Charles M. Royall v. Allen Dicks, et. al.
No. 0597
In the Appellate Court of Maryland
April 3, 2026
Wells, C.J.
September Term, 2024
Publiсation of a defamatory statement occurs whenever the statement is communicated to someone other than the person being defamed; mass distribution is not required. At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege facts from which a court can reasonably infer the false statements were made to third parties under circumstances public enough for the plaintiff to have learned of them. The low threshold to plead publication does not require the plaintiff to allege he was present when the statements were made or to explain precisely how he learned of them.
In this case, Royall alleged Dicks made statements to two of Royall’s former co-workers, whom he identified by name, at Royall’s former workplace. These allegations were sufficient to plead publication.
DEFAMATION – DEFAMATION PER SE – PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT OF WETHERBY V. RETAIL CREDIT CO.
In Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237 (1964), the question of whether false statements about a person’s sexual orientation were defamatory per se was neither contested nor litigated. The case was tried on premises, agreed upon by the judge and counsel, that the statements were libelous per se, and it went to the jury solely on whether the defendant credit company had abused its qualified privilege to publish those statements. Because neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court of Maryland was called upon to decide whether false statements about sexual orientation are defamatory per se, Wetherby does not establish Maryland precedent on that question.
DEFAMATION – DEFAMATION PER SE – SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Under Maryland law, false statements about a person’s sexual orientation are not defamatory per se. A statement is defamatory per se only when its injurious character is a self-evident fact of common knowledge such that courts should excuse the plaintiff from pleading and proving reputational injury. Profound changes in the legal and cultural landscape—including the decriminalization of consensual same-sex activity, the constitutional recognition of same-sex marriage, and extensive federal and state antidiscrimination protections—reflect that our common experience has evolved such that misstating a private person’s sexual orientation does not presumptively demean that person or suggest he or she is deserving of social approbation. Treating such statements as defamatory per se would rest on the flawed premise that non-heterosexual orientation is inherently shameful or disgraceful, which is inconsistent with Maryland public policy and
In this case, because Dicks’ statements pejoratively calling Royall a “fag” were not defamatory per se, Royall was required to plead and prove actual reputational injury.
DEFAMATION – DEFAMATION PER QUOD – INSUFFICIENT PLEADING OF ECONOMIC INJURY
When a statement is not defamatory per se, it may still be actionable as defamation per quod, if the plaintiff pleads and proves actual reputational injury resulting in economic loss. The plaintiff must allege some specific claim of actual economic or pecuniary harm; lowered social standing and its purely social consequences are insufficient. A plaintiff’s subjective belief that he could not seek an employment reference from a former employer, without particularized allegations that the employer would have repeated the defamatory statements to prospective employers or that specific employment opportunities were lost because of the statements, does not satisfy this pleading requirement.
In this case, Royall alleged only that he lost unspecified employment opportunities and was scorned by former co-workers and that he believed he could not seek a reference from his former employer. Because these allegations did not establish a reasonable expectation that false statements about his sexual orientation would be repeated to prospective employers or otherwise cause economic loss, the Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for defamation per quod.
DEFAMATION – CONDUCT AS DEFAMATORY STATEMENT – HAND GESTURES
A single silent and equivocal gesture, such as a fist pump, does not constitute an affirmative adoption of another person’s defamatory statement when the plaintiff does not allege he witnessed the gesture and the gesture is alleged to be a repetition of the same gesture made in a different, non-defamatory context years earlier. It is too remote and speculative to infer from such a gesture that the person making it adopted the substance of the accompanying defamatory statement.
In this case, Jewell’s alleged “right on” hand gesture in response to Dicks’ statement did not constitute a separately actionable defamatory statement about Royall’s sexual orientation.
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 597
September Term, 2024
______________________________________
CHARLES M. ROYALL
v.
ALLEN DICKS, ET AL.
______________________________________
Wells, C.J.
Ripken,
Woodward, Patrick L.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wells, C.J.
______________________________________
Filed: April 3, 2026
Examining the statements alleged here – pejoratively calling Charles M. Royall, appellant, a “fag” to his former co-workers – we also conclude they were not defamatory under the circumstances alleged by Royall, i.e., defamatory per quod. Consequently, we will affirm the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County’s judgment dismissing without prejudice Royall’s complaint against his former supervisors, Allen Dicks2 and Keith Jewell, and his former employer, C&C Meat Sales (“C&C”) (together, “Appellees”).
Royall’s Initial Complaints
In March 2022, Royall filed a complaint against Dicks and Jewell in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Representing himself, he alleged “continued defamation of character and publications of defamation after/since the filing of” a prior lawsuit in which he had settled claims of sexual harassment and age discrimination during his employment.3 That handwritten form complaint does not allege any supporting facts or otherwise identify the nature of the defamatory statements. Royall requested compensatory damages of $200,000, plus interest and costs for “los[t] wages and future los[t] wages.”
On June 16, 2022, Royall filed a superseding complaint, adding a claim for workplace sexual harassment in violation of
According to Royall, “Dicks stated several times during the four years” Royall was working at C&C “that all Black Men that shave their face (removing all of the hair are
Dicks’ statements about Royall’s sexual orientation were “not only demonstrably false,” but “defamatory per se” because homosexuality “is a crime involving moral turpitude” that is prejudicial to “his career . . . and reputation[,]”which “were devastated when [Allen] Dicks terminated [him] back in June, 2018,” given he “was out of work for well over a year.” Royall alleged that because Dicks and Jewell “continue to make false statements about” his sexual orientation, he “can not (sic) tell a prospective employer” to contact C&C for an employment reference. Seeking “compensatory damages for the reputational harm he has suffered as a result of . . . [the] false and defamatory implication that [he] is a gay/homosexual[,]” Royall alleged this lawsuit represents his attempt “to clear his name” and “restore his reputation” by establishing “legal liability for [a] continuing campaign to push this falsehood that [he] is gay/homosexual.”
Appellees removed the case to the United States District Court for Maryland based on its jurisdiction over the federal
Because the Amended Comрlaint eliminates claims arising from events during Royall’s employment, it does not include all the factual allegations that appear in his previous complaints. Instead, Royall pleads that “[t]his defamation case arises from false accusations . . . that [he] is a homosexual[,]” which continued in the aftermath of his termination, “intending to harm [his] career, damage his reputation, and cause him emotional distress, which they did. This lawsuit seeks to right those wrongs.”
Alleging these “factual assertions that [he] is a stinking homosexual are categorically and demonstrably false” and “also defamatory per se[,]” Royall claims that “Dicks has this extreme belie[f] that is drilled in his brain: ‘that all Black American Men that shave all of the hair off their face are homosexual.’” Moreover, “these slanderous assertions” were “made with actual malice, knowing that their statements were false or in reckless disregard of the statements’ truth or falsity[,]” with the intent “to harm [Royall’s] career, damage his reputation, and cause him embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress.”
Royall alleges that, “unsurprisingly, [Appellees’] “statements had precisely that effect.” “As a direct result of [Appellees] slandering [his] character,” Royall claims that his “reputation and career sustained profound damages. [He] lost business opportunities and faced scorn from his former coworkers and colleagues.” In addition, he “suffered embar[]assment, humiliation, and emotional distress, in an amount to be determined at
Post-Remand Dismissal and Appeal
Through counsel, Appellees jointly moved to dismiss Royall’s Amended Complaint, contending that neither the alleged statements by Dicks calling him a “fag,” nor the hand gesture by Jewell allegedly adopting that statement, were defamatory, either on their face or in the circumstances described. Royall, citing Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 240 (1964), filed written opposition to the motion. In his pleadings and at the April 26, 2024 motion hearing, he argued that his Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for defamation because Wetherby stands for the proposition that under Maryland common law, making a false statement about a person’s sexual orientation is defamatory per se.
The circuit court disagreed, ruling Royall failed to state a claim against Dicks, Jewell, or C&C. Citing the reasons advanced by Appellees, the court gave no “weight to the . . . 1964 case cited by” Royall that “an allegation of homosexuality is defamation, per se.” After the court entered a written order dismissing Royall’s Amended Complaint without prejudice, Royall noted this timely appeal.
Continuing to represent himself in this Court, Royall raises twelve issues collectively challenging the dismissal of his claims on the ground his Amended Complaint adequately pleads a claim for defamation per se and per quod against all three defendants.5
- 1). Whether the Appellant stated a claim for defamation.
- 2). Whether the attorney for the Appellee made two improper arguments.
- 3). Whether the claim against the Appellee Allen Dicks should not be dismissed.
- 4). Whether the claim against the Appellee Keith Jewell should not be dismissed.
- 5). Whether the claim against the Appellee C&C MEAT SALES, Inc. should not be Dismissed.
- 6). Whether the Appellant stated a claim for defamation per se.
- 7). Whether the Appellant stated a claim for defamation per quod.
- 8). Whether the Appellant stated a claim for respondeat superior.
- 9). Whether the Appellee Allen Dicks statements were made from spite, intending to harm the Appellant’s career, damage the Appellant’s reputation, and cause embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress.
- 10). Whether the defamatory statements were published.
- 11). Whether Allen Dicks terminated the Appellant because the Appellant assaulted the Appellee Allen Dicks.
- 12). Whether the affidavit of the Appellant description of the Appellee Allen Dicks must be given serious consideration.
We review without deference the dismissal of Royall’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, asking whether the motion court was legally correct. See Hollabaugh v. MRO Corp., 491 Md. 165, 171 (2025). When doing so, we “assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to” Royall, as “the non moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them[.]” Id. (cleaned up). “[W]e will affirm the circuit court’s judgment on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised.” Sutton v. FedFirst Fin. Corp., 226 Md. App. 46, 74 (2015) (citation omitted).
To plead a claim for private defamation, a complaint must allege: (1) the defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person; (2) the statement was false; (3) the defendant was at fault in making the statement; and (4) the plaintiff suffered harm.6 See Piscatelli v. Van Smith, 424 Md. 294, 306 (2012). A false statement is defamatory when it exposes the plaintiff “to public scorn, hatred, contempt[,] or ridicule, thereby discouraging others in the community from having a good opinion of, or associating with, that person[.]” Seley-Radtke v. Hosmane, 450 Md. 468, 482-83 (2016).
[A]ctions or conduct as well as spoken or printed words could be actionable per se or per quod. The distinction is based on a rule of evidence and the difference between them lies in the proof of the resulting injury. In the case of words or conduct actionable per se, their injurious character is a self-evident fact of common knowledge of which the court takes judicial notice and need not be pleaded or proved.
In the case of words or conduct actionable only per quod, the injurious effect must be established by allegations and proof of special damage and in such cases it is not only necessary to plead and show that the words or actions were defamatory, but it must also appear that such words or conduct caused actual damages.
M & S Furniture Sales Co. v. Edward J. Bartolo Corp., 249 Md. 540, 544 (1968). See Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407 Md. 415, 441 (2009); Shapiro, 105 Md. App. at 773.
Under these standards, litigants pleading defamation have three advantages. First and second among these benefits, the “‘presumption of harm to reputation . . . aris[ing] from the publication of words actionable per se’” and “made with actual malice” means that Maryland courts do not require the plaintiff to either plead or prove reputational injury, on the theory that when “the words themselves impute the defamatory character, no innuendo – no allegation or proof of extrinsic facts – is necessary[.]” Indep. Newspapers, 407 Md. at 441 (cleaned up). See Harvey-Jones v. Coronel, 239 Md. App. 145, 155 (2018). “‘In other words, if the statement is defamatory per se, damages are presumed when a plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice, by clear and convincing evidence, even in the absence of proof of harm.’” Id. (quoting Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md. App. 483, 549-
Third, and equally important, when a statement is defamatory per se and made with malice, the plaintiff can recover three types of damages: actual (economic) damages, punitive damages, and presumed (or noneconomic) damages. See M & S Furniture, 249 Md. at 544; McClure v. Lovelace, 214 Md. App. 716, 739-40 (2013). In addition to lost income and out-of-pocket expenses, money “[d]amages for nonpecuniary harm” may be awarded for “the consequences of reputational harm” because “[t]he principal element of damages . . . is frequently the disagreeable emotion experienced by the plaintiff[,]” so noneconomic damages offer some “vindication” in the form of “a judgment for ‘compensatory’ damages that declares publicly that [the plaintiff] has been mistreated and that he was justified in resenting it.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 905 (1977), cmts. c, d. Such damages encompass “that form of mental distress known as humiliation, that is, a feeling of degradation or inferiority or a feeling that other people will regard him with aversion or dislike.” Id., cmt. d. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1975) (recognizing “that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss” because “the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment
In contrast, when the alleged statement is defamatory per quod because its harmful meaning must be evaluated in context, the plaintiff is required to plead and prove reputational injury. See M & S Furniture, 249 Md. at 544; Samuels, 135 Md. App. at 549. Although actual economic and punitive damages may be available for defamation per quod, a plaintiff cannot recover presumed damages for noneconomic injuries. See M & S Furniture, 249 at 544; Samuels, 135 Md. App. at 549-50.
The threshold decision about whether a particular statement is defamatory per se is a question of law for the court. See Seley-Radtke, 450 Md. at 483; Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 723 (1992). This Court reviews that decision de novo, asking whether the motion court was legally correct based on the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations. See Davis v. Frostburg Facility Ops., LLC, 457 Md. 275, 284-85 (2018).
DISCUSSION
As grounds for reversing the dismissal of his Amended Complaint, Royall invokes what he claims is “the traditional rule” at common law that “calling a person a homosexual is defamatory per se.” In his view, the practice of treating a false statement about a private person’s sexual orientation as defamatory per se is “binding on this Court” and “remains the law in Maryland—as articulated by Maryland’s highest court” in Wetherby v. Retail
Appellees challenge both the applicability of Wetherby and the viability of the rule advocated by Royall.7 They first contend the Amended Complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to establish publication of the disputed statements. Regarding the defamatory nature of those statements, they argue “the modern consensus is that falsely calling someone gay is not defamatory per se” because that “theory of liability relies upon an outdated belief that homosexuality is, by its very nature, shameful or odious, or worthy of public scorn and approbation.” Nor did Royall adequately plead a defamation per quod claim against any of
For reasons that follow, we conclude (1) Royall pleaded sufficient facts to establish publication; (2) Wetherby does not hold that false statements about sexual orientation are defamatory per se; (3) under Maryland law, false statements about sexual orientation are not defamatory per se; and (4) Royall failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the reputational injury required to plead defamation per quod against any of the Appellees.
I. The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges publication of false statements about Royall’s sexual orientation.
As a threshold matter, Appellees invite us to decide this appeal on a ground “not raised or decided in the trial court,” which is that “Royall did not sufficiently allege publication of the allegedly defamatory comment.” Citing Werber v. Klopfer, 260 Md. 486, 493, 496 (1971), Appellees contend Royall “did not allege publication of the allegedly defamatory comment beyond a closed universe of three to four people[,]” and that the Amended Complaint does not support a “fair inference . . . that the two to three people who allegedly heard the defamatory comment changed their opinion of Mr. Royall in any way after hearing it, let alone changed their opinion of him because they now understood him to be gay.” Given “Royall alleged no publication beyond the walls of the C&C Meat workplace, yet he asserts that he suffers emotional distress (from a conversation he did not personally hear) and that he was denied professional opportunities (by people who were also not present for the conversation in questiоn[,]” Appellees argue the Amended Complaint “pleads no credible nexus between a private workplace exchange among four
In his reply brief, Royall points out that publication occurs whenever a defamatory statement is “communicated to someone other than the person being defamed[,]” so “mass distribution” of a defamatory statement is not required. Here, he argues, the derogatory statements and gesture were intentionally published to “one or more third parties” with the understanding and intention that information would be “conveyed to a wider audience[,]” causing Royall harm he intended to prove at trial, which included obstacles to his employment prospects. According to Royall, the “immediate and obvious” effect of the disputed statements was that “after working at C&C . . . for four years[,]” he “could not tell a possible future employer to contact Allen Dicks and/or Keith Jewell for a reference.”
Werber does not support dismissal of Royall’s Amended Complaint for lack of publication. In Werber, the allegedly defamatory statement accompanied a lampoon, listing a faculty member of Duke University among others whom “dissident” students “had on campus to harangue the student body over the last several years[.]” 260 Md. at 487. This statement was undisputedly circulated by the defendant to fellow alumni association members he “knew personally,” four to six others who were “interested generally in the affairs of” the university, and “a few faculty members.” Id. at 491. At trial, the plaintiff conceded his “reputation was not adversely affected” and offered “no proof of any specific or out-of-pocket damages.” Id. at 489. After the defendant admitted he “had no knowledge” the plaintiff fit the derogatory descriptors he used in the lampoon (i.e., sex deviate, communist, or advocate of narcotics), thе trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff and
On appeal from a $5,001 judgment, our Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the defendant’s “statement was not libelous” as a matter of law. See id. Citing the lack of “evidence that any of the readers of the lampoon,” who were “generally well informed people who were also knowledgeable about the campus[,]” would “have understood” it to be defamatory, the Court found “it impossible to believe” readers would not have understood “the inclusion of Klopfer in the list of left wing individuals was merely to identify him as a fellow with leftist leanings, a circumstance which he freely admits.” See id. at 495, 496.
Because the Supreme Court did not address whether the statement in question was published, but instead focused on whether it was defamatory under the circumstances proved at trial, Werber does not support dismissal of Royall’s Amended Complaint. Although Royall does not allege he was present for the defamatory statements made by Dicks or the defamatory gesture by Jewell, or otherwise explain how he learned about them, he does allege these statements were made to two of Royall’s former co-workers, whom he identifies in the Amended Complaint as Timothy Mobley and Mark Close. At this pleading stage, we are obligated to assume the truth of that averment and to draw inferences that these false statements were made at Royall’s former workplace, under circumstances that were public enough for them to be heard by and/or repeated to others, so that Royall eventually learned about them. Even if the Amended Complaint contains scant information about the circumstances in which the allegedly false statements about
To the extent appellees otherwise rely on Werber to contend the false statements about Royall’s sexual orientation could not be defamatory because their audience would not have understood them to impugn Royall’s heterosexual orientation, we will address in the next three sections why those statements, as pleaded in the Amended Complaint, were not defamatory, either on their face or in the circumstances alleged.
II. Wetherby did not decide whether a false statement about a private person’s sexual orientation is defamatory per se.
In his principal challenge to the dismissal of his Amended Complaint, Royall contends the circuit court erred in ruling that neither Dicks’ descriptions of him as a “fag,” nor Jewell’s gesture of agreement, were defamatory per se because this Court is bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237 (1964), that such a false statement about sexual orientation is defamatory per se. We do not agree Wetherby reaches that question or requires that result.
In Wetherby, the two plaintiffs were denied insurance because defamatory statements about their sexual orientation were included in the defendant credit agency’s investigative report. See id. at 239. They “were turned down by several companies” from whom they sought “life insurance for business purposes” in their “real estate and mortgage business.” See id. These denials “apparently” occurred “as a result of reports on them which Retail Credit Company had sent insurance companies at the companies’ requests.” See id.
prepared the reports which suggested that the ladies gave loud and boisterous parties at which there was considerable drinking and, on occasions, ‘brawls,’ that neighbors have been led to strong susрicions ‘of Lesbian action between those women’ and said that ‘[i]nformants will not come out and state that they think the applicant [Wetherby] is ‘Lesbian’ but hint and hedge around and do everything but state it, saying that they definitely do not act like the feminine sex if they are.’
Before trial, court and counsel agreed this dispute was not over whether the report contained defamatory statements about the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation, but whether the defendant had a qualified privilege to publish those statements. It was undisputed “that the libels complained of were all based on reports made by the credit company in the regular course of its business and sent only to its own customers and revealed to no one else” and “that the files containing the results of the investigations leading to the reports and the copies of the reports were kept locked in the credit company’s office[,]” from which they were stolen by a man whom the plaintiffs hired to procure them. Id. at 239-40. The parties stipulated “that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege[.]”8 Id. at 239.
[t]he case was tried on the premises, understood by the judge and the lawyers for both sides, that there had been sufficient publications, the statements suggesting that the appellants were Lesbians were libelous per se and that the truth or falsity in fact of the suggestions was not material and not, as such, an issue in the case. On the question of liability, the case was tried and went to the jury on the narrow issue of whether the credit company had abused or exceeded its qualified privilege.
The testimony adduced on both sides was largely as to the methods employed in making the investigations, the people interviewed, the facts assembled, and the method of reporting these facts to the customers of the credit company.
Id. at 239-40 (emphasis added).
Based on this record, the trial judge
instructed the jury as to publication, as to what constituted defamatory matter (later instructing that to refer to a person as a Lesbian or as having Lesbian tendencies is libelous per se), that there was a qualified privilege in the credit company, and said:
‘And the defendant declares that because of the qualified privilege there has been no libel. That is its defense.
‘So the truth or falsity of the matters contained in those documents, those exhibits, is not in issue. The tru[th] does not have to be proven by [the defendant]; nor does the falsity have to be proven by [the plaintiffs]. You are not to consider truth or falsity whatsoever in this case; it simply is not an issue.
have a qualified privilege to publish defamatory statements collected in an investigation, as supported by the cited case law. See Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 239 (1964) (citing Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir. Ct. D. of Md., Morris, J.); Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 376; Annotation 30 A.L.R.2d 776; Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87; Simon v. Robinson, 221 Md. 200).
The court also instructed the jury that the conditional privilege to publish defamatory matter “may be lost” if its “scope . . . exceeds the exigency of the occasion or reveals more than is necessary for the purpose of the report,” or “if the defendant publishes such a report without believing in its truth or without reasonable grounds for believing in its truth[.]” Id. Only if jurors concluded the privilege was lost could the defendant credit company be liable, because “‘[e]ven if you should find the words themselves were libelous per se, and you found that the defendant used them in the scope of their qualified privilege without any abuse, then you would have to find for the defendant.’” Id. at 240-41.
On appeal from the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant credit agency, the sole issue was whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding “the narrow issue of whether the credit company had abused or exceeded its qualified privilege” to publish information received during its investigation. See id. Our Supreme Court held the trial judge “did not prejudice the [plaintiffs] in instructing that the truth or falsity of the words claimed to be defamatory was not an issue in the case, particularly since she added that even if the jury found the words were otherwise libelous, they were not actionable if the defendant published them in the exercise of its qualified privilege, without abuse.” Id. at 244.
Wetherby differs from this case in dispositive ways. First and foremost, the defamatory nature of those statements about the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation was neither contested, nor material, because that “case was tried on the premises, understood by the judge and the lawyers for both sides, that . . . the statements suggesting that the appellants
Because neither the trial court, nor the Supreme Court in Wetherby was called upon to dеcide whether those false statements about the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation were defamatory per se, Wetherby does not establish Maryland precedent on that question. We recognize Royall is not alone in misunderstanding and misapplying Wetherby. Although Maryland appellate courts have cited the decision only for its qualified privilege holding,9
III. Under Maryland law, a false statement about a private person’s sexual orientation is not defamatory per se.
Royall’s mistaken reliance on Wetherby rests on the factual premise we examine next—the “injurious character” of false statements about sexual orientation is a “self-evident fact of common knowledge” because misidentifying a private person as non-heterosexual inevitably has negative consequences for that individual’s reputation. See M&S Furniture Sales, 249 Md. at 544. Simply stated, Royall argues false statements about sexual orientation are so patently harmful to an individual’s reputation that Maryland courts should not require that individual to plead or prove that injury.
Appellees, pointing to significant legal and cultural changes shaping our common experience around sexual orientation, contend Royall’s “theory of liability relies upon an outdated belief that homosexuality is, by its very nature, shameful or odious, or worthy of public scorn and approbation.” Appellees ask us, instead, to follow “the modern cоnsensus”
In Appellees’ view, treating false statements about sexual orientation as defamatory per se would be inconsistent with decisions and rationales in landmark United States Supreme Court cases such as: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015), which collectively establish that “members of the LGBTQ+ community deserve ‘equal dignity in the eyes of the law.’” Acknowledging the lack of Maryland precedent, Appellees cite persuasive reasoning by other courts that have compared this evolution in legal and community standards surrounding sexual orientation to “the historical treatment of race in defamation law[,]” pointing out
that, as late as 1957, it was defamatory to falsely identify a White person as Black, but it was not defamatory to falsely identify a Black person as White. . . . because White people enjoyed such enhanced social status that a person could only benefit from being mistakenly thought of as White – but being Black was so inherently demeaning and degrading that a White person most certainly suffered reputational and personal harm under that misidentification.
See Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138-39 (D. Mass. 2004).
Appellees also argue the “bright line that Mr. Royall seeks to enforce against homosexuals as a class of people” amounts to a “judicial imprimatur” for prejudice and mistreatment that is “outdated” and has “no place in modern jurisprudence as a foundation for a defamation suit.” Cf. id. at 138 (“If this Court were to agree that calling someone a homosexual is defamatory per se,” that “would, in effect, validate that sentiment and
In reply, Royall disputes that “attitudes about someone identified as . . . other than heterosexual have ‘changed[,]’” pointing out that the “United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Alito sold shares of beer giant Anheuser-Busch INBEV as conservatives were ditching the BUD LIGHT brewer over its partnership with a transgender social media influencer[,]” as evidence that “peoples all over these United States are listening” to his “‘Mega Phone.’” In addition, he cites “Trump’s transgender ban . . . in the United States Military” and predicts “Men and Women serving in the U.S. Military that are perceived to be Homosexual” will be “force[d] . . . to leave.”
As we have explained, a false statement is defamatory per se when the reputational damage from that statement “needs no explanation” because its “injurious character is a self-evident fact of common knowledge of which the court takes judicial notice[.]” M&S Furniture, 249 Md. at 544; Samuels, 135 Md. App. at 549. Only in such circumstances do “the words themselves impute the defamatory character” so that “no innuendo—no allegation or proof of extrinsic facts—is necessary[.]” Indep. Newspapers, 407 Md. at 441 (cleaned up).
The statements that are easiest to classify as presumptively defamatory are ones that falsely impute the commission of a crime. See, e.g., Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632 (1993) (false accusation of theft against employee); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406 (1972) (false accusation of theft against customer); Simon v. Robinson, 221 Md. 200 (1959) (false allegation plaintiff fraudulently diverted and converted funds for his own personal use); Lewis v. Accelerated Transp.-Pony Express, Inc., 219 Md. 252, 254 (1959) (false statement that plaintiff’s truck stop was “nothing but a whorehouse”); Haines v. Campbell, 74 Md. 158 (1891) (false allegation of arson); Padgett v. Sweeting, 65 Md. 404 (1886) (false allegation of perjury). Other false statements commonly considered defamatory per se are those imputing the subject is diseased; unfit for his or her profession, trade, or business; or has committed “serious sexual misconduct.” See Restatement (Second) of Tоrts §§ 570, 574 (1977); 1 D. Elder, Defamation: A Lawyer’s Guide §§ 1:15 – 1:18 (Dec. 2025 update).
Maryland courts have held a range of false statements disparaging a person in a manner that negatively affects his or her employability or community reputation to be defamatory per se. In many cases, there is overlap, such as when the statement concerns criminal behavior or incompetent work. For example, this Court has recognized as defamatory per se a statement by a stadium vendor that an usher “is a thief[,]” Carter v. Aramark Sports & Ent. Svcs., Inc., 153 Md. App. 210, 238 (2003); a college president’s statement that a professor was discharged for “poor performance[,]” Samuels, 135 Md. App. at 544, 550; and a union agent’s statement insinuating that a union member “was untrustworthy and not a fit person to perform the type of work in which he specialized; that is, the installation of safes, bank vaults, safe deposit boxes, and other similar items.” Nistico v. Mosler Safe Co., 43 Md. App. 361, 367 (1979). Likewise, a law firm principal’s statements regarding a discharged attorney were defamatory per se because they “impute[d] . . . incapacity or lack of due qualification” that “would disqualify him or render
The premise supporting classification of these false statements as defamatory per se is that the resulting harm to reputation is so inevitable and apparent that courts should not require the plaintiff to plead and prove the actual injury. For example, false statements imputing child abuse are defamatory per se because that “is the kind of allegation that would expose the person about whom it was spoken to widespread scorn, hatred, and contempt.” Helsinki v. Rosenberg, 90 Md. App. 158, 165, rev’d on other grounds, 328 Md. 664, 675 (1992) (affirming psychologist defamed plaintiff by “brand[ing him] as a man who committed an act reviled by society, which also constitutes a felony[,]” but her testimony was privileged both in court and when repeated to journalists outside courtroom).
Although statements falsely alleging sexual misconduct historically have been treated as defamatory per se, changes in our common experiences surrounding what behavior qualifies as presumptively harmful have notably shrunk this category.12 For example, although statements imputing “unchastity” used to be defamatory per se –
Whether courts should treat statements falsely imputing that an individual is gay as defamatory per se is a question of law that necessarily reflects our evolving common experiences. See M&S Furniture, 249 Md. at 544. Based on our current legal and social climate, we conclude that misstating sexual orientation is not defamatory per se because, absent specific circumstances pleaded in the complaint, such statements are not so self-evidently harmful to the reputation of a non-public figure that courts should excuse the need to plead and prove reputational injury.
During the 62 years since Wetherby, profound changes in the legal landscape reflect widespread effort toward establishing what the United States Supreme Court has described as “equal dignity in the eyes of the law” without regard to sexuаl orientation. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015). Significantly, after the Supreme Court ruled in
Although none of those decisions directly affect defamation law, they reflect what the United States Supreme Court has recognized were “substantial cultural and political
For example, as the Lawrence majority observed in 2003, “[o]ver the course of the last decades, States with same-sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing them.” 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003). In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor specifically pointed to Texas’s presumption that “calling a person a homosexual is slander per se because the word ‘homosexual’ ‘impute[s] the commission of a crime[,]’” as one of the negative consequences to reputation that should and would be eliminated by the decriminalization of sexual activity between same-sex adults. See id. at 583-84 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
As these landmark decisions illuminate, the outcome of widespread discourse about sexual orientation has been profound,18 leading to legislative and judicial protections at
The arc of community-wide change continues to broaden protections for expressions of sexual orientation. Where our laws were silent, our General Assembly has added explicit language articulating public policy promoting equal treatment without regard to sexual orientation. See, e.g., supra notes 24, 25. A recеnt example occurred when—with overwhelming support in both the House of Delegates and Senate—the Maryland Equal Pay for Equal Work Act, was amended to add “sexual orientation” to the list of specific prohibitions against discrimination in wage payment and employment
The case before us is not the first time Maryland courts have been asked to recognize that changes in our interpretation of the law go hand-in-hand with changes in our community. A decade ago, Maryland’s Supreme Court expressly found, “[a]s reflected by these legal protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation” that we are recounting here, “our ‘common experience’ has evolved as a result of public and private anti-discrimination measures reflecting current attitudes.” Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51, 77 (2016). Overruling Maryland caselaw precedent “undermined by subsequent events,” in order to approve the application of de facto parenthood concepts to families with same-sex parents, our Supreme Court pointed to changing community attitudes about sexual orientation:
Our state’s recognition of same-sex marriage illustrates the greater acceptance of gays and lesbians in the family unit in society. See also Melina Constantine Bell, Gender Essentialism and American Law: Why and How to Sever the Connection, 23 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 163, 200 (2016) (“[G]ay men and lesbians, and same-sex couples are gaining greater acceptance in the U.S.”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 Colum.
More recent appellate decisions have prohibited the use of harmful sexual orientation stereotypes in criminal prosecutions. In Vangorder v. State, 266 Md. App. 1, 27 (2025), this Court held “evidence of sexual orientation is irrelevant in child sexual abuse cases when the child is pre-adolescent and when, as [in that case,] there is no evidence linking sexual orientation with child abuse[.]” In doing so, we followed Turenne v. State, 488 Md. 239 (2024), pointing out that “every member of Maryland’s Supreme Court agreed to the proposition, albeit in dicta, that evidence of an adult defendant’s sexual orientation either is not relevant to a defendant’s sexual attraction to children or that the risk of unfairly prejudicing a defendant by reinforcing a stereotype of gay and lesbian people outweighs any potential probative value such evidence might have.” See Vangorder, 266 Md. App. at 19-20 (citing Turenne, 488 Md. at 274 n.16) (recognizing that “where the defendant is gay or lesbian and is of the same gender as the alleged victim, an attempt to make such a connection is particularly concerning, because it ‘could be misinterpreted’ as ‘reinforc[ing] a terrible stereotype of gay and lesbian people’ and ‘perpetrating a pernicious falsehood about same-sex orientation’”) (quoting Turenne v. State, 258 Md. App. 224, 264 (2023)). Both decisions, rejecting attempts to link sexual orientation to criminal behavior, reflect the Maryland judiciary’s responsibility to ensure “equal dignity in the eyes of the law.” See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681.
As one of our fellow appellate courts observed in an eloquent and oft-cited analysis of arguments like those now before us, “the defamatory tendency of a statement depends ‘upon the temper of the times [and] thе current of contemporary public opinion,’” so “a statement that is ‘harmless in one age . . . may be highly damaging to reputation at another time[,]’” and vice versa. Yonaty v. Mincolla, 97 A.D.3d 141, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). Rejecting dicta from prior cases suggesting “statements falsely imputing homosexuality” were defamatory per se, the New York court held such “decisions are inconsistent with current public policy and should no longer be followed.” Id. We find this ruling and rationale persuasive:
Defamation “necessarily . . . involves the idea of disgrace[.]” Defendant and amici argue—correctly, in our view—that . . . cases categorizing statements that falsely impute homosexuality as defamatory per se are based upon the flawed premise that it is shameful and disgraceful to be described as lesbian, gay or bisexual. In fact, such a rule necessarily equates individuals who are lesbian, gay or bisexual with those who have committed a “serious crime”—one of the four established per se categories[.]
That premise is inconsistent with the reasoning underlying the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court held that laws criminalizing homosexual conduct violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court stated that people who are homosexual “are entitled to respect for their private lives” but “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination in both the public and in the private spheres.” These statements of the Supreme Court simply
[W]e locate “the public policy of [this] state in the law as expressed in statute and judicial decision and also [by] consider[ing] the prevailing attitudes of the community[.]” Rather than countenancing the view that homosexuality is disgraceful, [New York’s] Human Rights Law, since 2002, has expressly prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment, public accommodations, credit, education and housing. Most revealing of the respect that the people of this state currently extend to lesbians, gays and bisexuals, the Legislature passed the Marriage Equality Act in June 2011, which . . . gave same-sex couples the right to marry in New York, thereby granting them all the benefits of marriage, including “the symbolic benefit, or moral satisfaction, of seeing their relationships recognized by the State[.]” . . .
We note that the most recent Appellate Division decision considering the issue in depth was decided nearly 30 years ago. . . . In light of the tremendous evolution in social attitudes regarding homosexuality, the elimination of the legal sanctions that troubled the Second Department in 1984 and the considerable legal protection and respect that the law of this state now accords lesbians, gays and bisexuals, it cannot be said that current public opinion supports a rule that would equate statements imputing homosexuality with accusations of serious criminal conduct or insinuations that an individual has a loathsome disease[.] While lesbians, gays and bisexuals have historically faced discrimination and such prejudice has not been completely eradicated, “the fact of such prejudice on the part of some does not warrant a judicial holding that gays and lesbians [and bisexuals], merely because of their sexual orientation, belong in the same class as criminals[.]”
Id. at 777-78 (citations omitted).
Crediting the evolution of “our ‘common experience,’” evidenced by the growing number and scope of “legal protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation[,]” Conover, 450 Md. at 77, we conclude false statements about sexual orientation are not defamatory per se. Misstating a private person’s sexual orientation does not presumptively demean that person by suggesting he or she is deserving of social
[w]hat has not changed in the case law is the conclusion that the category “defamation per se” should be reserved for statements linking an individual to the category of persons “deserving of social approbation” like a “thief, murderer, prostitute, etc.” To suggest that homosexuals should be put into this classification is nothing short of outrageous.
Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139 (D. Mass. 2004), aff‘d on other grounds sub nom. Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005).
This Court declines to perpetuate the prejudice animating a presumption that misstating a person‘s sexual orientation injures his, her, or their reputation. Mindful that defamation per se is a common law concept, which is court-created and court-implemented, we recognize that under
Treating false statements about sexual orientation as defamatory per se would contradict both the letter and the spirit of
Ultimately, we conclude treating a false statement about sexual orientation as defamation per se rests on a factual premise that Maryland courts reject and requires a judicial role Maryland courts decline to play. No matter how many more steps still lie ahead along our judicial journey toward ensuring that litigants in Maryland are treated with equal dignity under the law, adopting a common law presumption that false statements about sexual orientation are defamatory per se would be a misguided step backward.
For these reasons, we hold that under Maryland law, a false statement about the sexual orientation of a person is not defamatory per se. In turn, the motion court did not err in ruling Royall‘s Amended Complaint does not plead a claim for defamation per se.
IV. The Amended Complaint does not state a claim for defamation per quod.
We consider next whether, as Royall insists, he pleaded sufficiеnt facts to state a claim that the statements about his sexual orientation were harmful in the circumstances alleged, i.e., defamation per quod. Appellees argue the motion court did not err in dismissing Royall‘s Amended Complaint because (a) nothing “suggest[s] that the alleged
A. The Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish that Dicks made defamatory statements about Royall‘s sexual orientation but does not allege sufficient facts to establish Jewell did so.
1. The allegations against Dicks are sufficient to plead defamatory statements.
Appellees contend “[t]he alleged publication does not amount to a suggestion of homosexuality” because it was not “a statement of fact,” but merely “colorful, hyperbolic language[.]” In their view, “[t]o the extent Mr. Royall bases his claim on Mr. Dicks’ perceived labelling of him as a homosexual man,” “he is being overly literal in his interpretation of the word used[,]” based on “an outdated notion that being called those terms to indicate a sexual orientation is derogatory.” Appellees ask us to recognize instead that even though the pejorative term “fag” allegedly spoken by Dicks “has historically been invoked to describe homosexual men[,]” the mere use of that term “is not sufficient to prove that Mr. Dicks believes that Mr. Royall has sex with men, let alone that he intended to communicate that as fact[,]” given this word, “including its homosexual undertones[,]”
In support, Appellees cite to Theno v. Tongaonoxie Unified Sch. Distr. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 964-65 (D. Kan. 2005), and Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F. 3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999). We find both cases inapposite because the facts, decisions, and rationales do not support the broad proposition advanced by Appellees that homophobic epithets cannot have a defamatory meaning. Neither case involves a defamation claim, and both were decided before employment discrimination based on sexual orientation was recognized as a viable cause of action under Title VII of the
Nor does the decision in Werber v. Klopfer, 260 Md. 486 (1971)—that the derogatory lampoon in that case was not defamatory as a matter of law—require dismissal of Royall‘s claims. In contrast to the post-trial review of evidence conducted by the appellate court in that case, we are reviewing these alleged statements in the light most favorable to Royall, as the party opposing dismissal. See Hollabaugh v. MRO Corp., 491 Md. 165, 171 (2025). To be sure, “obscenities, vulgarities, insults, epithets, name-calling, [or] other verbal abuse” may be “obnoxious, insulting, or tasteless[,]” but these are “regarded as a part of life for which the law of defamation аffords no remedy.” Rodney A.
2. The allegations against Jewell are not sufficient to plead defamatory statements.
Although Royall sufficiently alleged Dicks made defamatory statements about his sexual orientation, we agree with the motion court that Royall did not allege sufficient facts
We agree with the motion court that it is simply pleading a “bridge too far” to speculatively stretch the meaning of that single silent and equivocal gesture by Jewell—which Royall does not allege he witnessed—into an affirmative adoption of Dicks’ false statement about Royall‘s sexual orientation. By Royall‘s own account, Jewell‘s gesture was a repetition of the same gesture he used when reacting to the termination of Royall‘s employment three years earlier. Given Royall does not allege Jewell‘s earlier gesture responded to a false statement about Royall‘s sexual orientation, we cannot reasonably infer merely repeating the same gesture three years later amounted to Jewell affirmatively adopting Dicks’ use of the term “fag” in that moment. It is too remote and too speculative to fill in those blanks in Royall‘s Amended Complaint. Cf. Montgomery Investigative Servs., Ltd., 173 Md. App. at 217 (recognizing “a defamation—a false accusation of theft—may be published by conduct as surely as by express words“); Tanner v. Pillsbury Mills, 281 P.2d 391, 392 (Utah 1955) (holding defendant‘s “occasional nod of the head, . . . signifying either ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ or an ‘acquiescence’ or a ‘disagreement‘” with statements being made about the plaintiff was not sufficient to plead defamation because those gestures were “so far removed from the claimed fact, so impotent in establishing a slander, and so closely akin to conjecture as to be worthy of little more than its mention here“).
Because Royall‘s false statements are not defamatory per se, he had to allege actual reputational injuries resulting in economic loss. See M & S Furniture, 249 Md. at 544; Samuels, 135 Md. App. at 549-50. Although false statements about sexual orientation could have an adverse economic impact in a range of possible scenarios, none are alleged here.
The Amended Complaint alleges only that as a result of Dicks’ post-employment statements about his sexual orientation and Jewell‘s hand gesture—which he claims occurred on November 21, 2021, more than three years after his employment ended in June 2018—he lost “employment opportunities” and was “scorn[ed]” by former co-workers. With respect to those injuries, he specifically explains that as a result of these statements, he believed he could not seek an employment reference from C&C. This is the sole factual basis proffered by Royall for his claim that false statements about his sexual orientation harmed his employability or otherwise caused economic injury.
Royall‘s economic harm allegation starkly contrasts with the scenario in Wetherby, where the parties stipulated those false statements about the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation undisputedly caused the plaintiffs to be denied business insurance. See id. at 239-40. Likewise, in contrast to defamatory statements that impugned a former employee‘s qualifications to practice law and medicine, respectively litigated in Shapiro, 105 Md. App. at 775-77, and Adventist Healthcare, Inc. v. Behram, 488 Md. 410, 429 n.13 (2024), Royall
To be sure, “[s]pecial harm may be a loss of presently existing advantage, as a discharge from employment[,]” or “a failure to realize a reasonable expectation of gain, as the denial of employment which, but for the currency of the slander, the plaintiff wоuld have received.” Restatement (Second) Torts § 575 (emphasis added). Cf., e.g., Adventist Healthcare., 488 Md. at 429 n.13 (noting hospital did not appeal this Court‘s holding that doctor stated defamation claim based on hospital‘s report to national databank regarding disputed circumstances leading to loss of hospital privileges); King v. U.S. Bank Nat‘l Ass‘n, 53 Cal. App. 5th 675, 704 (2020) (affirming defamation judgment based on substantial evidence that employer lacked reasonable grounds to believe truth of defamatory statements that it republished with malice to prospective employers, reporting that former employee falsified reports and employment records).
Although Royall averred in earlier pleadings that he was out of work for over a year after being terminated in June 2018, the statements identified in this complaint occurred in November 2021, so they could not reasonably have induced him to refrain from seeking a reference from C&C during that entire three-year period. In any event, given broad
Nor did Royall otherwise plead economic injury resulting from the “scorn” of his former co-workers. Because the disputed statements about his sexual orientation were not defamatory per se, he was required to allege “some kind of economic or pecuniary loss[,]” other than “lowered social standing and its purely social consequences[.]” Restatement (Second) Torts § 575 cmt. b. See M & S Furniture, 249 Md. at 544. He does not сlaim that his loss of reputation among former co-workers caused him a “material loss capable of being measured in money” based on “the lowered social standing resulting from the” alleged defamation. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 575 cmt. b.
Rather than pleading facts establishing a reasonable expectation that false statements about his sexual orientation would be repeated to prospective employers, Royall simply invokes language from a 33-year-old Missouri decision holding that a false imputation of homosexuality was actionable because “[a]ttitudes change slowly and unevenly among different groups[,]” stating that “[d]espite the efforts of many homosexual groups to foster greater tolerance and acceptance, homosexuality is still viewed with
Because Royall does not plead facts from which a fact-finder could conclude he suffered economic loss from two false statements about his sexual orientation by a former supervisor more than three years after his employment ended, his Amended Complaint does not plead a defamatory injury. Absent “some specific claim of actual harm” to Royall, “he is doing nothing more than trading in the same kinds of stereotypes that recent case law and good sense disparage.” Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 139. In turn, because the Amended Complaint fails to allege the core reputational injury element of a defamation per quod claim, the motion court did not err in dismissing the Amended Complaint against all three appellees.28
CONCLUSION
We conclude that under Maryland law, a false statement about the sexual orientation of a person who is not a public figure is not defamatory per se, because in our common experience, such statements are not so self-evidently harmful that courts should presume reputational injuries without pleading or proof. In turn, because the statements alleged here,
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE‘S COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
- 1. In a defamation action, is a complaint subject to dismissal where the plaintiff does not allege publication of the allegedly defamatory comment beyond a small closed group of individuals?
- 2. Did the Circuit Court err in finding that calling a person by a derogatory slur for a homosexual man, when that person is not homosexual, is not defamatory?
- 3. Did the Circuit Court err in finding that the Complaint did not allege sufficient facts to support a claim of defamation per quod?
- 4. Did the Circuit Court err in finding that an ambiguous hand gesture, purportedly signaling agreement with the allegedly defamatory statement, could not independently constitute actionable defamation as a matter of law?
- 5. Did the Circuit Court err in dismissing the tort claims against C&C Meat Sales for failure to sufficiently plead a basis for liability?