STRATIENKO v. CHATTANOOGA-HAMILTON COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY
No. 09-5415
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Nov. 17, 2010.
402 Fed. Appx. 990
We leave to the Tennessee courts the choice of what, if any, adverse inferences to apply in the remainder of the case that has been remanded to the state courts.
3. Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Production Orders
Erlanger never filed a notice of appeal, so we lack jurisdiction to reduce its sanctions. See
The district court did not err by not sanctioning Erlanger when it failed to produce the lab procedure log. It was within the court‘s discretion to find that past conferrals mentioned in other motions fail the requirement of
4. Additional Discovery
Stratienko cannot “show that he could obtain information through [reopened] discovery that would disclose material facts.” Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 294 (6th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The requested deposition of lab manager Cummings would relate to predeprivation due process, which is immaterial. The district court also acted within its discretion when it concluded that searching hard drives and deposing the e-discovery company would expend time and money unnecessarily.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court‘s discovery rulings and its grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
Samuel YENAWINE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John MOTLEY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 08-5443.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Nov. 17, 2010.
PER CURIAM.
Upon learning that he was under indictment, Samuel Yenawine turned himself in to police in Indiana and was extradited to Louisville, Kentucky. During interrogation, Yenawine told police officers, “I might need to speak with my lawyer about whether I should talk with you.” Yenawine then named his attorney and produced his attorney‘s business card, which included printed text that stated, among other things, that he would not answer questions without his lawyer present. The police officers then mistakenly informed Yenawine that his attorney could not represent him due to a conflict, and Yenawine proceeded to give a recorded confession. This confession was used at trial over Yenawine‘s objection, and he was convicted of arson and various other crimes. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the arson conviction on other grounds, but upheld the remaining convictions, holding that Yenawine‘s confession was admissible because Yenawine did not make an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel. Yenawine v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-SC-0283-MR, 2005 WL 629007, at *3 (Ky. Aug.25, 2005) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)). On August 22, 2006, Yenawine filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Under the relevant subsection, the writ should be granted only if the state-court proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
We conduct de novo review of a district court‘s denial of habeas corpus. Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir.2004). In Abela, this court granted habeas relief to a petitioner who gave a statement that was used at trial and solicited under facts that are strikingly similar to those of this case: (1) the petitioner was under police interrogation when he stated, “[M]aybe I should talk to an attorney“; (2) the petitioner named his attorney and gave the police officer his attorney‘s business card; and (3) shortly thereafter, the police continued questioning the petitioner and he gave a statement. Id. at 919. The court held that the state-court decision admitting Abela‘s statement at trial was contrary to clearly established federal law. Id. at 927. Abela thus controls the outcome in this case. We therefore must hold that the