Facts
- Plaintiff Rafael A. Sanchez, appearing pro se, filed an action against the City of New York and five unnamed NYPD officers after they allegedly seized his motorcycle on October 25, 2023, in Bronx County [lines="15-16"].
- On July 24, 2024, Sanchez submitted a nearly identical complaint against the same defendants, which is currently pending in a separate action under docket number 24-CV-5740 (LTS) [lines="20-23"].
- Five days later, on July 29, 2024, Sanchez filed the instant complaint, raising the same claims [lines="25-26"].
- The court determined that allowing a duplicate lawsuit would not serve any useful purpose [lines="27-28"].
- The case is dismissed without prejudice to Sanchez's pending case [lines="29-30"].
Issues
- Whether Sanchez's instant complaint is duplicative of his previous action currently pending before the court under docket number 24-CV-5740 (LTS) [lines="26"].
Holdings
- The court dismissed Sanchez's complaint without prejudice because it raised the same claims as his previously filed, pending lawsuit [lines="32-30"].
OPINION
JAMES R. RUDISILL, PETITIONER v. DENIS R. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
No. 22-888
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
April 16, 2024
OCTOBER TERM, 2023
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 22-888. Argued November 8, 2023—Decided April 16, 2024
Since World War II, the Federal Government has provided educational assistance to servicemembers with qualifying service through various GI bills. Typically, GI bills provide 36 months of educational benefits each up to a cap of 48 months in cases where servicemembers become eligible for benefits under more than one GI bill. See
Petitioner James Rudisill enlisted in the United States Army in 2000 and served a total of eight years over three separate periods of military service. He became entitled to Montgomery Bill benefits as a result of his first period of service. Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree and used 25 months and 14 days of Montgomery benefits to finance his education. Through his subsequent periods of service, Rudisill also became entitled to more generous educational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits to finance a graduate degree. Rudisill understood that such benefits would be limited to 22 months and 16 days under
Held: Servicemembers who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to
(a) The Government claims that someone in Rudisill‘s position is subject to
The statutory text resolves this case in Rudisill‘s favor. Rudisill earned two separate entitlements to educational benefits, one per the Montgomery GI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in the military for nearly eight years over three separate periods. Focusing on these two separate benefits entitlements—rather than on his periods of service—leads to two relevant observations about the statute. First, the statute establishes a baseline rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA “shall pay” a veteran‘s benefits.
(b) Section 3322(d), which creates a mechanism for certain servicemembers to “coordinate” their benefits, does not limit Rudisill‘s entitlement. First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any veteran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive benefits. Section 3322(d) does not mention the receipt of benefits but addresses instead the “coordination of entitlement.” Because Rudisill is already entitled to two separate benefits, he has no need to coordinate any entitlement under
There are two additional clues that
(c) The contention that Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefits by invoking
(1) To start, an election under
(2) The plain text of
55 F. 4th 879, reversed and remanded.
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BARRETT, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 22-888
JAMES R. RUDISILL, PETITIONER v. DENIS R. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
[April 16, 2024]
JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner James Rudisill first enlisted in the United States Army in the year 2000. Over the next decade, he reenlisted twice, serving a total of eight years on active duty. As a result of his first period of military service, Rudisill was entitled to 36 months of educational benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill, to be paid by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Rudisill‘s subsequent periods of service separately entitled him to 36 months of educational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Both of Rudisill‘s entitlements were subject to a 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.
Rudisill used 25 months and 14 days of his Montgomery benefits to help fund his undergraduate degree. Then, after serving his third tour of duty, Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits to attend divinity school.
The VA informed Rudisill that his Post-9/11 benefits were limited to the duration of his unused Montgomery benefits, pursuant to a provision of the Post-9/11 GI Bill,
The question before us is whether Rudisill can access his Post-9/11 benefits entitlement without being subject to
I
A
“The United States has a proud history of offering educational assistance to millions of veterans, as demonstrated by the many ‘G. I. Bills’ enacted since World War II.” Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, §5002(3), 122 Stat. 2358,
In the more than 75 years since Congress passed the first GI Bill in response to World War II, it has enacted additional GI bills, most of which share two relevant features. First, an individual with the requisite period of military service becomes “entitled to” educational benefits, typically in the form of a stipend or tuition payments, which the VA is then required to provide once the veteran enrolls in an eligible education program. Servicemen‘s Readjustment Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 288, 289; see also, e.g., Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 664–666; Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 13, 15. Second, with one brief exception,1 GI bills from the Korean
This case relates to the overlap between two recent GI bills. The first is the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984,
As with other GI bills, the Montgomery GI Bill consists of a detailed series of statutory provisions that include an entitlement and also durational limits. To be “entitled to basic educational assistance” under the Montgomery benefits program, a servicemember must satisfy certain military service requirements—typically two or three years of continuous active duty.
The second GI bill at issue in this case is the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 2357,
As with the Montgomery GI Bill, the Post-9/11 GI Bill establishes an entitlement and also prescribes durational limits. To be entitled to Post-9/11 benefits, servicemembers must typically serve on active duty in the Armed Forces for at least three years starting on or after September 11, 2001.
Because the Montgomery and Post-9/11 bills cover overlapping service periods, eligibility for benefits under these two bills overlaps as well. Consequently, the Post-9/11 GI Bill contains a provision titled “[b]ar to duplication of educational assistance benefits.”
Thus, to summarize: Per
B
When it enacted the Post-9/11 GI Bill, Congress addressed one immediate problem that arose due to the lag time between the start of the Post-9/11 GI Bill‘s entitlement period and the bill‘s effective date. The case before us concerns the scope of that solution.
As we have explained, the Post-9/11 GI Bill created an educational benefits entitlement for veterans who serve on or after September 11, 2001. But the legislation granting
Section 3322(d) informs these servicemembers that “coordination of entitlement to educational assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the one hand, and [the Montgomery GI Bill] on the other, shall be governed by [
Making a
II
Petitioner James Rudisill spent nearly eight years on active duty in the U. S. Army, providing three distinct periods of military service.3 He was deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, experienced combat, and sustained multiple injuries. He reached the rank of captain and earned several medals and commendations, including a Bronze Star. After each period of service, Rudisill received an honorable discharge.
In between his second and third periods of military service, Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree. To help finance this education, he used 25 months and 14 days of the Montgomery benefits he was entitled to receive due to his first period of service. After graduating in 2007, he reenrolled in the Army for a third period. By 2015, Rudisill successfully sought admission to Yale Divinity School; he intended to earn and use that degree to become a chaplain in the Army.
To fund his graduate school education, Rudisill applied to the VA for Post-9/11 benefits, relying on the entitlement that he had earned with respect to his second and third periods of service. But the VA issued a certificate of eligibility stating that Rudisill was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefits—the length of his unused Montgomery benefits. This response did not accord with Rudisill‘s understanding of the scope of his entitlement: In his view, he had earned an entitlement to 36 months of Post-9/11 benefits based on his second and third periods of service, and he could use 22 months and 16 days of that Post-9/11 entitlement due to
Over a dissent, a panel of the Federal Circuit agreed, holding that veterans with multiple periods of qualifying service are not subject to
We granted certiorari and now reverse the judgment of the Federal Circuit. 599 U. S. ___ (2023).
III
The question before us is this: When servicemembers have separate entitlements to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits, can they use their benefits, in any order, up to
As explained below, the pertinent statutory text resolves this dispute in Rudisill‘s favor. Section 3327(d)(2)‘s limit applies only to an individual who makes a
But Rudisill never made an election under
A
We start by examining Rudisill‘s benefits entitlements generally. It is undisputed that Rudisill earned two separate entitlements to educational benefits due to the length of his military service. Based on his first period of service, he became “entitled to” Montgomery benefits, as the statute clearly states.
So, from the outset, we know that Rudisill earned two separate benefits entitlements, one per the Montgomery GI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in the military for nearly eight years over three separate periods. Notably, our analysis does not focus on his periods of service. Contra, post, at 7-8 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Rather, what matters is that his lengthy service conferred two separate entitlements.
Recognizing Rudisill‘s separate entitlements leads us to two observations. First, the statute establishes a baseline rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA must pay a veteran‘s benefits. The Montgomery GI Bill requires that “[t]he Secretary shall pay to each individual entitled to [Montgomery benefits] who is pursuing an approved program of education a basic educational assistance allowance.”
Second, Congress has clearly and plainly delineated certain durational limits on these benefits entitlements. Montgomery and Post-9/11 entitlements have specified outer limits: Each program entitles the recipient to up to 36 months of benefits, and both are “[s]ubject to section 3695,” which imposes a 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.
Thus, even before turning to the statutory provisions that are most directly implicated here, it is clear that (1) Rudisill is separately entitled to each of two educational benefits; and (2) absent specified limits, the VA is statutorily obligated to pay him 48 months of benefits. As explained below, no statutory constraint prevents Rudisill from accessing his benefits, up to 48 months, in whichever order he chooses.
B
Section 3322(d) is the first of two statutory provisions that are at the heart of this dispute. That subsection, titled “Additional coordination matters,” states:
“In the case of an individual entitled to educational assistance under [the Montgomery GI Bill or other specified programs], or making contributions toward [the Montgomery Program], as of August 1, 2009, coordination of entitlement to educational assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the one hand, and such chapters or provisions, on the other, shall be governed by [
38 U. S. C. §3327 ].”
There is no dispute that subsection (d) applies to a servicemember who is entitled to Montgomery benefits but has
First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any veteran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive benefits. Sections 3011 through 3014, which outline the Montgomery entitlement, do not refer to coordination. Nor do
For the person covered by
Both the Government and the dissent argue that this view misconstrues the meaning of the term “coordination.”
Nor does the reference to “coordination” in subsection (d) exist in isolation. Rather, subsection (d) points to
If we were left with any doubt that
Second,
The most logical inference is that this date is material to the work of those particular provisions. And under the interpretation we adopt today, August 1, 2009, is highly relevant, because before then, individuals could have been accruing Post-9/11 benefits (ever since September 11, 2001) but would have had no way to opt into that benefits program. The swap Congress devised in
Adding all this up, we come to the conclusion that
C
Based on the analysis we have already laid out, Rudisill never reaches
We cannot agree that, to receive Post-9/11 benefits, a servicemember in Rudisill‘s situation must elect them via
To start, a
If he decides not to opt for a
To argue that Rudisill may receive Post-9/11 benefits only by making a
So, while Rudisill must make an election per
By blurring all elections into one, instead of recognizing that the statute contemplates multiple distinct elections, the Government—and the dissent—make a crucial misstep.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that
Other parts of the statute confirm that not all elections are the same. For example,
Undeterred, the Government turns to
From its start,
For veterans who have used some but not all of their Montgomery benefits,
First, like subsection (d)(1), this limitation only applies to “an individual making an election under subsection (a).” So, if a person does not make a
Second, this provision makes perfect sense under Rudisill‘s interpretation of the statute. If a veteran served for three years, he earned 36 months of benefits. If he received Montgomery benefits for this service but should have been able to get Post-9/11 benefits, due to the overlap in the eligibility for these programs,
By contrast,
In sum,
*
*
*
The bottom line is this: Veterans who separately accrue benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills are entitled to both benefits. Neither
It is so ordered.
I agree with the Court that the post-9/11 education-benefits law entitles James Rudisill, a military veteran, to additional benefits for graduate school. The Court goes on to say that the clarity of the benefits law at issue here means that we need not rely on the veterans canon of statutory interpretation. I again agree. I write separately, however, to note some practical and constitutional questions about the justifications for a benefits-related canon (such as the veterans canon) that favors one particular group over others.
Under the veterans canon, statutes that provide benefits to veterans are to be construed “in the veteran‘s favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). The veterans canon is a substantive canon of statutory interpretation. A substantive canon is a judicial presumption in favor of or against a particular substantive outcome. Some classic examples include the presumption against retroactivity, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the presumption of mens rea.
Applying a substantive canon, a court may depart from what the court, absent the canon, would have concluded is the best reading of the statutory text. Otherwise, of course,
Substantive canons are typically based on background constitutional principles or long-settled judicial understandings of congressional practice. See id., at 382-384. Because a substantive canon by definition has important decision-altering effects, any substantive canon must be sufficiently rooted in constitutional principles or congressional practices.
Here, no one suggests that the veterans canon rests on background constitutional principles. Rather, the canon seems to stem from a loose judicial assumption about congressional intent-in particular, an assumption that Congress intends for courts to read ambiguous veterans-benefits statutes more broadly than the courts otherwise would read such statutes. See Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. S. 561, 575 (1943).
But what is that assumption based on? The Court has never explained.
The first glimmerings of the veterans canon appeared in the 1940s. See ibid. But the early cases did not purport to establish a canon. They seem to have simply engaged in broadly purposive interpretation of the particular statutes at issue. Since those early cases, the Court has occasionally referred to a general pro-veterans interpretive principle, but without further explanation. See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 441 (2011); King v. St. Vincent‘s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 220-221, n. 9 (1991). The canon appears to have developed almost by accident.
Moreover, the veterans canon has apparently not mattered-in other words, has not affected the result-in any of this Court‘s past decisions in veterans cases, or in
Despite the canon‘s seemingly nonexistent impact on this Court‘s decisions, the Court‘s reflexive repetition of the canon over the years has created the appearance of deeper rooting, leading lower courts-particularly the Federal Circuit where veterans benefits cases are channeled-to rely on the canon in a way that this Court has not. Compare id., at 1350-1358 with id., at 1366-1374 (O‘Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). But this Court‘s repetition of the canon has not yielded any greater justification or explanation by the Court for applying such a canon in the first place.
In considering whether a sufficient justification exists, we must confront some fundamental problems with benefits-related canons like this one.
To begin with, the notion that benefits statutes should be interpreted to favor a particular group creates significant tension with the actual operation of the process by which Congress and the President enact spending laws. To be sure, if someone asked a Member of Congress or the President (or this judge, for that matter) in the abstract, “Should veterans get more benefits?” the answer would be yes. But that question is not (and cannot be) answered in the abstract. The spending process is a zero-sum game, where money spent on one group means less money for other groups and other national priorities.
Would Congress prefer to pay for another semester of veterans’ graduate-school educations, or instead for more Pell Grants for lower-income college students? Would Congress want to spend more on healthcare benefits for the disabled, or instead for prescription-drug benefits for senior citizens? Would Congress choose to increase the pension benefits of retired CIA agents, or instead the wages of soldiers who are serving in harm‘s way today? The list of difficult choices goes on and on. National security, assistance to the poor, law enforcement, energy production, environmental protection, border security, cancer research, housing aid, highway construction, airplane safety, school lunches, disaster relief, drug treatment, prisons, and a plethora of other national priorities all compete for funding in the legislative process. And the U. S. Treasury is not a bottomless well of free money-rather, the money comes primarily from the taxes paid by the American people.
The spending process in Congress requires hard choices with painful tradeoffs. Judges have no principled way to make those choices or weigh those tradeoffs. Nor do judges have a principled way, other than reading the statutory text as written, to conclude that Congress and the President would prefer to favor one group over another-or stated another way in this zero-sum process, to disfavor one group over another.
In addition to that practical problem, judges have no constitutional authority to favor or disfavor one group over another in the spending process. Rather, under the Constitution‘s separation of powers, Congress and the President make those policy judgments. See
For those reasons, courts interpreting spending laws usually do not apply canons to favor or disfavor particular groups. Courts, for example, do not apply a low-income-families canon, a healthcare-for-seniors canon, or a local-law-enforcement canon to favor those groups. (Nor, from the other direction, do courts apply a general fiscal-responsibility canon to narrowly construe spending statutes.)
In short, any canon that construes benefits statutes in favor of a particular group-rather than just construing the statutes as written-appears to be inconsistent both with actual congressional practice on spending laws and with the Judiciary‘s proper constitutional role in the federal spending process.
To be clear, Congress‘s commitment to assisting veterans through the many federal veterans-benefits programs is entirely appropriate given the sacrifices made by those who have served in the Armed Forces. The statutes that provide significant veterans benefits including healthcare, education, disability, and retirement benefits-properly assist those who have defended America. And when statutes afford broad benefits for veterans or others, as is often the case, courts should apply the statutes as written.
But providing federal benefits-and determining their scope-is Congress‘s prerogative. The Judiciary‘s role is to neutrally interpret those statutes, not to put a thumb on the scale in favor of or against any particular group. For that reason, it may be important in a future case for this Court to address the justification for any benefits-related canon that favors one group over others.
Our country rewards those who serve in the Armed Forces with educational benefits. This case involves the educational benefits available under the Montgomery GI Bill and the more recent Post-9/11 GI Bill. The Post-9/11 benefits are more generous than the Montgomery benefits, and veterans are sometimes entitled to benefits under both programs. By statute, however, veterans cannot receive benefits under both programs at the same time. Congress therefore created an election mechanism that allows veterans to switch from Montgomery benefits to Post-9/11 benefits. Under that mechanism, when a veteran switches to Post-9/11 benefits after using some, but not all, of his Montgomery benefits, the amount of his Post-9/11 benefits is limited to the number of months he had remaining for Montgomery benefits.
The Court agrees that Rudisill could not use his two sets of benefits concurrently, and that he switched to Post-9/11 benefits when he had some remaining Montgomery benefits. Ante, at 7, 14. But, it declines to apply the statute‘s corresponding limitation on his benefits because Rudisill
I
Since World War II, Congress has enacted numerous statutes that provide veterans with a range of educational benefits, commonly called GI bills. Two of these statutes are at issue here: the Veterans’ Educational Assistance Program Act of 1984 (Montgomery GI Bill),
Both programs impose a durational cap on the benefits that an individual may receive. Regardless of how long a veteran has served or how many periods of service he has, a qualifying veteran is generally eligible for a maximum of 36 months of benefits under each program.
The two educational-benefit programs cover overlapping time periods. And, several statutory provisions address this overlap. No veteran can use the two sets of benefits
The question before us is whether that statutory limitation applies to Rudisill‘s benefits. Rudisill served during three separate periods, spanning roughly eight years. He first enlisted in the Army in 2000 and served until 2002. During this period of service, Rudisill became eligible for Montgomery benefits. He used some of these benefits to start and, after a second period of service spanning about a year and a half, complete an undergraduate degree. Rudisill then rejoined the Army as a commissioned officer, serving from 2007 to 2011. Rudisill‘s second and third periods of service made him eligible for Post-9/11 benefits. After he completed his third period of military service, he was admitted to Yale Divinity School.
Rudisill sought to use his remaining benefits to fund his graduate education at Yale. At that time, Rudisill had used 25 months and 14 days of his Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate education. This left him with 10 months and 16 days of remaining Montgomery benefits. Rather than use these remaining benefits, however, Rudisill decided to switch to his Post-9/11 benefits. As part of that switch, Rudisill filled out a Department of Veterans Affairs
Applying the limitation on entitlement in
II
Rudisill‘s Post-9/11 benefits are limited to the amount of Montgomery benefits he had not used. Because he could not use his sets of benefits concurrently, the statute required that Rudisill coordinate his entitlements, and that such coordination would be governed by
As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Rudisill cannot use his Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits concurrently. See Brief for Petitioner 39-40; ante, at 14. Under
How does Rudisill “elect” which benefits to receive? That is the core of the dispute in this case. In my view, the statute answers that question by requiring Rudisill to coordinate his entitlements and creating an election mechanism for him to do so. After barring the concurrent use of benefits in
The “coordination” here refers to a veteran choosing which “entitlement“-i.e., set of benefits he would like to use. The ordinary meaning of “coordination” is “[t]he action of arranging or placing in the same order, rank, or degree.” 3 Oxford English Dictionary 898 (2d ed. 1989); see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 447 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “coordinate” as “to place or arrange in proper order or position” and “to assume proper order or relation“); Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 501-502 (1981) (defining “coordination” as “arrangement in the same order, class, rank, or dignity” and “coordinate” as “to make coordinate; put in the same order or rank“). In this context, coordination refers to a veteran ordering his sets of benefits. A veteran‘s entitlement to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits necessarily requires “coordination” because he cannot use them concurrently, as subsection (a) prohibits such use. And, subsection (d) explains
Unsurprisingly, the coordination provision points to an election mechanism. As relevant, under
There is a consequence, however, for using this election mechanism. By making a
Rudisill is covered by the election mechanism and its accompanying limitation. He is entitled to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits. And, as of August 1, 2009, he had used, but retained unused, Montgomery benefits. Section
III
Rudisill and the majority make various attempts at avoiding the statute‘s inevitable conclusion, but none hits the mark. That is in large part because the statute‘s text, though complicated, is ultimately unambiguous. Accordingly, they do not dispute that Rudisill earned entitlements to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits and that he cannot use these entitlements concurrently. Ante, at 9, 14; Brief for Petitioner 25-26, 39-40. They do not dispute that he made an election to switch to Post-9/11 benefits. Ante, at 14; Brief for Petitioner 26-27; App. 1a. And, they do not dispute that, when he made that election, he had used, but retained unused, Montgomery benefits. Ante, at 7; Brief for Petitioner 26.
Instead, Rudisill‘s primary argument is that the specific provisions in the statute governing coordination and election do not apply to veterans who have multiple periods of service. But, Rudisill acknowledges that the text of
Rudisill‘s contrary argument is especially unconvincing given that Congress included other period-of-service limitations in the very subchapter at issue. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U. S. 8, 14 (2019) (“Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision“). Congress provided that a “period of service counted for purposes ... of an education loan under [a different program] may not be counted as a period of service for entitlement to educational assistance under this [Post-9/11] chapter.”
Next, Rudisill contends that the election mechanism in
The majority, for its part, takes a different tack. Its reasoning seems to rest on the theory that because Rudisill was “entitled” to Montgomery benefits and “entitled” to Post-9/11 benefits, those multiple entitlements cannot be limited when switching between benefits. Ante, at 9-10. But, the majority‘s own reasoning undermines that theory. It agrees that Rudisill cannot receive the full 72 months of benefits he earned because a separate statutory provision limits him to 48 months total. See ante, at 10;
The majority tries to justify its selective reading of the statute by suggesting that the coordination provision in
The majority‘s remaining arguments are simply critiques of Congress‘s policy judgments. The Court calls the Government‘s reading of the statute‘s election mechanism “nonsensical” because it requires a veteran to exhaust or forfeit his Montgomery benefits before switching to Post-9/11 benefits. Ante, at 17. But, in reality, the election mechanism offers a veteran in Rudisill‘s circumstance two paths. He may use 48 months of benefits by first using all 36 months of his Montgomery benefits, followed by 12 months of Post-
In any event, the wisdom of this limitation is not up to this Court. It was for Congress to decide what Post-9/11 benefits a veteran should receive retroactively. As Rudisill acknowledges, the Post-9/11 program is “far more generous” and, accordingly, costs much more than the Montgomery program. Brief for Petitioner 15. Perhaps the limitation on entitlement reflects a measure to manage this growing cost, given that “[p]assing a law often requires compromise.” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 306 (2017). Or, perhaps not. Either way, the limitation is what Congress enacted-whether the majority agrees with its fairness or not-and the text that Congress enacted must dictate the result in this case.
Moving even further away from the text, the majority hints that the veteran‘s canon could apply if the statute were ambiguous. Ante, at 18. The veteran‘s canon directs that “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran‘s favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). Yet, as the majority recognizes, this canon cannot apply when the statutory text is plain, so it has no role to play here. More importantly, substantive canons such as the veteran‘s canon rest on uncertain foundations. See Arizona v. Navajo Nation, 599 U. S. 555, 572 (2023) (THOMAS, J., concurring). I share JUSTICE KAVANAUGH‘s concern that the veteran‘s
IV
The Court holds that, although Rudisill must make some election to switch from his Montgomery to Post-9/11 benefits, the statute‘s corresponding limits do not apply because it would reduce the amount of available benefits. In my view, the Court ignores the statutory mechanism that Congress created in favor of an interpretation that reaches a desired outcome. I respectfully dissent.
