OPATI, IN HER OWN RIGHT AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF OPATI, DECEASED, ET AL. v. REPUBLIC OF SUDAN ET AL.
No. 17-1268
Supreme Court of the United States
May 18, 2020
590 U. S. ____ (2020)
GORSUCH, J.
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
OPATI, IN HER OWN RIGHT AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF OPATI, DECEASED, ET AL. v. REPUBLIC OF SUDAN ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 17-1268. Argued February 24, 2020—Decided May 18, 2020
Held:
Plaintiffs in a federal cause of action under
Sudan stresses that §1083(c) does not itself contain an express authorization of punitive damages. It does admit that §1083(c) authorizes plaintiffs to bring
This Court declines to resolve other matters raised by the parties outside the question presented. But having decided that punitive damages are permissible for federal claims and that the reasons the court of appeals offered for its contrary decision were mistaken, it follows that the court of appeals must also reconsider its decision concerning the availability of punitive damages for claims proceeding under state law. Pp. 6–12.
864 F. 3d 751, vacated and remanded.
GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except KAVANAUGH, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–1268
MONICAH OKOBA OPATI, IN HER OWN RIGHT, AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF CAROLINE SETLA OPATI, DECEASED, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May 18, 2020]
JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1998, al Qaeda operatives simultaneously detonated truck bombs outside the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds died, thousands were injured. In time, victims and their family members sued the Republic of Sudan in federal court, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in perpetrating the attacks. After more than a decade of motions practice, intervening legislative amendments, and a trial, the plaintiffs proved Sudan‘s role in the attacks and established their entitlement to compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, however, Sudan argued, and the court agreed, that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act barred the punitive damages award. It is that decision we now review and, ultimately, vacate.
*
For much of our history, claims of foreign sovereign immunity were handled on a piecework basis that roughly paralleled the process in Schooner Exchange. Typically, after a plaintiff sought to sue a foreign sovereign in an American court, the Executive Branch, acting through the State Department, filed a “suggestion of immunity“—case-specific guidance about the foreign sovereign‘s entitlement to immunity. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 487 (1983). Because foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of “grace and comity,” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689 (2004), and so often implicates judgments the Constitution reserves to the political branches, courts “consistently . . . deferred” to these suggestions. Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 486.
Eventually, though, this arrangement began to break down. In the mid-20th century, the State Department started to take a more restrictive and nuanced approach to foreign sovereign immunity. See id., at 486–487. Sometimes, too, foreign sovereigns neglected to ask the State Department to weigh in, leaving courts to make immunity decisions on their own. See id., at 487–488. “Not surprisingly” given these developments, “the governing standards” for foreign sovereign immunity determinations over time became “neither clear nor uniformly applied.” Id.,
at 488.
In 1976, Congress sought to remedy the problem and address foreign sovereign immunity on a more comprehensive basis. The result was the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). As a baseline rule, the FSIA holds foreign states and their instrumentalities immune from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See
Two years after Congress amended the FSIA, al Qaeda attacked the U. S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In response, a group of victims and affected family members led by James Owens sued Sudan in federal district court, invoking the newly adopted terrorism exception and alleging
Republic of Iran, 353 F. 3d 1024, 1033 (2004).
In response to that and similar decisions, Congress amended the FSIA again in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), 122 Stat. 338. Four changes, all found in a single section, bear mention here. First, in §1083(a) of the NDAA, Congress moved the state-sponsored terrorism exception from its original home in
Following these amendments, the *Owens* plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the new federal cause of action, and hundreds of additional victims and family members filed new claims against Sudan similar to those in *Owens*. Some of these new plaintiffs were U. S. nationals or federal government employees or contractors who sought
relief under the new
After a consolidated bench trial in which Sudan declined to participate, the district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. District Judge John Bates offered detailed factual findings explaining that Sudan had knowingly served as a safe haven near the two United States Embassies and allowed al Qaeda to plan and train for the attacks. The court also found that Sudan had provided hundreds of Sudanese passports to al Qaeda, allowed al Qaeda operatives to travel over the Sudan-Kenya border without restriction, and permitted the passage of weapons and money to supply al Qaeda‘s cell in Kenya. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 139–146 (DC 2011).
At that point, Sudan decided to appear and appeal. Among other things, Sudan sought to undo the district court‘s punitive damages award. Generally, Sudan argued, Congress may create new forms of liability for past conduct only by clearly stating its intention to do so. And, Sudan
continued, when Congress passed the NDAA in 2008, it nowhere clearly authorized punitive damages for anything countries like Sudan might have done in the 1990s.
The court of appeals agreed. It started by addressing the plaintiffs who had proceeded under the new federal cause of action in
The petitioners responded by asking this Court to review the first of these rulings and decide whether the 2008 NDAA amendments permit plaintiffs proceeding under the federal cause of action in
*
The principle that legislation usually applies only prospectively “is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265 (1994). This principle protects vital due process interests, ensuring that “individuals . . . have an opportunity to know what the law is” before they act, and may rest assured after they act that their lawful conduct cannot be second-guessed later. Ibid. The principle serves vital equal protection interests as well: If legislative majorities could too easily make new
laws with retroactive application, disfavored groups could become easy targets for discrimination, with their past actions visible and unalterable. See id., at 266–267. No doubt, reasons like these are exactly why the Constitution discourages retroactive lawmaking in so many ways, from its provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts, to its demand that any taking of property be accompanied by just compensation. See id., at 266.
Still, Sudan doesn‘t challenge the constitutionality of the 2008 NDAA amendments on these or any other grounds—the arguments we confront today are limited to the field of statutory interpretation. But, as
For its part, Sudan points to Landgraf. There, the Court observed that, “in decisions spanning two centuries,” we have approached debates about statutory meaning with an assumption that Congress means its legislation to respect the principle of prospectivity and apply only to future conduct—and that, if and when Congress wishes to test its power to legislate retrospectively, it must say so “clear[ly].” Id., at 272. All this is important, Sudan tells us, because when we look to the NDAA we will find no clear statement allowing courts to award punitive damages for past conduct.
But if Sudan focuses on the rule, the petitioners highlight an exception suggested by Altmann. Because foreign sovereign immunity is a gesture of grace and comity, Altmann reasoned, it is also something that may be withdrawn retroactively without the same risk to due process and equal protection principles that other forms of backward-looking legislation can pose. Foreign sovereign immunity‘s “principal purpose,” after all, “has never been to permit foreign
states . . . to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit in United States courts.” 541 U. S., at 696. Thus, Altmann held, “[i]n th[e] sui generis context [of foreign sovereign immunity], . . . it [is] more appropriate, absent contraindications, to defer to the most recent decision [of the political branches] than to presume that decision inapplicable merely because it postdates the conduct in question.” Ibid. And, the petitioners stress, once the presumption of prospectivity is swept away, the NDAA is easily read to authorize punitive damages for completed conduct.
Really, this summary only begins to scratch the surface of the parties’ debate. Sudan replies that it may be one thing to retract immunity retroactively consistent with Altmann, because all that does is open a forum to hear an otherwise available legal claim. But it is another thing entirely to create new rules regulating primary conduct and impose them retroactively. When Congress wishes to do that, Sudan says, it must speak just as clearly as Landgraf commanded. And, Sudan adds, the NDAA didn‘t simply open a new forum to hear a pre-existing claim; it also created a new cause of action governing completed conduct that the petitioners now seek to exploit. Cf. Altmann, 541 U. S., at 702–704 (Scalia, J., concurring). In turn, the petitioners retort that Altmann itself might have concerned whether a new forum could hear an otherwise available and pre-existing claim, but its reasoning went further. According to the petitioners, the decision also strongly suggested that the presumption of prospectivity does not apply at all when it comes to suits against foreign sovereigns, full stop. These points and more the parties develop through much of their briefing before us.
As we see it, however, there is no need to resolve the parties’ debate over interpretive presumptions. Even if we assume (without granting) that Sudan may claim the benefit of Landgraf‘s presumption of prospectivity, Congress was
as clear as it could have been when it authorized plaintiffs to seek and win punitive damages for past conduct using
Sudan‘s primary rejoinder only serves to underscore the conclusion. Like the court of appeals before it, Sudan stresses that §1083(c) itself contains no express authorization of punitive damages. But it‘s hard to see what difference that makes. Sudan admits that §1083(c) authorizes plaintiffs to bring claims under
Sudan next contends that
That takes us to Sudan‘s final argument. Maybe Congress did act clearly when it authorized a new cause of action and other forms of damages for past conduct. But because retroactive damages of the punitive variety raise special constitutional concerns, Sudan says, we should create and apply a new rule requiring Congress to provide a super-clear statement when it wishes to authorize their use.
We decline this invitation. It‘s true that punitive damages aren‘t merely a form a compensation but a form of punishment, and we don‘t doubt that applying new punishments to completed conduct can raise serious constitutional questions. See Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 281. But
clearly authorizes retroactive punitive damages in a manner a litigant thinks unconstitutional, the better course is for the litigant to challenge the law‘s constitutionality, not ask a court to ignore the law‘s manifest direction. Besides, when we fashion interpretive rules, we usually try to ensure that they are reasonably administrable, comport with linguistic usage and expectations, and supply a stable backdrop against which Congress, lower courts, and litigants may plan and act. See id., at 272–273. And Sudan‘s proposal promises more nearly the opposite: How much clearer-than-clear should we require Congress to be when authorizing the retroactive use of punitive damages? Sudan doesn‘t even try to say, except to assure us it knows a super-clear statement when it sees it, and can‘t seem to find one here. That sounds much less like an administrable rule of law than an appeal to the eye of the beholder.
*
With the question presented now resolved, both sides ask us to tackle other matters in this long-running litigation. Perhaps most significantly, the petitioners include a postscript asking us to decide whether Congress also clearly authorized retroactive punitive damages in claims brought by foreign-national family members under state law using
We decline to resolve these or other matters outside the question presented. The petitioners chose to limit their petition to the propriety of punitive damages under the federal cause of action in
Solicitor General observed this limitation in the question presented at the petition stage. See Brief for United States as *Amicus Curiae* 19, n. 8. The parties’ briefing and argument on matters outside the question presented has been limited, too, and we think it best not to stray into new terrain on the basis of such a meager invitation and with such little assistance.
Still, we acknowledge one implication that necessarily follows from our holding today. The court of appeals refused to allow punitive damages awards for foreign-national family members proceeding under state law for “the same reason” it refused punitive damages for the plaintiffs proceeding under
The judgment of the court of appeals with respect to punitive damages is vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
