Roosevelt Moore v. M. Biter
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2682
9th Cir.2014Background
- At 16, Roosevelt Moore committed multiple forcible rapes, oral copulations, robberies, and related offenses; tried as an adult and convicted in 1991.
- Moore received consecutive fixed-term sentences for each count (none over eight years) that aggregate to 254 years; parole eligibility not until ~127 years served.
- Moore filed state habeas petitions arguing Graham v. Florida renders his aggregate sentence unconstitutional; state courts denied relief and California Supreme Court denied review.
- A Ninth Circuit panel granted federal habeas relief, holding Graham applies retroactively and Moore’s aggregate term-of-years is materially indistinguishable from a life-without-parole sentence.
- Judge O’Scannlain (joined by six other judges) dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing the panel improperly extended Graham and failed to respect AEDPA deference and split authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Graham v. Florida prohibits consecutive fixed-term sentences that aggregate to a de facto life term for juvenile nonhomicide offenders | Moore: Graham forbids juvenile nonhomicide sentences that amount to life without parole; aggregate term-of-years is materially indistinguishable | State/majority below: Graham’s holding is limited to formal life-without-parole sentences; it did not clearly address aggregate fixed-term consecutive sentences | Panel below: Graham applies; en banc denial dissent: Graham did not clearly establish that rule; state courts not contrary under AEDPA |
| Whether the state court decision was "contrary to" or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law under AEDPA | Moore: State courts unreasonably applied Graham by treating aggregate de facto LWOP differently | State: Supreme Court has not squarely addressed aggregate consecutive terms; AEDPA requires deference where law not clearly established | Dissent: AEDPA prohibits reversing state-court decision absent clear Supreme Court precedent; panel failed to justify disregarding split authority |
| Whether Graham’s national-consensus and reasoning extend to long term-of-years sentences | Moore: Practical effect matters; if parole eligibility exceeds life expectancy, it’s equivalent to LWOP | State/dissent: Graham’s objective indicia counted formal LWOP sentences; Court did not analyze aggregate consecutive terms so extension is not clearly established | Dissent: Graham did not consider aggregate sentences; cannot be read to clearly establish their unconstitutionality |
| Whether the panel’s ruling creates an improper circuit split and intrudes on state sentencing authority | Moore: (implicit) uniform Eighth Amendment protection for juveniles requires applying Graham to de facto LWOP | Dissent/state: Many courts disagree; panel created a split and raised administrability and sovereignty concerns without justification | Dissent: En banc rehearing should have resolved split; panel erred to decide under AEDPA without addressing conflicting authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment bars life-without-parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
- Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (definition of "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent under § 2254)
- Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (panel granted habeas relief applying Graham to aggregate term-of-years)
- Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012) (refused to extend Graham to consecutive fixed-term juvenile sentences)
- Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (scope of "clearly established" Supreme Court law under AEDPA)
- Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (caution against defining "clearly established" law too broadly)