elementary school and
B. Project Approvals
In addition to an EIR, prepared pursuant to CEQA, project approvаl also required amendments to the City‘s General Plan, zoning map, and planning code (to add the Parkmerced special use district [sometimes referred to as the SUD]), as well as approval of a local coastal zone permit and the negotiated development agreement between the City and real party in interest (collectively Project Approvals).
Real party in interest applied to the City for environmental review of the project in January 2008. In May 2009, the City issued a notice of preparation for the project EIR. The draft EIR (DEIR) was released for public review on May 12, 2010. A 60-day public comment period followed. The City‘s Historic Preservation Commission held a hearing to receive input on the DEIR. The comments and responses document was released on October 28, 2010, and informational meetings were held by the planning commission. On February 10, 2011, the planning commission held a formal public hearing and voted to certify the project‘s final EIR (FEIR) and to recommend that the Board approve the project and related Project Approvals.
On March 1 and 2, 2011, appellants and others filed timely appeals with the Board contesting certification of the FEIR. The Board heard the appeal on March 29, 2011, and took public comment. After close of the public comment, the Board voted to continue the item. Meanwhile, the Board‘s land use and economic development committee (LUEDC) took additional public comment on the remaining project approvals. The LUEDC held four hearings—on March 28, April 18, May 16, and the morning of May 24, 2011. At the May 16 and May 24 meetings, the LUEDC discussed and approved amendments to the approvals. At the end of the May 24 hearing, the LUEDC forwarded the amended documents to the Board without recommendation.
On the afternoon of May 24, 2011, the Board held a hearing on the continued EIR appeal and the project approvals. At the end of that meeting, the Board denied the appeal, upheld certification of the EIR and approved the project. On June 6, 2011, the Board finalized the project approvals. The mayor signed the approvals on June 10, 2011, and a notice of determination was filed that day.
C. The Petition for Writ of Mandate
Appellants filed their “Verified Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief” on July 11, 2011. Disputes over the content of the record followed and appellants moved to “Clarify the Extent of the Administrative Record,” seeking to exclude certain hearings from the record. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion, ordering hearings before the LUEDC and the Historic Preservation Commission to be transcribed and included in the record and excluding two hearings occurring after the Board‘s certification of the EIR. The trial court also granted real party‘s demurrer (joined in by the City) to the seventh and eighth causes of action of PMAC for declaratory relief and for violation of due process rights. The operative pleading, the “Verified Third Amended Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate,” was filed on April 6, 2012. Following a hearing on the merits of the petition, the trial court took the matter under submission. It issued its order denying the petition on all counts on December 14, 2012. Judgment was entered on January 16, 2013, and this timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. General Plan Adequacy
A. General Plan
“The Legislature has required every county and city to adopt ‘a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county or city. . . .’ (
” ‘[T]he propriety of virtually any local decision affecting land use and development depends upon consistency with the applicable general plan and its elements.’ [Citation.] ‘Since consistency with the general plan is required, absence of a valid general plan, or valid relevant elements or components
“The adoption or amendment of a general plan is a legislative act. (
Appellants attack the San Francisco General Plan itself, arguing the Urban Design Element of the General Plan is inadequate for failing to include standards for population density and building intensity as required by
The trial court concluded that a reasonable person could conclude, as did the City, that table I-27 and map I-2 in the General Plan‘s “Housing Element,” and maps 4 and 5 in the Urban Design Element provide the information described in
1. Population density. The terms “population density” and “building intensity” are not defined by the statute. In Twain Harte Homeowners Assn. v. County of Tuolumne (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 664 [188 Cal.Rptr. 233] (Twain Harte), the court determined “the reasonable interpretation of the term
The Urban Design Element of the General Plan includes a “Land Use Index.” This index includes land use maps and references to land use policies scattered through other elements. Appellants acknowledge, as they must, that the actual layout of a general plan is generally within the local agency‘s discretion. (
The section of the Housing Element describing the existing housing stock contains a table (I-27, “Generalized Housing Densities Allowed by Zoning“) and corresponding map (I-2, “Generalized Housing Densities Allowed by Zoning“) that together provide an adequate description of the population densities for the Parkmerced area. Table I-27 of the Housing Element sets forth five categories of housing density (low, moderately low, medium, moderately high, and high) and specifies the types of zoning districts that relate to each category. For each category, the table states both the “average units per acre” and the “population density,” in addition to describing the general locations where these density levels may be found. Map I-2, on the following page, shows the locations of each housing density category throughout the City. A narrative preceding the table and map describes them: “Table I-27 offers a listing of the City‘s zoning categories that permit residential development, grouping these by generalized hоusing density levels. Map I-2 provides a generalized illustration of housing densities city-wide.” The map identifies portions of the Parkmerced site as “medium density,” corresponding to an average population density of 124 persons per acre, and other portions as “high density” corresponding to an average population density of 651 persons per acre. Accordingly, the General Plan includes a statement of population density (numbers of people) for the territory it covers. (See Twain Harte, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 699; see also Camp v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 334, 350 [176 Cal.Rptr. 620] [there must be a perceptible connection between density standards and locations within the jurisdiction].)
Moreover, respondents dispute appellants’ claim that table I-27 only describes existing densities. The averages in the table correspond to specific zoning designations and general locations throughout the City, as also identified in the table. Therefore, respondents maintain, geographic locations and the zoning designations throughout the City also signal the generally recommended population density. Further, the Housing Element contemplates that new housing will generally be constructed at densities similar to the surrounding development. Therefore, table I-27 and map I-2 also project the likely future densities throughout the City. (See Housing Element pt. I, pp. 92-93 [discussion projecting future residential development on in-fill sites at lower densities in neighborhoods characterized by single-family homes, and higher densities closer to downtown and in the City‘s mixed-use districts].) We conclude the General Plan adequately states population densities.
2. Building intensity. Terming the General Plan building intensity standards “marginally better” than its “population density” standards, appellants argue that the Urban Design Element inclusion of a citywide map of maximum building heights, and its map identifying building bulk standards are insufficient, as the standards do not contain the usual measure of floor intensity ratios and bulk limits are set only for parts of a building exceeding a certain height.1
The Urban Design Element includes a map of the various permitted building heights citywide and a separate map addressing building bulk. (Land
Notes
Building intensity for the site is further regulated through the project‘s General Plan amendment and SUD. Project approvals amend height map 4 to establish a boundary around the Parkmerced site and replace existing height regulations with a notation to ” ‘See Parkmerced Special Use District, Section 249.64 of the Planning Code and Sectional Map HT13 of the Zoning Maps.’ ” The SUD, in turn, establishes building height and bulk for the site through amendments to the applicable zoning height map and a bulk table. The ordinance establishing the Parkmerced SUD also contained amendments to the Planning Code identifying permitted uses in each of the newly established Parkmerced classes of use districts, as well as prohibited uses in the SUD as a whole.
The standards for building heights and the bulk limits for buildings above specified heights are precisely the sorts of standards called for in Twain Harte, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at page 699 (standards might include “restrictions such as height or size limitations, restrictions on types of buildings or uses to be permitted within a designated area“). The building intensity requirement of
3. Correlation of circulation element with changes in population density and building intensity. Appellants suggest the General Plan is also deficient in that the “Transportation Element” is not correlated with the Land Use Element, as required by
Furthermore, as recognized in Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 1196, “the internal consistency and correlation requirements do not require a city or county to limit population growth or provide traffic management measures to
required between them. The precise form of the building or buildings would in large measure be left to the individual developer and his architects under these guidelines.” (Policy 3.6, italics added.)
As respondents point out, the Project Approvals reflect the City‘s decision to limit parking and roadway capacity in areas well served by transit. We do not second-guess such a policy choice.
II. Project Consistency with the General Plan
As is often the case, the standard of review and the degree of deference this court is to apply to the decision of the City is determinative of many of the issues presented. Appellants, joined by amici curiae Sierra Club and California Preservation Foundation, contend that deference to the City‘s interpretation of the priority policies of the General Plan was unwarranted, because the priority policies had been enacted via a citizen‘s initiative, “Proposition M,” rather than authored by the City itself. Appellants and amici curiae argue that the initiative must be interpreted to effectuate the intent of the voters and that the City‘s intent and its interpretation of the meaning of the policies are irrelevant and entitled to little, if any, deference.
Appellants and amici curiae further maintain that the priority policies must be strictly construed, as Proposition M requires that the City make findings of consistency with those priority policies for all future projects, and that the plain language of Proposition M requires a specific finding of consistency with each and every priority policy identified therein. Consequently, appellants and amici curiae assert that the consistency findings here were inadequate, insofar as they were based on determinations that the project was generally compatible with the priority policies or that “on balance” the project will further the priority policies and not obstruct their attainment. We disagree.
A. Deference to the City‘s Interpretation of the General Plan Priority Policies
As stated by the Sixth Appellate District in Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1562-1563 [135 Cal.Rptr.3d 380] (Pfeiffer): “Our evaluation of appellants’ contention is governed by well established standards. ’ ” ‘An action, program, or project is consistent with the general plan if, considering all its aspects, it will further the objectives and policies of the general plan and not obstruct their
We addressed the applicable standard of review—abuse of discretion—more than two decades ago in Sequoyah, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at page 717: “The city council‘s determination that the . . . project is consistent with the [city‘s general plan] comes to this court with a strong presumption of regularity. [Citation.] To overcome that presumption, an abuse of discretion must be shown. (
Even those cases relied upon by appellants for the proposition that the priority policies must be strictly construed recognize and apply the abuse of discretion standard of review. Endangered Habitats, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 777, agreed that appellate courts “review decisions regarding consistency with a general plan under the arbitrary and capricious standard. These are quasi-legislative acts reviewed by ordinary mandamus, and the inquiry is whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or procedurally unfair. [Citations.] Under this standard, we defer to an agency‘s factual finding of consistency unless no reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion on the evidence before it. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 782.) Similarly, Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural etc. County v. Board of Supervisors (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 1] (FUTURE), also acknowledged: “The Board‘s determination that [the project] is consistent with the Draft General Plan carries a strong presumption of regularity. (Sequoyah, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) This determination can be overturned only if the Board abused its discretion—that is, did not
No case cited by appellants or found by us refuses to apply this deferential standard to the determination by a local agency that a particular project was consistent with its general plan.
Appellants and amici curiae argue that the reason for deference to the local legislative body is absent where, as here, the amendment to the General Plan that set forth the priority policies was not proposed by the City, but was the result of an initiative adopted by the voters over opposition of many members of the Board. It is true that many cases explain that reviewing courts accord great deference to the agency‘s determination ” ‘because the body which adopted the general plan policies in its legislative capacity has unique competence to interpret those policies when applying them in its adjudicatory capacity. [Citation.]’ ” (Pfeiffer, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1563; see, e.g., Friends of Lagoon Valley, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 816; Sierra Club, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509; Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 142 [104 Cal.Rptr. 2d 326] (Save Our Peninsula).)
However, the Board‘s role in implementing the General Plan, including its discretion to determine whether proposed projects are consistent with the General Plan, is at least as important. The above cases also recognize that ” ‘[b]ecause policies in a general plan reflect a range of competing interests, the governmental agency must be allowed to weigh and balance the plan‘s policies when applying them, and it has broad discretion to construe its policies in light of the plan‘s purposes. [Citations.]’ ” (Pfeiffer, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1563; see Sierra Club, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1509-1510; Save Our Peninsula, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 142.) Such deference to the actions of the legislative body stems from well-settled principles of court respect for the separation of powers. (See Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 572 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 888 P.2d 1268] (Western States) [“[E]xcessive judicial interference with the [agency‘s] quasi-legislative actions would conflict with the well-settled principle that the legislative branch is entitled to deference from the courts because of the constitutional separation of powers. (
Nor do we find persuasive the claims of appellants and amici curiae that policy reasons supporting liberal interpretation of citizens’ initiative measures suggest affording less deference to the City‘s consistency findings here. Unlike Perry v. Brown (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1116, 1165 [134 Cal.Rptr.3d 499, 265 P.3d 1002], holding that sponsors of citizens’ initiatives must be allowed to defend their validity, this case does not involve a challenge to the validity of a citizen‘s initiative. Rather, it is a challenge to the City‘s application of the General Plan and, specifically, to the City‘s interpretation and application of the priority policies adopted by Proposition M and found today in section 101.1, subdivision (a) of the City‘s planning code. The same rules of construction that apply to other amendments to the planning code or to the General Plan apply here. “Once an initiative measure has been approved by the requisite vote of electors in an election, . . . the measure becomes a duly enacted constitutional amendment or statute.” (Perry, at p. 1147.) As our Supreme Court has observed, ” ‘Although the initiative power must be construed liberally to promote the democratic process [citation] when utilized to enact statutes, those statutes are subject to the same constitutional limitations and rules of construction as are other statutes.’ (Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 675 [194 Cal.Rptr. 781, 699 P.2d 17].) The same is true when a local initiative is at issue.” (Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 540 [277 Cal.Rptr. 1, 802 P.2d 317].)
Any other conclusion would undermine the well-established limited role of judicial review in these types of cases and could lead to unworkable results, such as requiring application of different standards of review to consistency determinations in the same proceeding where some General Plan policies were adopted by initiative and others by the agency.2
Relying upon Endangered Habitats, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 777 and FUTURE, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, appellants and amici curiae argue that the priority policies of the General Plan were fundamental, mandatory and clear. Consequently, they contend, project approval required findings that the project complied with each and every one of the strictly construed priority policies and the Board was not permitted to weigh and balance the various policies when considering project compliance. Again, we disagree.
When we apply the abuse of discretion standard of review, ” ‘the nature of the policy and the nature of the inconsistency are critical factors to consider.’ (FUTURE, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.) In addition, general consistencies with plan policies cannot overcome ‘specific, mandatory and fundamental inconsistencies’ with plan policies. (Id. at p. 1342.)” (Clover Valley Foundation v. City of Rocklin (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 200, 239 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 733].)
As we recognized in Sequoyah, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 704, “[N]o project could completely satisfy every policy stated in the [general plan], and . . . state law does not impose such a requirement. [Citations.] A general plan must try to accommodate a wide range of competing interests—including those of developers, neighboring homeowners, prospective homebuyers, environmentalists, current and prospective business owners, jobseekers, taxpayers, and providers and recipients of all types of city-provided services—and to present a clear and comprehensive set of principles to guide development decisions. Once a general plan is in place, it is the province of elected city officials to examine the specifics of a proposed project to determine whether it would be ‘in harmony’ with the policies stated in the plan. [Citation.] It is, emphatically, not the role of the courts to micromanage these development decisions. Our function is simply to decide whether the city officials considered the applicable policies and the extent to which the proposed project conforms with those policies, whether the city officials made appropriate findings on this issue, and whether those findings are supported by substantial
In Endangered Habitats, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 777, and FUTURE, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, appellate courts held the findings of consistency made by the respective counties were unsupported by substantial evidence (FUTURE, at p. 1342) and that “no reasonable person could have made the consistency finding on the record” (Endangered Habitats, at p. 789). In each case, the appellate court determined the land use project at issue to be inconsistent with very specific and mandatory policies of the applicable general plan. (Endangered Habitats, at pp. 785-786, 789; FUTURE, at p. 1342.)
As described by Friends of Lagoon Valley, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at page 819, “the general plan in Endangered Habitats[, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 777,] required the maintenance of specific levels of service at certain intersections as computed using a specific methodology.3 (Id. at pp. 782-783.) Although an EIR determined cumulative traffic impacts were not significant under a different methodology, the court remarked this fact was ‘of no import’ given the unambiguous requirements of the general plan. (Id. at p. 783.)” The traffic level service policy, by establishing a particular performance standard to be evaluated by a particular methodology was “mandatory” and “clear,” such that the project that could not meet the performance standard under the required methodology, was inconsistent with the general plan. (Endangered Habitats, at pp. 782-783.) Furthermore, the general plan at issue in Endangered Habitats explicitly did not allow balancing of certain identified policies. Rather, it mandated compliance with a specific plan in order to maintain a buffer between urban development and a national forest. The specific plan distinguished between mandatory and permissive provisions and a consistency checklist explained that “‘shall’ indicates a mandatory [r]egulation to which there are no exceptions, while ‘should’ indicates a non-mandatory [g]uideline.‘” (Id. at pp. 785-786.) The Endangered Habitats court concluded that the specific plan amendment allowing the specific plan regulations to be balanced was in direct conflict with the general plan policy that new
Similarly, the general plan in FUTURE, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, specified without exception that the designation “low density residential” would be restricted to certain areas. The project proposed to develop “low density residential” in another area. It was “readily apparent” the project directly conflicted with a mandatory policy set forth in the general plan. (Id. at pp. 1340-1341.) The appellate court held there was no substantial evidence supporting the county‘s implied finding of consistency, concluding that “[n]o reasonable person, on the evidence before the Board, could conclude otherwise.” (Id. at p. 1341; see Sierra Club, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511.)
As stated above, the priority policies adopted by Proposition M are found in section 101.1 of the City‘s planning code, which provides in relevant part:
“SECTION 101.1. MASTER PLAN CONSISTENCY AND IMPLEMENTATION
“(a) The Master Plan shall be an integrated, internally consistent and compatible statement of policies for San Francisco. To fulfill this requirement, after extensive public participation and hearings, the City Planning Commission shall in one action amend the Master Plan by January 1, 1988.
“(b) The following Priority Policies are hereby established. They shall be included in the preamble to the Master Plan and shall be the basis upon which inconsistencies in the Master Plan are resolved:
“(1) That existing neighborhood-serving retail uses be preserved and enhanced and future opportunities for resident employment in and ownership of such business enhanced;
“(2) That existing housing and neighborhood character be conserved and protected in order to preserve the cultural and economic diversity of our neighborhoods;
“(3) That the City‘s supply of affordable housing be preserved and enhanced;
“(4) That commuter traffic not impede Muni transit service or overburden our streets or neighborhood parking.
“(5) That a diverse economic base be maintained by protecting our industrial and service sectors from displacement due to commercial office
development, and that future opportunities for resident employment and ownership in these sectors be enhanced;
“(6) That the City achieve the greatest possible preparedness to protect against injury and loss of life in an earthquake;
“(7) That landmarks and historic buildings be preserved; and,
“(8) That our parks and open space and their access to sunlight and vistas be protected from development.”
Subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 101.1 of the planning code provide that the City may not adopt any zoning ordinance or development agreement authorized pursuant to
The language of section 101.1, subdivision (b) of the City‘s planning code, that the priority policies are to “be the basis upon which inconsistencies in the Master Plan are resolved,” does not remotely provide the type of specificity and clarity that is found in the general plan policies of either FUTURE, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 1332 or Endangered Habitats, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 777. A reasonable person could conclude that such language allows the City to weigh and balance the priority policies and to construe them in light of the purposes of the General Plan. As for the specific priority policies themselves, the plain language of these policies lacks the type of directive courts use to determine whether a policy is mandatory—use of words such as “must” or “shall.” Our reading of the priority policies here persuades us they are neither “mandatory” nor “clear,” and the project does not directly conflict with them, unlike the plans in FUTURE and Endangered Habitats, where the project in each case directly conflicted with one or more specific and mandatory policies set forth in the general plans to the degree that no reasonable person could conclude they were consistent. While the City planning code requires that procedurally, a project must be found consistent with the policies, the policies themselves contain no objective standards, but only subjective standards that neither prohibit any particular development or type of development nor command any particular outcome.
Nearly 30 years ago, immediately after passage of Proposition M, the San Francisco City Attorney issued an analysis of that measure, observing
C. Priority Policy Consistency Determination
Appellant challenges the City‘s findings that the project and its accompanying approvals were consistent with priority policies Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8.
“[Priority Policy No. 2] The existing housing and neighborhood character will be conserved and protected in order to preserve the cultural and economic diversity of our neighborhoods:
“The proposed Project would preserve the existing diversity and character of Parkmerced by maintaining the same number of rent controlled units (3,221 rent controlled units) that currently exist at Parkmerced. The Project would accomplish this by conserving 1,683 existing rent controlled apartments, which would remain subject to the Rent Stabilization Ordinance, and replacing all 1,538 existing rent controlled apartments that would be demolished by the Project with a new unit that would be subject to the same protections as contained in the Rent Stabilization Ordinance for the life of the building. In addition, under the proposed Project, residents of buildings proposed for demolition would be given the opportunity to relocate to such replacement units in a new building and would be assessed the same rent as their previous unit. The Project would also enhance the diversity of Parkmerced by constructing a large number of new BMR [below market rate] affordable units. Currently, Parkmerced has no BMR units. Further, the proposed Project would enhance the character of the Parkmerced neighborhood by establishing a social and commercial core, improving pedestrian accessibility, and creating open space and recreational opportunities. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Priority Policy No. 4] The commuter traffic will not impede MUNI transit service or overburden our streets or neighborhood parking:
“The proposed Project would enhance MUNI transit service by re-routing the MUNI M-Oceanview light-rail line through the Project Site, creating two new stations and relocating the existing Parkmerced/SFSU station. These improvements would alleviate the overcrowding issues at the existing Parkmerced/SFSU station and improve the connection to SFSU by requiring riders to cross Holloway Avenue as opposed to Nineteenth Avenue. The realignment would also reduce the walking distance to transit for residents of Parkmerced, thereby encouraging the use of public transportation. In addition, the proposed roadway re-alignments would ease the burden on City streets in
the Parkmerced area by improving traffic flow. Finally, the proposed Project would add approximately 90 on-street and 6,252 off-street parking spaces, ensuring that residents of the proposed Project do not rely on parking in the adjoining neighborhoods. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Priority Policy No. 6] The City will achieve the greatest possible preparedness to protect against injury and loss of life in an earthquake.
“The proposed Project would help the City achieve the greatest possible preparedness to protect against injury and loss of life in an earthquake because the new buildings would be constructed in accordance with all applicable building codes and regulations with regard to seismic safety.
“[Priority Policy No. 7] That landmark and historic buildings will be preserved:
“The proposed Project would not adversely impact any City landmarks because there are no City-designated landmarks on the Project Site. Although none of the buildings on the Project Site are designated City landmarks, as mitigation for the Proposed Project‘s impacts to historic resources under [CEQA], the Project Sponsor will prepare documentation of the site based on the National Park Service‘s Historic American Building Survey/Historic American Engineering Record Historical Report Guidelines and provide a permanent display of interpretative materials concerning the history of the original Parkmerced complex.
“[Priority Policy No. 8] Parks and open space and their access to sunlight and vistas will be protected from development:
“The proposed Project would provide 68 acres of open space in a network of publically accessible neighborhood parks, athletic fields, public plazas, greenways and a farm. The Project would provide significant additional open space in the form of private or semi-private open space areas such as centralized outdoor courtyards, roof decks, and balconies. These private and semi-private open spaces would be required within the development of each residential building within Parkmerced. The parks and open space would be more accessible and usable than the current open spaces. Parks and open space within, and in the vicinity of, the proposed Project would continue to receive a substantial amount of sunlight during the day when use is at its highest rate. Existing coastal views from parks located to the east and north of the Project Site would be maintained with implementation of the proposed Project.”
The priority policy consistency findings made by the City are supported by the reasons given by the planning commission and are supported by the
D. Project Consistency with Other General Plan Policies
Appellants contend that other policies in the General Plan echo the priority policies and that project approvals are also inconsistent with those policies.4 Having rejected appellants’ premise—that the project and Project Approvals were inconsistent with the priority policies—we also reject their conclusion. Nevertheless, we briefly address the claims of inconsistency.
1. Housing element policy 3.6 consistency determination. Housing element policy 3.6 states: “Preserve Landmark and Historic Residential Buildings.” This policy is by its terms more narrow than priority policy No. 7, as it is limited to historic residential buildings. Parkmerced does not contain any landmark or historic buildings, residential or otherwise. A reasonable person could conclude the project and project approvals were not inconsistent with this general plan element.
2. Community safety element policy 2.11 regarding hazards from gas lines. Appellants contend community safety element policy 2.11, which states, “reduce hazards from gas fired appliances and gas lines,” is similar to priority policy No. 6. Appellants argue the project site is located “very close to major [Pacific Gas and Electric Company] gas pipelines” and that the “Planning Department attempted to belittle the risk involved using data . . . that antedated the San Bruno [pipelinе] explosion of the previous fall.” Appellants urge the data used by the City antedated the San Bruno explosion and they speculate that the project “will impede emergency response to a foreseeable catastrophic failure. . . .” The City consulted federal authorities as to the location of gas pipelines (noting that “the closest gas transmission line to the Project Site is PG&E‘s Line 109, which generally follows Alemany Boulevard,” outside project boundaries) and as to the risk of gas line explosions, finding them “rare.” The City‘s risk assessment did take into consideration the San Bruno
We conclude a reasonable person could have reached the conclusion reаched by the City here that the project was consistent with community safety element policy 2.11.
E. Project Consistency With Numerous Other Additional General Plan Objectives and Policies
As in Sequoyah, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 704, appellants here challenge the project on the basis of seven of the numerous policies and objectives encompassed in the General Plan (which City numbers at 78 or more). Given the standard of review here and the discretion vested in the City to weigh and balance General Plan policies in its determination whether the project is consistent with the General Plan (id. at p. 719), we would be hard pressed to overturn the City‘s determination in this case were we to find it unsupported with respect to a single policy. After identifying at least 78 objectives and policies in the Housing, Urban Design, and Transportation Elements with which the project is consistent, the City found that replacing the Parkmerced housing development, designed to separate land uses and rely extensively on automobile use, with a modern and sustainable development that will alleviate the City‘s housing shortage, promote transit use, and increase energy
III. CEQA*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Due Process
Appellants contend the trial court erred in dismissing appellant PMAC‘s due process claim upon real party‘s demurrer. We find no error.
The eighth cause of action alleged that as tenants of Parkmerced, members of PMAC hold property rights associated with their rent-controlled units, that they will be displacеd by the Project Approvals and the development agreement, that they have a due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, and that these rights were violated by the refusal to properly provide notice to them and to allow them to readdress the Board following significant changes to the development agreement and to Project Approvals affecting their property rights. The last-minute changes to the development agreement added provisions that in the event a court challenge invalidates the rent control provision, real party will provide the tenants with relocation assistance and damages that will compensate them for the loss. These changes were made in the attempt to minimize any uncertainty about tenants’ ability to retain rent control in the new units whatever the impact of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (
Appellants acknowledge the well-settled rule that “only those governmental decisions which are adjudicative in nature are subject to procedural due process principles.” (Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612 [156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 596 P.2d 1134], italics omitted (Horn).) “Legislative action generally is not governed by these procedural due process requirements because it is not practical that everyone should have a direct voice in legislative decisions; elections provide the check there. [Citations.]” (Calvert v. County of Yuba (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 613, 622 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 797]; see Horn, at p. 613; Nasha v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 772].) Appellants also acknowledge that the approval of a development agreement is a legislative act. (
* See footnote, ante, page 498.
Nevertheless, appellants posit the novel theory that a development agreement, while not a project approval, is an entitlement and not a “law of general applicability.” Therefore, appellants contend, approval of the development agreement is subject to due process protections, despite its characterization by statute as a legislative action. No case cited by appellants supports this argument—that a legislative act may trigger procedural due process rights when it is arguably not a law of general applicability. Such holding would upset well-established legislative-adjudicative act categorical distinctions and likely would cause uncertainty and confusion. California courts are not required to conduct an individualized assessment into the type of land use decision at issue. (Arnel, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 517.) In Arnel, the California Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance is a legislative act that may be enacted by initiative, whatever the size of parcel or number of landowners affected, unlike administrative zoning decisions, adjudicatory in nature, such as the grant of a variance or the award of a conditional use permit. (Id. at pp. 514-515.) The court emphasized the “problems courts will face if we abandoned past precedent and attempted to devise a new test distinguishing legislative and adjudicative decisions.” (Id. at pp. 522-523.)
As respоndents point out, appellants rely on a handful of cases as supporting the expansion of due process protection where a legislative act “exceptionally affected” a small number of people. (See Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado (1915) 239 U.S. 441, 446 [60 L.Ed. 372, 36 S.Ct. 141] (Bi-Metallic) [distinguishing Londoner v. Denver (1908) 210 U.S. 373 [52 L.Ed. 1103, 28 S.Ct. 708], as involving a “relatively small number of persons . . . who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds“]; Harris v. County of Riverside (9th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2d 497, 502 [holding that due process applied to zoning ordinance that “‘exceptionally affected‘” Harris‘s land].) None of these cases would apply due process requirements to the approval of a general plan amendment, zoning ordinance or development agreement encompassing 152 acres and affecting renters in more than 1,500 units. (See Arnel, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 522-523.) As Bi-Metallic recognized in finding no due process right at issue in that case: “Where a rule of
Moreover, insofar as approval of the development agreement requires consideration of broad-based policy issues and the exercise of legislative discretion, it is conduct that does not fit well within the framework of adjudicatory decisions. (See Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435, 443–444 [120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797] (Mammoth Lakes).)28 Whether or not approval of the development agreement here is conduct applying to more than a few people, it is undisputed that under state law the approval of the development agreement is a legislative act. As such, it has long been held that no procedural due process rights attach.
Nor do we find persuasive appellants’ theory that because the development agreement granted a vested right to the developer, “locking in” the regulatory framework under which further approvals would be considered, Parkmerced tenants necessarily acquired vested rights entitling them to procedural due process. That the development agreement may provide a vested right to the developer does not necessarily take away vested rights from PMAC or its members. Moreover, courts have repeatedly rejected the claim that an approval should be subject to procedural due process requirements simply because it affects property rights in some manner. Legislative actions often
Appellant contends that under Horn, supra, 24 Cal.3d 605, a property owner whose property interest would be directly and significantly affected by granting a vested right to another property has a right to due process. However, Horn first concluded that approval of a tentative subdivision map was “adjudicatory” in nature. (Id. at p. 614 [“Subdivision approvals, like variances and conditional use permits, involve the application of general standards to specific parcels of real property. Such governmental conduct, affecting the relatively few, is ‘determined by facts peculiar to the individual case’ and is ‘adjudicatory’ in nature.“]) Only thereafter did the court address the argument of the subdivider that the plaintiff neighbor had suffered no significant deprivation of property which would invoke constitutional rights to notice and hearing. As to that point, the court held that “whenever approval of a tentative subdivision map will constitute a substantial or significant deprivation of the property rights of other landowners, the affected persons are entitled to a reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before the approval occurs.” (Id. at p. 616, italics added.) In this case, having properly determined the first question, that a legislative act was involved to which act procedural due process did not attach, the trial court was not required to analyze whether the members of PMAC suffered a substantial or significant deprivation of property rights. (See Oceanside Marina Towers, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 744.)
Because the character of the development agreement approval is a legislative act, and it has long been established that procedural due process rights to notice and hearing do not attach to such acts, we conclude the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the eighth cause of action.29
V. Administrative Record
Appellants contend the trial court erred in including in the administrative record transcripts of a set of hearings before the LUEDC of the Board. Appellants contend transcripts of the LUEDC hearings were not relevant to the City‘s decision because these documents were not before the decision maker—the Board—when it certified the EIR for the project on June 6, 2010.
From August 10, 2010, to May 24, 2011, the LUEDC, a committee of the Board, held five meetings to consider the project and development agreement. The last of these was held the morning of May 24, hours before the Board considered and certified the EIR appeal and the project. At both the May 16 and May 24 meetings, the LUEDC discussed and approved amendments to the approvals. At the end of the May 24 hearing, the LUEDC forwarded the amended documents to the Board without recommendation.
On the afternoon of May 24, the Board heard the appeal of the EIR, denied the appeal and approved the project. On June 6, 2011, the Board finalized the Project Approvals. In certifying the EIR, the Board found that “the FEIR files and all correspondence and other documents have been made available for review by this Board and the public. These files are available for public review by appointment at the Planning Department offices at 1650 Mission Street, and are part of the record before this Board by reference in this motion . . . .” (Italics added; see
Following the filing of their petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, appellants moved to “clarify the record” (Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Madera (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 48, 62 [131 Cal.Rptr.3d 626] (Madera), disapproved on other grounds in Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Const. Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 304 P.3d 499]), seeking to exclude from the administrative record transcripts of various hearings on the project, including the LUEDC hearings.30 The trial court granted the motion in part and ordered: “The transcripts for San Francisco‘s Historic Preservation Commission hearing on June 2, 2010, and for all of the hearings of the Board of Supervisors’ [LUEDC] relating to the Parkmerced Project, are within the scope of the administrative record, and shall be included in the record. The transcripts for these hearings are within the scope of [section] 21167.6. Transcripts of these hearings must be prepared, certified as a true and accurate record of the proceedings, and included in the administrative record. . . .”
“We review a trial court‘s determination to include or exclude a document from the administrative record pursuant to the mandatory language of subdivision (e) of section 21167.6 by applying the following ordinary principles of appellate practice. [¶] The trial court‘s findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. [Citation.] The trial court‘s conclusions of law are subject to independent review on appeal. [Citation.] [¶] In addition to the foregoing standards of review, appellate review of a trial court‘s determinations regarding the scope of the administrative record is subject to the principle that appellate courts presume the trial court‘s order is correct. [Citation.] This presumption produces the corollaries that (1) an appellant must affirmatively demonstrate an error occurred and (2) when the appellate record is silent on a matter, the reviewing court must indulge all intendments and presumptions that support the order or judgment. [Citation.] The intendments and presumptions indulged by the appellate court include inferring the trial court made implied findings of fact that are consistent with its order, provided such implied findings are supported by substantial evidence.” (Madera, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 65, fn. omitted.)
C. Section 21167.6
As Madera, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 48, recognized: “The contents of the administrative record are governed by subdivision (e) of section 21167.6,31 which begins: ‘The record of proceedings shall include, but is not limited tо, all of the following items . . . .’ Subdivision (e) then
Section 21167.6, subdivision (e)(10) includes “[a]ny other written materials relevant to the respondent public agency‘s compliance with this division or to its decision on the merits of the project . . . .” (Italics added.) A broad “interpretation of ‘other written materials,’ . . . stands in harmony with the introductory language in section 21167.6, subdivision (e) that states the ‘record of proceedings shall include, but is not limited to . . . .’ (Italics added.) This language demonstrates that the Legislature intended courts to avoid narrowly applying the 11 categories set forth in section 21167.6, subdivision (e) when such an application would subvert the purposes underlying CEQA.” (Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 697, 718 (CID).) The audio recordings of the LUEDC hearing (and their later transcriptions) constitute “‘other written materials relevant to‘” the agency‘s “‘decision on the merits of the project‘” (id. at pp. 714, 716) and, therefore, were required to be included in the administrative record.32 (205 Cal.App.4th at p. 703 [“tape recordings of public agency hearings qualify as ‘other written materials’ for purposes of [this subdivision], and, therefore, copies of tape recordings should have been included in the record of proceedings that City lodged with the trial court“].)
Relying upon Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pages 571-572, appellants contend the LUEDC hearings evidence was not before the decision makers when they made their decision. However, Western States did not concern the issue of what documents were properly included in the administrative record. Rather, it addressed the issue whether evidence admittedly not contained in the administrative record was admissible in a traditional mandamus action under CEQA to determine that the agency had abused its discretion within the
Appellants contend that it is not sufficient documents were “available to” the decision makers before they made their decision. Western States certainly stands for the proposition that documents generated after the Board decision are generally inadmissible on the abuse of discretion issue. However, it nowhere holds that the documents must be identified in the motion affirming certification of the EIR in order to be “before the decision maker.” Appellants’ attempt to extract support for their position from CID, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pages 718-723, is unavailing. That part of the CID opinion addressed whether documents referenced in comment letters on the DEIR should be included in the administrative record under section 21167.6, subdivision (e)(7). In determining whether such documents were “‘submitted to‘” the public agency, the court used the general meaning of “presented or made available for use or study.” (CID, at pp. 723-724.) The court held documents that were “readily available for use by City personnel” and documents named in a comment letter along with a specific Web page at which the document could be easily located, together with a specific request that they be included in the record satisfied the statute; whereas documents referenced with a citation to a general Web site were “not made readily available to City and, therefore, are not part of the record of proceedings under section 21167.6, subdivision (e)(7).” (Id. at p. 724.) Not only does this portion of CID interpret a different part of the statute, but the question whether documents and other evidence referenced in comment letters by the public are “readily available” to the City is patently distinguishable from the question of the ready availability to the City of the City‘s own hearings. The court could certainly conclude that members of the Board did not need instruction on where to find the recordings of its committee meetings.
Furthermore, the LUEDC hearings undisputedly occurred before the Board‘s decision. The Board‘s motion that it had “heard testimony and received public comment regarding the adequacy of the FEIR” is reasonably determined to include public testimony before Board committees. Under the Board‘s Rules of Order, the full Board did not take separate public testimony on matters that were before a Board Committee. (Board, former Rule of Order 1.5(b), eff. Feb. 15, 2011 [“If a committee has provided the opportunity for public testimony and forwarded an ordinance, resolution, or motion to the full Board, the Board does not provide a second opportunity for public testimony at the full Board meeting“].) Testimony received by the Board as to
Appellants have failed to show that the trial court erred in determining the LUEDC hearings were properly part of the administrative record.
D. No Prejudice
Finally, we agree with respondents that even if the LUEDC committee‘s transcripts were not part of the administrative record, the trial court‘s order of inclusion would not constitute reversible error, absent a showing by appellants as to how they were prejudiced by the inclusion of the transcripts. Appellants have not tried to demonstrate actual prejudice, but rely upon a theory that any violation of CEQA‘s procedural mandates is “presumptively prejudicial,” citing Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 137 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 580, 939 P.2d 1280].33
Recently, our Supreme Court has explained: “An omission in an EIR‘s significant impacts analysis is deemed prejudicial if it deprived the public and decision makers of substantial relevant information about the project‘s likely adverse impacts. Although an agency‘s failure to disclose information called for by CEQA may be prejudicial ‘regardless of whether a different outcome would have resulted if the public agency had complied’ with the law (§ 21005, subd. (a)), under CEQA ‘there is no presumption that error is prejudicial’ (§ 21005, subd. (b)). Insubstantial or merely technical omissions are not grounds for relief. ([Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008)] 44 Cal.4th [459,] 485-486 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 28, 187 P.3d 888].) ‘A prejudicial abuse of discretion occurs if the failure to include relevant information precludes informed decisionmaking and informed public participation, thereby thwarting the statutory goals of the EIR process.’ [Citation.]” (Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Const. Authority, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 463, italics added.)
Insofar as prejudice resulting from the inclusion of too much information in the administrative record is concerned, the court in County of
DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of respondents is affirmed.
Richman, J., and Brick, J.,* concurred.
On September 4, 2014, and September 5, 2014, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 19, 2014, S221844.
* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
We do not agree with amici curiae‘s argument based upon Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031] (Yamaha), that less judicial deference should be afforded to the City‘s interpretation of its General Plan in this case, as the standard of review is “fundamentally situational.” (Id. at p. 12.) The situation here does not change based on the author of the relevant part of the general plan any more than
changing membership in the agency that adopts a general plan would result in a changing standard of review. Further, we observe that Yamaha was cited in San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 745], as authority for application of the traditional, highly deferential standard of review in a challenge to a project‘s compliance and consistency with the City‘s General Plan: “The inquiry for the issuance of a writ of administrative mandamus is whether the agency in question prejudicially abused its discretion; that is, whether the agency action was arbitrary, capricious, in excess of its jurisdiction, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or without reasonable or rational basis as a matter of law. (“The development agreement must be approved by ordinance and is, therefore, a ‘legislative act.’ (