Bonnie J. ROWE, Individually and as Guardian of the Person and Estate of James W. Rowe, Petitioner, Respondent, v. ST. PAUL RAMSEY MEDICAL CENTER, Petitioner, Ramsey Health Care, Inc., et al., Petitioner, Appellants.
No. C1-90-610
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Aug. 2, 1991
472 N.W.2d 640
MEMORANDUM
The court of appeals in its оpinion neglected to address one of the issues raised by petitioner in his appeal to the court of appeals, specifically, whether the trial court, in excluding certain evidence presented by the defense, denied petitioner his right to present evidencе in his defense. Rather than grant the petition and remand to the court of appeals, we have addressed this issue in our consideration of the petition for review and have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the evidentiary rulings in question.
WAHL, J., took no part.
Alan R. Vanasek, Thomas M. Countryman, Jardine, Logan & O‘Brien, St. Paul, for appellants.
W. Scott Herzog, Peter A. Koller, Moss & Barnett, Minneapolis, for respondent.
James Alexander, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, amicus curiae.
WAHL, Justice.
The parties to this medical malpractice appeal seek a determination as to whether the claim of a spouse for loss of consortium and the claim of a health insurer for medical expenses are included within a single $200,000 limitation of liability for a claim of personal injury pursuant to the municipal liability provisions of
James Rowe and his wife, Bonnie Rowe, were involved in an automobile accident near Amery, Wisconsin on January 26, 1987. James Rowe was seriously injured and was air lifted from a local hospital to St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center (SPRMC). At SPRMC on February 27, 1987, James Rowe underwent emergency surgery to remove his gall bladder. After surgery, it was discovered that his blood sugar level had dropped tо zero, a condition that caused severe, irreparable brain damage. James Rowe was reduced to a persistent vegetative state and resides in a nursing home where he is expected to remain for the rest of his life.
SPRMC is treated as a municipality under
Rowe, HMOM and SPRMC entered into a stipulation in late 1989 to remove all issues from the suit except the question concerning the statutory limitation of SPRMC‘s liability under section 466. The parties stipulated, inter alia, that James Rowe‘s personal injuries exceed $200,000, that Rowe‘s consortium claim has a value of $175,000, and that HMOM‘s subrogated claim amounts to $316,000. SPRMC agreed to pay, and has paid, $200,000 to Rowe as guardian for James Rowe.
The parties stipulated that the uncompensated сlaims of Bonnie Rowe and HMOM “shall be viewed as fully paid, satisfied and released” if the courts of this state answer in the affirmative the following question of law, which they submitted to the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment:
Are the “claims” of a spouse for loss of consortium and the “claims” of a subro-
gated group health insurance [sic] [both] encompassed within a single $200,000 limitation of liability for a “claim” for personal injury pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 466.04 and§ 246A.18 ?
The trial court determined that neither consortium nor the subrogated claim was subject to a separate limitation of liability, but rather that both claims were subject to the single $200,000 cap that applied to the injured party‘s claims. Summary judgment was granted to SPRMC on both counts. Rowe appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision that HMOM was not entitled to a separate limitation of liability for its subrogatеd claim. By a 2-1 decision, however, the panel reversed the trial court and held that Rowe was entitled to a separate limitation of liability for her loss of consortium claim. Rowe v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, 460 N.W.2d 98 (Minn.App. 1990). We granted the petitions of both parties for further review.
I.
We are asked to determine whether a sрouse‘s claim for loss of consortium is entitled to the application of a separate damage cap under the Municipal Liability Statute,
466.04 MAXIMUM LIABILITY
Subdivision 1. Limits; punitive damages. (a) Liability of any municipality on any claim within the scope of sections 466.01 to 466.15 shall not exceed:
(1) $200,000 when the claim is one for death by wrongful act or omission and $200,000 to any claimant in any other case;
(2) $600,000 for any number of claims arising out of a single occurrence; * * *
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*
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Subd. 2. Inclusions. The limitation imposed by this section on individual claimants includes damages claimed for loss of services or loss of support arising out of the same tort.
We first consider whether Bonnie Rowe is “any claimant” under Subdivision 1 with a separate claim independent of her injured husband‘s claim. The court of appeals cited this court‘s decision in Huffer v. Kozitza, 375 N.W.2d 480 (Minn.1985) as controlling authority on this issue. In Huffer, we held that a wife‘s claim for loss of consortium, while derivative from her husband‘s personal injury claim, is a sеparate claim with separate injuries. Pursuant to Huffer, the loss of consortium claimant qualifies as “any claimant” under subdivision 1 and is therefore entitled to a separate application of the damages cap under that subdivision unless such application is precluded by the lаnguage of subdivision 2.
The critical question then is not whether Bonnie Rowe is “any claimant” under the statute but whether a separate damages cap for her loss of consortium claim is precluded by section 466.04, subdivision 2. The trial court, relying on the court of appeals’ decision in Brandt v. State, 428 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.App.1988) which construed virtually identical language in the State Tort Claims Act (
Subdivision 2 provides that the limitation on municipal liability imposed by section 466.04 on individual claimants “includes damages claimed for loss of services or loss of support arising out of the same tort.” Rowe argues that this language is intended to prevent manipulatiоn of claims for tangible economic losses and avoid double recovery. Subdivision 2, according to Rowe, precludes separate recovery only for the tangible elements of loss of consortium such as household chores and duties, but does not preclude sepаrate damages for the intangible elements, particularly comfort, companionship, and sexual relationship, which are also encompassed by the loss of consortium claim. See, e.g., Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 510-11, 170 N.W.2d 865, 867-68 (1969). In short, she argues that “loss of services” is not synonymous with the broad claim of “loss
In order to analyze Rowe‘s claims, we must look at the historical context in which
It is, moreover, unlikely that the legislature intended to draw a distinction between tangible and intangible elements of the claim of loss of consortium and to preclude application of a separate damages caр to the former but not the latter. Historically, as SPRMC points out, “loss of services” and “loss of consortium” have been defined and accepted as essentially equivalent. See Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); See also, Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1984) (“the loss of services element has become identified with a recovery for all of the traditional еlements of common law consortium“). Given this historical context, we conclude that the legislature intended to include all elements of the loss of consortium claim in the limitation prescribed in subdivision 2.
Public policy considerations support this conclusion. Section 466 was enacted in 1963, shortly after this court prospectively abolished the sovereign immunity of municipalities in Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962). Act approved May 22, 1963, ch. 798, 1963 Minn. Laws 1396. This court subsequently upheld statutes imposing limits on sovereign liability in recognition of the legislature‘s legitimate public purpose in protecting the fiscal integrity and stability of the government. See Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn.1989); Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 867 (Minn.1988). The statutory preclusion of separate municipal liability for derivative loss of consortium claims that arise from the same tort is a rational means of protecting the fiscal stability of government. Thus, under the statute, the spouse may recover for loss of consortium damages, but only to the extent that the injured party‘s damages have not already consumed the maximum amount recoverable under the cap.
This case is distinguishable from Faber v. Roelofs, 298 Minn. 16, 25, 212 N.W.2d 856, 862 (1973) where we relied on the “any claimant” language in Section 466.04, subd. 1(a)(1) to apply separate liability caps to a child‘s сlaim for personal injury and his father‘s claim for the child‘s medical expenses. The law, as reflected in Faber, recognizes a separate injury to the parent of an injured child. The father in Faber was a separate claimant whose separate claim for medical expensеs was not precluded by subdivision 2 of Section 466.04.
Here, the derivative claim for loss of consortium, although recognized as a separate claim, is a “claim for loss of services or loss of support arising out of the same tort” which is not entitled to a separate limitation of liability under the Municipal Liability Statute. Reversing the court of appeals on this issue, we hold that a spouse‘s claim for loss of consortium is included in the same liability cap that limits recovery by the injured spouse under
II
We now determine whether a health insurer with a subrogated claim for medical expenses is a separate claimant entitled to a separate liability cap under
The court of appeals has considered application of provisions in the State Tort Claims Act virtually identical to Section 466.04 to an employer‘s claim to a separate damages cap for payment of an employee‘s medical еxpenses. Bekis v. Schilling, 357 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.App.1984). The Bekis court held that an employer‘s claim was separate and distinct and thus entitled to a separate liability cap under the statute. Id. at 365 (citing Faber v. Roelofs, 298 Minn. 16, 212 N.W.2d 856 (1973)). The result in that case, however, was compelled by a workers’ compensation statute that provides for a separatе cause of action by the employer to recover medical expenses paid to the employee. 357 N.W.2d at 365 (citing
Our decision on this issue is further supported by the poliсies that underlie subrogation: (1) to prevent double recovery, and (2) to allocate payment according to fault. See Westendorf by Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn.1983). Neither purpose is violated here. No double recovery is had by the injured party. The municipality, the party at fault, has paid to the full extent of its maximum liability. Subrogation is not intended to extend the liability of the tortfeasor which, in this case is capped at $200,000. As with the consortium claimant, the subrogee is entitled to recover from the municipality to the extent that the subrogor‘s damages have not consumed the entire $200,000 limit prescribed in the statutе.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a medical provider with a subrogated claim for medical expenses is not a separate claimant entitled to a separate liability cap under
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals on the lоss of consortium claim and reinstate the judgment of the trial court on this issue. We affirm the court of appeals on the subrogation issue.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
YETKA, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. It is well established in our law that wife and husband, subject to certain conditions, have separate claims for loss of consortium. Huffer v. Kozitza, 375 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Minn.1985); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969). In my view, а claim for loss of consortium, as the court of appeals pointed out, comprises undefined or intangible elements as well as “services” and “support” as those terms are used in