Saint Joseph Tower Assisted Living v. RoyceSaint Joseph Tower Assisted Living v. Royce
Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Because mootness is a justiciability doctrine that operates to prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction, an appellate court reviews mootness determinations under the same standard of review as other jurisdictional questions. - Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the decisions made by lower courts.
- Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A case is moot if the facts underlying the dispute have changed, such that the issues presented are no longer alive.
- Moot Question. The central question in a mootness analysis is whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.
- Moot Question: Appeal and Error. The public interest exception to the mootness debate requires an appellate court to consider (1) the public or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for guidance of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar problem.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, PETER C. BATAILLON, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for Douglas County, BEAU G. FINLEY, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Caitlin Cedfeldt and James Drawz, of Legal Aid of Nebraska, for appellant.
Mary M. Schott, of Evans & Dixon, L.L.C., for appellee.
FUNKE, C.J.
Jayne Royce appeals the order of the district court for Douglas County that affirmed the decision of the county court for Douglas County ruling in favor of Saint Joseph Tower Assisted Living Community (Saint Joseph) on its complaint for restitution of real property pursuant to the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA).1 We determine that because a writ of restitution was issued and Royce was removed from the property, no meaningful relief may be given and this appeal is moot. We reject Royce‘s arguments that the public interest exception applies, and we dismiss this appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
In May 2023, pursuant to a lease, Royce began residing in an apartment in a building owned by Saint Joseph. The lease incorporated provisions of a resident handbook and required the resident to, among other things, keep the premises “safe, clean and sanitary” and the apartment “tidy and free of clutter.”
FIRST AND SECOND NOTICES AND FIRST COMPLAINT FOR RESTITUTION
On August 31, 2023, Saint Joseph and Royce executed a “Negotiated Risk Agreement” (NRA) that documented Saint Joseph‘s concern that because of unpacked boxes that were “stacked everywhere,” Royce was not meeting her obligation to keep the apartment tidy and free of clutter. The NRA included the following notice: “If [Royce] does not adequately clean up and clear out her apartment in the next two weeks a 30-day notice for discharge will be issued.” On October 9, Saint Joseph provided Royce a letter stating that her apartment
On January 17, 2024, Saint Joseph filed a complaint for restitution against Royce in the county court. Saint Joseph alleged in the complaint that Royce had failed to vacate the apartment in compliance with the notice Saint Joseph had given. A trial was held in the county court on February 8, and that same day, the county court dismissed Saint Joseph‘s complaint with prejudice. The journal entry and order filed in the county court stated that the court had granted a motion to dismiss made by Royce during closing arguments. The journal entry and order further stated that the dismissal was “[b]ased on evidence submitted at [t]rial” but did not set forth specific findings or further explain the reason for the dismissal.
THIRD NOTICE AND SECOND COMPLAINT FOR RESTITUTION
On February 9, 2024, the day after the county court dismissed Saint Joseph‘s first complaint for restitution, Saint Joseph provided a letter to Royce stating that her lease was being terminated. The letter referred to the allegations of violations of the lease set forth in the October 9, 2023, notice and stated that the violations had been “continuous” since June 2023. The letter further stated that a visual inspection of Royce‘s apartment on February 2, 2024, “confirmed the apartment continue[d] in a cluttered, overcrowded, unclean[], and unsafe state” that “continue[d] to materially and negatively affect health and safety” in violation of the lease and the resident handbook. The letter stated that “a 14-day discharge notice [was] being issued” and that Royce was “required to vacate the property on or before February 23, 2024.”
On February 26, 2024, Saint Joseph filed a new complaint for restitution in the county court. The caption of the complaint
COUNTY COURT‘S ORDER
After a trial, the county court filed an order on April 10, 2024, ruling in favor of Saint Joseph on its complaint for restitution. The court rejected Royce‘s argument that Saint Joseph‘s complaint should be dismissed because Saint Joseph failed to comply with
The county court found that the NRA executed on August 31, 2023, satisfied the statutory notice requirements of
The county court rejected Royce‘s argument that the February 9, 2024, notice was waived when Saint Joseph accepted rent from Royce in December 2023 and January 2024. The court stated the argument was without merit considering the nature of the breach of the lease, as well as the language of
Turning to Saint Joseph‘s evidence of Royce‘s noncompliance, the county court found that “the cluttered condition of [Royce‘s] apartment and its significantly constricted passageways present a fire and safety risk” and “could materially affect the health and safety of those near this apartment” and that therefore, Royce had failed to keep her apartment clean and safe as required by the lease, the resident handbook, and Nebraska law. The county court specified that Royce was in violation of
NOTICE OF APPEAL, SUPERSEDEAS BOND, ORDER FOR RESTITUTION, AND EVICTION
On April 10, 2024, Royce filed a notice of intent to appeal the county court‘s judgment to the district court. That same day, the county court filed an order setting a supersedeas bond of $4,000 to be paid within 3 business days and ordering Royce to pay an additional $4,000 per month during the appeal.
On April 18, 2024, Saint Joseph filed a motion for writ of restitution in the district court. Saint Joseph alleged that Royce had not posted the supersedeas bond within the 3 days set by the county court, and it therefore requested that a writ of restitution be issued. On April 24, the district court filed an order for restitution of premises in which it cited
APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT
On June 24, 2024, Royce filed a statement of errors in the district court. Royce asserted, restated and renumbered, that the county court erred by (1) failing to dismiss Saint Joseph‘s complaint for failing to comply with the pleading requirements of
On July 1, 2024, the district court held a hearing on Royce‘s appeal. The court also heard arguments on a motion Saint Joseph had filed that same day in which, among other things, it urged the district court to dismiss the appeal as moot. Saint Joseph asserted that because Royce and her possessions had been out of the apartment since May, there was no relief that could be granted by the district court. Saint Joseph cited our decision in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb2 to argue that the appeal was moot and that the public interest exception to mootness did not apply. At the end of the July 1 hearing, the district court stated it would take the matter under advisement and issue a written opinion.
On November 6, 2024, the district court entered an order in which it rejected Royce‘s claims of error and affirmed the county court‘s judgment of restitution. Regarding Royce‘s claim that Saint Joseph‘s complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements of
Regarding Royce‘s claim that Saint Joseph had waived its right to enforce the NRA through the February 9, 2024, notice, the district court stated that the evidence showed that Saint Joseph had collected monthly rents from Royce after the first notice and that the acceptance of rent constituted a waiver of Saint Joseph‘s complaint for restitution based on the first notice. However, the district court further stated the evidence showed that conditions that violated the lease still existed when Saint Joseph gave the notice on February 9, and the court determined that while Saint Joseph‘s acceptance of rent in December 2023 and January 2024 waived its right to restitution based on the first notice, the acceptance of rent did not waive Saint Joseph‘s right to restitution based on the February 9 notice.
Regarding Royce‘s claim that Saint Joseph‘s complaint should have been dismissed based on res judicata and the county court‘s dismissal of Saint Joseph‘s first complaint, the district court stated that res judicata did not apply because when the county court dismissed the first complaint, it made no finding regarding whether Royce had violated the lease or had remedied any violation.
Regarding Royce‘s claim that the supersedeas bond was set at an amount contrary to
Royce appeals the district court‘s order affirming the county court‘s order.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Royce assigns that the district court erred in determining that the county court did not err in rejecting Royce‘s arguments that (1) Saint Joseph‘s complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements of
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Because mootness is a justiciability doctrine that operates to prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction, an appellate court reviews mootness determinations under the same standard of review as other jurisdictional questions.3 When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter of law, which requires an appellate
ANALYSIS
The district court determined that the supersedeas bond issue was moot because Royce had moved out of the apartment and there was nothing the district court could do to remedy the county court‘s error in setting the bond at an amount higher than what was warranted by the evidence and
[3,4] In NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, the county court had entered judgment in favor of a landlord in eviction proceedings brought under the URLTA, and the district court affirmed the county court‘s judgment on appeal.5 On appeal to this court, we considered whether the case was moot given that a writ of restitution had been executed and the tenant had been removed from the apartment. We stated the propositions that a case is moot if the facts underlying the dispute have changed, such that the issues presented are no longer alive, and that the central question in a mootness analysis is whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.6 We further cited with favor the proposition from another state supreme court that a moot case exists where a judgment rendered by the court will have no practical legal effect upon an existing controversy because an intervening
Applying these standards, we determined in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb that the case was moot. We reasoned that there was no meaningful relief we could provide to remedy any errors pertaining to the tenant‘s attempt to stay in her apartment pending appeal because the tenant had been removed from her apartment prior to the completion of the appellate process, and we reasoned that even if we were to find error in that removal, there was nothing we could do at that time that would allow the tenant to stay in her apartment pending appeal.8 We further reasoned that an action under the URLTA determines only “who is entitled to immediate possession,” and the tenant offered no reason that she would be entitled to possession of the apartment at the time of the appeal.9
[5] We then considered in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb whether the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied. We stated that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine requires us to consider (1) the public or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for guidance of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar problem.10 We further cited the proposition that even if a problem is likely to recur, it is generally inappropriate for an appellate court to review a moot case that does not evade review as a result of a transitory setting.11 Applying these standards, we rejected the tenant‘s arguments that the public interest
Like the tenant in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, Royce was evicted from her apartment after the county court entered its order and before the district court decided her appeal. In arguing the mootness issue in this appeal, Royce does not assert that there is relief we can provide at this time to enforce a current right to possession of the apartment; instead, she argues that issues in this appeal fall within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Therefore, we determine that based on our reasoning in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, the present appeal is moot, and we consider Royce‘s arguments regarding the public interest exception.
Royce argues that the public interest exception applies in this case because this appeal presents “public question[s]”15 and “there is a need for guidance for public officials because there is a likelihood of future recurrence.”16 She also argues that “cases governed by URLTA usually evade an appellate court‘s review.”17 Royce further makes arguments relating to the consequences of her eviction—like the arguments we rejected in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb—as arguments for applying the collateral consequences exception.
Based on similar reasoning and the precedent of NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, we also reject Royce‘s public interest arguments as they relate to the supersedeas bond issue. Regarding the bond issue, Royce may have a better argument that the issue evades appellate review because the county court‘s setting an excessive bond prevented her from using the method provided in the URLTA to stay a writ of restitution pending the appeal. However, in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, the tenant raised a similar argument regarding her allegations that the county court violated
We decline to apply the public interest exception to the supersedeas bond issue in this case because we do not see a need for guidance, and we find it unlikely that the issue will recur. Royce states that the county court “set[] the supersedeas
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we determine that the issues in this appeal are moot, and we decline to apply the public interest exception to consider any of the issues on appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.