Samuel ANSTEY, Petitioner Below, Petitioner v. David BALLARD, Warden, Mt. Olive Correctional Complex, Respondent Below, Respondent
No. 15-0067
Supreme Court
Submitted: April 5, 2016. Filed: June 2, 2016.
787 S.E.2d 864
LOUGHRY, Justice:
Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Derek A. Knopp, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Gilbert C. Dickey, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondent.
LOUGHRY, Justice:
This case is before us upon the appeal of Samuel Anstey (“petitioner“) from the December 24, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of Fayette County denying his petition for relief in habeas corpus. The petitioner challenged his 1995 first degree murder conviction, without a recommendation of mercy, in the death of Marie Donollo (“victim“). In his habeas petition, the petitioner asserted he was entitled to a new trial because the advancement in fire science and arson investigation during the last twenty years constituted newly-discovered evidence which demonstrated the fundamental and unconstitutional unfairness of his trial. Following its consideration of the parties’1 briefs, the affidavits of the petitioner‘s new fire experts, and the underlying trial record, the circuit court denied the habeas petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.2 Based on our thorough review of the appendix record, which includes the current habeas proceeding and a transcript of the petitioner‘s murder trial, as well as the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we find no basis to reverse the circuit court‘s decision. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Facts
A. The Underlying Trial
On May 11, 1994, a Fayette County grand jury returned indictment No. 94-F-31 charging the petitioner with first degree murder in violation of
The evidence revealed that sometime in either 1991 or 1992, the petitioner, a thirty-six-year-old, out-of-work coal miner, moved into the house trailer occupied by the victim, his eighty-one-year-old grandmother and adoptive mother.3 The trailer was located in the Harvey Hill area of Fayette County. According to witnesses at trial, the relationship between the petitioner and the victim was problematic.
Witnesses for the State testified to hearing arguments between the petitioner and the victim, who was in declining health and who believed the petitioner was unwilling to help her. A neighbor, Charles Green, testified to hearing the petitioner and the victim argue. He also stated that the victim asked if she could live with him and his wife so that they could take care of her.4 On one occasion, Mr. Green observed that the victim had a black eye, which the victim attributed to the petitioner.5 At the victim‘s request, Mr. Green installed brackets on the victim‘s bedroom door, so that she could put a padlock on it.
Nancy Kirby, who had known the victim for a number of years, testified that during the year prior to the victim‘s death, the victim was always upset and crying; that she complained of having no transportation and being unable to get to the store; and, that during several visits to the victim in her trailer, Ms. Kirby observed there was no food in the refrigerator. She further testified that approximately one year before the victim‘s death, the victim asked her to feel a knot on her head, stating the petitioner had struck her in the head with the telephone. This witness also testified that nearly every time she spoke with the victim over a four-year period, the victim told her that the petitioner treated her badly and was mean to her, and that she was taking him out of her Will.6
Anna Mae Sowder, a longtime friend of the victim, testified that she spoke with the victim by telephone six or seven times a week. During those conversations, the victim would talk about her “troubles,” including having no way to get to the store and being alone and afraid. The victim also stated that unless the petitioner began treating her better, she would rather throw her money into the Thurmond River than allow him to have it, complaining that the petitioner “aggravate[d] [her] to death, wanting [her] money.” By way of example, Ms. Sowder stated that the victim told her that after the petitioner purchased a trailer, he “aggravate[d] her, wanting her to pay the trailer off[.]” After he purchased a truck, the victim told her that “he‘s expecting me to pay for the truck.”7
The State‘s witnesses also included various bank employees and officers who testified concerning the victim‘s financial activities shortly before her death. The evidence revealed that, prior to December 1993, the victim had exclusive control of her sizeable assets which largely consisted of certificates of deposit at two Oak Hill banks—Bank One and One Valley Bank.8
Other evidence at trial revealed that on December 9, 1993, the victim and the petitioner went to Bank One where they were assisted by longtime bank employee, Diana Janney. According to Ms. Janney, the petitioner told her that the bank needed to add him to the victim‘s certificate of deposit accounts. When Ms. Janney asked the victim if that was what she wanted to do, the victim “just kind of fell back in the chair a little bit and, you know, threw her hands up and said, ‘Well, he‘s going to get it, anyway, so we might as well add him on.‘” Ms. Janney explained to the victim that if the petitioner‘s name were added to her certificates of deposit, he would have equal rights to those funds. Ms. Janney testified: “I was kind of reluctant, so when [the petitioner] saw my reluctance, he said, well, if I didn‘t add the name on there, he was going to use the power of attorney to add his name on them.”9 Being
Ms. Booth, another longtime bank employee, testified she was well acquainted with the victim who had been coming to the bank for twenty years. She assisted Ms. Janney in making certain the victim understood that anyone added to her accounts would have equal access to their funds. She also cautioned the victim that it would be far more difficult to remove someone from her accounts than it was to add them. Although Ms. Booth was also uncomfortable with the situation, being aware that the victim had never before wanted anyone else on her accounts, the bank employees proceeded to add the petitioner to the victim‘s certificate of deposit accounts totaling in excess of $400,000.10 At this same time, the petitioner was also added to the victim‘s Bank One safety deposit box in which she kept an unknown amount of cash and certificates of deposit.
According to Ms. Janney, approximately one week later, the victim returned to the bank, alone, seeking to remove the petitioner from her certificate of deposit accounts. The victim was advised that the only way to remove the petitioner from her accounts was to close them, which would result in a financial penalty. Because the victim did not want to incur a penalty, no further action was taken at that time.
On February 2, 1994, the victim again visited Bank One by herself. Upon examining her safety deposit box, she became very upset because she believed some money and/or certificates of deposit were missing. Ms. Janney explained that the certificates of deposit were used to fund a trust that was established in December,11 but the victim did not appear to understand. The victim immediately closed out her old safety deposit box, opened a new one for her exclusive use, and told Ms. Janney that she wanted to change her Will because she did not want the petitioner to have anything.
After leaving Bank One on February 2nd, the victim visited Mr. Tissue, who prepared a revocation of the POA as part of the victim‘s apparent effort to regain control of her assets.12 Describing the victim as distraught based on her belief that the petitioner had taken money from her safety deposit box, Mr. Tissue testified that the victim expressed a desire to change her Will. An appointment was made for her to return to his office the following day at which time she reiterated her desire to change her Will. Not knowing whom to designate as her beneficiary, they discussed the possibility of leaving her estate to charities.13
On February 7, 1994, the victim, this time accompanied by the petitioner, appeared at Mr. Tissue‘s office. Because he was unable to see them at that time, an appointment was made for them to return on February 10, 1994. This appointment was never kept because around 4:00 a.m. the next day, February 8, 1994, a fire occurred in the trailer shared by the petitioner and the victim.
During the ensuing investigation by law enforcement and the office of the State Fire Marshal, the petitioner maintained he awoke around 3:00 a.m. to noises and the sound of the victim yelling.14 According to the petitioner, upon opening his bedroom door, he felt
The Oak Hill Volunteer Fire Department (“the VFD” or “the Department“) arrived on the scene twelve minutes after receiving the fire alarm and the petitioner indicated that his grandmother was still in the trailer.16 Firefighters discovered the unconscious victim in her bed and removed her through her bedroom window. CPR was administered, and she was transported to Plateau Medical Center in Oak Hill. The victim died on February 12, 1994. According to the State medical examiner, the cause of death was “smoke and soot inhalation resulting in a brain dead condition.”
Chief Delbert Cordle of the Oak Hill VFD testified that while he did not determine the cause of the fire, he thought, based on his observations, the fire had started in the kitchen. After the fire was extinguished and the trailer secured, Chief Cordle turned the scene over to the Department‘s fire investigation unit, which was led by Lieutenant Robert Begley, and contacted the State Fire Marshal.17
Lieutenant Begley testified that both he and Assistant State Fire Marshal Roger York went to the fire scene during the morning of February 8th.18 Chief Cordle and the petitioner were already at the fire scene. Lieutenant Begley spoke to the petitioner who told him they had been having a problem with an outlet in the kitchen; that he had been trying to get his mother to move; and that while she had enough money to move, she refused to do so. The petitioner also commented on how quickly the fire department had arrived.
During his investigation, Lieutenant Begley noted that the fire damage was in the
Lieutenant Begley also observed “there was a lot of fire damage directly underneath the toaster” located on the kitchen counter top, noting that two sheets of aluminum foil had been placed on top of the toaster; the bottom crumb tray had been removed; and the toaster‘s plunger, or lever, was in the down position. Lieutenant Begley testified to seeing the charred material on the floor vent near the foot of the victim‘s bed, and he concluded there was no connection between that material and the fire in the kitchen area.
As part of his investigation, Lieutenant Begley photographed various areas of the fire scene, including the toaster and the electrical breaker box located in the petitioner‘s bedroom. Upon finding three circuit breakers that appeared to be tripped, he flipped them off, back on, and then off again. These actions were criticized by the petitioner‘s fire experts at trial.
The State called three fire experts at trial: Assistant State Fire Marshal Roger York; Steven Cruikshank, Director of Emergency Services and Fire Coordinator for Fayette County;20 and Harold Franck, an expert in electrical and forensic engineering and fire determination. Each expert offered testimony concerning fire cause and origin based on their respective examinations of the trailer and its contents. All three of these witnesses testified concerning the materials surrounding the petitioner‘s bedroom door, which effectively prevented smoke from entering the room; their conclusions that the area of fire origin was in the kitchen and the cause of the fire was the toaster; and their respective determinations that there had been a second, independent incendiary fire in the victim‘s bedroom that had self-extinguished.
Assistant State Fire Marshal York21 described the manner in which he investigated the fire. Based on smoke patterns and other evidence, he concluded that the victim‘s bedroom door and window were open at the time of the fire, which allowed for smoke to travel into her room, across her bed where she was sleeping, and vent out her bedroom window. After noting the petitioner would have knowledge of air movement from his work as a coal miner, Mr. York testified that he found an anamometer in the petitioner‘s bedroom, which is a device used to measure airflow in an underground mine.22 When asked whether the smoke detector worked, the petitioner told Mr. York that the detector did not emit sound during the fire.
Regarding the fire‘s origin, Mr. York testified he systematically eliminated all potential accidental causes and determined that the fire was incendiary in nature due to tampering with the toaster, which was made to appear accidental. He testified that the small fire in the victim‘s bedroom was not caused by the other fire, nor by the trunk-line of the furnace.23 On cross-examination, Mr. York
Mr. Cruikshank, who had investigated approximately 200 trailer fires, testified that he began his investigation by examining the exterior of the trailer before entering and progressing from the least to heaviest areas of burn. He found major fire involvement in the kitchen with the toaster being the only potential heat source, noting heavy damage to the toaster‘s electrical cord. Mr. Cruikshank could find no accidental cause for either fire and concluded that the burning of the trailer was intentional: “[W]hen you have two separate fires and you can‘t connect the two, it‘s considered an incendiary fire.”25
Mr. Franck, who had investigated between 400 and 500 fires,26 eliminated all potential accidental causes for the fires, including those identified by the petitioner, i.e., a lightbulb above the kitchen stove and the furnace/thermostat. He determined that the primary fire began in the kitchen near the toaster based on the degree of fire damage to this area and the “V” smoke pattern above the toaster. Mr. Franck analyzed the toaster in his lab, which revealed how it had been used to set the fire. He found that the two pieces of wire that fell out of the toaster during his examination were suspicious because they had arced on two ends, which was supportive of his conclusion that the toaster cord had been stuffed inside the bottom of the toaster.27 Mr. Franck also observed that the spring to the toaster‘s control lever had been manipulated, which defeated the purpose of the lever and allowed the toaster to remain on. This, in turn, caused the insulation on the cord stuffed inside the toaster to burn and catch fire.28 Mr. Franck found that his conclusions were further supported by a “saddle mark” on a piece of the toaster wire, which he determined was caused by the wire resting on a heating element inside the toaster.
The petitioner‘s trial counsel cross-examined Mr. Franck regarding National Fire Protection Association 921 (“NFPA 921“). Mr. Franck testified that he possessed all of the NFPA standards, including NFPA 921, which he described as guidelines for fire investigation. With regard to the tripped breakers that Lieutenant Begley manipulated, Mr. Franck agreed with defense counsel that NFPA 921 states that you should not move items that are suspect in a fire. Mr. Franck added that things are often moved around during the fire suppression effort, which is why fire investigators necessarily gather information from those involved in extinguishing the fire when making a cause and origin determination.
Turning to the petitioner‘s evidence, his trial strategy was to attack the quality of the State‘s fire investigation and the validity of the State‘s theory about the cause of the fire. He also attempted to rebut the State‘s motive
In addition, the petitioner presented several cause and origin witnesses,29 who testified that there was no evidence of a fire in the victim‘s bedroom; that there was a single, accidental fire that originated in the living room; that the single fire was caused by a short circuit in a living room lamp; and that the fire did not start in the area where the toaster was located. During their trial testimony, each of these witnesses was handed the charred debris that had been found in the victim‘s bedroom and asked to examine it, and each person testified that it looked like the burned ceiling tile remains that had been observed in the burn area of the trailer.
Tim May, a professional fire investigator who had taught fire investigation at the National Fire Academy in Maryland, and who travels the world teaching fire investigation, testified as an expert for the defense. He visited the fire scene on April 13, 1995. Following his investigation, he concluded this was “an accidental fire, no question whatsoever.” After explaining the “prescribed” way to conduct a cause and origin examination, he stated that his examination of the trailer revealed that the fire, “without doubt,” started in the living room and not in the toaster.30 According to Mr. May, the beading on the living room lamp‘s electrical cord evidenced that the wire had shorted and arced, which caused the fire. Regarding the charred debris found in the victim‘s bedroom, Mr. May testified it was absolutely burned-out ceiling tile that had made its way into the victim‘s bedroom in the normal process of a fire scene, explaining that “if you walk through burning material, you carry it with you, and that‘s exactly what happened.” In conclusion, Mr. May was critical of the State‘s fire investigators, maintaining their case made no sense and that their reports and testimony conflicted “with everything from a breaker box, to the area of origin, to the position of a toaster[.]”
The petitioner also presented the testimony of Charles Kovarik, who was qualified as an expert in electrical engineering. Like Mr. Franck, Mr. Kovarik examined the toaster. Unlike Mr. Franck, he determined that the toaster was not the source of the fire; that he was certain it was not on at the time of the fire; and that the interior of the toaster was “quite clean,” whereas its exterior looked like it was the “victim” of a fire. He also found “no physical evidence that confirmed that it was rigged,”31 and he attributed the beading on the toaster‘s electrical cord as being caused by the fire, rather than having caused the fire. He also disagreed with Mr. Franck‘s conclusions regarding “saddle marks” on the toaster cord.32
Like Mr. May, Mr. Kovarik agreed that the conductors shorted in the living room lamp‘s wiring, which created an arc that produced enough energy to create a fire.33 He further testified that once the short circuit
With regard to the victim‘s financial activities, the defense maintained during closing argument that the evidence showed that the eighty-one-year-old victim in declining health wanted to transfer control of her money to her designated heir, the petitioner, through the creation of joint accounts and the POA. As further support for the victim‘s intentions, the defense stressed that she had further allowed a trust to be created for the petitioner‘s benefit. The defense also maintained that the victim was simply confused when she thought the petitioner had stolen some of her money from the safety deposit box because those funds had merely been forwarded to the trust account.35
In rebuttal, the State recalled Mr. Franck, who testified that the living room lamp did not cause the fire. He described in some detail how the shape of the beading on the lamp‘s cord showed that it was caused by the fire, rather than causing the fire, which he contrasted with the shape of the beading on the toaster cord, which showed that it had caused the fire. He further described the evidence showing that the lamp had not short circuited internally, but was externally attacked by the fire.
On September 8, 1995, after an eleven-day trial, the jury found the petitioner guilty of first degree murder without a recommendation of mercy. The circuit court entered an order on the verdict and sentenced the petitioner to the penitentiary for life without the possibility of parole. In December 1996, this Court refused the petitioner‘s direct appeal. See State v. Samuel R. Anstey, Docket No. 960855.36
B. The Current Habeas Proceeding
On May 12, 2014, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Fayette County challenging his murder conviction.37 He demanded a new trial or, in the alternative, an omnibus habeas corpus hearing.38
The petitioner asserted in the habeas petition that the advancement of fire science and arson investigation since his 1995 conviction constitutes newly discovered evidence and
According to the petitioner, prior to 2000, the scientific method which forms the basis of NFPA 921 was not widely accepted and was disregarded by the State‘s witnesses in investigating the trailer fire. He further notes that the only mention of NFPA 921 at trial was during his counsel‘s cross-examination of the State‘s expert, Harold Franck, concerning the tripped breakers. The petitioner maintained that, even as first written, the application of NFPA 921 to the investigation would have put the case in a different light and would have exposed the conclusions of the State‘s witnesses as being objectively unreliable.39
In response, the State argued that because NFPA 921 was published in 1992, well in advance of the petitioner‘s 1995 trial, it does not qualify as newly-discovered evidence. Arguing that NFPA 921 has never been compulsory, the State contends the provisions of NFPA 921 demonstrate that deviations from the procedures set forth therein do not automatically invalidate an expert‘s opinion. The State maintained that the use of NFPA 921 in a new trial would only constitute impeachment evidence and, therefore, could not serve as a basis for habeas relief. The petitioner replied that, while NFPA 921 is not compulsory, it goes beyond impeachment evidence and is of significance in the challenge to his conviction. The petitioner reasons that, at a minimum, he is entitled to an omnibus hearing to explore more thoroughly the change in science as it relates to the reliability of the evidence used to convict him.
On December 24, 2014, the circuit judge, who presided over the petitioner‘s criminal trial, denied habeas relief. The circuit court found that an omnibus hearing was unnecessary because the petition and its attached affidavits thoroughly described the claimed advancements in scientific fire investigation, which was at the heart of the petitioner‘s argument, and that no testimony or other evidence was necessary for the court to rule.
In denying habeas relief, the circuit court agreed with the State that NFPA 921 is not newly-discovered evidence since it was in existence prior to the petitioner‘s trial. Moreover, noting that NFPA 921 has never been compulsory, the circuit court agreed with the State that its use in a new trial would be cumulative and constitute nothing more than impeachment evidence. Finally, the circuit court found that the criticisms set forth in the affidavits of the petitioner‘s new fire experts were not dissimilar to those offered by the petitioner‘s trial experts who testified that the State‘s investigative techniques and methods were flawed and their conclusions erroneous.
The petitioner appeals to this Court from the circuit court‘s December 24, 2014, order. See
II. Standard of Review
Although several issues were raised below, in this appeal, the petitioner only assigns as error the circuit court‘s application of the rule governing newly discovered evidence, specifically as it relates to fire investigation science, and its denial of an evidentiary hearing. Our review of the circuit court‘s final order denying habeas corpus relief is threefold:
In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in a
habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.
Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006); see also Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Thompson v. Ballard, 229 W. Va. 263, 728 S.E.2d 147 (2012) (“‘Findings of fact made by a trial court in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding will not be set aside or reversed on appeal by this Court unless such findings are clearly wrong.’ State ex rel. Postelwaite v. Bechtold, 158 W. Va. 479, 212 S.E.2d 69 (1975).“). Further, “[o]n an appeal to this Court the appellant bears the burden of showing that there was error in the proceedings below resulting in the judgment of which he complains, all presumptions being in favor of the correctness of the proceedings and judgment in and of the trial court.” Syl. Pt. 2, Perdue v. Coiner, 156 W. Va. 467, 194 S.E.2d 657 (1973). With these standards in mind, we proceed to determine whether the circuit court erred in denying habeas corpus relief to the petitioner.
III. Discussion
The petitioner sets forth two assignments of error. First, he contends that his right to due process of law was violated because the habeas court failed to recognize, as newly-discovered evidence, the scientific advancement in fire investigation since his 1995 conviction. According to the petitioner, this newly-discovered evidence is represented by NFPA 921, which reflects the standard of care in fire investigation and demonstrates that his trial and conviction were fundamentally unfair. Second, the petitioner contends that the newly-discovered evidence is of a scientific and complicated nature such that the habeas court should have permitted him to develop the record through an omnibus habeas corpus hearing.
A. Newly-discovered Evidence
1. The Frazier factors
In determining whether newly-discovered evidence warrants a new trial, this Court considers the following factors:
“A new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence unless the case comes within the following rules: (1) The evidence must appear to have been discovered since the trial, and, from the affidavit of the new witness, what such evidence will be, or its absence satisfactorily explained. (2) It must appear from facts stated in his affidavit that plaintiff was diligent in ascertaining and securing his evidence, and that the new evidence is such that due diligence would not have secured it before the verdict. (3) Such evidence must be new and material, and not merely cumulative; and cumulative evidence is additional evidence of the same kind to the same point. (4) The evidence must be such as ought to produce an opposite result at a second trial on the merits. (5) And the new trial will generally be refused when the sole object of the new evidence is to discredit or impeach a witness on the opposite side.” Syllabus Point 1, Halstead v. Horton, 38 W. Va. 727, 18 S.E. 953 (1894).
Syllabus, State v. Frazier, 162 W. Va. 935, 253 S.E.2d 534 (1979); accord Syl. Pt. 1, State v. O‘Donnell, 189 W. Va. 628, 433 S.E.2d 566 (1993); see generally
We begin our analysis by observing that the petitioner has not cited any controlling appellate authority in this state to the effect that an expert opinion based on a methodology other than NFPA 921 is inadmissible as inherently unreliable. Nor does the petitioner assert that NFPA 921 has been generally accepted as authoritative or compulsory in West Virginia, either at the time of the petitioner‘s trial in 1995, or today. Although the National Fire Protection Association, or NFPA, generally, has been cited in statutory40 and regulatory laws in this
pressly
When analyzed under the Frazier factors, it becomes abundantly clear that periodic amendments to NFPA 921 do not constitute newly-discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial in the case at bar. See also Green v. Koerner, 312 Fed. Appx. 105, 110 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of habeas petition where petitioner cited developments in fire science since her conviction in 1995, and finding that state developed case based on best forensic techniques available at that time, “even if later scientific developments put those techniques into question“). In addition, we agree with the circuit court‘s conclusion that the affidavits of the petitioner‘s new fire experts—Gerald Hurst, a consulting chemist and expert on fire analysis, and Mark Goodson, an electrical engineer and expert in fire investigation and causation—reflect they would merely offer cumulative evidence directed towards impeaching the State‘s fire experts, making the third and fifth Frazier factors unavailing.46
Mr. Hurst states in his affidavit that NFPA 921 is updated every three or four years and describes the fire investigation procedures that are to be followed in any fire investigation. He concludes the only scientifically supportable conclusion is that the cause and origin of the trailer fire remains “undetermined.” Mr. Hurst also avers “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that the State‘s fire investigation, under current NFPA 921 standards, “did not conform to recommended fire investigative protocol, was not conducted in a methodical and reliable fashion, and did not utilize the scientific method to determine origin and causation.” Specifically, he determined that the State‘s hypothesis—that a fire originated with the toaster in the kitchen and in the victim‘s bedroom—was not scientifically valid and was the product of “expectation bias,” rather than validation through the scientific method.47
Significantly, Mr. Hurst‘s criticisms, at their essence, echo those addressed by defense counsel during his cross-examination of the State‘s fire experts, as well as those voiced by the petitioner‘s experts at trial. For example, although Mr. Hurst contends the State‘s expert (Harold Franck) formed a hypothesis and then set out to prove its validity, Mr. Franck‘s trial testimony reflects that he took possession of the toaster for a closer examination in his lab because it was the sole potential cause of the fire in what he had determined to be the area of fire origin. Mr. Franck also examined the electrical outlet into which the toaster had been plugged to determine whether it was involved in causing the fire. The fact that the results of his analyses pointed to an incendiary fire does not indicate that he set out to prove arson.
Mr. Hurst also criticizes the State‘s investigators’ conclusion that there was a second incendiary fire, as well as their failure to seize the purportedly discolored linoleum surrounding the vent in the victim‘s bedroom,48 and the failure to consider the possibility that the charred debris recovered from the purported second fire could have been carried into the room during fire suppression and investigation. He further criticizes their reliance on “V” burn patterns in the trailer;49 their photographing the circuit breaker
The petitioner‘s other new expert is equally critical of the State‘s investigation. In his affidavit, Mark Goodson describes how NFPA 921 incorporates the scientific method into the field of fire investigation and has become the standard for assessing the reliability of expert testimony.51 Following his review of those portions of the trial transcript and exhibits specifically related to the fire, Mr. Goodson concludes that the State‘s cause and origin witnesses did not follow the scientific method in connection with their investigation of the trailer fire, and they used methods that are not currently accepted within the fire investigation community to-
day. He found Mr. Franck‘s analyses and opinions to be so flawed as to compel improper conclusions, particularly with regard to Mr. Franck‘s analysis of the toaster and its cord. These criticisms are not unlike those expressed by the petitioner‘s trial expert, Charles Kovarik, as discussed above. Further, although Mr. Goodson states that Mr. Franck should have microscopically documented the contact between the toaster cord and the heating element, the record shows that during Mr. Franck‘s trial testimony, he specifically references his “microscopic examination of these wires[.]” Mr. Goodson also cites Mr. Franck‘s failure to consider that Lieutenant Begley found the circuit breaker connected to the smoke detector was tripped and moved it to the “off” position. Again, this criticism was developed during the cross-examination of Mr. Franck and the other witnesses for the State, and in the direct testimony of the petitioner‘s fire experts.52
Based on all of the foregoing, it is clear that the attack advanced by the petitioner‘s current experts, while framed as deviations from NFPA 921 and “scientific” methodology, is, at its essence, simply rebuttal and impeachment evidence.53 Furthermore, the evidence the petitioner seeks to rely upon is cumulative of the petitioner‘s trial experts who thoroughly criticized the State‘s investi-
gation
[o]f great importance and significance is the fact that indeed two (2) expert witnesses did testify at trial on behalf of the Petitioner. Both of said expert witnesses were unequivocally and clearly critical and contradictory of the State‘s expert witnesses, and both of the defense trial experts testified that the fire in the trailer was accidental in origin and that it was not started intentionally. The Petitioner‘s new expert witnesses may have had the benefit of approximately twenty (20) years of advancement in fire science, but the bedrock of their proposed testimony would certainly be the same as was the testimony of the Petitioner‘s two (2) experts who testified at trial, i.e. that the State‘s experts’ investigative techniques and methods were flawed, and their conclusions wrong.
The opinions of Mr. Franck and Mr. York were the result of a reliable process. Both collected data; took photographs; noted the extent of damage in the various areas of the trailer; and eliminated potential accidental causes for the fire by examining appliances and electrical circuitry and outlets. Mr. Franck took the toaster and other materials to his lab where they were subjected to further examination. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court‘s conclusion that NFPA 921, the advancement of scientific method in the field of fire investigations, and the criticism expressed by the petitioner‘s new experts goes to the weight to be attributed to the testimony of Mr. Franck and Mr. York—not to its admissibility at trial. See Schlesinger v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 489, 504-05 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (observing that “no court in this circuit ... has refused to admit expert testimony in an arson case because his or her opinion was based on a methodology other than that prescribed in NFPA 921“; finding that fire investigator‘s conclusion that fire was incendiary was based on his years of experience and his physical inspection of fire premises; and concluding that “[t]he decision not to follow the methodology set forth in NFPA 921, as well as other purported flaws in the [investigator‘s] [ ] methodology ... goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.“). Indeed, once all of the expert testimony was received into evidence, “it was left to the jury to evaluate that testimony and give it the weight to which it was entitled.” State v. Shingleton, 237 W. Va. 669, 682, 790 S.E.2d 505, 518 (2016); see also People v. Jackson, No. 272776, 2008 WL 2037805, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 13, 2008) (addressing defendant‘s challenge to opinions of state‘s fire expert based on NFPA 921 and concluding that deviations from those procedures are not necessarily wrong or inferior and did not render expert‘s opinion inadmissible since “[s]uch criticisms go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the testimony.“).
The fourth Frazier factor is perhaps most problematic for the petitioner—that his purported newly-discovered evidence ought to produce an opposite result at a second trial on the merits. Although we have found no legal authority demonstrating that NFPA 921 is either a compulsory or mandated standard for fire investigations in this state, the fact remains that the criticisms being offered by the petitioner‘s new experts are not new and their conclusions are less favorable than those offered by the petitioner‘s trial experts, who were confident in their respective opinions that there was a single, accidental fire. In other words, if the jury reached its unanimous verdict54 based on the substantial circumstantial evidence presented against the petitioner, coupled with the State‘s expert testimony that was subjected to thorough cross-examination, we cannot find that similar criticisms offered by the petitioner‘s new fire experts are likely to produce an opposite result at a second trial.55 As the circuit court aptly summarized:
Having considered this evidence, as well as the evidence given by neighbors and longtime friends who testified the victim told them the petitioner was verbally and physically abusive towards her and that all he wanted was her money,56 we concur in the circuit court‘s inescapable conclusion that the expert testimony which the Petitioner now seeks to use as “newly discovered evidence” is clearly not “such as ought to produce an opposite result at a second trial on the merits” as required by Frazier. The Court concludes, having heard all the evidence at trial, that had the Petitioner‘s “new” experts testified at trial, the jury‘s verdict would have been the same. Accordingly, we uphold the circuit court‘s denial of habeas relief on the basis that the petitioner cannot meet the Frazier factors for newly discovered evidence.
2. Due Process Violation and Inadmissibility of Expert Testimony
In further support of his newly discovered evidence argument, the petitioner also asserts that his due process rights were violated because the investigative techniques used during the investigation of the subject fire would not be admissible at trial today, under a Daubert/Wilt analysis, since fire investigations have become “scientific.” See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W. Va. 39, 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). In Wilt and Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W. Va. 512, 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995), we adopted a Daubert analysis which imposes a “gatekeeper” duty upon trial courts to screen scientific expert opinions to ensure relevancy and reliability.
We first note that the petitioner‘s argument on appeal is somewhat different from the argument he raised before the circuit court, which was ineffective assistance of trial counsel for their failure to raise a Daubert challenge to the State‘s experts’ testimony at
Even today, the admissibility of the State‘s expert testimony would be assessed under
Given the absence of any authority demonstrating that NFPA 921 is a compulsory or mandatory standard for fire investigators in West Virginia, either today, or in 1995, we find that the petitioner was not denied his right to a fair trial and due process of law through the admission of the testimony of the State‘s experts. See Jackson v. McQuiggin, No. 10-12426, 2012 WL 5410993, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2012), aff‘d, Jackson v. McQuiggin, 553 Fed. Appx. 575 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding habeas petitioner‘s state court trial was not fundamentally unfair nor were his due process rights violated by trial court‘s decision to admit testimony of state‘s fire expert, citing with approval state appellate court‘s conclusion that “NFPA 921 expressly provides that it contains only nonmandatory provisions; it merely sets guidelines and recommendations for fire investigations, not requirements.“). For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court‘s habeas ruling.
B. Denial of Evidentiary Habeas Hearing
The petitioner argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing because it has prevented him from demonstrating the substantial impact of the new fire investigation science on the expert testimony presented at his trial. The State asserts that the circuit court did take evidence on the petitioner‘s newly discovered evidence through the affidavits of his new experts, and contends that the petitioner has failed to explain what additional evidence the circuit court needed to address his claim.
If the petition, affidavits, exhibits, records and other documentary evidence attached thereto, or the return or other pleadings, or the record in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction and sentence ... show to the satisfaction of the court that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, or that the contention or contentions and grounds (in fact or law) advanced have been previously and finally adjudicated or waived, the court shall enter an order denying the relief sought.
Further, we have previously held that
“[a] court having jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings may deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing and without appointing counsel for the petitioner if the petition, exhibits, affidavits or other documentary evidence filed therewith show to such court‘s satisfaction that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Syllabus Point 1, Perdue v. Coiner, 156 W. Va. 467, 194 S.E.2d 657 (1973).
Syl. Pt. 2, White v. Haines, 215 W. Va. 698, 601 S.E.2d 18 (2004).
The circuit court judge was in the unique position of having also presided over the petitioner‘s eleven-day murder trial. Consequently, he was intimately familiar with the trial evidence59 when assessing the affidavits of the petitioner‘s new experts, which he found had “thoroughly set forth the nature of the claimed advancements in scientific fire investigation which constitutes the crux of the Petitioner‘s argument,” and which led to the court‘s conclusion that “no testimony or other evidence [was] [] necessary for the Court to rule upon the application of the relevant law[.]” The circuit court‘s decision in this regard is adequately supported by its thirty-six-page order that recounts the evidence from the petitioner‘s criminal trial, as well as its “careful review” of the parties’ briefs and the new expert affidavits, which led it to conclude that “the relevant facts of the case ... have been sufficiently and adequately developed” for the court to rule as a matter of law. The circuit court‘s factual findings and legal conclusions are certainly sufficient to meet Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings in West Virginia, which provides that “[i]f the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is not required, the court shall include in its final order specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why an evidentiary hearing was not required.”
Based on our review of the trial and habeas proceedings, and for the reasons set forth above, we agree that the nature of the claimed advancements in scientific fire investigation were sufficiently addressed in the parties’ briefs and expert affidavits filed below, and we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court‘s decision to rule without first holding an evidentiary hearing.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error in the circuit court‘s December 24, 2014, order denying the petitioner‘s request for habeas corpus relief.
Affirmed.
Chief Justice Ketchum, dissenting:
Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated: “Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many things that were not so.”1
That statement encapsulates the error of the majority in affirming the denial of habeas relief. The error is twofold. First, the majority fails to realize that the State‘s investigating witnesses, based on group-think and the quantity of the evidence rather than its quality, concluded, unscientifically, that the fire was intentionally set. Second, the majority has accepted the determination of the habeas court that Anstey‘s assertion of newly-discovered evidence, i.e., the advancement in fire science represented by NFPA 921, as
Given the complexity of the evidence, Anstey cannot reasonably present grounds for a new trial unless an omnibus habeas corpus hearing is conducted. Therefore, the issue is not whether this Court should award him a new trial. Instead, the issue is whether Anstey has made a case for an evidentiary hearing and whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying him one. I am of the opinion that Anstey meets the standards which would entitle him to an omnibus habeas corpus hearing. I, therefore, dissent.
I. Standards For Conducting An Omnibus Habeas Corpus Hearing
The habeas court compared an eleven-day trial with the affidavits of two experts submitted by Anstey and summarily concluded, without findings of fact and conclusions of law, that “no testimony or other evidence is necessary.” However, Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings in West Virginia requires as follows:
If the petition is not dismissed at a previous stage in the proceedings, the circuit court, after the answer is filed, shall, upon a review of the record, if any, determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. If the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is not required, the court shall include in its final order specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why an evidentiary hearing was not required.2
The habeas court had before it Anstey‘s petition, the affidavits of his experts, the State‘s answer to the petition, and Anstey‘s response to the State‘s answer. The positions of the parties were, thus, joined and in sharp conflict over the evidentiary value of NFPA 921 as newly-discovered evidence. Nevertheless, the habeas court unfairly determined in a single paragraph without the requisite findings that an omnibus hearing would not be conducted. The habeas court then extrapolated findings and conclusions on the merits of Anstey‘s petition. As a result, this Court is left, on appeal, “greatly at sea without a chart or compass”3 in the absence of an evidentiary transcript from which the ultimate findings of the habeas court may be reviewed. It was an abuse of discretion and a denial of Anstey‘s right to due process not to conduct an omnibus habeas corpus hearing in this case.
II. The Mandate of the West Virginia Legislature
During the 1995 trial, State‘s expert Harold Franck referred to the NFPA standards as follows: “So it is a set of guidelines that have been developed over the past few years, and, hopefully, the NFPA wants to have those as national standards at some point.” (emphasis added). Franck‘s surmise came true. NFPA 921 became the national authority for standards in fire science and investigation years later in 2000 upon its endorsement by the United States Department of Justice.4
Significantly,
Syllabus point 5 of Smith v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm‘n, 216 W. Va. 2, 602 S.E.2d 445 (2004), holds: “A regulation that is proposed by an agency and approved by the Legislature is a ‘legislative rule’ as defined by the State Administrative Procedures Act,
Accordingly, insofar as NFPA standards have been recognized by the West Virginia Legislature, the State Fire Commission and the State Fire Marshall, NFPA standards enjoy a higher status than merely an expert opinion on what the proper standard ought to be.5 The NFPA standards necessarily include NFPA 921. In view of the extent to which NFPA standards permeate West Virginia law, it cannot be said that NFPA 921 is excluded. For example, given the requirement of
The incorporation of NFPA standards into West Virginia law, including NFPA 921, was never addressed by the habeas court. This State‘s incorporation of those standards constitutes an additional reason why an omnibus habeas corpus hearing should have been conducted.6
III. Certitude Is Not Certainty
Without doubt, the fire investigation conducted by the volunteer firefighters at the trailer is questionable. The appendix record
Q. Okay. Did you put them back basically where they had been, or did you put them in a different position?
A. I would say I put them back to the off position. I flipped them off to—as sort of a reminder when I was doing a report or something what three breakers were tripped, in my opinion.
The evidence at trial concerning the electrical circuitry in the trailer was directly relevant to whether a living room lamp short-circuited resulting in the fire and tripping a breaker switch which, in turn, shut off the power to the electric smoke alarm.
In addition, unlike in the living room and kitchen areas of the trailer, the ceiling in the bedroom where the victim was found was still in place. Though never conclusively determined, Anstey‘s evidence indicated that ceiling tile was found among the debris on the vent in the victim‘s bedroom. That evidence supported Anstey‘s assertion that the debris was tracked into the bedroom by volunteer firefighters and that, therefore, there was no second fire in the trailer. Responding to the State‘s ‘two-fire’ theory, Anstey maintains that the State‘s determination that a separate fire occurred in the victim‘s bedroom was conclusory and “in direct contravention
with NFPA 921‘s requirement that all data pertaining to the determination of a fire‘s origin be analyzed.”
Finally, it is worth noting that Anstey called two witnesses during the underlying trial who testified that the victim herself had threatened to set the trailer on fire. One of those witnesses, an acquaintance of the victim, stated: “She said on several occasions she would set fire to herself and burn everything up.”
A case strikingly similar to the current matter was before the Court of Appeals of Indiana in Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In Bunch, the defendant was convicted of the murder of her son involving a fire in their mobile home. The son was found in a bedroom and died at the scene from smoke inhalation. During the defendant‘s 1996 trial, the State relied largely on expert testimony which described the presence of an accelerant and two separate fires—one in the bedroom where the son was found and another in a doorway. In Bunch, the State used its two-fire theory to assert that the fires were intentionally set. The defendant‘s expert witness testified that the mobile home fire should have been classified as undetermined. The murder conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
In 2006, the defendant, in Bunch, filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming newly-discovered evidence in the form of advances in the field of fire science. Unlike the present case, the habeas court in Bunch conducted an evidentiary hearing during which the defendant presented the testimony of experts who discussed the scientific advances in relation to the mobile home fire. The habeas court, however, denied relief on the basis that the conclusions of the defendant‘s experts, that the fire was undetermined, was the same as that of the defendant‘s expert in the underlying trial. The habeas court, in Bunch, further concluded that the testimony of the defendant‘s experts merely tended to impeach the State‘s witnesses and did not constitute newly-discovered evidence.
McAllister also testified the consideration of a fire victim‘s physiological condition did not become a recognized component of the fire origin analysis until after 2001, the first time a chapter on the fire-related deaths appeared in the National Fire Protection Association 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations (“NFPA 921“), which is “a peer reviewed and generally accepted standard in the fire investigation community.” Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 150 F. Supp. 2d 360, 366 (D. Conn. 2001). *** The post-conviction court‘s finding that [the defendant‘s] post-conviction evidence is just “different packaging” for the same conclusion does not give appropriate due to the science which has emerged since [the defendant‘s] trial to support that conclusion. 964 N.E.2d at 287, 289.8
In Bunch, a post-conviction, evidentiary hearing was conducted. During the hearing, the defendant was able to develop the record with new expert testimony of a complex nature concerning the fire in the mobile home. Consequently, an expanded record and comprehensive order from the post-conviction court were before the Court of Appeals of Indiana for review. By contrast, no evidentiary hearing, was conducted by the habeas court with regard to Anstey‘s petition which, as in Bunch, alleged newly-discovered evidence pursuant to an amended NFPA 921. The principles set forth in NFPA 921 played no part in Anstey‘s 1995 trial.9
Manifestly, the publication of NFPA 921 and its periodic amendments do not, per se, constitute newly-discovered evidence in the absence of a nexus between its provisions and the facts of a particular case. Here, the habeas court summarily concluded that “no testimony or other evidence is necessary.” I disagree. The granting of an omnibus habeas corpus hearing was warranted by the following: (1) the standards for conducting a hearing under the habeas rules and the Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act, (2) the recognition of NFPA 921 by the West Virginia
IV. The NFPA 921 Affidavits
Ultimately, the question in this case is whether Anstey‘s affidavits from two new experts on fire investigation constitute newly-discovered evidence and justify an omnibus habeas corpus hearing. The experts are Dr. Gerald Hurst, a consulting chemist on fires and explosions, and Mark Goodson, a consulting engineer. Obviously, the fact that Hurst and Goodson‘s conclusions may coincide with the conclusions of Anstey‘s experts at trial does not mean that a jury will return the same verdict as before. As Anstey suggests, if a similar conclusion about the fire is more logically sound and can be shown to be scientifically valid based on NFPA 921 criteria, as amended, the conclusion is likely to be more persuasive and readily acceptable by a jury.11
Hurst‘s affidavit notes that, since its initial publication in 1992, new editions of NFPA 921 have been issued every three or four years and that the 2011 edition is the current version. Concluding that the trailer fire remains undetermined, Hurst indicates that “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” the State‘s investigation “did not conform to recommended fire investigative protocol, was not conducted in a methodical and reliable fashion, and did not utilize the scientific method to determine origin and causation.” Specifically, Hurst determined that the State‘s hypothesis, that a fire originated with the toaster and also in the victim‘s bedroom, was not scientifically valid. Instead, according to Hurst, the State‘s hypothesis fell victim to “expectation bias,” rather than validation through the scientific method.12
Mark Goodson notes in his affidavit that NFPA 921 incorporates the scientific method into the field of fire investigation and has become the standard for assessing the reliability of expert testimony. With regard to the trailer fire, Goodson concluded:
It is clear based upon my review of the transcripts of the State‘s origin and cause witnesses that they did not follow the scientific method in connection with their investigation of the trailer fire. Rather, the State‘s experts relied upon outdated methods that had permeated the fire investigation community for years prior to the time of their investigation and testimony, and those methods are no longer accepted within the fire investigation community today.
Attached to Hurst and Goodson‘s affidavits is an appendix which lists the materials, in compact disc form, provided for Hurst and Goodson‘s review. The materials consist primarily of testimony and exhibits from Anstey‘s 1995 trial. Although a large quantity of material was provided, Goodson‘s affidavit suggests that the data is not a reliable source to use in trying to determine how the fire started.13 For example, Goodson states in his
It has been said that expert opinion “is only an ordinary guess in evening clothes.”14 While that statement appears descriptive of the evidence in Anstey‘s 1995 trial, it is not reasonably applicable to the new evidence, backed up by NFPA 921, which Anstey seeks to present in this habeas corpus proceeding. At the very least, the affidavits of Hurst and Goodson rightly form the basis for granting an omnibus habeas corpus hearing.
V. Conclusion
In my view, Anstey has shown newly discovered evidence in the form of the advancement in fire science and arson investigation in the intervening years since his conviction. The advancement is represented by the National Fire Protection Association 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations (NFPA 921). NFPA 921, as amended, is now recognized by the Department of Justice and by this State through the mandate of the West Virginia Legislature.
Moreover, Anstey has correctly shown that the habeas court‘s refusal to grant him an evidentiary omnibus habeas corpus hearing prevented him from demonstrating the substantial impact of NFPA 921 on the expert testimony presented during his 1995 trial. The evidence Anstey proposes to introduce may very well place his conviction in a different light by exposing the conclusions of the State‘s witnesses as objectively unreliable. However, he cannot present that evidence as grounds for a new trial unless a hearing is conducted. The circuit court abused its discretion in denying Anstey the opportunity to develop the record. Due process requires an omnibus habeas corpus hearing in this case.15
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Notes
If it appears to the court from said petition, affidavits, exhibits, records and other documentary evidence attached thereto, or the return or pleadings, or any such record or records referred to above, that there is probable cause to believe that the petitioner may be entitled to some relief and that the contention or contentions and grounds (in fact or law) advanced have not been previously and finally adjudicated or waived, the court shall promptly hold a hearing and/or take evidence on the contention or contentions and grounds (in fact or law) advanced, and the court shall pass upon all issues of fact without a jury. (emphasis added)
1.3 These procedures represent the judgment developed from the NFPA consensus process system that if followed can improve the probability of reaching sound conclusions. Deviations from these procedures, however, are not necessarily wrong or inferior but need to be justified.
4.1 The use of a systematic approach often will uncover new factual data for analysis, which may require previous conclusions to be reevaluated.
Mr. Franck testified that the presence of patterns inside the toaster‘s cover indicated that the toaster‘s power cord had been stuffed inside the toaster. There is no evidence beyond Mr. Franck‘s opinion-based assertion, however, in support of the conclusion that the cord was stuffed up inside the toaster. Although such an observation would have been unusual and worthy of noting and photographing, neither of the fire department officials who first identified and seized the toaster at the scene made any mention of the cord being inside the toaster.
(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) In addition to the requirements in subsection (a), expert testimony based on a novel scientific theory, principle, methodology, or procedure is admissible only if:
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(3) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.