700 F. App'x 661
9th Cir.
2017

Ronnie EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONDORA, Dr.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15498

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed August 17, 2017

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

661 Fed. Appx. 661

amend her complaint. “Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the district court could reasonably conclude that further amendment would be futile.” (citing ). The district court in this case reasonably concluded that further amendment would be futile based on Hammer‘s waiver of her claims, and we therefore affirm.

6. We reverse the district court‘s costs entered against Hammer and Donoval. A district court‘s awarding of costs does not constitute an abuse of discretion unless it is “based on an inaccurate view of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” See . Because we are reversing and remanding some of Hammer‘s claims, we vacate the entry of costs against Hammer and Donoval.

To conclude, we affirm the district court‘s grant of the 12(c) motion; the denial of Hammer‘s motion to convert; and the denial of Hammer‘s motion to amend. We reverse the district court‘s judgment of Hammer‘s unconstitutional bias claim; liberty interest, stigma plus claim; the claims against Ribi and Briscoe in their individual capacities; Donoval‘s claim; and the entry of costs.

Hammer sought to augment the record in regards to her liberty interest, stigma plus claim. Because we are reversing and remanding this claim, Hammer‘s Motion to Augment the Record (Docket Entry 49) is DENIED. Additionally, the Appellees’ Motion to Strike footnote 3 of Hammer‘s amended reply brief (Docket Entry 55) is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I think the district court correctly dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims, and I would therefore affirm the judgment in its entirety.

Ronnie Edwards, Pro Se

LeAnn Sanders, Trial Attorney, Shirley Blazich, Michael McLoughlin, Alverson, Taylor, Mortensen & Sanders, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees Mondora, Dr., Katrina

Tye S. Hanseen, Attorney, Marquis Aurbach Coffing, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees Hightower, Mitchell, Reyes, Scott

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Ronnie Edwards appeals pro se from the district court‘s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims arising out of his pretrial detention at Clark County Detention Center. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. . We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Edwards’ deliberate indifference to safety claims because, under any potentially applicable standard, Edwards failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants knew of or disregarded an excessive risk to Edwards’ safety relating to a puddle of water on the floor. See (slippery shower floors do not give rise to an arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment); see also (en banc) (setting forth elements of Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim by pretrial detainee).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Edwards’ constitutionally inadequate medical care claims because, under any potentially applicable standard, Edwards failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any of the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Edwards’ health. See (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment, negligence, or medical malpractice does not amount to deliberate indifference); (pretrial detainee‘s claim of medical deliberate indifference is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than under the Eighth Amendment, but same standards apply); see also cf. (elements of pretrial detainee failure-to-protect claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Edwards’ various motions to amend his complaint because amendment would be futile. See (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint if amendment would be futile); see also (“A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Edwards’ motion to file a surreply because Edwards did not identify in his motion the new arguments he alleges defendants raised or why such arguments would justify granting leave to file a surreply. See (court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court‘s decisions concerning its management of litigation).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Edwards’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) motion for a stay and additional discovery because Edwards failed to demonstrate that the discovery requested would have precluded summary judgment. See (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a plaintiff must show that the discovery sought would have precluded summary judgment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Edwards’ discovery related motions because Edwards failed to demonstrate that he suffered any actual and substantial prejudice. See (“A district court is vested with broad discretion to permit or deny discovery, and a decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edwards’ request to amend the scheduling order because Edwards did not demonstrate good cause as required by the Local Rules regarding such requests. See D. Nev. Local R. 26-4 (setting forth requirements to request modification of scheduling order); (abuse of discretion standard for determination of compliance with local rules).

We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court‘s denial of Edwards’ motion for reconsideration of the district court‘s grant of summary judgment because Edwards failed to amend his notice of appeal or file a new notice of appeal after the motion for reconsideration was denied. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from).

Because Edwards failed to raise his vision impairment in his oppositions to summary judgment, Edwards waived his right to raise this issue on appeal. See (failure to raise issue during summary judgment waives right to do so on appeal).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See .

AFFIRMED.

Notes

*
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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