Dissenting Opinion
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:
Our Court defies AEDPA once again, this time by failing to distinguish one “life without parole” sentence from multiple “term-of-years” sentences. A panel of this Court holds that Graham v. Florida,
I respectfully dissent from our decision not to rehear this case en banc.
I
Roosevelt Moore appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Moore committed a series of forcible rapes and other offenses at the age of sixteen and was tried as an adult. In 1991, a jury convicted him of twenty-four crimes, including nine counts of forcible rape, seven counts of forcible oral copulation, and two counts of robbery, and also found that he used a firearm for most of the offenses. He was sentenced to fixed terms of imprisonment for each offense with enhancements for using a firearm, to run consecutively. Although none of the individual sentences exceeded eight years, Moore was sentenced to 254 years in prison, cumulatively. He cannot be considered for parole until he serves at least 127 years and two months.
Nearly two decades later, Moore filed state habeas petitions, pro se, arguing that his sentence is unconstitutional in light of Graham. The Los Angeles County Superior Court summarily denied his petition. The California Court of Appeal held that Graham does not apply to Moore’s sentence, and the California Supreme Court summarily denied review.
Our panel, however, granted habeas relief, holding that Graham applies retroactively to Moore’s sentence and that the California state courts’ decisions were contrary to Graham because Moore’s ease is materially indistinguishable from Graham’s. Moore,
II
Under AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas relief on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the state court’s decision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Early v. Packer,
A state court “must apply legal principles established by a Supreme Court decision when the case falls squarely within those principles, but not in eases where there is a structural difference between the prior precedent and the case at issue, or when the prior precedent requires tailoring or modification to apply to the new situation.” Moses v. Payne,
A
In Graham, the Supreme Court announced that the Constitution does not permit “a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonho-micide crime.”
To support its conclusion that the state court’s decision was contrary to Graham, the panel reasoned that “Moore’s sentence of 254 years is materially indistinguishable from a life sentence without parole because Moore will not be eligible for parole within his lifetime.” Moore,
And there the panel’s opinion stops, failing to confront the most meaningful distinction between Moore’s case and Graham: Moore’s term of imprisonment is composed of over two dozen separate sentences, none longer than eight years; Graham’s is one sentence, “life without parole.” Because the Supreme Court explicitly stated that Graham concerned “only those juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomi-cide offense,”
If that express limitation on Graham’s holding were not enough, Graham’s reasoning makes clear that the Supreme Court did not squarely address aggregate term-of-years sentences. Beginning with “objective indicia of national consensus,” the Court noted that there were “123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving life without parole sentences,” and “only 11 jurisdictions nationwide in fact impose life without parole sentences on juvenile non-homicide offenders — and most of those do so quite rarely.” Graham,
But, to reach that conclusion, the Court did not consider the prevalence of sentences like Moore’s — lengthy term-of-years sentences adding up to de facto life imprisonment. See id. at 113 n. 11,
If the Court has not squarely addressed the constitutionality of aggregate term-of-years sentences, the state court’s determination that Moore’s sentence is not unconstitutional cannot be contrary to clearly established federal law.
B
Unsurprisingly, in the absence of an express holding regarding such sentences, “courts across the country are split over whether Graham bars a court from sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to consecutive, fixed terms resulting in an aggregate sentence that exceeds the defendant’s life expectancy.” Id. Some have held that Graham prohibits aggregate term-of-years sentences that amount to the functional equivalent of life without parole. See, e.g., People v. Caballero,
To be sure, in many of the eases refusing to extend Graham, the sentence at issue left some possibility, however slight, that the prisoner might eventually be released. But nothing in their reasoning turned on such possibility. See, e.g., Brown,
The existence of such a split is good evidence that the California courts’ determination here — Graham does not apply to Moore’s sentence — is not contrary to
Were the panel required to confront the constitutionality of Moore’s sentence on direct review, or on collateral review of a federal sentence, picking one side of the dispute would have been necessary. But AEDPA precludes federal courts from settling such disputes on collateral review of a state sentence, at least without a persuasive explanation of how so many courts erred so obviously. The panel’s opinion neither acknowledges the dispute nor explains how the panel divined a clearly established holding of the Supreme Court in the face of such widespread disagreement. Instead, it concedes a tangentially related split over how Graham applies “to lengthy term-of-years sentences that provide some possibility of parole.” Moore,
C
An equally telling omission: the panel offers no justification for creating a circuit split, acting instead as though it has not done so. The only argument the opinion provides for ignoring the Sixth Circuit’s well-reasoned and thorough opinion is that the facts are different. Id. But any factual distinction — Bunch will be at least 95 years old when he is eligible for parole, Bunch,
Moreover, nothing in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion turns on the possibility that Bunch might outlive his sentence. Our sister circuit acknowledged that Bunch’s sentence “may end up being the functional equivalent of life without parole.” Bunch,
The panel cannot evade the force of Bunch’s reasoning by noting an insignificant factual distinction, which our sister circuit assumed away. Yet the panel’s opinion sets forth no other argument.
Ill
Respect for the California courts, for our sister circuit, and for courts across the
But the states encompassed by our Circuit cannot ignore the opinion’s holding, which requires them to ask:
At what number of years would the Eighth Amendment become implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, some lesser or greater number? Would gain time be taken into account? Could the number vary from offender to offender based on race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria? Does the number of crimes matter?
Henry,
Without authority to do so, the panel’s opinion would force all the states in our Circuit to confront those questions; the opinion forbids them from “applying] Graham as it is written,” yet gives them no other “tools to work with,” Henry,
IV
As the Supreme Court has reminded us yet again, “AEDPA recognizes a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.” Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. -,
Because the panel’s opinion defies AED-PA, creates a circuit split, and threatens frequent and unjustified intrusions into state sovereignty, I respectfully dissent from our Court’s regrettable failure to rehear this case en banc.
Notes
. Compare Moore v. Biter,
. The Court’s analysis of objective indicia does not dictate its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, of course. See Graham,
. None of those courts were required, as the panel was, to give deference under AEDPA to the contrary decision of a state court. Thus, none of them held, as the panel's opinion does, that the unconstitutionality of such sentences was "clearly established” by Graham. Moreover, even courts that have applied Graham to aggregate term-of-years sentences have recognized they are extending the case beyond its "clearly established” holding. See Rainer, - P.3d at -,
. See State v. Bunch, No. 06 MA 106,
Lead Opinion
ORDER
The panel has voted to deny the petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc.
The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc. A judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed. R.App. P. 35.
The petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc are DENIED. No further petitions will be entertained.
Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc is filed concurrently with this Order.