ROSE B.* v. PRINCESS DICKSON DAWSON
(AC 39695)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued May 31—officially released August 29, 2017
DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Mullins, Js.
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interest of the applicant for a protective order, we decline to identify the applicant or others through whom the applicant’s identity may be ascertained.
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Syllabus
The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff’s application for a civil protection order. The plaintiff had filed the application, pursuant to statute (
- The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the application because the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to warrant such relief; because the record did not contain either a memorandum of decision or a transcribed copy of an oral decision signed by the trial court stating the reasons for its decision as required by the rules of practice (
§ 64-1 [a] ), and the defendant merely included a copy of three pages of the trial transcript that was not signed by the court, which did not reveal the factual or legal bases for the court’s decision, this court’s review of the record did not afford it a basis on which to conclude that errors were made, and this court would not speculate with regard to the rationale of the trial court’s decision nor presume that the court acted erroneously. - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for reconsideration, in which she alleged that because the application filed by the plaintiff did not include dates, she lacked adequate notice as to the specific facts that formed the basis for the plaintiff’s application and was unduly surprised at the hearing by the plaintiff’s version of the events; the defendant did not raise any issue with respect to a lack of specificity in the plaintiff’s application prior to the date of the full hearing, during the presentation of evidence at the hearing, or after the court heard the evidence but prior to the time that it rendered its decision in this matter, and because the defendant did not assert that she was prejudiced by the lack of specificity in the plaintiff’s application until after the court announced its ruling, which was adverse to her, the trial court properly found the defendant’s expressed concern to be untimely.
Argued May 31—officially released August 29, 2017
Procedural History
Application for civil order of protection, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Kamp, J., granted the application; thereafter, following a hearing, the court, Hon. Edward F. Stodolink, judge trial referee, continued the order of protection, and
Robert Berke, for the appellant (defendant).
Opinion
KELLER, J. The defendant, Princess Dickson Dawson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a civil protection order filed by the plaintiff, Rose B.1 The defendant claims (1) that the court abused its discretion in granting the application because the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to warrant such relief2 and (2) the court improperly denied the defendant’s “request for a continuance and reconsideration.” We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts. On September 27, 2016, the plaintiff, pursuant to
The court, Hon. Edward F. Stodolink, judge trial referee, held a hearing on the application on October 6, 2016. At the hearing, the court considered the application brought by the plaintiff against the defendant as well as a separate application brought by the plaintiff against the defendant’s daughter.3 The plaintiff testified with respect to three separate incidents. The first was on May 10, 2016, at the Stratford Walmart store; the second was on June 25, 2016, at a public park in Bridgeport; the third was on September 26, 2016, at a courthouse in Bridgeport. The court also heard testimony from the defendant, the defendant’s daughter, and Sylveri Gonzalez, a victim’s advocate. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the plaintiff’s application, with the conditions sought by the plaintiff to remain in effect until October 6, 2017. The court denied the defendant’s oral motion, raised immediately after the court announced its
I
First, the defendant, interpreting the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, argues that the court abused its discretion in granting the application because the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to warrant such relief. We disagree.
In the appendix to her brief, the defendant has included a copy of what she describes as the “Trial Court’s Decision,” but it is not in the proper form. The “decision” consists of three pages of the trial transcript. These pages consist of a colloquy between the court, the defendant’s counsel, the defendant, and the plaintiff. The transcript is not signed by the trial court. A signed copy of a memorandum of the court’s decision does not appear in the court file.
Because the court’s judgment in the plaintiff’s favor was a final judgment in this matter, the court was obligated under
“When the record does not contain either a memorandum of decision or a transcribed copy of an oral decision signed by the trial court stating the reasons for its decision, this court frequently has declined to review the claims on appeal because the appellant has failed to provide the court with an adequate record for review. . . . Moreover, [t]he requirements of
As stated previously in our discussion, the defendant has drawn our attention to the pages of the trial court transcript in which the court stated that it granted the relief sought in the plaintiff’s application. The unsigned transcript, however, does not reveal a sufficiently detailed and concise
A careful review of the defendant’s arguments reflects her belief that the court committed errors of law or fact in exercising its discretion to grant the application. Because the record does not reveal the factual or legal bases for the court’s decision, our careful review of the record does not afford us a basis on which to conclude that such errors were made. See Ellen S. v. Katlyn F., 175 Conn. App. 559, 565, 167 A.3d 1182 (2017), and cases cited therein. This court will neither speculate with regard to the rationale underlying the court’s decision nor, in the absence of a record that demonstrates that error exists, presume that the court acted erroneously. See, e.g., State v. Milner, 325 Conn. 1, 13, 155 A.3d 730 (2017); Stacy B. v. Robert S., 165 Conn. App. 374, 382, 140 A.3d 1004 (2016). Accordingly, we reject this claim.
II
Next, the defendant claims that the court “erred in denying [her] request for a continuance and reconsideration.” The defendant argues that the court’s ruling was improper because “[t]he application [filed by the plaintiff] did not include dates and therefore did not provide [the defendant] with adequate notice as to the specific facts which form the basis of the application.” She argues that, at the time of the hearing, she was unduly surprised by the plaintiff’s version of the events. We disagree with the defendant that the court’s ruling reflected an abuse of discretion.
With respect to the motion for reconsideration,4 the defendant refers us to the trial transcript, which reflects that, immediately after the court stated that it had granted the plaintiff’s application, the defendant’s counsel stated: “In regard to [the defendant], you know, what sometimes is complicated about these is that sometimes the applications are not entirely complete and don’t have all the dates. Now that we are on notice of the dates, would the court . . . consider a motion to reconsider so [that] we can have the opportunity to supply for lack of a better word an alibi regarding the dates that were alleged?” The court replied: “No, because the hearing was set by Judge Kamp some time ago and it was going to go forward today.” The defendant’s counsel replied: “The only problem is we don’t know based on the complaint what the dates were in regards to the complaints.” The court stated: “I’ll deny your request.”
As the defendant correctly observes, the court’s denial of the oral motion for reconsideration is entitled to deference by this court. “The granting of a motion for reconsideration . . . is within the sound discretion of the court. The standard of review regarding challenges to a court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration is abuse of discretion. As with any discretionary action of the trial court . . . the ultimate [question for appellate review] is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shore v. Haverson Architecture & Design, P.C., 92 Conn. App. 469, 479, 886 A.2d 837 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 907, 894 A.2d 988 (2006).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.