Ruehmer v. Queen City LodgeRuehmer v. Queen City Lodge
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 9, 2021
Thomas Bruns and Christopher Wiest, for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Lazarus & Lewis, LLC, Stephen S. Lazarus and R. Jessup Gage, for Defendants-Appellees.
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants Christopher Ruehmer, Michelle Lehman, Lindsay Anderson, Rachel Baldwin, Linda Borowicz, Alicia Essert, Charles Hains, Marcus Sherman, Dennis Barnette, and Robert Nelson (collectively referred to as plaintiffs) appeal from the trial court‘s entry dismissing their complaint against defendants-appellees Queen City Lodge No. 69, Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP“) and Dan Hils, president of the FOP, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶2} In a single assignment of error, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in determining that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in the complaint. Because the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of and were inextricably intertwined with the collective-bargaining rights contained in
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶3} The FOP is represented by legal counsel, who provides it with various legal services including, but not limited to, representing FOP members in employment disciplinary administrative proceedings and defending FOP members in civil litigation for claims arising out of their employment. The law firm of Lazarus & Lewis, LLC, (“Lazarus“) serves as legal counsel for the FOP.
{¶4} For the purposes of evaluating the FOP‘s legal needs and potential providers of legal services, Hils appointed a Legal Services Committee. This committee determined that Lazarus was the best option to serve as legal counsel for
{¶5} At a subsequent meeting of the FOP on July 27, 2020, a member of the FOP made the following motion:
I move that the decision to select FOP counsel be determined by a Department-wide vote, to occur within 45 days, and to reverse the decisions of the Executive Board awarding the legal services contract to Lazarus & Lewis and disqualifying Peter Stackpole and Zach Gottesman from consideration. This motion affords the entire membership the opportunity to select which legal firm represents us. After the passage of this motion, informational meetings can be held by each competing firm and we can all decide who gets the legal contract.
{¶6} Approximately 307 FOP members attended this meeting. But approximately 65 officers in attendance had to leave the meeting to begin their shift prior to a vote on the motion occurring. Following a vote, the FOP determined that the motion failed to pass because the votes in favor of the motion were less than 50 percent of the number of FOP members who signed in at the beginning of the meeting.
{¶7} The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the FOP and Hils seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the FOP failed to follow Article XII, Section 4 of the FOP Constitution in determining whether
{¶8} The complaint additionally contained a claim for unlawful retaliation, alleging that the FOP threatened various members with expulsion for participating in this action in violation of
{¶9} The FOP and Hils filed a
{¶10} The plaintiffs appealed the trial court‘s granting of the motion to dismiss.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
{¶11} In a single assignment of error, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶12} We review a trial court‘s dismissal under
{¶13} Because the trial court‘s dismissal was based on its finding that the claims asserted in the plaintiffs’ complaint were inextricably intertwined with the rights created by
{¶15} However,
{¶16} Here, the trial court found that the claims filed in the court of common pleas fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB because they were “inextricably intertwined with rights created by
{¶17} We consider plaintiffs’ declaratory-judgment and retaliation claims separately to determine whether the trial court properly found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
1. Declaratory-Judgment Claim
{¶18} In their first claim, which sought a declaration that the motion to select legal counsel for the FOP by a department-wide vote had passed, the plaintiffs alleged that the FOP failed to follow the union constitution when determining whether the motion had passed. The complaint specifically asserted that Article XII, Section 4 of the FOP Constitution provides that the latest edition of Robert‘s Rules of
{¶19} The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a claim asserting a violation of a union constitution fell within the jurisdiction of SERB or the court of common pleas in Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn., 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 572 N.E.2d 87. In that case, the plaintiffs (the Franklin County Law Enforcement Association and certain employees of the Franklin County Sheriff‘s Department) contended that a partial settlement that had been reached between the FOP, the county commissioners, and the sheriff concerning the resolution of outstanding issues between the sheriff and his employees was an attempt by the defendants “to defeat the rights of the employees to a fair vote at SERB.” Id. at 167-168. The complaint further alleged that the partial settlement violated
{¶20} The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the asserted claims fell “squarely under
More fundamentally, plaintiffs simply have not asserted any claims that fall outside the scope of
R.C. Chapter 4117 . That chapter was meant to regulate in a comprehensive manner the labor relations between public employees and employers. Necessarily, then, it was not meant to give SERB exclusive jurisdiction over claims that a party might have in a capacity other than as a public employee, employer, or union asserting collective bargaining rights. Thus, as a matter of jurisdiction, if a party asserts rights that are independent ofR.C. Chapter 4117 , then the party‘s complaint may properly be heard in common pleas court. However, if a party asserts claims that arise from or depend on the collective bargaining rights created byR.C. Chapter 4117 , the remedies provided in that chapter are exclusive. Of course, even if a common pleas court has jurisdiction,R.C. 4117.10(A) in some cases may preempt the party‘s independent claim.
{¶21} The court‘s treatment of the plaintiffs’ third claim, which alleged that the FOP had violated its constitution by scheduling a vote on the settlement without
{¶22} The FOP and Hils argue that the holding in Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. on this third claim extends to all claims involving a dispute between a union and its members over the interpretation of the union‘s constitution and by-laws. We do not read the court‘s holding so broadly. In our view, the court found that the asserted constitutional violation was inextricably intertwined with the rights in
{¶23} In the present case, plaintiffs alleged only a violation of the union constitution, not a specific violation of
It is an unfair labor practice for an employee organization, its agents, or representatives, or public employees to:
(1) Restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code. This division does not impair the right of an employee organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein, or an employer in the selection of his representative for the purpose of collective brgaining [sic] or the adjustment of grievances.
* * *
(6) Fail to fairly represent all public employees in a bargaining unit[.]
{¶25}
(A) Public employees have the right to:
(1) Form, join, assist, or participate in, or refrain from forming, joining, assisting, or participating in, except as otherwise provided in Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code, any employee organization of their own choosing;
(2) Engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection;
(3) Representation by an employee organization;
(4) Bargain collectively with their public employers to determine wages, hours, terms and other conditions of employment and the continuation, modification, or deletion of an existing provision of a collective bargaining agreement, and enter into collective bargaining agreements;
(5) Present grievances and have them adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect and as long as the bargaining representatives have the opportunity to be present at the adjustment.
{¶26} We find that the plaintiffs’ first claim arises from and is dependent on, and is inextricably intertwined with, the rights contained in this provision, specifically the right to “[f]orm, join, assist, or participate in, or refrain from forming, joining, assisting, or participating in * * * any employee organization of their own choosing,” as set forth in
{¶27} Our determination is in accord with the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s application of Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. in subsequent cases in which it considered the issue of whether jurisdiction over particular claims fell to SERB or to the court of common pleas. The court has consistently maintained that the dispositive test to be applied in determining jurisdiction is whether the asserted claims arise from or are dependent on the collective-bargaining rights in
{¶28} In Sutula, a union representing a group of city employees filed a complaint in the court of common pleas after it was unable to reach an agreement on a collective-bargaining agreement with the city following lengthy negotiations pursuant to
{¶29} The Sutula court reversed the dismissal and granted the writ after finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the claims. Sutula at ¶ 25. It held
{¶30} In State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., the court considered whether a court of common pleas or SERB had “jurisdiction to determine whether employees of privately owned or operated prisons are public employees, as defined by
{¶31} While acknowledging that “[t]he principles announced in Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. are not so broad as to place all claims that touch on
{¶32} Like the claims asserted in Sutula and State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., the first claim in this case does not directly allege an unfair labor practice. But the conduct alleged in support of the claim is conduct that, if proven, would constitute an unfair labor practice under
{¶33} We have also found several cases from our sister districts to be instructive and supportive of our determination that the claim at issue in this case falls within the jurisdiction of SERB.
{¶34} In Murray v. Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-912, 2014-Ohio-2790, a former lieutenant with the Columbus Police Department filed a complaint against the city of Columbus, the police chief, the public safety director, his union, and the union president alleging, as relevant to this appeal, that the city and the
{¶35} On appeal, the Tenth District held that all claims asserted by plaintiff fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB. It found that the defendants’ conduct as alleged by the plaintiff—falsely claiming that a grievance had been settled and misleading plaintiff regarding the resolution of the grievance—constituted, if proven, an unfair labor practice under
{¶36} As in Murray, the plaintiffs in this case attempted to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the court of common pleas by pleading their claim as a failure to follow the union constitution when determining the results of a vote, as opposed to alleging an unfair labor practice or a violation of a right accorded to public employees under
{¶37} The claims and the alleged conduct on the part of the defendants in Murray and the case at bar are distinguishable from the claims and conduct alleged in other cases from our sister districts that have found that claims fell within the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas, rather than SERB. In Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs. v. Gatti, 2017-Ohio-8533, 100 N.E.3d 68 (11th Dist.), Gatti, an employee of the Trumbull County Engineer‘s Office and a member of the union representing Engineer Office employees, was involved in a workplace accident. Id. at ¶ 2. Following the accident, Gatti was on various periods of leave from work and collected workers’ compensation benefits. The Engineer‘s Office also provided hospitalization benefits to Gatti during his leave, although Gatti was required by a collective-bargaining agreement to pay a proportionate share of the advanced hospitalization-insurance premiums. Gatti failed to pay the balance on the premiums, and the county filed suit against him for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Id. at ¶ 4-5. Gatti moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Eleventh District affirmed. Id. at ¶ 6. It found that no allegations had been made relating to an unfair labor practice, and that the complaint concerned remuneration for an employee‘s share of a hospitalization-insurance premium. Id. at ¶ 15. The court held that “[a]lthough appellant‘s duty to pay his share and appellees’ right to reimbursement arise out of the CBA, there is no provision under
{¶38} Similarly, in Cleveland Patrolmen‘s Assn. v. White, 109 Ohio App.3d 329, 672 N.E.2d 195 (8th Dist.1996), the Eighth District held that the court of common pleas had jurisdiction over a complaint alleging violations of a city charter and city ordinances in the alleged improper hiring of nonpolice personnel to perform clerical police duties. The court found that the complaint did not allege a violation of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, but instead only alleged violations of the city‘s own charter and codified ordinances that concerned civil service eligibility lists and hiring pursuant to competitive examinations. Id. at 335. It further found that “the complaint in mandamus asserts rights independent of the collective bargaining agreement,” and that “the collective bargaining agreement does not specifically address civil service eligibility lists or hiring pursuant to competitive examinations.” Id. It accordingly determined that the dispute raised in the complaint did not arise out of, and was not connected with, the collective-bargaining agreement and did not fall within the jurisdiction of SERB. Id. at 336-337.
{¶39} Unlike the claims asserted in Gatti and White, the plaintiffs’ first claim alleging that the FOP and Hils violated the union constitution by failing to properly tabulate the results of a vote, is inextricably intertwined with the collective-bargaining rights in
2. Unlawful-Retaliation Claim
{¶41} The plaintiffs’ complaint additionally contained a claim for unlawful retaliation. The complaint alleged that, prior to this lawsuit being filed, the FOP threatened the plaintiffs with expulsion from the FOP for participating in the litigation, that
{¶42} While the plaintiffs couched this claim as a violation of the Ohio Constitution and Ohio public policy, we find that it arises from, and is inextricably intertwined with, the rights set forth in
{¶43} We accordingly find that the trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful retaliation based on its determination that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB. The plaintiffs’ assignment of error is overruled.
{¶44} Because the claims asserted in the plaintiffs’ complaint arise out of and are inextricably intertwined with the rights set forth in
Judgment affirmed.
BERGERON and HENDON, JJ., concur.
SYLVIA SIEVE HENDON, retired, from the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.