ROUNTREE v. THE STATE
S23A0531
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 21, 2023
Quavion S. Rountree appeals his conviction for malice murder in connection with the shooting death of Anahitdeep Singh Sandhu.1
Rountree contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter and on mutual combat. Because Rountree has failed to carry his burden of showing plain error, we affirm.
The evidence submitted at trial shows the following.2 On April 28, 2019, Sandhu and his fellow United States Marine, Desmen Worley, were on furlough, visiting Worley‘s hometown and staying at Grimaldi Miro‘s apartment in the same apartment complex where Rountree lived. That afternoon, Sandhu and Miro walked to Rountree‘s apartment for the purpose of trading a prescription medication containing codeine for ecstasy pills. When Rountree said that he did not have any pills, all of them walked out of the apartment. Rountree said that he considered Sandhu a “threat,” although Miro did not see Sandhu flash a gun or do anything that was threatening. Sandhu and Miro then walked back to Miro‘s apartment.
Rountree called Delvin Ross, walked away from his apartment, and told Miro and others that he “felt like doing something stupid.” They could tell Rountree was “angry” and
Rountree went to Miro‘s apartment, and Sandhu came out and stood in the doorway. Rountree pointed Ross‘s pistol at Sandhu and told him to turn over the gun and the prescription drug that he had. When Sandhu lowered his hands to reach for the gun in his waistband, Rountree shot him several times, fatally wounding him. Several eyewitnesses testified that Rountree shot Sandhu, and they gave other testimony consistent with the preceding summary of the evidence.
Rountree testified that he was in his apartment with his two children and his fiancée when Miro and Sandhu came over; that he saw Sandhu had a firearm; that he feared for his life and his children‘s lives; that he ushered Miro and Sandhu outside where Sandhu used racial epithets and asked Rountree if he “want[ed] to do this out here or inside,” which Rountree took as a threat; that he thought they were trying to rob him; that he called Ross and, when Ross arrived, took the pistol from him and chambered a round; that he went to tell Sandhu to stay away from his apartment; and that he shot Sandhu after he saw Sandhu reach for his gun. Based on this testimony, the jury was charged on the defense of justification at Rountree‘s request.
1. Rountree contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to charge the jury on mutual combat and on voluntary manslaughter. He concedes that the omission of the mutual-combat instruction can be reviewed for plain error only, but contends that he preserved for ordinary appellate review his enumeration pertaining to the voluntary-manslaughter instruction. He has not, however, so we review both contentions for plain error only.
Rountree argues that his objection at the charge conference to the omission of his requested instruction on voluntary manslaughter was sufficient to preserve the issue for ordinary appellate review. However, “[o]bjections at a charge conference do not suffice to preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given.” Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342, 347 (6) (721 SE2d 80) (2012). In this case, Rountree made no objection when the trial court finished reading the charge to the jury. Instead, after the trial court excused the jury and asked if the parties had objections to the charge, defense counsel answered, “No, your Honor.” Because of Rountree‘s failure to make any objection to the charge as given, both his contention relating to the trial court‘s omission of his requested instruction on voluntary manslaughter and his contention regarding omission of an instruction on mutual combat can be reviewed only for plain error. See
2. As for Rountree‘s contention that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, he has shown no error, much less plain error.
A person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter if he “causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder” and “acts solely
In support of his argument that the evidence required the trial court to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, Rountree relies primarily on his own testimony that he was fearful for the lives of his children and himself because Sandhu brought a weapon to his home. But “neither fear that someone is going to pull a weapon nor fighting are the types of provocation that demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.” Behl, 315 Ga. at 816 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Rountree also testified that Sandhu used threatening words and racial epithets. But “angry statements alone ordinarily do not amount to ‘serious provocation’ within the meaning of
Accordingly, there was no evidence whatsoever of serious provocation sufficient to excite a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person such that Rountree would have been entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. See id. And Rountree, therefore, has failed to meet the plain-error test.
3. With respect to Rountree‘s contention that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on mutual combat, he merely “adopts” his previous “argument and citation of authority” regarding the omission of a voluntary manslaughter charge. However, Rountree never explains why it was error, much less plain error, not to charge specifically on mutual combat. Indeed, the evidence presented at trial, including that which Rountree argues in support of his claim of error in the omission of a voluntary manslaughter instruction, does not show “a willingness, a readiness, and an intention upon the part of both parties to fight” and therefore does not require a charge on mutual combat. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. 459, 463 (1) (863 SE2d 127) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying a request to charge on mutual combat
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.