Ruble v. ReamRuble v. Ream
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY {¶ 1} Nadine Ruble appeals from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Juanita Ream. She argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that
{¶ 2} On August 3, 1999, appellant received injuries in an automobile accident that appellee allegedly caused in Washington County, Ohio. At the time of the accident, both appellant and appellee resided in West Virginia.
{¶ 3} On August 1, 2001, appellant filed a complaint against appellee in Wood County, West Virginia. When she filed the complaint, appellant resided in West Virginia and she apparently believed appellee still did also. However, appellee had moved tо Pennsylvania. Thus, on September 18, 2002, the West Virginia court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.
{¶ 4} On November 26, 2002, appellant filed a complaint against appellee in Washington County, Ohio. Appellant‘s complaint noted that she initially filed the case in Wood County, West Virginia.
{¶ 5} Appellee subsequently filed a
{¶ 6} Appellee then countered that
{¶ 7} The trial court subsequently granted appellee‘s motion, concluding that neither
{¶ 8} In her two assignments of error, appellant argues that the trial court erroneously granted appellee‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Under
I
{¶ 9} Appellant first argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that the statute of limitations barred her cause of action. Appellant asserts that because appellee was absent from the state after her cause of action accrued,
{¶ 10} Appellee contends that cases decided since Couts have eroded its holding. Appellee asserts that under Bendix,
{¶ 11} Before we can address the merits of appellant‘s first assignment of error, we must initially consider whether we have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of
{¶ 12} Later, in George Shima Buick, Inc. v. Ferencak (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1211, 1212, 741 N.E.2d 138, the Ohio Supreme Court extendedCicco‘s service requirement to apply when the constitutionality of a statute is raised in a motion to dismiss filed in an ordinary civil actiоn. The court stated: “Each time a party legally challenges the constitutionality of a state statute, the party is, in essence, requesting the court to enter a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional. Even if the challenge is not initially raised in a `complaint for declaratory judgment’ pursuant to
{¶ 13} In Picklo, the court determined that it had applied Cicco “too zealously” in deciding that thе trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute when that issue was first raised in a motion to dismiss in an ordinary civil action. See Picklo, 96 Ohio St.3d at 197. The court thus overruled Ferencak, explaining: ”Cicco recognizes that
{¶ 14} Consequently, after Picklo, Cicco‘s service requirement appears to apply only when the constitutionality of a statute is raised in a declaratory judgment action and not when the issue is raised in a motion filed in an ordinary civil action. See Ferencak, 91 Ohio St.3d at 1213 (Cook, J., dissenting) (stating that
{¶ 15} Here, the complaint is an ordinary civil action seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Neither appellant nor apрellee has requested a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of
{¶ 16} Our analysis begins with the recognition that statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality and that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. See State v. Bennett (2002), 150 Ohio App.3d 450, 458, 782 N.E.2d 101 (citing State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 566 N.E.2d 1224). When possible, statutes must be construed in conformity with the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Id. (citing State v. Tanner (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 2, 472 N.E.2d 689). When there is more than one possible interpretation of a statute, we must construe the statute to save it from constitutional infirmities. Id. (citing State v. Sinito (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 98, 330 N.E.2d 896). Moreover, statutory language “`must be construed as a whole and given such interpretation as will give effect to every word and clause in it. No part should be treated as superfluous unless that is manifestly required, and the court should avoid that construction which renders a provision meaningless or inoperativе.‘” D.A.B.E., Inc. v.Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health (2002), 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 256, 773 N.E.2d 536 (quoting State ex rel. Myers v. Spencer Twp. Rural SchoolDist. Bd. of Edn. (1917), 95 Ohio St. 367, 372-73, 116 N.E. 516).
{¶ 17} A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to a particular set of facts. See Belden v.Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629, paragraph four of the syllabus; Oliver v. Feldner (2002), 149 Ohio App.3d 114, 121, 776 N.E.2d 499. The effect of a successful challenge will differ depending on whether the court strikes the statute on its face or as applied. Oliver, 149 Ohio App.3d at 121 “If a stаtute is unconstitutional as applied, the State may continue to enforce the statute in different circumstances where it is not unconstitutional, but if a statute is unconstitutional on its face, the State may not enforce the statute under any circumstances.” Women‘s Med. Professional Corp. v.Voinovich(C.A. 6, 1997), 130 F.3d 187, 193, quoted in Oliver, 149 Ohio App.3d at 121.
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} In Couts, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted
{¶ 20} Twenty-one years later, the Ohio Supreme Court again considered
{¶ 21} In concluding that
{¶ 22} Several years after Couts and Seeley were decided, the United States Supreme Court held that
{¶ 23} Subsequent to Bendix and Reynoldsville Casket, the Ohio Supreme Court considered
{¶ 24} Here, we conclude that under Bendix,
{¶ 25} Moreover, although both Couts and Seeley appear to support appellant‘s argument that
II
{¶ 26} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by determining that
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28} In Vaccariello, the court considered
{¶ 29} In Osborne, the court considered the limited question of whether
{¶ 30} Consequently, we agree with the trial court‘s decision that
Judgment Affirmed.
Evans, P.J. Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.