Rose Woods, LLC v. WeismanRose Woods, LLC v. Weisman
In a proceeding pursuant to
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
On May 30, 2008, the petitioners submitted, to the Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Board (hereinafter the Planning Board), a final subdivision application for a four-lot residential development, which included individual sewer pumps on each lot. In a memorandum dated June 11, 2008, the Town of Poughkeepsie Sewer Department (hereinafter the Sewer Department) commented that individual pumps were not acceptable, and that one pump must serve the four lots. Additionally, in a letter from
Thereafter, the Planning Board adopted two resolutions granting the petitioners 90-day extensions for final subdivision approval. In a letter from the petitioners’ retained engineer to the chair of the Planning Board dated February 13, 2009, the petitioners requested final subdivision approval. In that letter, the petitioners also referred to the restriction set forth in the Sewer Department‘s comments, informing the Planning Board that, contrary to the restriction, “[t]he subdivision has been designed with individually owned pump stations and force mains.” In a letter dated June 9, 2009, the Sewer Department reiterated to the petitioners that individual pumps were unacceptable, as such pumps had presented maintenance problems in the past. On June 16, 2009, the day before the last extension for final subdivision approval was to expire, the petitioners commenced this proceeding pursuant to
Initially, we agree with the Supreme Court that relief in the nature of mandamus is not available in the instant case. The extraordinary remedy of mandamus is available in limited circumstances only to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act which does not involve the exercise of official discretion or judgment, and only when a clear legal right to the relief has been demonstrated (see Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525, 539 [1984]; Matter of Horowitz v. New York City Police Dept., 82 AD3d 887 [2011]). Such relief does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary act by a Planning Board, its chair, or any other municipal agency (see Matter of Inn at Hunter, Inc. v. Village of Hunter, 35 AD3d 1072 [2006]; Matter of Kroll v. Village of E. Hampton, 293 AD2d 614 [2002]; Matter of Smith v. Board of Appeals of Town of Islip, 202 AD2d 674 [1994]; Matter of Young v. Town of Huntington, 121 AD2d 641 [1986]).
The petitioners’ remaining contentions are without merit.
Prudenti, P.J., Angiolillo, Florio and Cohen, JJ., concur.